Sapientia clamitans wisdome crying out to sinners to returne from their evill wayes: contained in three pious and learned treatises, viz. I. Of Christs fervent love to bloudy Ierusalem. II. Of Gods just hardning of Pharaoh, when hee had filled up the measure of his iniquity. III. Of mans timely remembring of his creator. Heretofore communicated to some friends in written copies: but now published for the generall good, by William Milbourne priest.
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Title
Sapientia clamitans wisdome crying out to sinners to returne from their evill wayes: contained in three pious and learned treatises, viz. I. Of Christs fervent love to bloudy Ierusalem. II. Of Gods just hardning of Pharaoh, when hee had filled up the measure of his iniquity. III. Of mans timely remembring of his creator. Heretofore communicated to some friends in written copies: but now published for the generall good, by William Milbourne priest.
Author
Jackson, Thomas, 1579-1640.
Publication
London :: Printed by I. Haviland, for R. Milbourne at the Unicorne neere Fleet-bridge,
1638.
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Subject terms
Sermons, English -- 17th century.
Cite this Item
"Sapientia clamitans wisdome crying out to sinners to returne from their evill wayes: contained in three pious and learned treatises, viz. I. Of Christs fervent love to bloudy Ierusalem. II. Of Gods just hardning of Pharaoh, when hee had filled up the measure of his iniquity. III. Of mans timely remembring of his creator. Heretofore communicated to some friends in written copies: but now published for the generall good, by William Milbourne priest." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/a07536.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 9, 2024.
Pages
The third generall point proposed,
concerning the Logicall deter∣mination
of this proposition
[whom hee will, hee hard∣neth]:
or concerning the im∣mediate
or proper object of the
induration here spoken of.
PHaraoh, we grant, was har∣dened
by Gods absolute,
irresistible will. Could Beza,
can Piscator, or any other Ex∣positor
living enforce any
descriptionPage 157
more, out of the literall mea∣ning
of those texts? whether
granting thus much, wee must
grant withall (what their fol∣lowers,
to my apprehension,
demand) that Pharaoh was an
absolute Reprobate from the
wombe; or, that hee was by
Gods irresistible will ordained
to this hardening, which by
Gods irresistible will did take
possession of his heart, is the
question to be disputed. They
(unlesse I mistake their mea∣ning)
affirme: I must even to
death, deny. I desire then that
in this case I may enjoy the
ancient pivilege of Priests, to
be tried by my Peeres, which
(God wot) need not be great
descriptionPage 158
ones. I will except against no
man, of what profession, place
or condition soever, either for
being my Judge, or of my Jury,
so his braines be qualified with
the speculative rules of syllogi∣zing,
and his heart seasoned
with the doctrine of the ninth
Commandemen••, which is, Not
to ••eare false witnesse against his
Neighbour, against his know∣ledge.
To avoid the Sophisticall
chinkes of scattered proposi••i∣ons,
wherein Truth often lyes
hid in rhetoricall or popular dis∣course,
wee will joyne issue in
this syllogisme.
Whatsoever God from eternity
decrees by his irresistible will, is
descriptionPage 159
absolutely necessarie, and inevi∣table,
or impossible to be avoided.
God from eternitie decreed to
harden Pharaoh by his irresistible
will.
Ergò, The hardning of Phara∣oh
was absolutely necessarie, and
impossible to be avoided.
And if his hardning were in∣evitable,
or impossible to bee
avoided, it will bee taken as
granted that he was a reprobate
from the wombe; Damnatus
antequàm natus, the absolute
childe of eternall death, before
he was made partaker of mor∣tall
life.
The Major proposition is a
Maxime not questioned by any
Christian, Jew, or M••home∣tane.
descriptionPage 160
And out of it wee may
draw another Major as unque∣stionable,
but more immediate
in respect of the conclusion
proposed; [Whomsoever God
decrees to harden by his irresistible
will, his hardning is absolutely in∣evitable,
altogether impossible to
be avoided. The Minor, [Pha∣raoh
was hardned by Gods irresi∣stible
will] is granted by us, and
(as wee are perswaded) avou∣ched
in termes equivalent by
our Apostle. The difference is
about the conclusion or connexion
of the termes; which without
better limitation than is ex∣pressed
in the proposition or
corollarie annexed, is loose and
Sophisticall.
descriptionPage 161
Would some braine which
God hath blest with naturall
perspicacitie, art and opportu∣nitie,
vouchsafe to take but a
little paines in moulding such
〈◊〉〈◊〉 cases for the Praedicates, as
Aristo••le hath done for the Sub∣jects
of Propositions, (though
those wee often use not, or use
amisse) those seeming Syllo∣gismes
whose secret flawes clear
sighted judgements can hardly
discerne, by light of arts would
crack so fonly in framing, that
bleare eyes would espie their
ruptures without spectacles.
