Politicke, moral, and martial discourses. Written in French by M. Iaques Hurault, lord of Vieul and of Marais, and one of the French kings priuie Councell. Dedicated by the author to the French-kings Maiestie: and translated into English by Arthur Golding

CHAP. I. ¶Of Wisedome, and Discreetnesse.

IN old time, when by Gods suffe∣rance Oracles had place, the citie of Delphos was renowned through the whole world, for the prowd and state∣ly temple there, which was dedicated and consecrated to Apollo, whereunto folke resorted frō al parts of the world to aske counsell, and to heare the an∣swers that were giuen by his image. At the enterance of this goodly Temple, were written these words, KNOW THY SELFE. In the interpretation of which words, many haue erred, imagining that a man knows himselfe, when he can skill of the things that concerne his duetie or office, and his mysterie, trade of liuing, or profession; as when a Sur∣gion can skill to launce a sore, or a Phisition to heale a disease, or a Shoomaker to make a Shoe. But none of all these is the knowing of a mans selfe. And though a man beheld all the parts of his bodie, yet knew he not himselfe the more for all that. For as Plato saith, He that knoweth his bodie, kno∣weth that which is his, but he knoweth not himselfe. So that neither Phisition nor handicraftsman knoweth himselfe, but their knowledge is of things that are separated from them∣selues. Wherefore to speake properly, none of them accor∣ding

to their art, can bee said to be wise. Likewise hee that hath a care of his owne body, mindeth that which is his, and not himselfe. And vvhosoeuer loueth a man, cannot bee dee∣med to loue his bodie, but his soule. Therefore vvhen we say, a man must know himselfe: it is as much to say, as hee must haue a care of his soule, to prepare it to the knowing of God his maker, after whose image it is created, that hee may, as it were in a looking glasse behold the inuisible Godhead, the ef∣ficient cause of wisedome, and of all good things; and that by the knowledge of the vertues which God hath giuen vn∣to him, he may consider how greatly he is indetted vnto God, and that he hath not any thing of himselfe, but that all com∣meth of God. And when he knoweth what he is, that is to wit a reasonable creature, then lifteth he vp his heart (as is soong in the church); that is to say, he lifteth vp his mind to the au∣thor of his welfare.

Now then, to know God, it behooueth to haue the know∣ledge of our selues, that is to wit, of our inward man, which is framed of diuine essences, to the intent we despise not the hea∣uenly vnderstanding and mind that was giuen to man in his creation, for want of knowing it aright, and for want of consi∣dering the vertue and power thereof; least through want of such vnderstanding thereof, in steed of being wise and wel ad∣uised, and in steed of chusing the good way, wee follow the woorser, and (as Dauid saith) Become like the horse and mule, for not considering what God hath bestowed vpon man. Therefore it standeth vs on hand to consider from whence we be, and to what end we be created; that by beholding the excellencie which we haue receiued of God, we may submit our selues wholy vnto him, and to his wisedome; which inui∣teth vs thereunto, as is to bee seene in fiue hundred places of the booke of Wisdome. Those then which refer al their acti∣ons to the said first cause, we call Wise men, according to the writings both of the Bible, and also of the Heathen authors, specially of the great Mercurie, Plato, and Cicero, who affirme, That the first point of wisedome, is to know a mans selfe. And

by this knowledge a man shall perceiue wherat he ought to leuell himselfe, and so he shall foresee the impediments that may hinder & annoy him. He then which hath not wisdome, cannot discerne what is his, or what is well or ill done; neither can we know what is ours, vnlesse we know our selues. And he that knoweth not what is his, is also ignorant what is another mans; and consequently he is ignorant what belongeth to the commonweale, and so shal he neuer be good housholder, or good common-weales man, because he knoweth not what he doth. By reason wherof, he shall walke on in error, wande∣ring and mistaking his marke; so as he shall not atchieue any thing of value, or if he doe, yet shall he be but a wretch. For no man can be happie or gouerne happily, vnlesse he be good and wise, because it is only he that discerneth good from euill. Now if this saying may be verefied of al mē, much more with∣out comparison doth it agree to princes than to other men, be∣cause they haue authoritie aboue all: and to execute authori∣tie well, it behoueth to haue Discretion and Wisedome. For reason would, that the wise should commaund the ignorant, according to the saying of Ecclesiasticus, That the free-borne shall serue the bondmen that are wise. And as Dennis of Hali∣carnassus saith, It is a law common to all, that the better sort should commaund the worser. It is they therefore to whom the said goodly precept is chiefly appointed, to the end they should know the being and state of their soule, the force and power wherof consisteth in wisdome, whose ground is truth. For it is the propertie of wisdome to discerne the truth of all things, whereby the darknesse of ignorance is driuen out of our mind, and light is giuen vnto vs. In this respect Iacob hauing gotten wisdome by trauel, is said in Genesis to haue had the sight of God: because that to the actiue life, he had also ioyned the contemplatiue. In so much that we may say, that the wise man is the cleeresighted, and hath iudge∣ment & reason to discerne good from euil, that he may keepe himselfe from being deceiued. For nothing is more contrarie to the grauitie of a wise man, than error, lightnes, and rashnesse.

