The beginning, continuance, and decay of estates vvherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies. Written in French by R. de Lusing, L. of Alymes: and translated into English by I.F.

THE THIRD BOOKE.

CHAP. I.

The causes of the fall and ruine of estates.

• 1 Estates are subiect to change.
• 2 Some of longer, some of lesse continuance.
• 3 Great, small, and meane estates, and their causes of ruine; externall, internall, and mixt.
• 4 Lesse estates come to their endes soonest by externall causes.
• 5 The great by internall.
• 6 The meane more durable, yet subiect to alteration.

1 THe order that nature ob∣serueth in all things crea∣ted doth plainly enough teach vs that whatsoeuer is borne passeth and hast∣neth towards death; and that all things which haue a beginning necessarilie and interchangably roule towards their end. This proceedeth either of an ordinarie and naturall course, or of the violence and altera∣tion of compound bodies. Hence we drawe this con∣struction, that estates change, monarchies faile, and the ru∣ine of one serueth as the raising to the other.

2 Againe, as of humaine bodies some are more strong,

vigorous, and of a better composition then others, and so are of longer continuance; so we see the same difference in kingdomes and estates: in as much as some preserue themselues longer, either because by their nature they are more surely founded (as for example the Signory of No∣bles is more lasting then the popular estate, and a Monar∣chal estate more then a common-weale, because a Monar∣chy keepeth the causes of corruption more aloofe from her; or is policed with better lawes) or because of the situ∣ation which is naturally more strong then the other, as we see at this day in the Signorie of Venice.

3 But because this assertion is subiect to diuers obiectiōs, we will diuide it only into two propositions. First then of principalities, some are small, some great, some indifferent, either in regard of their subsistance or first essence, or of the comparison which may be made betweene them and their neighbours: Secondly, the efficient causes of the vtter ru∣ine of estates are either inward, or outward, or mixt: The inward are to be fetched and conceiued in respect of the negligence, ignorance, and riot of Princes which giue themselues ouer to all voluptuousnesse; whereto may be added the factions, secret practises, ambitions, and despe∣rate humors of subiects, with sundrie other occasions, all fit to bring estates to their vtter ruine. The outwad cau∣ses are the stratagemes, armes, and force of the enemie. The mixt are such as participate of both, as are the rebel∣lions of the people, treasons of particular men, put in exe∣cution by forraine ayd and force. Since then it is so that all principalities are subiect to ruine by one of these three cau∣ses; we are now to vnfold what maladies may infect, as well great and indifferent, as small estates; and draw all within the compasse of inward, outward, and mixt causes.

Now like as in naturall things naturall corruption is more tolerable then violent, so must we consider whether the alteration and impairing of estates and common weales chance by reason of age, or by the violence of some not forseene cause.

4 Returning then to our former diuision and well exa∣mining it, wee shall finde that small Estates come to their ends rather by meanes of outward causes (brought in by force and violence) then otherwise: In as much as their power being insufficient to withstand their mighty neigh∣bours ambitious attempts, they are at the first incounter o∣uerset with the storm of his conquests; in this maner the se∣ueral Signories of Lombardy fel in subiection either of the Duke of Milan, or of the Venetiās; the free cities of Thos∣cany became a pray to the Duke of Florence: The Princes of Africke to the King of Fez-Marocco, and Algiers.

5 On the contrarie, great Empires are vsually subuerted by meanes of inward causes; either by ease & plenty, which customarily makes Princes to swell with insupportable pride; by voluptuous riot (whereto people amidst their abundance are most prone) or else by insolency and pre∣sumption seazing the great ones of the country when they see themselues much followed and reuerenced, all fit in∣ticements to dispose a hart (but indifferently generous) to plot for his owne raising.

Nec quenquam iam ferre potest Caesarue priorem, Pompeiusue parem.

Then is it (as one saith) that Caesar cannot brooke a superior, and that Pompey stomaketh an equall.

6 Meane estates vndergoe danger as well as the two for∣mer, yet far lesse, since they hold the meane as the other the extreams, for they are not so vnfurnished of strength, as that it would be easie for euery one to inuade and oppresse them, neither are they of that greatnesse and wealth, as to afforde matter to particular men to grow mighty, or else a∣bandon themselues immoderatly to delights & pleasures, or to transport themselues beyond the limits of reason. This is it that so long preserued the common weales of Sparta & of Venice, which euermore respectiuely intertai∣ned a meane and equality.

The mixt causes of the ruine of Estates are inward trea∣cheries and outward force. Treason hatched within an

Estate much more indammageth a great then a small or meane Empire. For a monarke is not able to turne his eie vpon euery corner of his Kingdome; and sturring spirits are fortified in their attempts either with the hope of im∣punity (the nourse of vices in all Estates and gouernments) or with the opinion they haue conceiued of not being dis∣couered till such time as their proiects meete with some good successe. These things happen sooner, when the Prince is far off then at hand. Spaine can witnesse it, which was so vnhappily betraied by Count Iulian, as it thereby fell into the hands of the Moores. So was the Empire of the Mamelucks by the treason of Caierbeius possest by Selim Emperour of the Turkes. Who would search more na∣rowly into Christendome shall finde that the ciuill wars of France minister more examples for proofe of this then is necessary. Thus wee see that small estates are most to stand in feare of forraine force, since they haue not wherewithei∣ther of or in themselues to be able to resist or to take breath: That the meane estates are alwaies lesse offended by out∣ward force then the smallest, and more free from inward treason then the greatest.

CHAP. II.

From what coniectures the con∣tinuance of estates may be gathered.

• 1 Causes of the change of Estates.
• 2 The ruine of Estates is most answearable to their begin∣nings.
• 3 The rootes of common wealths how maintained.
• 4 Security especially to be auoided.

1 I Will no farther extend the discourse of the former chapter, nor diue into the o∣ther efficient causes of the ruine of e∣states: for should I handle what might be farther said of this matter, I should wan∣der too far frō the propounded subiect, and perhaps racke the argument beyond his due pitch. I will then tie my selfe only to the coniectures of the con∣tinuance or fall of estates, omitting other causes, as also all that may be referred to the iudgement of the heauens, the influence of the stars, and to their vertue; sithence this knowledge is fraught with so many obscurities and contrarieties in what is written thereof, as I will spare to search too far into it: Though otherwise we are to imagine that nothing is made in vaine, and that those celestiall bo∣dies moue not by chance, but rather by diuine order and disposition. Againe, the errors of their Ephimerides and the different supputation of the first masters of their profes∣sion, make the knowledge to be vncertaine and their so surely grounded maximes to afford contrarie resolutions. Let vs not meddle then with the aspects of the stars, or the natiuities of estates, but regard and consider the effects of what is at our owne home without taking so high a flight. We say then that estates suffer either by the vnremouea∣ble ordinance of God, or by the naturall course of time, wherewith in time they grow feeble, and change: or else by the wils of men, so vnstable and light, as they ordinari∣ly breede an vniuersall alteration thorow out a whole estate and common-weale. We will only drawe our coniectures from naturall causes (not to meddle with the iudgement of the diuine Maiesty or mans inconstancy) nakedly and simply to speake of them as neere and familiar, to the end we may not enter into the chaos of causes heauenly and most remote.

2 So then we are to thinke that the continuance of estates is proportioned to their beginning. It is with them as with

sensible creatures, which the more they hasten to arriue at the perfection of their being, the sooner also they faile and die: the contrarie is seene in those which with a slow and measured pase attaine to a more faire maturity and perfe∣ction: as for example, among beastes the horse, amongst trees the willow are of no long indurance: but those that (as the Hart and Oliue) make by degrees and slowly to∣wards their ripenes, are likewise more lasting. We may say the like of Empires and Estates: for as we see them slow or swift in their increase, so are they more swift or slow in their ruine. Haue not the French more then once conquered the duchy of Milan and the kingdome of Naples, and that as a man may say almost in a moment? so haue they many times lost it and all in a moment: such conquests resem∣ble Torrents tumbling downe the mountaines, which in lesse then an hour, by reason of the great shoutes of waters they bring with them, become fearefull and dangerous; when soone after in an instant, we see them fallen and shal∣low, so as a childe may wade thorow them without trouble or danger. Now not to leaue this conquest of Milan and Naples, we must to this purpose by examples contrary to the former make good the ground of our proposition: which to performe, I will set before you the manner how the Spaniards conquered and held these prouinces.

I finde it hath been by a long course of time, and infinite trauaile accompanied with all the paines and trou∣bles, which those who set vp their rest vpon a conquest and resolue to abide out the wars, ordinarily indure. Hence their labour hath taken such roote, as nothing since hath been able to escape their hands, howsoeuer they haue been oft times galled and put to their plunges. It is requisite then that Empires haue their rootes to sustaine them, which must be deepe and sound, otherwise it is impossible they should long continue. Now that they may be such, there is an especiall wisedome and many yeeres requi∣red.

3 The true rootes of an estate are the loue of the people

towards their Prince, the sincere and holy distribution of Iustice amongst the subiects; military discipline well po∣liced and obserued by the souldiours; honours, rewards, and benefits bestowed according to vertue and merit: that great men be not slightly set by, abased or contemned: that the common sort of people be intertained with all honest satisfaction: necessary prouisions for the maintenance of places of strength; well husbanding of the treasure; friendly intelligence with neighbour Princes; vncorrupt election of officers; modesty in their proceedings: these are the very true rootes able to fortifie and make monar∣chies to flourish and raise them to eternity: which rootes can neuer proue setled spring, or send foorth worthy fruit, vnlesse they be planted in the soile of wisdome, aduice and industrie, and husbanded by the continuance of time.