It shall suffice mee at this time
to shew how grosly the Syllo∣gisme
propo••ed failes in the
fundamentall rule of all affir∣mative
descriptionPage 162
Syllogismes. The Rule
is, Quaecunque conveniunt cum a∣liquo
tertio, inter se conveniunt.
All other rules concerning the
quantitie of propositions, or
their disposition in certaine
Mood and Figure, serve onely to
this end, that the convenience
or identitie of the Major and
Minor with the Medium may
be made apparent. This being
made apparent by Rules of art,
the light of Nature assures us
that the connexion betweene
the Extremes is true and indis∣soluble.
Now this Identitie or Vnitie
(for that is the highest and su∣rest
degree of convenience) is of
three sorts, of Essence, of Qualitie,
descriptionPage 163
of Quantitie or proportion, under
which is comprehended the
Identitie of Time. Whatsoever
is truly called one and the
same, is so called in one of these
respects. And all those Identi∣ties
may be either Specificall (or
Common;) or Numericall,
Mixt or Single. Most Fallacies
arise from substitution of one
Identitie for another. As hee
that would admit that propo∣sition
for true of Specificall Iden∣titie,
which is most true of Nu∣mericall,
might bee cheated by
this Syllogisme;
I cannot owe you the same
summe which I have paid you.
But I have paid you ten pounds
in Gold.
descriptionPage 164
Ergo, I doe not owe you ten
pounds in Gold.
The Negative included in
the Major is true of the same
Individuall or Numericall sum;
but not of the same Specificall.
For suppose twenty pounds in
gold were due; the one moytie
might be paid, and the other
yet owing. But men of com∣mon
understanding are not so
apt to be deceived in matters of
money or commoditie with
captious collections of this
kinde, as unable to give them
a punctuall solution. Every
Creditor in his owne case
would be ready to give this or
the like sufficient practicall an∣swer:
I doe not demand my ten
descriptionPage 165
pounds which are already paid; but
the other ten pounds which are yet
behind: that is (as a Logician
would say) The same sum specie,
which hath beene paid, may yet be
owing; not the same numero: Or,
the same sum by equivalence; not
the same individuall coynes.
But the Intrusion or admissi∣on
of one Numericall Identitie
for another of different kinde,
is not so easily discerned in mat∣ters
not dist••nguishable by
common sense; especially if
the Relative or Antecedent be in
ordinary discourse promiseu∣ously
matched with both, and
that conjunctim or divisim. The
Numericall Identitie inclused
betwixt the Relatives, [Whatso∣ever
descriptionPage 166
and whomsoever, quis, quic∣quid,
quaecunque] and their An∣tecedents
whether expressed or
understood, is sometimes an
Identitie of Essence or Nature
onely, sometimes of Qualitie
onely, sometimes of Quantitie
or proportion onely: sometimes
of Essence and Qualitie, but
not of Quantitie; sometimes of
Essence and Quantitie, but not
of Qualitie; sometimes of Qua∣litie
and Quantitie, but not of
Essence.These Rules are uni∣versally
true, [Wheresoever
the Minor proposition is
charged with an Identitie of
Qualitie, Quantitie, Time or
Essence, wherewith the Major
is not charged: or è contra
descriptionPage 167
wheresoever the Major is char∣ged
with any one or moe of
these Identities, from which
the Minor is free: the Syllo∣gism:,
if it be affirmative,
must needs bee false, and
tainted with the fallacie of
Composition. Of the former
rule, that vulgar example, be∣cause
best knowne, is most
••it.
Quas heri emisti carnes, easdem
hodie comedisti.At heri emisti carnes crudas.Ergo; Hodiè carnes crudas
comedisti.
The Identitie included be∣tweene
the Relative and the
Antecedent in the Major pro∣position,
is an Identitie of Es∣sence
descriptionPage 168
or Substance onely. The
Minor includes another Identi∣tie,
of Qualitie, which cannot
be admitted in the Conclusion;
because not charged in the Ma∣jor.
Had the Assumption beene
thus; At heri ••misti carnes ovil∣las,
the conclusion would
rightly have followed; Ergo,
Carnes ovillas hodie comedisti;
For this is a part of Essentiall
unity. The fallacie is the same
backwards and forwards;
Quas bodie comedisti carnes,
easdem beri emisti.At hodie tostas comedisti.Ergo, Heri tostas emisti.
Examples of fallacies against
the latter rule are more frequent
in most mens writings, than
descriptionPage 169
vulgarly knowne. This for
one;
The same sound which once
pleaseth a judicious Musicians
constant eare, will please it still.