And although Wisdome and Discreetnesse doe well be∣seeme all men, because it is the propertie of man to search the truth, as who (being partaker of reason, gathereth the cō∣sequencies of things by considering their principall causes and proceedings:) yet notwithstanding Wisdome is an essen∣tiall thing in princes and gouernors. For nothing doth so firmly stablish a principalitie, as a wise man, who (as saith Ec∣clesiasticus) instructeth his people, and the faithfull are the fruits of his vnderstanding. The wise man shal be replenished with blessednesse, and as many as see him shall commend him. And in the third chapter of Salomons Prouerbs, it is said; That the purchace of Wisdome is more worth, than all that euer a man can gaine by the trafficke of gold and siluer; and all that euer man can wish is not comparable vnto hir. For that very cause there was a writing in the foresaid temple of Del∣phos, which commaunded men to honor Wisdome and iu∣stice, whom Hesiodus and Pindarus faigned to sit at Iupiters side. Wherefore we may well say, That Wisdomes is the mo∣ther of all good things, and the tree of life that was in the earthlie Paradise, as saith S. Austine in his thirteenth booke of the citie of God. And to shew the excellencie therof yet more, Ecclesiasticus saith, That Wisdome is a greater aid and strength to a wise man, than ten gouernors are to a country. And therefore in the 16 of the Prouerbs it is said, That Pro∣phesie is in the lips of a king; which thing is meant of a wise king. After which maner he saith in another place, that the delight of a king is in a wise seruant; which is to be vnderstood of a good and wise king. For commonly els such men are not welcome to princes. But as Aesop saith, either a man must please a king, or els he must not come at him.

Bion was wont to say, That Wisdome goeth before the other vertues, as the sight goeth before the other sences, and that without wisdome there is no vertue at all. For how were it possible for the iust man to yeeld vnto euery man that which belongs to him, if Wisdome had not taught him what is due to euery man? Therfore afore wee enter into the

morall vertues, it is requisite by the way to speake a word of the contemplatiues; namely of Wisdome and Discreation: because that without contemplation ioyned with skill, a man can doe nothing that is beautifull and good. The Stoiks make no difference betweene these two vertues, sauing that Wisdome consisteth in the knowledge of things belonging both to God and man; and Discreetnesse consisteth only in things belonging to man. For both of them be contempla∣tiue vertues, proceeding from the mind and vnderstanding. But yet one of them is meerely contemplatiue, that is to wit, Wisdome, which (after the opinion of antient Philoso∣phers) is occupied but in contemplation of the heauen, the earth, and the stars, respecting nothing but such things as are euerlasting and vnchanged; and because they be not subiect to any alteration, man needeth not to scan of them. And as Aristotle saith in his sixt booke of Morals, It behooueth a wise man not only to vnderstand whatsoeuer may be gathe∣red of principles, but also to vnderstand the principles them∣selues truly, and to speake truly of them. And as a Geometri∣cian scanneth not whether a triangle haue three angles made by the meeting and closing together of three right lines, but holdeth it for an vndoubted certaintie; so the contemplatiue vnderstanding, doth not so much as dreame of any thing that admitteth any alteration; neither is it subiect to consulting and deliberating. But Discreetnesse, which is cumbered with things vntrue, erronious, and troublesome, and is to deale with casuall aduentures, is driuen to consult of things doubt∣full, and after consultation to put it selfe in action. For as Cicero saith, All vertue consisteth in action. Concerning the which, we will hold still the precept which he giueth vs in his books of Duties, where he saith, That whosoeuer will be wise, must eschew two vices, one is, he must not vphold things vnknown as known: and to eschew the falling into that vice, he must spend time and labour in considering things aforehand. For if a mans wit be not confirmed and fortified by reason, he doth easily wauer, and is easily driuen from the discourse wheron