4 It is often seene that great Conquests and victories at∣tained without losse or labour, so blinde the Conquerour, as they make him become like one of those long reeds or canes which carry outwardly a good apparance, but are in∣wardly hollow and of fraile substance. They cause him to contemne his companions, and those who assisted him in obtaining his victories, but more the subdued people, whence ordinarily followeth, that the higher is his fortune, the neerer is his fall. Wee haue straied sufficiently. It is now high time to returne to our principall discourse: and as we haue heretofore made it appeare that there are three sorts of estates; so wee are now to vnfold in what ranck of the three the Turke is to be bestowed.

CHAP. III.

That the monarchy of the Turke is comprehended within the num∣ber of great estates.

• 1 The substance of the ensuing Chapters.
• ...

• 2 Greatnesse of the Turkish Empire.
• 3 Compared with the Romaines.
• 4 The marueilous successe thereof inwarre.

1 From the diuision of estates deliuered by vs in the former chapter, this is to take his foundation, and by these causes wee are to make choice of that of the three which is the surest; by what accidents or infirmities both the one and the o∣ther may vndergoe a change, either outwardly or inward∣ly, and in which rank of the three wee are to lodge the Turke. Some one perhaps will iudge this question super∣fluous and vnprofitable, seeing his renowne, his conquests, and his long rule doe but too much teach vs what he is: notwithstanding all this I should not thinke it besides the purpose a little to particularize the causes of his greatnesse.

2 The estate of the Turke is held without question to bee one of the greatest and mightiest, as well in regard of the large circuit it containeth, as of his power: he is great be∣cause of so many Prouinces reduced to his obedience; and though he haue not so great a share in Europe as the Ro∣maines sometimes had, he hath to counteruaile this, more aduantaged himselfe in Asia and Africke: for when the fortune of the Romaines was at the greatest, and that they had their armes most at libertie, yet went they not beyond Euphrates: It is very true, that Traian went farther, but all the Prouinces he subdued were soone abandoned by Adri∣an his successor.

The Turke hath not done so, for he hath extended his dominion as far as Tigris; he possesseth all Mesopotamia, or as they terme it Diarbecke. From thence he reacheth as far as Balsera or the Gulfe of Persia, which the Romans neuer saw, and the Gulfe of Arabia. And to say better, all is his from the red sea to the Cittie Aden, which is in the maine continent beyond the mouth of this sea, more then an hundred and fiftie miles: he hath also inlarged his do∣minions

toward the South far beyond Aegypt. In Africk all is his, except three places of strength which the king of Spaine holdeth, Pegnon de Veles, Oran, and Melila: Mau∣ritania also is his, only three fortresses excepted, which are Tanger, Arsilla, and Mazagan, conquered by the Por∣tugall: when I name Africk, I intend that country com∣monly termed Barbary, and not Ethiopia.

3 Hauing now seene the largenes of his dominions, we are next to discourse of his meanes and power. I finde that he hath better established the one and the other, then the Romans euer did whē they were at their intirest great∣nes, because in such a most large compasse of his country, there is no king or common weale beareth sway to distin∣guish his dominions: which was otherwise with the Ro∣manes, who had many such wedged in, within the conti∣nent of their Empire.

There is not any one of his subiects that dareth to say that the house wherein he dwelleth, or the land he tilleth, is his owne. They acknowledge to hold all they haue of him: he ordinarily intertaineth diuers great and mighty armies both by sea and by land. So as it must needes be granted that he is greater in his estates, meanes and power, then e∣uer were the Romans, for he so peaceably maintaineth what he hath conquered, as he can no waies vndergoe the troubles and wars which the Romans endured at the hands of Mithridate, the Parthians, Farnaces and others. More∣ouer, next Europe the Gaules are not his enemies. The Cymbrians are his associats; so as he fostereth such a tran∣quillity and obedience on all sides, as he amasseth inesti∣mable treasure.

4 And more, (a thing worth the noting) in three hun∣dred yeeres space since he began first to reigne, he hath re∣ceiued but foure notable ouerthrowes (that excepted which he receiued the yeere past neere Tauris) But the Romaines in lesse time receiued more and greater at the only hands of the Carthaginians. In sum, there is not that nation in the world which can vaunt of so many victories

in so short a space, or to haue triumphed of the captiuity or death of so many kings and great Princes, as the great Turke; or that haue with such happie successe and disci∣pline so soone raised so mightie an Empire as his is at this day. Is it not a fearfull matter to heare it related that Ma∣homet the second (an infidel) hath had such fauour of the heauens, as to haue beene able in the space of 32. yeeres raigne, to subdue two Empires, vsurpe twelue kingdomes, and take by force two hundred cities? That which affor∣deth the greatest cause of wonder, is, that all this hath suc∣ceeded in the very time when the art of military engines & fortifications were in their perfection, and wherewith we might haue armed our selues to withstand him. In con∣clusion, what shal we say of Selim the first, who in lesse then foure yeeres space vanquished the Mamelucks, subdued all Syria, Palestina, the red sea, a great part of Arabia and all Aegypt? These are questionlesse goodly and notable Tro∣pheys of the Turks greatnesse, but most dishonorable and dangerous for all Christendome.

CHAP. IIII.

Whether the Empire of the Turke draw towards an end.

• 1 The Ottaman Empire leaneth toward ruine.
• 2 The reasons are the bordering princes vpon the Turkes estate, and their prouiding for their safety.
• 3 Made wise by others harmes they stand vpon their defen∣siue war.
• 4 They are bridled by strong fortresses.
• 5 Contrary arguments.

1 WE haue discoursed as briefely as might be of the fall and ruine of estates, of their effi∣cient causes, and vpon what coniectures a man might gather them. It is now time that we see and ex∣amine in like sort whether the empire of the Turke be nere

his end, and abatement of his greatnesse, according as a man may draw from coniectures it leaneth towards his de∣clining; and though the foundation heereof be built vpon reasons so cleere and euident as they are not to be contrari∣ed, yet will I alledge one that carrieth more apparence then all the other; and that is, that the greatnesse of his empire is at the highest that it may be by the ruine of Prin∣ces by him expelled, vanquished and made away one after an other, whilest he hath in the meane time triumphed of their estates and rich spoiles; but now that he hath none to oppose him with hopes of so fauourable issue as had the o∣ther: his ambition, heart, and courage will grow idle and languish; whence in time will spring the ruine of his Em∣pire; Is he not already come to that passe? The Princes that confine vpon him, though more weake then he to bid him battaile, assaile, or defend, haue neuerthelesse so orde∣red their affaires and meanes, as they are able at this day to sheeld themselues sufficiently from his attempts.

2 Amongst others the King of Persia, doth he not so ballance his power as he hath giuen him many great ouer∣throwes, and one lately (as I haue said) neere Tauris? The Tartarians also hold him plaie and more prouoke him then he them; and of late they got from him Caffa a strong and wealthy towne; moreouer whilest he was busi∣ed about the wars of Persia the Georgians took and sacked Xistis; but they were not able to hold it; so as the Turke hath repossessed himself of it. The Muscouit doth not on∣ly defend himselfe from the incursions of the Turks, but he oft times also skirmisheth with them, commanding as he doth aboue an hundred and fifty thousand horse. The King of Polonia likewise more mighty then the Musco∣uit, is so strong as he will not take wrong; but is able ra∣ther at all times to repell the violence of his enemy. The house of Austria together with the aid of the Princes of Germanie, hath wherewithall to make their party good and to oppose him: the Venetians, vnited with Italy and Spaine (which in such a case will not abandon them) are

likewise able enough to defend themselues and hold their owne. As for the king of Spain, he is so mighty by sea and by land, both of men and mony, as he dareth vndertake himselfe to incounter the Turke in battaile, much more to defend himselfe if assaulted. The King of Fez is not anie way awed by him, and is more strong then he, at the least in Africke; which he approued to the common hurt of Christendome by that ouerthrow and death of the King Don Sebastian of Portugall, where so many Christians mi∣serably ended their daies. The last of those which abut vpon the Turke is Prester Iohn, who hath hitherto beha∣ued himselfe so honorably against him, as he hath neuer shewed any token of fearing his forces. So as being now vnable by reason of the concord & stout opposition of his neighbours, to gaine farther ground; he must of necessity (vnlesse God in regard of our sinnes be otherwise pleased) begin to recoile; and that greatnesse which he hath built vpon others ruines must decay and lessen; since the mat∣ter which gaue the increase is on his part wanting.

3 There is yet an other point which fortifieth this opini∣on, and that is: that all such Princes as confine vpon the Turke, are by others example made more wise, aduised and considerat, then they were before the ruine of such as serued for a pray to the Ottomans; whereby they will dis∣creetly looke to themselues how they courageously haz∣zard their persons or estates at one battaile: they will ra∣ther be content to stand vpon their defence, attending while time beget some apparent occasion, roundly and to the purpose to set vpon him.

4 Againe, there are at this day so many fortresses, so strong and so well appointed, as they are in a manner im∣pregnable, so as the Turke is not like to finde the way so o∣pen as heereto fore he did to carry them: but if he should put himselfe vpon that hazardous enterprise of forcing them one by one, it were as much as to become the author of his owne ruine.

5 Neither ought any man in opposing this, alledge the

losse of Cypres, since it hapned not so much through the Turkes power, as because of the distance of Venice, which was to supply them with men and munition. A man may by a contrary argument say as much of the sauing of Malta (speaking according to humaine causes) for it was not pro∣tected either by the forces within it selfe, or by the succor sent thither from other parts: but only because the Iland was so far distant from Constantinople as the army could not in due time and season receiue their prouisions and bee refreshed as was requisite, nor well imploie such as were sent thither. If it would please God that the Turke might often make such voiages, he would prepare vs faire occasi∣ons to attempt the reuenge of the outrages Christendome hath by him sundry waies receiued.

CHAP. V.

By what kinde of causes the Em∣pire of the Turkes might most easily faile.