But this present voice or sound,
which is now taken up (suppose a
young Quirister were singing)
doth please his Masters eare.
Ergò, It will please it still to
the very fall.
The Major supposeth an ex∣act
Identitie not of Essence or
Qualitie onelv, but of Propor∣tion:
otherwise it is false. For
the articulate sound may bee
Numerically the same, as being
uttered with one and the same
continued breath. The voice
likewise may be for its qualitie,
descriptionPage 170
sweet and pleasant: but so
weake and unartificiall, that it
may relish of flatnesse in the
fall; and so lose the proportion
and consonancie which in the
beginning or middle it had
with a judicious Musicians eare,
or internall Harmonie.
The forme of this following
fallacie is the same;
Whatsoever the eternall and
immutable rule of goodnesse once
approves as just and good, it al∣wayes
so approves. For in that it
is immutable, it is still the
same; and if the object remaine
the same, the approbation must
needs be the same.
But the eternall and immutable
rule of justice once approved the
descriptionPage 171
humane nature, or the corporall
reasonable creature, as just and
good.
••rgo, It alwayes approves at
least the humane nature, or reaso∣nable
creature, as just and good.
The conclusion is evidently
false, albeit wee restraine it to
the same individuall humane
nature, or reasonable creature
which immutable goodnesse
did actually approve. What is
the reason? or where is the fault?
in the connexion. The Major
includes an exact Identitie not
of Essence or Substance onely:
but of Qualitie, or rather of Con∣sonancie
to the immutable rule
of goodnesse. And whiles this
Identitie of Qualitie or Conso∣nancie
descriptionPage 172
lasts, the rule of good∣nesse
cannot but approve the
nature thus consonant: otherwise
it should bee mutable in its
judgement, or approbation.
The minor proposition suppo∣seth
the same identitie of quali∣tie
or consonancie; but not the
continuance of it. And therefore
the conclusion is only true of that
time, wherein the identitie of
consonancy remained entire. That
is, in few words; Though the
humane nature continue still
the same; or though Adam were
still the same man, yet hee was
not still one and the same in re∣spect
of divine approbation.
For that supposeth an identitie
of qualitie, of justice and good∣nesse.
descriptionPage 173
As these alter; so it al∣ters.
The Syllogisme last mentio∣ned
would bee unanswerable,
were their doctrine not fallaci∣ous
or rather altogether false,
which would perswade that
every entitie, nature, or creature,
quaialis, as such, is good and
approveable by the Creator.
Was it then the humane nature?
No, but the humane nature so
qualified as he created it, which
he approved. And whatsoever
other nature is so qualified as
Adams was, when he approved
it, hath still the same approba∣tion
from the immutable rule
of goodnesse, which he had: Be∣cause
the consonancie to the di∣vine
descriptionPage 174
will may bee the selfe same
in natures numerically distinct.
The Syllogisme in which wee
stated the seeming endlesse con∣troversie
last, hath all the faults
which these two last fallacies
had, and a great many more.
The Syllogisme was this;
Whatsoever God from eternitie
hath decreed by his irresistible
will, is inevit••ble. Or thus;
Whomsoever God from eter∣nity
reproves or decrees to har∣den
by his irresistible will, that
mans reprobation or indurati∣on
is inevitable.
But God from eternity re∣proved
Pharaoh, and decreed
to harden him by his irresisti∣ble
will.
descriptionPage 175
Ergo, Pharaohs reprobation
or induration was inevitable.
The Major supposeth an Iden∣titie
not of person onely, but of
qualitie: yea of degrees of qua∣litie.
For as the immediate ob∣ject
of divine approbation is
justice, consonancie or confor∣mitie
to the immutable rule of
goodnesse: so the immediate ob∣ject
of reprobation or indura∣tion,
is not the abstract entitie
or nature of man; but the nature
mis-qualified, that is, unjust
or dissonant from the rule of
goodnesse. And according to the
degrees of injustice or disso∣nancie,
are the degrees of divine
dislike, of divine reprobation or
induration. The minor
proposi∣tion
descriptionPage 176
includes not onely an iden∣titie
of Pharaohs person, but
such a measure of injustice or
dissonancie, as makes him lia∣ble
to the eternall decree of re∣probation
or induration by
Gods irresistible will. But it
supposeth not this identitie of
such bad qualities; or this full
measure of iniquitie to have
be••••e alwayes in him. Without
alteration of his person or na∣ture,
he was subject to great va∣riety
of qualification: and each
qualification capable of divers
degrees and different dispro∣portion
with the eternall and un∣changeable
rule of goodnesse. And
therefore the minor proposition,
albeit eternally true, yet is eter∣nally
descriptionPage 177
true onely with reference
to those points of time, wherein
Pharaoh was so qualified. No
universalitie can infer any more
particulars than are contained
under it: and all those it neces∣sarily
infers. An universalitie
of time cannot inferre an uni∣versalitie
of the subject: nor an
universalitie of the subject in∣ferre
an universalitie of time.