• 1 The power of the Turke not to be easily ouerthrowne by out∣ward causes.
• 2 The power of Princes & estates bordering vpon the Turke, as the Persians, Tartarians, Moscouits, Polonians, Germans, Venetians, Spaniards, &c.

1 AS wee haue at large intreated in the chapters going before by what causes all estates may be brought to their last end and ruine; so are we now to come to that of the Ottomans, as one of the greatest; and examine by what inconueniences it may vndergoe a change. I am of opi∣nion that this their so raised greatnesse can hardly decay by vertue of outward causes; seeing the Princes bordering

vpon their estate, are euery one in particular weake to as∣saile them, as they might well doe if they were peaceably vnited.

2 This weakenesse presupposed, it followeth that it will proue a hard matter to ruine him by forraine force, whose strength and meanes it is requisit we examine to inlighten this opinion.

First, those that confine vpon the Turke next Africke, are the King of Fez, of Marocco, and Prester Iohn: next Asia, the Sophi and the Tartarians: in Europe the Duke of Muscouy, the King of Polonia, the Emperour, the Ve∣netians, and the King of Spaine.

As for the King of Fez he hath men enow, but small store of mony, so as he hath not the meanes or ability to maintaine a lasting war: Againe, though I should suppose he were able to be at the charge, yet I finde him naked of other things necessarie to aduantage himselfe vpon the Turke, such as are places of strength to forward his pro∣ceedings, and assure his retrait: so as he is like enough to come short of his aime: and if he should performe some worthy exploit in Africk, doubtles the King of Spaine his neighbour would soone be iealous of his good fortune. And in very deede this is not the point, for it is all one with Christendome whether the King of Fez be too strong for the Turke, or the Turke for the King of Fez, since both are the Christians enemies. As for Prester Iohn, all the world knoweth he hath enough to doe to defend him∣selfe against the Turkes forces; neither is it long since he wan from him all the hauens he had vpon the red sea, and amongst others that of Archiech and Mazzua: now for the Sophi, if we search their histories we shall finde that the kings of Persia haue alwaies had the worse of the Turks, & among all other Mahomet the second ouercame Vsumcas∣san; after him Selim the first did as much to Ismael whom he forced into the remotest parts of his country. Tarmas also met with the like measure at Solimans hands: and on the contrary we see that Cudabenda hath had such a hand

of Amurath the third now raigning, as he hath often van∣quished his armies, and now of late at Tauris: and though he haue atchieued most worthy victories, yet hath he no∣thing aduantaged himselfe. In the Turkes country, he hath not wan one fortresse of importance, or ought else that might counteruaile the charge of his wars: This hath succeeded in regard the Soph••is strōg of horse, but vnpro∣uided of foote, which should be the principal force of such as besiege or defend. Moreouer, to force places of strength there is required great store of cannon & other munition, all wanting to the Sophi, who may well meete the enemy in the feeld and bid him battaile, but not pursue and assaile him if he retire into his fortres; because of the aboue said defects of foot & artillery; & though he were prouided of them, yet wants he the skill how to vse thē like others. The example of Tauris approueth this sufficiently, for after he had this last yeere vanquished the armie of the Turks, and slaine an hundred thousand men, he could neuer take the Cittadell wherein the Turks had drawne all their mu∣nition of war, and left aboue eight thousand men; neither is there any newes hitherto that he hath taken it & expel∣led them thence. The Tartarians are as ill stored with foote and artillery as the Persians, and except that they last got of the Turke, it may be truly said that they neuer did him harme. As for the Moscouit which abutteth vp∣on him (as doe also the Polonians) they haue in regarde of the Turke small store of men, horse and mony; so as the most they can doe is to hold their owne. Now con∣cerning the Germans, they haue lost much of their ancient reputation by the ouerthrow they receiued of the Turke at Exechium, Buda, and sundry other places; so as they are glad to keepe home without daring to assaile him. The Venetians haue beene so vnfortunate, as they haue neuer moued war against the Turke but it hath succeeded con∣trary to their hopes: and which is the worst of all, they ne∣uer consented to anie treatie of peace, but they did for∣goe some important member of their estate. And to

say the truth Mahomet the second got Negropont, Scu∣tari, and Groya; Baiazet tooke from them Lepanto and Modon, and after in a treaty of peace they made with him they parted with S. Moore; in an other treaty they left to Soliman Napoles of Maluasia: Selim the second wan by force the Ile of Cypres, Duleme, and Antiuari: And though these be heauy losses, yet in regard they were far distant from their estates they are more supportable then if they had beene neere hand, so ought they now more then euer aduise how to strengthen themselues against the Turke by their braue resolution and prouision, which they may better doe now then euer, in regard their forces are more liuely, and the members of their common-weale more vnited and compact then heeretofore. Now we are to come to the king of Spaine. Let vs say that he hath store of mony and all prouision necessary to be imploied in the wars; that he is not without sufficient numbers of foot and horse alwaie in pay; that hee hath the commodity extraordinarily to leuy so many men as may make the Turke stand in feare of him; that his forces by sea are good and strong, and that he can increase them at his pleasure; that he hath store of victuals, commodity of hauens, for conuenient landing in his countries; and in a word that he is so mighty, as that neither he standeth in awe of the Turk, neither dareth the Turke assaile him: yet this power and hability could neuer hitherto be imploied to the purpose against the common enemy of Christendome. Not for want of will or inclination thereto, but because he is hin∣dred by the reuolt of Flanders. The suspition also and feare of his neighbours armes, would neuer permit him to display an vnited and firme power against the Turke: he hath rather beene enforced to wast his time and meanes vpon the particular preseruation of his estates somewhat distant one from an other, in stead of courageously exploi∣ting them against the Turkes to the good and consolation of Christendome. But our sinnes are they especially which haue depriued vs of the glorious fruits and aduantages we

might haue gained by so worthy a power. In conclusion, we must grant that since the Empire of the Turke cannot receiue any damage or alteration by outward causes (which are wont to ruine estates) it is necessary that inward causes either separate or mixt effect it; yet before we discourse of these two meanes I hold it not amisse a little to examine, whether his estate may be by maine and open force ouer∣throwne.

CHAP. VI.

That it is not an impossible thing for the Christians with open force to vanquish the Turke.

• 1 The Turke is not inuincible.
• 2 Examples of their sundry ouerthrowes.
• 3 A comparison of their good and ill successe in battailes. All proofes that they may be conquered.

1 THe conclusion of the argument of the former chapter, is, that the Turke can∣not by way of open force receiue harme or ruine of importance; because of the mighty power and meanes he hath of his owne. But heereby is not inferred that therefore Christian Princes should faile of courage or hope, to goe thorow with their affaires to his preiudice; ra∣ther otherwise placing their confidence in the Almighty, they are to hope better then euer, for the reasons I shall heereafter alledge; by the handling wherof I hope to proue that so far is he from being inuincible, as on the contra∣ry he may be easily vanquished as many experiences may resolue vs.

2 We haue elsewhere said that Baiazet the first was ouer∣come and taken aliue at the battaile he fought at Mount-Stella against the great Tamberlain, vnder whose hands he

died a captiue. Carambeius Bassa of Amurath the second, was discomfited by Ladislaus King of Polonia in the valley of mount Hermus: he came with an intention to reuenge himselfe of the losse and dishonor that the Bassa of Notalia had receiued at the hands of Iohn Huniades, which at one time recouered from him a part of Seruia and all Molda∣uia: but instead of performing this he became himselfe prisoner of that King, and had almost al his army put to the sword. Baiazet the second sent Calibeius and Querscogles his sonne in law into Asia against Caitheus Soldan of Aegypt with a great army to reuenge the intertainment the Soldan had giuen Zizimus his brother, whom he had suc∣cored with men and mony against him: his army was ouer∣throwne neere Adena a towne of Cilicia, where the Turke receiued the most notable ouerthrow that was euer giuen him. For of an hundred thousand which presented them∣selues in the battaile, the third part remained not aliue; yet those that performed this noble execution, were scarce one against sixe; but the aduice of two Italians and of the Ma∣meluckes so furthered the affaires of Caytheus, as he spied a time to charge the Turkes when they least expected it. Soliman left the siege of Vienna with losse of 60000. men which were there slaine, hauing giuen twenty generall as∣saults to the towne. The yeere following he assembled an other army of 200000. men, with intention cruelly to re∣uenge the harmes he had receiued; but the Emperour Charles the fift went to meete him, with such forces, as the other fled so hastily as he had scarce leasure to saue his baggage. Don Iohn of Austria naturall sone of Charles the fifth in the yeere 1571. got at Lepanto that so renowned victory of the army of Selim the second; this hath since made them walke (as they say) with the bridle in their hands, and confesse they had passed too rash a iudgment vpon the power of the Christians either by sea or by land: I omit to speake of the prowesse & noble acts of Scander∣beg against the Turkes, and how many times he ouerthrew the Commanders of Amurath the second: and valiantly

recouered Albania the place of his birth whereof he and his predecessors had beene depriued by that Tyrant, nei∣ther will I again cite the examples of Iohn Huniades or Ma∣thew Coruin, who in a manner with a handfull of men op∣posed and discomfited the Turkish forces, nor of the Por∣tugals, though they haue at sundry times assailed the Turk neere the red sea, barred him of passage, and rid him of the meanes of farther issuing out of the mouth of that sea. What should I speake of the Tartarians, who but lately tooke from him Taurica Chersones (called at this day Pe∣rocopsky) if the reports which come from those partes be credible?