This collection is false, God
from eternitie foresaw that all men
would be sinners. Ergo, Hee fore∣saw
from eternitie, that Adam in
his integritie should bee a sinner.
The inference in the former Syl∣logisme
is as bad; God decreed to
••ard••n Pharaoh from eternitie.
Ergo, Hee decreed to harden him
descriptionPage 178
in every moment of his life. Or,
Ergo, He was a reprobate from his
cradle. This conclusion rightly
scanned, includes an universa∣litie
of the subject, that is, all
the severall objects of divine
justice, which are contained in
Pharaohs life; not one particu∣lar
onely. Whereas Pharaoh in
the minor proposition, is but
one particular or individuall
object of induration, or of the
divine decree concerning it.
And thus at length we are ar∣rived
at that point, whence wee
may descrie the occasions by
which so many Writers of
good note have missed the
right streame or current of our
Apostles discourse, and gravel∣led
descriptionPage 179
themselves and their Audi∣tors
upon by-shelves. All this
hath beene for want of conside∣ration,
That albeit Pharaoh from
his birth unto his death, were but
one and the same individuall man;
yet was hee not all this while one
and the same individuall object of
Gods decree concerning mercie and
induration. The difference be∣twixt
these wee may illustrate
by many parallell resemblan∣ces.
Suppose that Scepter (whose
pedegree Homer so accurately
describes) had in that long suc∣cession,
lost any of his length;
this had broken no square nor
bred any quarrell, whether it had
beene the same Scepter or not. Yet
if the first and last owners
descriptionPage 180
should have sold or bought
scarlet by this one and the same
Scepter; they should have found
a great alteration in the measure.
So then it is one thing to bee
one and the self-same standard;
and another thing, to bee one
and the self-same staffe or scep∣ter.
The least alteration in
length or quantitie that can be,
doth alter the identitie of any
measure: but not the identitie of
the materiall substance of that
which is the measure. The same
graines of barly which grow
this yeare, may bee kept till se∣ven
yeares hence. But hee that
should lend gold according to
their weight this yeare, and re∣ceive
it according to their
descriptionPage 181
weight at the seven yeares end,
should finde great difference in
the summes: though the grains
bee for number and substance
the same, yet their weight are
divers. Or, suppose it to bee
true which is related of the
Great Magore, that hee weighs
himselfe every yeare in gold,
and distributes the summe
thereof to the poore; and that
he had continued this custome
from the seventh yeare of his
age: yet cannot there bee halfe
the difference betwixt the
weight of one and the same
Prince in his child-hood and in
his full age, after many heartie
prayers to make him fat, as is
betweene the different mea∣sures
descriptionPage 182
of Pharaohs induration
within the compasse of one
yeare.
Therefore, this argument,
[Pharaoh was hardned after the
seventh plague by Gods irresistible
will: Ergo, Hee was an irrecove∣rable
reprobate from his child∣hood]
is to a man of understan∣ding
more grosse, than if wee
should argue thus; [The Great
Magore distributed to the poore
five thousand pounds in gold in
this fortieth yeare:••rgo, Hee
distributed so much every yeare,
since hee began this custome of
weighing himselfe in gold.] For
as he distributes unto the poore,
not according to the identitie of
his person, but according to the
descriptionPage 183
identitie or diversitie of his
weight: so doth the immuta∣ble
rule of justice render unto
every man, not according to
the unitie of his person, but ac∣cording
to the diversity of his
worke. Unto the severall mea∣sures
of one and the same mans
iniquities, severall measures of
induration, whether positive or
privative, are allotted from eter∣nity.
But finall induration by
Gods irresistible will, or irre∣coverable
reprobation, is the
just recompence of the full
measure of iniquity; or (as the
Prophet speakes) To harden
thus, is to ••eale up iniquitie to de∣struction,
without hope or pos∣sibility
of pardon.
descriptionPage 184
These two propositions are
of like eternall truth; [God
from eterniti•• decreed by his irre∣sistible
will to harden Pharaoh ha∣ving
made up the full measure of
his iniquitie:] and, [God from
eternitie did not decree by his ir∣resistible
will, that Pharaoh should
make up such a measure of iniqui∣tie.]
For hee doth not decree
iniquity at all, much lesse full
measures of iniquity. And yet,
unlesse he so decree, not iniqui∣ty
only, but the full measure of
it; Pharaohs induration or re∣probation
was not absolutely
necessary, in respect of Gods
eternall decree. For it was no
more necessary, than was the
full measure of iniquity unto
descriptionPage 185
which it was due. And that (as
hath beene said) was not neces∣sary,
because not decreed by
Gods irresistible will; without
which, necessity it selfe hath no
title of being.