3 Such as haue beene curious in the search of the Tur∣kish history haue obserued, that in the space of two hun∣dred and fourescore yeeres they haue fought with their neighbours thirty and sixe battailes, whereof they haue only gained eighteene and lost the rest. These are all signes and successes whereby a man may conclude that they are not inuincible, and that their fortune hath beene ballanced betweene gaine & losse, so as we may beleeue, if God for our offences did not busie the forces of Christian Princes elsewhere then against the Turke, where he hath had the ouerthrow once, he had had it thrice: by all these foregoing examples we may collect that this proud ene∣my hath not his head so hard as it may not be broken, or else sorely brufed. And though Christian Princes are not of power sufficient apart and of themselues to take him to taske, yet may they doe it by ranging themselues to that vnion and concord, as that there be amongst them but one common fortune. This being granted (as I pre∣sume it shall) we are to vnfold how they may purchase his ruine.

CHAP. VII.

Why the leagues among Christian Princes are commonly of small effect.

• 1 Leagues are concluded for the respect of honour and profit.
• 2 The inequality of gaine bringeth a difficulty to the conclu∣sion of leagues.
• 3 Christian Princes the farther they are from the Turke, the lesse haue they feare of dangers wherewith other more neere him are possessed.
• 4 No man vainely exposeth himselfe to an apparant danger but where an euident commodity inuites him.
• 5 While each striues to protect his owne frontiers from the Turke, others are neglected.
• 6 The inequality of aide begetteth a contention who shall com∣mand most in the wars.
• 7 Remedies against such difficulties and calamities.

1 THere are many respects and causes, which customarily make the leagues of Christian Princes altogether vneffectu∣all, which may appeere to some a matter of hard disgestion, and for this cause I hold it requisite particularly to cleere it. It is a receiued maxime that all the actions of Princes are vndertaken for two principal causes, honor and profit: that the consideration of honor often masqueth vnder the pre∣tence or good of their affaires: we will then only meddle with profit which we may tearme interest.

2 Now this interest (a common maske for all faces) can∣not be a like equall betweene Christian Princes with one consent vndertaking the war against the Turke: for they diuersly confine vpon the common enemy, and this diuer∣sity breedeth a difference also betweene their resolutions and interests; and though this be an inconuenience not in

the case in handling to be contemned, yet the principall difficulty dependeth not heerein: It rather consisteth wholly in the concord of the treaty of the league, and this concorde is hard to be wrought for these following rea∣sons.

3 All these Princes are not neighbours of the Turke in the same equallity: some are more strong then other: this difference of strength affordeth to some a commodity to defend themselues or offend him with their owne forces: others are weake, and consequently exposed to the incursi∣ons and spoiles of the Turke. It is an infallible maxime, that the farther Princes are from the danger, the lesse for∣ward are they to stir, prepare for the war, or contribute to the charge or meanes requisite for the vndertaking thereof with the like feruency and affection as they would if they saw themselues so neere to the mischiefe, and that there were apparant danger.

4 Againe, that Prince which seeth no great profit or in∣terest in such an enterprise doth lesse regard it then he whō necessity inforceth to stand vpon his garde, and feare that tyrants inuasion. Moreouer, if the Princes vnited to this league and combination shall once know that they shall get little or smally aduantage their estate, it is not to be ex∣pected (when they enter into it) that they will bring with them that courage, resolution, affection, and forwardnesse as the businesse would require. See then how the disposi∣tion of the interest makes the beginning difficult, the pro∣ceeding and issue vncertaine, by reason of the diuers alte∣rations and varieties which accompany euery associated Prince, sutable to his passion or affection; Whereupon would vndoubtedly follow an impossibilitie of establish∣ing this league, and vnion vpon so sure foundations, as that the beginning may be good, the middle and end better: since the effect without vnion amongst many agents re∣maineth euermore as nothing or nothing woorth.

5 We fall then farre short of our reckoning, vnlesse wee can minister some remedy to the diuersities of this interest

and profit. This inconuenience is attended on, and coun∣terpeized by an other of as great or greater consideration: And this is the interest and particular consequence of the neighbourhood that euery one indifferently hath with the Turke; by the which indifferency, each one accor∣ding as his feare is, will desire the warre may be vnderta∣ken to his aduantage. As for example, Spaine feareth the neighbourhood of Algiers; Venice of Albania: hence will grow that the league taking effect, the Venetians will striue that the forces of the league may be imployed in the Leuant, the Spaniards toward the South: so as it will not be possible to manage the enterprise to both their sa∣tisfactions.

6 There is yet another inconuenience that our Princes wil not be able by an equall portion to enter into the league, inasmuch as one wanteth meanes to contribute thereto in money more then a sixt part, another a fift part; others that haue no money, will contribute men or ships; others more mightie in both, will vndertake halfe or a second. These are all the portions by whose assemblie a league may be formed. Of their indifferencie groweth yet another diffi∣cultie or inconuenience (as we list to tearme it) and that is, that whosoeuer contributeth the halfe, would likewise haue in his handes (as the greatest and mightiest) all the power and swaie. In which it will follow, that the other shall not vndertake or performe ought but by his aduice, direction, and assistance: If he will make a stand, they are not to go forward; if he list to march elsewhere, then their desires carrie them, they must follow him: If his affaires presse him to alter his resolution and minde, and that hee will retyre to his home, they are constrained to doe the like, so as all their charge, paines, and holy intentions, are vtterly ouerthrowne, and they oftentimes rest exposed to the iniurie and reuenge of their dangerous neighbour, a∣gainst whom they iointly rose in armes.

7 These are, to say the trueth, considerations and incon∣ueniences of that value and consequence (measuring them

by their parts, and not by the whole) as we must conclude that none but God is able to tune this league to an agree∣ing harmony, which we are most humbly to craue at his Almightie hands with a strong faith, a true amendment of life, and a more perfect charitie then this age affoordeth.

CHAP. VIII.

The defects which may be obserued in the leagues of the yeere 1537: and 1571.

• 1 The conditions, successe and errors of the league in anno 1537.
• 2 Of that of 1570.
• 3 How a league may be established to auoide the formerly committed errors.

1 COntinuing the matter of the former chapter, it will not be beside the pur∣pose, by the way to touch the defects which were found in two the most me∣morable leagues that haue beene made in our time betweene the Princes of Christendome. The first resolued vpon in the time of Pope Paul the third, betweene him, the Emperour Charles the fifth, and the Venetians. It was then, beside the condi∣tions, agreed vpon that the Emperour and the Knightes of Malta should set foorth 82. Gallies, the Venetians a like number, the Pope 36. only. Andrew Doria was chosen Generall of the Emperours army, Vincentio Capelli of the Venetians, and Marco Grimani Patriarch of Aquileia of the Popes, hauing for his Lieutenant Paul Iustinian; and for the maine land seruice Ferdinand Gonzaga was chosen Generall. Moreouer it was concluded betweene the prin∣ces, that whatsoeuer they should get from the Turkes with

the forces of the league either in Greece or Dalmatia should be left to the Venetians as in recompence of their so great expence and losse that they should suffer by war∣ring vpon the Turke. Soliman seeing the forces of the league assembled, made hast to lanch his Gallies foorth in∣to the maine. Such was his diligence as they were within a few daies in a readinesse and went for Candy, where they made some hauocke, but of no great moment. After these roades Barbarossa made a stay of al the army in the gulfe of Larta, there to attend the Christians which came onward, but so slowly as the season passed without performing ought, or without that they once met together, and that which was yet worse, our men inforced by tempest, reti∣red themselues to Corfú whence they set foorth. Barba∣rossa followed them as far as Antipaxo within an hundred miles of Corfú, but perceiuing them to prepare themselues to fight he speedily retired to the gulfe of Larta, so as our army was resolued for Dirachium, otherwise called Drazo or la Velona, but that being a dangerous harbour for the gallies, they turned their force vpon Castell Nouo which they carried by assault: an exploit (to say the truth) of that small importance (respecting their charge and prouision) as it wan them as much dishonor as profit, the towne being won the Spaniards seazed themselues of it. The Veneti∣ans disputed it as a thing appertaining to them according to the articles of the league; but it was to small purpose, wherefore quieting themselues since it was not to be reme∣died they tooke an occasion thereupon to shift themselues of the league. The yeere following Soliman recouered Castle Nouo with the losse of those Spaniards which kept it, who were all put to the sword, those which escaped in∣during a most miserable seruitude: and though the peace treated by the Venetian was somewhat disaduantageous, yet they indured that more willingly, then to be otherwise dealt with then was agreed vpon: other causes might be alleaged, as the ceasing of trafficke and many other dis∣commodities, besides the impouerishing of their Estate,

all which necessarily attende the intertainement of ar∣mies.

2 The last league of the yeere 1571. yeelded not much better fruits, for after a great charge, and the gaining of so famous a victorie, no other good redounded thence to the Christians, but that the Turke made an assay of their valour; and by little and little the confederate forces diui∣ded themselues: the Venetians departing vpon occasion of almost the same iealousies, as in the former league.

3 It will be now time to deliuer how all these inconueni∣ences may be stopped, and the league become firme and durable, without consideration of any particular interest, to the end that euery one may voluntarily in deuotion consent thereto to the glory of God with a free heart, and an vndaunted magnanimitie: In which case, the conditi∣ons being rather free then forced on either side, we may reape thereby fruits woorthy and honorable: These two leagues heeretofore mentioned, hapned in a time so dan∣gerous for the Venetians, as it was more then necessarie that the Christian Princes (though not interessed) should vnite their forces to assist and protect the other. So the one standing in the water vp to the throat, and incompas∣sed with danger, and the other on the contrary, free from feare of perill, they entred into the couenants and condi∣tions of the league, not such as they ought to haue beene to make them lasting; but such as were presented to men standing in neede of them, who inforced by necessitie, might not refuse them, to the end to cleere themselues of a neere threatning mischiefe. Leagues wil then be dura∣ble when they shall be stablished at a time whē men are free and exempt from all constraint; and not to attend as they do, till the Turke affright one of the confederates, and that he be alreadie come into the field so strong both by sea and land, as the Venetians or some other of the confede∣rates are already by him assailed. At such a time to seeke a remedy by their hastie assembling, is the way to imprint a certaine feare in their people; and make them flocke to∣gether

in the fold as sheepe in presence of the woolfe. It is requisite then that the league be contracted at leisure, in a time of peace, and in a season when the associates may be inuited, not by any vrgent danger, but voluntarily, and with such an alacritie of heart, as they may vnite their per∣sons, their meanes, their powers, and their courages all to∣gether to offend the common enemy.