From these deductions I may
clear a debt for which I ingaged
my selfe, in my last publike me∣ditations.
My promise was
then, to make it evident that
these two propositions [God
from eternity decreed to harden
Pharaoh by his irresistible will;]
[God from eternitie did not decree
to harden Pharaoh by his irresisti∣ble
will,] might easily be made
good friends, if their Abbe••••ors
would cease to urge them be∣yond
their naturall dispositi∣ons.
descriptionPage 186
From their natures, they
are indefinites not singulars.
Both, in a good sense, may bee
made to tell the truth. But a
wrangler may work them both
to beare evidence for error.
[God from eternitie did not decree
to harden Pharaoh by his irresisti∣ble
will,] is true of Pharaoh in
his infancie or youth: but false
of Pharaoh after his wilfull con∣tempt
of Gods summons by
signes and wonders.
Beza's collection upon this
place, is grounded upon the in∣definite
truth of this affirmative,
[God from eternity decreed to har∣den
Pharaoh.] But hee extends
this indefinite truth beyond its
compasse. For hee makes it an
descriptionPage 187
universall, in that hee termi∣nates
the irresistible decree to
every moment of Pharaohs life,
without distinction of qualifi∣cation.
And it may be, hee was
of opinion, that as well each
severall qualification, as each
different measure of Pharaohs
hardening or impenitency, did
come to passe by Gods irresisti∣ble
will. His error, into which
the greatest Clerk living (espe∣cially
if hee be not an accurate
Philosopher) might easily slide,
was in confounding eternitie
with successive duration; and
not distinguishing succession it
selfe, from things durable or
successive. Hee and many o∣thers
in this argument speake••
descriptionPage 188
as if they conceived that the
necessarie coexistence of eterni∣tie
with time did necessarily
draw every mans whole course
of life, motu quodam raptus, after
such a manner as Astronomers
suppose that the highest Spheare
doth move the lower, whereas,
if wee speake of the course, not
of Pharaoh's naturall, but mo∣rall
life; it was rather an incon∣dite
heape or confused multi∣tude
of durables, than one en∣tire
uniforme duration. And
each durable hath its distinct
reference to the eternall decree.
That which was eternally true
of one, was not of all; much
lesse eternally true of another.
Eternitie it selfe, though im∣mutable,
descriptionPage 189
though necessarily,
though indivisibly co-existent
to all, was not so indissolubly
linked with any, but that Pha∣raoh
might have altered or stay∣ed
his course of life before that
moment, wherein the measure
of iniquitie was accomplished.
But in that moment hee became
so exorbitant, that the irresisti∣ble
decree of induration did
fasten upon him. His irregular
motions have ever since be∣come
irrevocable; not his acti∣ons
onely, but his person, are
carried headlong by the ever∣lasting
revolution of the un∣changeable
decree, everlasting
unavoydable destruction.
The proposition or conclu∣sion
descriptionPage 190
proposed, [Pharaoh was
hardened by Gods irresistible
will,] is true from all eternitie,
throughout all eternitie; and
therefore true from Pharaohs
birth unto his death: but not
therefore true of Pharaoh how∣soever
qualified, or of all Phara∣oh's
qualifications throughout
the whole course of his life.
For so the proposition becomes
an universall, not onely in re∣spect
of the time, but of the sub∣ject;
that is, of all Pharaohs seve∣rall
qualifications. The sense is,
as if hee had said, [God from e∣ternitie
decreed to harden Phara∣oh,
howsoever qualified, as well in
his infancie as in his full age, by
his irresistible will: and thus ta∣ken
descriptionPage 191
it is false. The inference is
the same with the fore-mentio∣ned,
[Adam in Gods foreknow∣ledge
was a sinne•• from eternitie;
Ergo, Adam was alwayes a sin∣ner;
a sinner before hee sinned, du∣ring
the time of his innocencie:] or
with this, God from all eternitie
did decree by his irresistible will,
that Adam should die the death;
Ergo, Hee did decree by his irre∣sistible
will, that Adam should die
as soone as hee was created, or be a
sinner all his life long.
To reconcile these two pro∣positions
aright, [God from e∣ternitie
decreed by his irresistible
will that Adam should die,] [God
from eternitie did not decree by his
irresistible will, that Adam should
descriptionPage 192
die,] otherwise than wee have
reconciled the two former,
[God from eternitie decreed to
harden Pharaoh by his irresisti∣ble
will;] [God from eternitie
did not decree to harden Pharaoh
by his irresistible will,] no Wri∣ter,
I presume, will undertake.