CHAP. IX.

A league which may be treated with∣out danger of the former defects.

• 1 The qualities of perfect leagues.
• 2 The conditions of leagues, and what each of the confederates is to attempt vpon the enemie.
• 3 The commoditie of them so concluded.
• 4 Aduise for a generall contribution against priuate gaine.
• 5 That the danger we stande in of the Turke, is greater then many suppose, and that therefore those that are most re∣mote, ought willingly to contribute.
• 6 What should mooue vs to ioyne in league against the Turke.

1 NOw then to reape the woorthie and ho∣norable fruits of a holie league & asso∣ciation, we are to remooue the defects and inconueniences which haue made the former leagues prooue abortiue: And the better to effect it, it is necessary that their treaties be voluntarie: that Princes voluntarily ioyne their powers & meanes to one end, though by diffe∣rent courses: so as growing to capitulations, the one doe not aduantage himselfe vpon the straightning of the others affaires. This is it which equalling the conditions, will cause euery one to partake in the enterprise, without all suspect or particular iealousie: It is not enough that the defects

of these leagues be discouered, if they make vs not more wise in the framing of other to come: to the end we may with all deuotion and sinceritie builde them on a strong and vnmooueable foundation; and thus in my opinion may be the manner of our proceeding.

2 It is not required that to establish this league and make it fructifie, the confederate forces should assemble in one place, but at one time: my meaning is, that our Princes must bee readie to assaile the enemie at once in diuers places, and that euery one bende his forces towards parts which are neerest to him, so to begin the warre to some purpose: As for example, the Spaniards should inuade the parts of Algiers: the Venetians and the Pope, of Alba∣nia: the gallies of Sauoy, Malta, and Florence, should continue their ordinarie courses against the Turke; vnlesse they would ioyne with the Venetians or the king of Spain: the Polonians should set vpon Walachia: the Emperour and Princes of Germany vpon Hungary.

3 Questionlesse if each of these did in this manner as∣saile him, their courage and force would be the greater, as would likewise be their desire to persist in their enterprise, without any respect of paines or expence, hoping all would redound to their honour, profit, and particular se∣curitie: which they cannot expect from the other leagues, and this is that which hath in part made them defectiue. The enemie that should be so many waies set vpon, would be constrained to diuide his forces, which consequently would become lesse able to protect him, on all sides wher∣soeuer he should be assailed. First, the gallies of Malta assisted with some other, and scouring (as they might) the Leuant seas, would keepe in such awe those that guarde Alexandria and Rhodes, as they would not dare to peepe out: Againe, if Spaine would inuade Barbarie, the gallies of Algiers would be sure to keepe home: so as the strength of Venice ioyned with that of the Church, would doe what they list, and would meete with no encounter by sea which they should not easily ouermatch: especially if at

the same time the Emperour and the King of Polonia, would warre likewise vpon the Turke. We haue an exam∣ple of the times which verifieth our position. When Soli∣man vndertooke the warre of Hungary, against Charles the 5. Andrew Doria Generall of his galleies, with a very small armie troubled all the Leuant, tooke by maine force Coron and Patras, and harrowed all those seas without controule or encounter of the enemies: whence followeth, that if the Christians would as I haue saide, at one instant set vpon the Turke, they would force him no doubt into a narrow straight.

4 There is one point that would make the enterprise ea∣sie, more forcible and lasting, but it would hardly be disge∣sted, and that is to draw all Christian Princes which confine not with the Turke, to contribute vnto it. All these suppose themselues free from danger and make no reckning of o∣thers sufferings, in whose behalfe they thinke they should not cōtribute, as those that were like to haue but the charge and the other the profit. In a word, all catholike Princes are so wedded to this particular interest, which is euer more differing and vnequall among them (as hath beene before alledged) as the league would neuer be thorowly concluded or of long continuance, this must of necessity be forgotten, and the only desire of the exaltation of the Church of God must be that which must range them to the necessarie point, whereof they need not trauell to seeke examples out of their owne houses, which if they would but imitate all would succeed wel, to inuite them to it I wil alledge one.

The principall aime of the league set on foote by God∣frye of Buillion, and of so many Princes and Nobles some greater then himselfe which accompanied him, was not placed but vpon the particular honour of the Maiesty of God, whereabout euery man emploied himselfe with such zeale and deuotion, as without attending the succours or furtherance of any great King or Emperour, they drew to∣gether an army of an hundred thousand horse and three

hundred thousand foote, wherewith they subdued almost all the east.

5 Leauing apart all these considerations let vs come to the opinion that some haue of their being far from dan∣ger, and we shall finde peraduenture that they are neerer thereto then they are aware.

When Amurath came first out of Asia into Europe was not Hungary (which is now subiect to the Turke) farther off from the confines of the Ottomans Empire then are now the countries of Saxony or of Bauiers, then they of Franconia, the Swichzers and the French? yet we see it now most in his possession.

6 Shall we then say because we haue a mountaine before vs, or a riuer betweene vs, or some estate that seemeth to shelter vs, that therefore we should hold our selues happy and in security, and not be touched with others danger and misery? No surely. For if we be Christians we ought not only to haue compassion of others calamities, but afforde them also our good and charitable assistance: moreouer he that measureth future things but by the consequence of things present, findeth himselfe oft times beguiled; we are to haue such prouident care of what is present, & to come, that we may leaue to ours the same assurance we wish to our selues, to the end to preserue them by this prouidence from such danger as they might incur after vs. And though we should not carry that regard of our children and poste∣rity, and that the consequence of our estate did not spur vs on to such an enterprise, shall there remaine in vs so little courage and charity, loue and deuotion to the glory of God, from whom we haue our being and of whom wee hold our powers, as that we should all forget to husband his vineyard, and expell thence such as intrude themselues into it and pollute it? wherefore serue all those heapes of treasure which the Princes of Lombardy amasse, one in enuy of an other? whereupon will those so mighty Prin∣ces of Germany and the Imperiall townes spend their reue∣nues and incomparable riches? what occasion can all of

them finde more goodly then this to attaine to an immor∣tall glory? It is then for the inlarging the kingdome of Christ that we must imploy all we haue, and for the deliue∣rance of those sacred places ouer which those barbarous in∣fidels tyrannize, to redeeme so many thousand of poore Christian slaues which suffer and grone vnder the yoake of that inraged dogge, to giue life to an infinite number of Christians, to reuenge their wrongs, to punish the iniurires & blasphemies which that tyrant and his helhounds haue breathed out against the glory of God, his holy name and church. And if humaine appetite must needs be an actor in this theater, it would be an easie matter for great Princes that send their forces, to vrge this consideration in the capi∣tulations, that they should haue in fauour of their contri∣butions part of the spoiles and conquests that they might happily obtaine. Againe, if the loue of the seruice of God had a working in them, they might vndertake in person the Generall conduct of the army, or command part of the confederat troupes. Godfrey a poore Prince, in comparison of those that now sway Christendome, alienated the Duchy of Bouillion for so godly a voyage. Stephen Count of Chartres did the like with his estate, as did also many great men, who had no other motiue thereunto then the enter∣prise of the holy land. Charles the seuenth King of France, did he not succor the Emperour of Constantinople with a great number of horse which he sent him vnder the con∣duct of the greatest personages of his kingdome? And must we sit idle with crossed armes whilest the cruell flames of this infidels tyranny burne and consume the houses of our neighbours?

CHAP. X.

Wherein consist the greatest forces of the Turke.

• 1 Whether the Ianizzars be the chiefe strength of the Turke.
• 2 That horse are more necessary in the war then foote.
• ...

• 3 The progresse of the Turke before and after the institution of the Ianissars.
• 4 Victories gotten by the horse.
• 5 Ouerthrowes giuen by the enemies horse to the Christians.
• 6 Conclusion that horse in seruice excell foote.

IT seemeth that the greatest part of such as discourse of the forces of the Turke at∣tribute his chiefe strength to the band of Ianizzars, as the only sinew of his power: and amongst other reasons wherewith they striue to fortify their oppinion, this is one. It hath hapned many times that the army of the Ottomans hath beene so hardly laide to, as the battaile hath been in a manner lost, yet haue they gathered strength and kept themselues on foote, yea they haue gotten the victory, and all through the vertue and valour of these Le∣gionaries.

2 Machiauel discourseth vpon this point, and as one much passionate holdeth himselfe to this argument, that foote are more necessary then horse in all exploites of war, and he laieth his principall foundation vpon the example of certaine Romaine Captaines, which (saith he) to breake into, and force the enemy on foote haue caused their men at armes to alight from their horses and fight on foote a∣gainst them: It is a poore argument and of small impor∣tance, since that for once that they made their horsemen alight, an hundred occasions were offered to make them mount on horse backe if they had the commodity of horse; he which is on horsebacke may when he please alight, but a footeman cannot get vp on horsebacke when hee will. This mony shall serue to pay Machiauel whom I leaue to proceed forward. I affirme, that in a ranged battaile, and in the plaine field the forces of the Turke consist and prin∣cipally rely on the horse. The proofes are cleere and at hand, as the processe of this discourse shall discouer.

3 First no man is ignorant of the great victories the

Turk got long time before the institution of the Ianizzars. Amurath the second the yeere 1420. was he that first or∣dained them: yet Ottoman had before that taken Sebasta (a city of importance in Asia) where he slew aboue an hun∣dred thousand of his enemies. Orcan his sonne had dis∣poiled the Emperour of Constantinople and of Bithinia at seuerall worthy incounters. Amurath the first had passed Asia into Europe, with his forces tooke Gallipoli, Filipoli, and Andrinople; and we may thinke that he did not ob∣taine those victories without dangerous and bloudy in∣counters: he conquered also diuers other cities and wan many other victories of the Princes of Seruia and Bulgaria, whom he compelled to stoope vnder the yoake of his obe∣dience. Baiazet the first ouercame Sigismonde King of Bo∣hemia, and put all those French to the sword which Charles the 6. of France sent to his succour. Calepin his sonne vn∣derstanding that Sigismond had raised an army, vpon the newes of the ouerthrow giuen by Tamburlaine to Baiazet, to salue his losses went to meete him at Salumbezza, and so valiantly incountred him, as his whole army was cut in pee∣ces, so as it cannot be said that the victories the Turke hath obtained since the institution of Ianizzars haue beene ei∣ther greater or more memorable then the former, rather they were the steps to these other happy atchieuements. The beginning of things containe in them the efficient vertue of the whole. This disputation might proue great and might ballance on either side, if I did not ad waight to one of the opinions.

I will then say, that before the institution and seminary of Ianizzars, the Turks receiued but one memorable ouer∣throw at mount Stella at the hands of Tamburlan the most strong enemy that euer they assaied, and that after their institution they receiued more and greater, as were those of Vsumcassan, of Iohn Huniades, of Mathew Coruin, of the Mamelucks, of the great Scanderbag, of Don Iohn of Au∣stria, of the Kings of Persia and others.

4 The second proofe which I will produce to fortifie the

truth of my proposition, is, that all such as haue had the better hand of the Turkes, euer had it by the meanes of their horse, wherein they did exceed the enemy in num∣ber and strength, as we haue so often saide of the Persians and of the Mamelucks. The great Sophi ••••mael, had he not vanquished Selim the second with the strength of his horse, if when he did set vpon the rier-ward, where the Turke was in person, the thunder of his Cannon had not so affrighted the horse, as they ran away with their masters, to the disordering of the whole armie? The onely thing that ouerthrew the fortune which the Persian had almost alreadie in his possession. Cudabeuda King of Persia, hath many times ouercome the Turkish forces, by the onely strength of his horse, whereof he hath more and is better armed then the other. The Hungarians in like sort haue many times put the Turkes to the woorse by their fight on horsebacke.

5 The third and strongest proofe of my assertion, is, that all the harmes we haue receiued of the Turke, haue come by his horse, as at Nicapolis, at Salembezza, at Varna, at the riuer of Moraua, at Exechium, at Buda and else∣where.

6 And if it euer hapned that the Ianizzars recouered the battaile halle lost, it is to be imputed to this, that they were reserued for the rierward; so as it was easie for fresh men to repell those which were already weakned and tyred. But I thinke no man but will grant, that if instead of the Ianiz∣zars they had beene as many horse, they had performed as much. As on the contrarie, if the other had kept in store some fresh troupes of horse, as the Turkes, they had dealt otherwise with them, and kept them well enough from be∣reauing them of the victorie. In conclusion, the horse are they that defeat the enemie, and become masters of the field, that prepare the way for the foote to the beseeging of townes, and giue them time and leisure to force and take them.

CHAP. XI.

Where the Turke might be most easily assailed to ouercome him either by sea or by land.

• 1 Examples of sea victories.
• 2 The goodnesse of our hauens.
• 3 The number of our skilfull mariners.
• 4 The Christians farre beyond the Turkes in maritime mat∣ters.
• 5 The Turkes horse fearefull to the Christians, vnprofitable at sea.
• 6 That the Turkes are easily to be ouerthrowne at sea.

1 THere were much matter for doubt and disputation vpon this question, if rea∣son and experience did not cleere it: for experience we haue it fresh in many ac∣cidents; which instruct vs that an at∣tempt by sea, would be lesse difficult to vs, and more hurtfull to the Turke, for the reasons and examples which I will deliuer. As often as our forces haue to some purpose put themselues into the Leuant seas, they haue beene euermore victorious, as at Metelin, at Cafalo∣nia, at Preuesa, at Scorsolari. If any one opposing me ob∣iect the ouerthrow of our armie at Gerbes, which hapned about the same time, let him read the discourse of the Hi∣storie, (as is requisite) and he shall finde that that chanced not through the force and valour of the enemy, but rather through our owne fault; insomuch as our armie could not take their opportunitie to dislodge in due time; but suf∣fered themselues to be besieged by the hardnesse of the season, and by tempests; which so disordred them as it was easie for the enemie to force them. Grimani Generall of

the Venetians, let slippe the occasion of a woorthy victo∣rie, when he knew not how to take his time to charge the enemie, as he might well haue done at Sapienza. But on the contrarie, as often as the Emperour Charles the fift set foorth an armie to some purpose, the Turke durst neuer looke abroad; as when he vndertooke the voyage of Tu∣nis and of Algiers, where neuerthelesse he encountred many disasters, he brought before Tunis seauen hundred saile, and before Algiers fiue hundred onely. Thus much for experience.

2 Now we must see what reasons we haue in store to prooue that we may more easily assaile the Turke by sea then by land. Among others this may passe, that our seas are more frequented, and our ports more rich and safe then those of the Leuant. For first (set aside Constantino∣ple) there is not thoroughout their obedience, any one Porte that may be equalled to those of Venice, Lisbone, Siuill, Antwerp, London, Amsterdam, Lubec, or Danske, &c. and very few also that may be compared with those of Naples, Genoua, Villa-Franca, Nessina, Palermo, Ragusa, Marsseilles, Tolon, Bourdeaux, New-Hauen, Rochelle, and Rouane, &c.

3 It is cleere then that we surmount the Turke not only in numbers of Portes and good harbers for the retraict and shelter of our armies, but also in Mariners and men accustomed and experienced in both the seas. Moreouer, there is not perhaps in the world a coast that affoordeth greater plentie of men then that of Genoua, Dalmatia, Sclauonia, Venice, Candye. Againe, there is not a nation to be found of more resolution or better proofe for sea af∣faires, then are those of Marseilles. I omit to speake of the Catalonian, the Portugal, the Biskayan, the English, the Norman, the Hollander, and Zelander, all people mar∣ueilous skilfull in Nauigation.

4 I would willingly demaund, what it auaileth the Turke to possesse a large and spacious sea bordering country, if it remaine vnhabited; neither were it enough if it were: for

the exploits of maritime warre, it is requisite they be vali∣ant, resolute, and such as can endure trauell and paine. Alongst all the coast of Africke, the Turke hath not one Hauen of account besides Algies. In all Egypt hee hath only Alexandria, and Dalmatia, at the least which are held in any consideration. In Soria, take away Saffo and Pam∣philia, those neere Tirus, Ephesus, Cicize, and the rest so celebrated in ancient times, remaine at this day namelesse, and buried in their owne ruines. They haue Gallipoli which is of no great traffike: they haue that of Constanti∣nople, whereof they steade and vaunt themselues most of all: Moreouer, all these Ports are not so good or so con∣uenient as ours, either if we consider the forme, or the commoditie of situation, nor so well stored with artillerie as ours are.

5 Againe, fighting by sea, wee shall not need to feare their horse, whose encounter in regard of their multitude cannot be but a terror vnto vs; relying as they doe vpon them, as the principall nerue of their forces; but as for foote, we excell them in number and valour:

6 For conclusion, it is most certaine, if we could once depriue the Turke of the vse of the sea, he would be soone ouerthrowne by land with a sufficient number of gallies, which might be maintained in the Archipelago: we should cut him off from all trafficke with Egypt and Soria, as also keeping certaine gallies in the Straight and chanell, we should hinder the commerce of Asia and Constantinople, which he could not be long without, so that by continuing this manner of warring vpon him without intermission, we should by little and little heaue him out of the whole Empire of Greece, where there would be enough to satiate the greedie am∣bition of the Chri∣stians.

CHAP. XII.

Of the inward causes whereby the Empire of the Turkes may come to ruine.

• 1 Of inward causes by which an Estate may be ouerthrowne.
• 2 The occasions of the change of the Turkish Empire, are, a defect that may happen of the Ottoman race:
• 3 The hatred, contempt, and disobedience of the Turkes of∣ficers and seruants:
• 4 The discorde that may arise betweene his children about the succession.
• 5 That it is hard now to stirre vp and maintaine dissention amongst them.
• 6 Another occasion may be the Iannizzers libertie and inso∣lencie towards their master:
• 7 Another the rebellion and reuolt of his countries and their Gouernours.

1 AS we haue before deliuered by what outward causes the Empire of the Turks may soonest receiue an alterati∣on, so we are now to handle the meanes whereby he may be inwardly weake∣ned, and whether by the infirmities which are begotten in other estates, that of the Ottomans may be likewise distempered and corrupted; of the inward causes of this corruption, some concerne the Heads and Ministers, others are deriued from among the people. I will then produce some few examples noting the errors of such as sway a Soueraigne authority, and so orderly come to the other, to collect thence what may serue to procure the Turkes ruine.

2 That which would fall most to our purpose would be if the great Turke should die without heires of the true line

and race of Ottoman. For in such a case it is likely the Beg∣lerbyes, Vizirs, Bassas, Sangiacks, and the greatest persona∣ges of the Turkish nation, would each one for himselfe in∣deauour to possesse himselfe of whatsoeuer he could most easily compasse.