The onely reconciliation pos∣sible,
is this, [God did decree by
his irresistible will, that Adam
〈◊〉〈◊〉 s••o••ld die:] [God did not
decree by his irresistible will, that
〈◊〉〈◊〉 not sinning, should die] nor
did hee decree by his irresisti∣ble
will, that Ad••m should sin,
that hee might die. For (as wee
said before) God did neither
decree his fall, nor his perseve∣rance
by his irresistible will.
descriptionPage 193
And his death was no more in∣evitable
than his fall. Nor was
Pharaohs small induration
more inevitable, than the mea∣sure
of iniquitie to which such
induration was from eternitie
awarded by Gods irresistible
will. Of Pharaoh thus conside∣red,
the conclusion was true
from eternitie; true in respect
of every moment of Pharaohs
life, wherein the measure of his
iniquitie was, or might have
beene accomplished; though it
had beene accomplished within
three yeares after his birth. And
this accomplishment presup∣posed,
the induration was most
inevitable, his finall reprobati∣on
as irrecoverable, as Gods
descriptionPage 194
absolute will (taking absolute as
it is opposed to disjunct) is irre∣sistible:
The same proposition in re∣spect
of reprobation is univer∣sally
true Vniversalitate subje∣cti,
that is, of every other per∣son
so ill qualified as Pharaoh
was, when God did harden
him. Whosoever shall, at any
time, become such a man as
Pharaoh was then, is a repro∣bate
from eternitie by Gods ir∣resistible
will. And seeing no
man is exempted from his juris∣diction,
hee may harden whom
hee will, after the same manner
that hee hardened Pharaoh: al∣though
de facto hee doth not so
harden all the reprobates; that
descriptionPage 195
is, hee reserves them not alive
for examples to others, after the
ordinary time appointed for
their dissolution. Nor doth he
tender ordinary meanes of re∣pentance
to them, after the
doore of repentance is shut up∣on
them. God in his in••inite
wisdome hath many secret pur∣poses
incomprehensible to
man; as, Why, of such as are equall
offenders, one is more rigorously
dealt with all than another: Why,
of such as are equally disposed to
goodnesse morall, one is called
before another. That thus to
dispense of mercy and justice
in this life, doth argue no par∣tialitie
or respect of persons
with God, is an argument
descriptionPage 196
elsewhere to be insisted upon.
The point whereupon wee
are now to pitch, is this indefi∣nite,
[Men are not reprobated or
hardened by Gods irresistible
will, before they come to such a
pitch or hight of iniquity. No
man living shall ever bee able
to make this inference good:
Pharaoh was absolutely reproba∣ted
from eternitie, that is, His re∣probation
was immutable from e∣ternitie;
Ergo, Pharaoh in his
youth or infancie was a reprobate.
To infer the consequence pro∣posed,
no Medium more pro∣bable
than this can possibly be
brought; Pharaoh from his infan∣cy
to his full age, was alwayes one
and the selfe same man; Et de eo∣dem
descriptionPage 197
impossibile est idem affirmari
& negari. The consequence not∣withstanding
is no better than
this following: The Eclipse of
the Moone was necessarie from the
beginning; Ergo, The Moone was
necessarily eclipsed in the first
quarter, or in the prime; Because
the Moone being of an incorruptible
substance, hath continued one and
the same since the creation. But
unto this consequence every Ar∣tist
could make replie, that the
proper and immediate subject
of the Eclipse is not the Nature
or Substance of the Moone how∣soever
considered; but in cer∣taine
opposition to the Sunne.
So that albeit this proposition,
[The Moone shall be eclipsed] 〈◊〉〈◊〉
descriptionPage 198
true necessarily and from ever∣lasting:
yet it is necessarie, yet
it is true onely of the Moone in
such Diame••rall opposition to the
Sunne, that the Earth may cover
it with her shadow as with a
mantle. Whensoever it is in
such opposition, it is necessarily
Eclipsed. Whensoever it is not
in such opposition to the Sunne, it
cannot possibly by course of
nature be Eclipsed. It is in like
manner true which wee have
often said, that the proper and
immediate object of the eternall
decree, concerning induration
or reprobation, was not Phara∣ohs
individuall Entitie or essence:
but Pharaoh charged with a cer∣taine
measure of iniquitie, or
descriptionPage 199
separation from his God.
Granting then that Pharaohs
substance was one and the
same, as incorruptible as the
Moone: yet the degrees of his
declination from the unchange∣able
rule of justice, or of his op∣position
to the fountaine of
mercy and goodnesse, might be
more than are the degrees of the
Moones aberration or elongation
from the Sunne. Now the All∣seeing
providence did more ac∣curately
calcul••te each word,
each worke, each thought of
Pharaoh, and their opposition
to his goodnesse, than Astrono∣mers
can doe the motions of the
Moone or Planets. And will he
not make his payment accor∣ding
descriptionPage 200
to his calculation? So that
in one and the selfe same Phara∣oh
there might be more severall
objects of the eternall decree,
than are minutes or scruples in
forty yeares motion of the
Moone. Not the least varietie or
alteration in his course of life,
but had a proportionate conse∣quent
of reward or punishment
allotted to it from all eternitie,
by the irresistible decree. Unto
Pharaoh then having made up
the full measure of his iniquitie,
the irresistible induration and
unrecoverable reprobation was,
by the virtue of this eternall de∣cree,
altogether necessarie and
inevitable. But unto Pharaoh,
before this measure of iniquity
descriptionPage 201
was made up, neither indurati∣on
nor irrecoverable reprobati∣on
was so necessarie or inevita∣ble.
To thinke the unchange∣able
rule of justice should a∣ward
the same measure of indu∣ration
or reprobation unto
farre different measures of ini∣quitie,
is deeper than the dregges
of Heathenisme: it is a doctrine
which may not be vented where
any Christian care is present.
The former resemblance is
fully parallell to our resolution
in all other points, save onely
in this, that the eternall decree
did not so necessary direct or
impell Pharaoh to make up the
full measure of his iniquitie, as
it doth direct and guide the
descriptionPage 202
course of the Moone, till it come
in full and Diametrall opposition
to the Sunne. Therefore this Si∣militude
will not follow, The
Moone, though not at this time
Eclipsed; yet holds that course
by the unchangeable decree, which
in time will bring it to be in Dia∣metrall
opposition to the Sunne,
and by consequence to be Eclipsed:
So though Pharaoh in his infanci••
was not reprobated or hardened by
Gods irresistible will; yet was hee
by the eternall decree ordained to
such reprobation or induration,
without possibilitie of altering his
course, or avoiding that oppositi∣on
which his full age had unto
divine goodnesse.
As every true convert or re∣generate
descriptionPage 203
person may say with
Saint Augustine, Ego non sum ego;
I am become another man: so
might it be truly said, in a con∣trarie
sense, Pharaoh sometimes
was not Pharaoh. When he was a
childe, he spake as a childe, hee
thought as a childe. His mouth
was not opened against God:
his minde was not set on mur∣ther.
To have seene the Israeli∣tish
infants strangled and expo∣sed
to the mercilesse ••louds,
would more have affected his
heart, being young and tender,
than afterwards it did his
daughters. Nor was that cruel∣tie,
which in his full age hee
practised, so contained in his
infancie, as poison in the ser∣pents
descriptionPage 204
egge. It did not grow up
by kinde or necessitie of his na∣turall
temper; much lesse was
it infused by Gods irresistible
will: but acquired by custome.
The seeds of it were sowne by
his owne selfe will: ambitious
pride was the root: politick
jelousie was the bud: tyrannie
and oppression, the fruit. Nei∣ther
was it necessary by the eter∣nall
decree, that this corrupt
seed should be sowne: or being
sowne, that it should prosper
and bud; or that after the bud∣ding,
it should ripen in malig∣nity.
During all this progresse
from bad to worse, the imme∣diate
object of Gods immuta∣ble
and unresistible will was
descriptionPage 205
mutabilitie in Pharaoh. But this
progresse which was not neces∣sarie
by any eternall decree or
law, being de facto once accom∣plished;
his destruction was in∣evitable,
his induration unresi∣stible,
his reprobation irreco∣verable,
by the eternall and un∣controulable
decree.
That Pharaoh in his youth or
infancie was not such an object of
Gods irresistible will for indura∣tion,
as in his full age hee be∣came,
may be thus demonstra∣ted:
No man whose salvation as yet
is truly possible, is utterly exclu∣ded
by Gods irresistible will from
salvation.
But the salvation of Pharaoh
descriptionPage 206
in his youth or infancie was truly
possible.
Ergo, Pharaoh in his youth or
infancie, was not excluded by
Gods irresistible will from salva∣tion.
Therefore, He was not then the
object of Gods irresistible will for
induration.
The Major is evident from
the exposition of the termes.
For God is said to will that on∣ly
by his irresistible will, which
hath no possibility of the con∣trary.