3 The second cause would be, if in regard of his cruelty, or negligence, the Prince should giue his subiects occasion to hate and contemne him: but the mischiefe would proue yet greater if it did arise from the cowardlinesse or sloath of the Prince. For his strength consisting wholly in the great numbers of his souldiours ordinarily intertained, how could he possibly containe such mighty armies in deuoti∣on and quietnesse; if he did not daily busie them in the exercise of war? And lesse how could so many nations be held within compasse of feare and obedience without the feare of ordinary armes? It is not to be doubted then if they had a Prince who were giuen ouer to idlenesse and a loose life, or that they discried him to be a coward & sloth∣full, but they would be forward to draw their swords a∣gainst him, and thence worke their owne destruction. Ba∣iazet the second had proofe of this, for abandoning him∣selfe to all pleasures and resoluing vpon a priuat and retired course of life, to spend his time in reading good authors; his sonne sought his destruction, and in the end fauored by the Ianizzars depriued him of his life and kingdome. For though Baiazet repressed the first violence of his sonnes ambition, yet he was at the last forced by the Ianizzars not only to pardon his rebellion, but also to send him with an army against his other sonne Accomat, who supposing his father ment to prefer Selim before himselfe, who was the elder, caused the noses and eares of his fathers messengers most shamefully to be cut off; the enormity of this fact ill digested, and worse interpreted was that which cancelled the greater faults of Selim, to take vengeance of this last & lesse outrage; whence it came to passe in the end that these same Ianizzars possest Selim of the empire, who soone af∣ter put to death his vnhappy father. Amurath the third

now raigning hauing withdrawne himselfe from the acti∣ons of war to liue in ease and quiet hath lost much of his souldiours and seruants ancient obedience, zeale, and ob∣seruance, such as they were wont to carry towards their Soueraignes greatnesse. The Bassa of Cairo who had the gouernment of Aegypt, named Ragusei, being summoned (according to their Emperious custome) to make his ap∣pearance at the port, flatly refused to come thither and made his escape with a world of treasure which he had a∣massed by extorsions and pilling of the people, during the time of his administration. The Ianizzars which were at those times appointed for the wars of Persia, would not once moue a foote to march thitherward: but as halfe in a mutiny said plainly they would not any more go vpon any enterprise vnlesse the great Turke their Lord would vn∣chamber himselfe from among his concubines, and vnder∣take the voyage himselfe in person, so as he was constrai∣ned by vertue of giftes and increase of pay to win them to the war. Moreouer of late after the ouerthrow of Tauris, the Turke hauing appointed a new generall for the succo∣ring of his vanquished army, and reenforcing of such as remained within the cittadell; all the commandements he could lay vpon him, could not preuaile so much with him as to get him to march forward, rather he grew to capitu∣late with him, and that finished, he made the most adoe in the world to muster vp twenty thousand men, who refu∣sed likewise to goe to that war, otherwise then vpon all the aduantages they could deuise to demand: not like sub∣iects and slaues, but as if they had beene neighbours, al∣lies, and confederates. These breaches already made in the obedience they were wont to render thir lord and Ma∣ster, may perswade vs that they will easily rebell, vpon the first occasion that shall present it selfe without respect of their Princes greatnesse, or obseruation of their ancient military policy.

4 The third occasion might befall, if there were many brethren to debate the Empire after the death of their fa∣ther,

as it hapned between Zizimus, and Baiazet, sonnes of Mahomet, and betwene Acomat and Selim, sonnes of Ba∣iazet. This Baiazet was fauoured of the Ianizzars against his brother. Zizimus was vpheld onely by the aid of the Soldan of Cairo, and King of Persia. Selim likewise was borne by the Ianizzars and Bassas, and Acom••nt by forraine Princes: they incountred and fought cruel battailes, whose victories brought the whole Estate in danger: Baiazet and Selim remained conquerours, each one his party by meanes of the great numbers of men that accompanied them, and of the valour of the souldiours of the old bandes which serued vnder them. Notwithstanding all these op∣portunities which God so to the purpose prepared, not one Christian Prince once stirred, or so much as made of∣fer to arme in fauour of the weaker of those which conten∣ded: which would no doubt haue entangled both of them in a long and dangerous strife, enough finally to haue rui∣ned or much decaied the house of the Ottomans, when they should haue called such an one to their succour as would haue rather blowen then quenched their fires. A∣mongst all the Princes of Christendome there was none but the great master of Rhodes, which sent some supplies of artillery to Zizimus, and which after receiued and de∣fended him from the hands of Baiazet, when he was dri∣uen to retire himselfe to his protection.

5 These domestique quarrels cannot now become so strong (especially such as might happen betweene bre∣thren) as then they might, considering that the Mame∣lucks, who as neighbours might haue fomented and giuen intertainment to such differences, are now extinct and their name no more mentioned. They were in their time the only emulators of the Turkes glory: Rhodes hath made an exchange of her fortune, and is now in the power of this tyrant. Cypres beareth the like yoake. These two Ilands affoorded an especial commodity to sow dissentions among the Turks, to fauour and succour one of the parties.

6 The fourth cause would easily arise from the presump∣tion

and head-strong rashnesse of the Ianizzars, likely e∣nough to attempt and execute as much as sometime did the Pretorian bands of the Romans, who made slender ac∣count to fill the Empire with slaughters and massacres, wherein many Emperours ended their daies: they electing others at their pleasures against the authority of the Senat, and the loue and reuerence they ought to haue borne to∣wards their country. The like may we hope or expect from the Ianizzars, that they will one day assume to themselues the same power and learne to performe the like, whereof they gaue an assaie at such time as they compelled Baiazet the second to resigne the Empire to Selim his sonne. They did almost the like when Soliman caused his sonne Musta∣pha to be murthered; for they besieged him and inuironed his tent for certaine daies space, crying out they would know the cause of that yong Princes death. In the end by the deuise of the Bassa and with stoore of coyne, he wan to him foure thousand of them, who disengaged him of the feare and danger wherein he was plunged.

7 The fift cause may be fetched from the ambition or discontent of the great ones of the countrie, or of mini∣sters swaying the supreame authority & credit in places of gouernment. Gazeles gouernour of Soria made way for a reuolt of the like quality, as did also Acomat Generall of Aegypt: Gazeles, assisted by the Mamelucks, Arabians and those of Rhodes, endeuoured to set himselfe vp against the great Turke: but he was discouered by Cayembeius whom he had acquainted with the conspiracy. This man either for feare (as looking into the danger of the enterprise) or for enuy of his companions greatnesse, reuealed all to his Master Soliman, who presently dispatched against him Fa∣ratha Bassa, by whom he was vanquished in battaile. Aco∣mat had not the leasure to proceed far in his attempt, for as he did inconsideratly precipitate himselfe into the triall thereof, so was he as speedily discouered, and in an instant suppressed and slaine, without hauing thriued ought in his dessignes.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the mixt causes.

• 1 What are the mixt causes.
• 2 How Estates are ouerthrowen by mixt causes.

1 IN this third booke we haue at large dis∣coursed how by inward and outward causes, Estates may be indangered: now we must speake of causes compounded, of the one and the other, which, to dis∣course more intelligibly, we tearm mixt, which likewise are of power of themselues to alter an Em∣pire and to bring it, either by an vniuersall or a particular change, to a lamentable ruine. These mixt causes then are those whereby both the enemy abroad, and the subiect at home may by a common consent conspire against an E∣state and subuert it.

2 One of the causes or meanes may be a popular insurre∣ction nourished by the enemy, or else the conspiracy of some particular men set on by forraine practises; or to tearme it better, the treasons which subiects may hatch in fauour, and by the meanes and authority of their neigh∣bours. This hapneth in a twofold manner, when the sub∣iect beginneth and setteth on foote the practise, or when a stranger laieth the way open vnto them vnder some cou∣lered pretence, or else when some one particular person or all a whole communalty frame the occasion thereof in re∣gard of some displeasure or oppression. Finally, this falleth out also when the enemy abroad tempereth with one, two, or three, of the principall men to reuolt against their prince and take armes in hand to ouerturne and ruine the Estate.

CHAP. XIIII.

How particular persons may be gained.

• 1 How his people are to be prouoked to rebellion.
• 2 How his great men and chiefe officers are to be gained.
• 3 These courses at the first not succeeding, are to be oftner at∣tempted.
• 4 Wary proceeding is requisite, lest those that manage the bu∣sinesse incurre danger.
• 5 To whom such businesses are to be committed.

1 IT resteth now that we make it appeere how such practises may be set on foote and cherished: we will then beginne with the enterprise to bee plotted by some particular person, by whose assi∣stance it may take effect. We must pre∣suppose that this person is either priuat or publike, the priuat persons are those which suffer themselues most of∣ten to be corrupted by mony, and with these there neede not so many ceremonies or bro••kings, but if they be pub∣like persons of rancke and authority, either in regard of the greatnesse of their family, or managing of state affaires; there is far greater difficulty in corrupting them then the other: yet if we may but discouer in them the stinges of ambition and desire of greatnesse, and that we propose to them the assurance of speedy succours, for the execution of the des••••gne; then is it that we bring them to dare any thing, especially if they haue neuer so little disposition to be reuenged of some receiued indignity. It is indeed a hard matter to worke particular and priuate persons without great vncertaineties and dangers.