The necessity of it like∣wise
may bee made evident by
the rules of conversion; No mans
salvation that stands excluded by
Gods irresistible will from salva∣tion,
is truly possible: Ergo, No
descriptionPage 207
man, whiles his salvation is possi∣ble,
is utterly excluded by Gods
irresistible will from salvation; or,
which is all one; No man whiles
his salvation is possible is either
hardned or reprobated by Gods ir∣resistible
will: or in Latine more
perspicuously thus, Nullus per
irresistibilem Dei voluntatem sa∣lute
exclusus, est servabilis: Er∣go,
Nullus servabilis (id est,
quamdiu servari potest) est à sa∣lute
exclusus per irresistibilem
Dei voluntatem. No argument
can be of such force or perspi∣cuitie
as is this primary rule of
argumentation:
Negativa universalis simplici∣ter
convertitur.
The Minor, [Pharaohs salva∣tion
descriptionPage 208
in his youth or infancie was
truly possible,] is as evident from
another Maxime in Divinitie;
Quicquid non implicat contradi∣ctionem,
est possibile; sive obje∣ctum
Divinae potentiae. Now
what contradiction could it
imply, to save this childe, sup∣posing
Pharaoh, more than it
did to save another; for exam∣ple,
Moses? Unlesse wee will
say, that Pharaoh was made of
another mould, or a creature of
another Creator, than Moses or
other children are. To save Pha∣raoh,
as a sonne of Adam, could
imply no contradiction: other∣wise,
no flesh could possibly be
saved. If to save Pharaoh after
he had committed many actu∣all
descriptionPage 209
sinnes and follies of youth,
did imply any contradiction,
what man of yeares, in this age
especially, can hope for par∣don?
It will be replied, that albeit
to save Pharaoh in his youth or
infancie did imply no contra∣diction
in the object; and there∣fore
his salvation was not abso∣lutely
it selfe impossible: yet it
being supposed, that God from
eternity decreed to harden him
and destroy him by his irresi∣••ible
will; it must needs im∣ply
a contradiction in Gods de∣cree
or will to save him; and
by consequent, his salvation
was impossible ex Hypothesi.
This answer is like a medi∣cine
descriptionPage 210
which drives the malady
from the outward parts where∣to
it is applied, unto the heart.
It removes the difficultie into a
more dangerous point. For wee
may with safetie inferre, That
God did not decree by his irresisti∣ble
will to exclude Pharaoh in his
youth or infancie from possibilitie
of salvation: because, to have sa∣ved
Pharaoh in his youth or infan∣cie
was in it selfe not impossible, as
implying no contradiction.
In bodies naturall, so long as
the passive disposition or capa∣citie
continueth, the same effect
will necessarily follow; unlesse
the efficacie or the application
of the agent alter. I dem secundum
idem, semper natum est producere
descriptionPage 211
idem: He which is alwayes the
same without possibility of al∣teration
in himselfe, is at all
times equally able to doe all
things that in themselves are not
impossible. And no man, I
thinke, will say that Pharaohs
election in his infancie was in
it selfe more impossible, than
his owne reprobation was. And
hee that thinketh his owne re∣probation
was in it selfe impos∣sible,
cannot thinke himselfe so
much bound to God, as he ma∣keth
shew of, for his infallible
election.
If from the former proposi∣tion,
Whatsoever is absolutely
possible to God, is alwayes possible
to him, a man should thus as∣sume;
descriptionPage 212
To have shewed mercie to
Pharaoh was absolutely possible to
God, and hence conclude; Er∣go,
It is possible to God, to shew
mercie on him at this instant: the
illation, whatsoever the asserti∣on
be, includes the same fallacie
of composition, which was before
discovered in the Syllogisme,
Quas emisti carnes, casdem come∣disti;
Sed crudas emisti, &c. For
Pharaoh, though unto this day,
one and the same reasonable
soule; yet is he not one and the
same object of Gods eternall
decree for hardning or shewing
mercie. To save any man of
Gods making, implies no con∣tradiction
unto that in••inite
power by which he was made.
descriptionPage 213
To save any man that hath not
made up the full measure of his
iniquitie, implies no contradi∣ction
to his infinite goodnesse,
no impeachment to his Maje∣stie:
it is agreeable to his good∣nesse.
To save such as have
made up the full measure of
their iniquitie, alwayes implies
a contradiction to his immuta∣ble
justice. And all such, and
(for ought we know) only such,
are the immediate objects of
his eternall, absolute and irresi∣stible
will or purpose of repro∣bation.
But when the measure
of any mans iniquitie is made
up, or how farre it is made up,
is onely knowne to the all-see∣ing
Judge. This is the secret
descriptionPage 214
wherewith flesh and bloud
may not meddle; as being es∣sentially
annexed to the prero∣gative
of eternall Majestie, b∣longing
only to the cognizance
of infinite wisdome.
Whether granting that Pha∣raoh was a reprobate from eter∣nitie, wee must grant withall that Pha∣raoh was a reprobate in his middle age, youth, or infancie.