2 But if we must haue to doe with the great persons of the Estate, we must warily make choice of our time, sound

them whether they be male content or ill affected towards their Prince, either in respect that some one is aduanced to their preiudice, or for some other cause which may awake in them a longing to shake off their yoake and seaze them∣selues of the Estate. These are the meanes and occasions, which should be chosen and diligently husbanded by our Christian Princes, smoothly and with dexterity to procure the ruine of the common enemy; putting on (as they say) the foxes skin when the lions is wanting. The dis∣pleasure and ielousie which Faratha Bassa conceiued a∣gainst Hebraim Bassa because he saw him raised by Soliman to greater honour and estimation then himselfe, so depri∣ued him of all reason, as suffering the desire of reuenge by little and little to transport him, he began to plot a rebelli∣on, but discouered he was forthwith put to death: the selfe same occasion was the ouerthrow of Pirrus and Mu∣stapha raised by Soliman. In our time in the court of Amu∣rath the third now raigning, these ielousies and hart-bur∣nings haue beene great betweene Mahomet and Musta∣pha, and since that betweene the same Mustapha and Cica∣la (who hath outstript him) and all for fauour of their Master. If these humors and ill dispositions had beene well looked into and wisely imploied to their best vse by some great Prince of Christendome, they had beene fit matter to haue bred a dissention and reuolt amongst those barba∣rous people.

3 Now though such practises should not perhaps at the first be of sufficient power to worke that vniuersall change which we wish in that tyrants Empire; yet are we not there∣fore to desist as men dismaied; remembring that most commonly the beginnings of innouations and commoti∣ons so extraordinary, are feeble, and that that wisdome sheweth it selfe like it selfe which can so diligently suckle and nourish them as they may attaine to a happy growth. I am of opinion, that when we incounter with instruments that are not without ambition, courage, and a thirst of reuenge; after we haue felt and sounded them once, twise,

or thrise, we shall in the end make a breach in their loyalty and obedience; especially if we set before them (be it vn∣der a true or false title) the certaintie of some mightie suc∣cour, whereof they may see the preparatiues; for so they will the more couragiously attempt against the life and estate of their Prince.

4 Moreouer it is not to be forgotten, that when such practises shall be discouered by the Turke, and that he shal see the Christians more diligent then hitherto they haue beene, to sound the affections of his seruants and sub∣iects: he will thereupon enter into such a distrust of them, as euen that will make him offer them some hard measure. This distrust will be enough to beget a thousand suspitions and hard conceits in his seruants, and subiects, either for the managing of affaires, or for the danger that the opi∣nion of loyaltie incurreth, when it hath to deale with such a distrustfull and suspitious Prince, as this would prooue: so as by little and little it would worke vs out some occasi∣on fitting our purpose, especially, if whilest this practise were hatching, and on foote, the children of the Turke should take armes one against the other, or that during their fathers life, they should dispute the possession of the Empire: for the ice being already broken, there would be a more easie passage and better successe, then if it had not beene taken in hand at all.

5 But because an especiall iudgement, patience, and much wisedome are requisite in such businesses, we must make choice of men furnished with all these parts, to the end they may wisely know when to take their opportuni∣ties and times, to sow these dissentions, and that there be not want of mony to distribute amongst this people, which are farther in loue therewith, then any other nation the world affoordeth.

CHAP. XV.

How the people of the Turke may be wrought from his obedience.

• 1 How the Turkes Christian Subiects are to be wrought to rebellion.
• 2 A place must be chosen for refuge of such as rebell.
• 3 The vaine fooleries of their Alkoran are to be discouered.
• 4 How bookes written to that purpose may come to his subiects hands.
• 5 How such bookes are to be composed.
• 6 What fruites are to be hoped from their reading.
• 7 Exhortation to the Ianizzars.
• 8 The conclusion of this worke.

1 THe Turke hath two sorts of people subiect to his Empire; one followeth the sect of Mahomet; the other the truth of the Gospel of Iesus Christ. The Mahometanes are quiet, as those which being of one and the same law, haue no cause to make any tumult. The Christians cannot stirre, as being ouer topped and awed by a greater power then their owne, which curbeth them so, as there is no better way to moue them to rebel, then to make them handle (as it were) and see the assurance of an approching succour, to prouide them of armes and all other furniture for the wars: for otherwise it is impossible they should dare to make the least shew once to mooue, whilest they haue the enemie ouer them alwaies in a readinesse and armed, who would in a moment confound them, especially being as they are naked and vnprouided of armes, offensiue or defensiue. Selim the second doubting the woorst, by the counsaile of Occhially, caused al the Christians inhabiting the sea coasts,

to retire themselues farre vp into the maine land, to the end the presence of the Christian forces should not incou∣rage them against him, as it hapned at such time as Andrew Dorea atchieued the enterprise of Patras and Coron.

2 If the Christians should euer vndertake the like dis∣signe they ought to take especiall heede how they vnship their succours in those parts of the continent where the horse are at hand, since they were likely enough by their strength to choake at the first the reuolt of the Christians, for so mighty are they in horse, and of such speed and dex∣terity, as they would in an instant beare downe before them whatsoeuer should oppose them. Wherefore it would be better to enter by Albania and by places mountanous and of difficult accesse, where the horse are not able to serue, as in the plaine. This is as much as we ment to say of such Christians as are vnder the Turkes dominions, all which I will imagine want not will to rebell, if the Princes of Chri∣stendome would furnish them of meanes.

3 Now let vs see what way were best to be taken to pro∣uoke the Mahometans to reuolt, and to fill their countries with troubles, and ciuill dissentions. If we will but consi∣der how their religion is fraught with vntruthes, their Al∣coran abounding in follies, we shall finde it easie to picke matter enough out of it to set them together by the eares, especially if wee doe but disperse among them certaine bookes fit to conuert them, or make them doubt of the foolish superstitions they obserue, composing them for Europe in the Sclauonian tongue, and for Asia in the Arabian.

4 But because it would be hard to conuey these bookes into the countries of the Turkes obedience but that they would soone perceiue the deuice and speedily remedy it: It were best beginning far off, in the Indies and in the parts of Asia and Africke held by the Portugales: for because of the trafficke which is great in those parts many Turkish Marchants and others ariue there from all quarters. They come to Mozambique in Africke, to Zophala and Quiloe

in Asia. They descend also as low as the Moluccas, Co∣chien, Goa, Dia, Ormus, and sundrie other parts apper∣taining to the crowne of Portugale. These bookes also might be dispersed abroad in the countrie of the Gentiles, which are friends and confederates of the Christians, as in Calicut, Zailan, Cambeia, and others; and the like at Oran, Arzilla, and in other parts of Arabia subiect to the crowne of Spaine and Portugall, and in all other parts of Europe which border vpon the Turkes.

5 There must be a care had that the title of the booke be so coloured, as it doe not at the first discouer the intent of the author, but rather that it intice them to peruse it with a certaine curiosity and shew of pleasantnesse and delight. It is requisite also that the discourse be not fraught with a∣ny disputations or subtill point against the Articles of their beleefe, but that contrariwise it be full of tales and matter fit to moue laughter; yet with some well conueied passage which may by the way discouer or make them doubt of the fables of their Alcoran.

6 The Turkish Marchants or others, into whose hands this booke should light, would cōfidently reade it in those parts where the Turke is not obeied. And though per∣haps they durst not aduenture to carry it with them, yet the impression and substance of what they had read would re∣maine fixt in their mindes, so as they would after relate it as newes to their friends and families, in such sort as it would grow by little and little to be diuulged thereabout, whence would spring a longing in others which should come and goe into those countries to buy & reade them: In this manner the Alcoran in processe of time would grow out of credit amongst them, and those things which with scruple and obseruation they collect thence, would turne to a iest and subiect of laughter, whence there could not but insue some schisme and diuision amongst them, for the most religious men of their sect and the most interested would oppose themselues wilfully to maintaine it. Neither

would it make for the purpose to make mention in any sort of our Sauiour Christ, much lesse to let it be knowen that the author thereof were a Christian: for the immortall ha∣tred they beare to that name would make it odious, and would bring it at the very first to be reiected. It should ra∣ther be so contriued as if it came from some other of an o∣ther sect, wherein a man might borrow the hand of the inhabitants of Cambaia, of India, of Arabia, or of Persia. In this manner it would be better welcome and would carrie with it more estimation and authority.

7 It were well also if there were framed and published a remonstrance to the Ianizzars in the Sclauoman tongue, whereby might be signified vnto them their originall, and howe in their infancy they were cruelly halled from the bosomes of their Christian fathers and mothers, conueyed into Turky, and there nusled vp in the sect of Mahomet, not hauing iudgement as then to distinguish of good and euill; that they are the pillers to vphold this Tyrant which hath set his foote vpon the throat of their fathers liberty, and which keepeth them as slaues vnder the yoake of a dis∣honorable and barbarous seruitude. This would auaile much, especially if there were thereto annexed an exhorta∣tion to take better knowledge of themselues, and hence, forward like good children to imbrace and free their mise∣rable parents, which daily lament them; and aboue all to perswade them to returne to the deare bosome of the church wherin they were first, regeuerate and which atten∣deth with spread armes to receiue them, entertaine them, and saue them.

8 These things well caried would in the end make the Turke so suspitious, and vntractable, as he would offer oc∣casions enow to his people hencefoorth to rouse vp themselues, and better aduise how to shake off that cruell and vnsupportable yoake which so mightily oppresseth them, and to fashion themselues to a more happy and se∣cure life for the quiet of their consciences and saluation of

their soules. This is that whereof the Christians ought di∣ligently to bethinke themselues; and not to worke one an others ruine and destruction, as they spare not to doe against the expresse commandement of God, which so often recommendeth vnto vs loue and cha∣ritie towards our neighbours.

FINIS.

Notes

• Anno 714.
• 1516.
• 1570.
• 1565.
• Quae non pro∣sunt singula, multa ••uuant.
• 1474.
• 1397.
• 1439.
• 1440.
• 1482.
• 1529.
• 1537.
• 1570.
• 1532.
• Alcut 1088.
• 1363.
• Machiauels opinion for foote.
• 1305.
• 1363.
• 1396.
• 1397.
• 1580.
• Vid. 181.
• 1511.
• 1482.
• 1513.