he was grounded at the first. Therefore it behooueth that the resolution whereto he sticketh be firme, and not subiect to alteration, least he doe things afore he haue well considered and tried thē, and so it befal him as doth to liquerous persons, which oftentimes desire some meat with ••ouer-earnest appe∣tit, wherof whē they haue once had their fil, by & by they be weary of it, which thing happeneth to such as enterprise any thing lightly, and without good aduisement aforehand. But the choice that is grounded vpon sure knowledge and firme discourse of reason, dooth neuer alter, though the thing that was vndertaken come not to good end. The other vice wher∣of Cicero maketh mention, is, that some men set all their stu∣die vpon things difficult and needlesse, after the maner of the ouer-profound wisdome of men in old time, to the which wis∣dome Socrates would in no wise giue himselfe. Therfore let vs omit that kind of wisdome, as wherof we haue not to treat here, and wherunto we cannot attaine. For the former Philo∣sophers gaue themselues the title of Wise men; yet notwith∣standing, those that haue bin wiser than they, would not take that title vnto them. As Pithagoras, who said, He was but only a louer of wisdome. And Socrates, who confessed himselfe to know nothing. By reason wherof he was accounted the wisest man of his time. And neuer since was there any man so proud and presumptuous, as to take that title vpon him. As for vs that are Christians, we ought to reiect it vtterly, because the name of wisdome is attributed to the sonne of God, and that God only is wise: so that we agree with the philosophers, That wisdome consisteth rather in heauenly things, and in a cer∣taine contemplation, than in action. And therfore letting it alone, we will returne to the other contemplatiue vertue, which is called Discreetnesse, and (commonly) Wisdome al∣so. But that is an vnpropper kind of speaking, whether we ap∣ply the tearme to matter of vnderstanding, or to matter of art. As for example, when we say that Phidias was a wise in∣grauer, in so saying we intend to shew the vertue of the art, because wisdome is the perfectest of all skils. Which word

Wisdome, I shall be faine to vse sometimes, (because it is so vsed in our common speech) not for the wisdome that sear∣cheth things diuine, wonderfull and hard to attaine vnto, but for the vertue of deliberating, which we call Discreetnesse, wherewith we haue to deale in humane affaires. For as Ari∣stotle saith in his sixt booke of his Morals, No man consulteth of things that are vnpossible, and whose end is not the good that consisteth in action. But Discreetnesse which the com∣mon sort call wisdome, and consisteth chiefly in the choise of good from euil, is not goten but by aduised deliberation, wher∣through we refuse the euill and chuse the good. Which thing cannot be done by a foole, or by a harebraind person. For as Sa∣lomon saith in his Prouerbs, The foole hath no delight in Discreetnesse, but in the imaginations of his owne heart. Phi∣l•• the Iew expounding the first chapter of Moses, saith, That by the knowledge of good and euill, Discreation is to be vn∣derstood, which discerneth and deemeth as a iudge be∣tweene one thing and another. Therefore let vs come to the definition of Discreetnesse, the which Cicero in his Acade∣miks calleth the Art of liuing, and which we may say to be the way and path that leadeth to the morall vertues. Aristo∣tle saith, that Discreetnesse is an habit matched with the ve∣ry reason that is peculiar to action, and discourseth what is good or euil. And in another place he saith, That it is the ver∣tue of the reasonable part, which prepareth the things that pertain to happinesse, meaning the happinesse that cōsisteth in the good estate of the soule, and not in the outward euent of things. For the well doing of things is the end of our actiōs, & of our taking of thē in hand. And therfore a good housholder, whom we call a good husband, & a good cōmon-weale man, whom we call also a man that hath good skill in matters of state; (of whom the one hath an eye to the things that are good for himselfe, and the other to the things that are good for the common-weale) are esteemed wise and discreet, when they performe their charge well. There is yet another difference betweene a discreet man, and a wel-aduised man.

For the man which aimeth at some certaine point, and im∣ployeth all his naturall wits to reach therunto, if it be for an euill end, is neuerthelesse accounted wel-aduised, wheras (to say more truly) he is subtle and wilie; and if it be for a good end and in a vertuous matter, he is counted wise and discreet. For as Aristotle saith in his Morals, It is vnpossible for an euill man to be wise. But he that in all thing seeth cleerely what is true, and can by good iudgement and sharpenesse of wit conceiue the reason therof; that man is reputed wise, and therfore men seeke vnto him in all their affaires. And as in sailing (saith Socrates) men beleeue the Pilot of the ship; so ought we to beleeue the wisest in al the actions of our life. For the Pilot guideth the ship by his discretion; and as Ho∣mer saith in his Iliads, One Wagoner outgoeth another by his aduisement. It is not by the strength and lightsomnesse of body: but by discreation and well-aduisednesse, that men doe great things. And as Horace saith in his Odes, Force without discretion ouerthroweth it selfe. For wisdome is better than strength, saith Ecclesiasticus. And Salomon saith in his Prouerbs, that the wise man hath great strength; for by discretion is warre made, and by good counsell is victorie obtained. Phocili∣des saith: that a wise man is more worth than a strong man. And Euripides saith, That wise counsell is able to vanquish great hosts. And therefore at Lacedemon the captaine that had compassed his matters by policie, did sacrifice to their gods with an Oxe; and he that had compassed them by force, sacri∣ficed a cocke. For although they were a warlike people, yet they deemed that exploit to be greater and more beseeming a man, that was atchieued by good aduisement, skill, and rea∣son, than that which was executed by valeantnesse and force of arms. And as Alamander the Sarzin said, Those that are of most skill in warre, how strong soeuer they be besides, had le∣uer to intrap their enemies by sleights and policies, than to encounter them valiantly at the swords point. And Blondus in his triumph at Rome saith, That the chiefe of an armie should fight by discretion and policie, rather than by bold∣nesse

and valiancie, because there is no comparison betweene wisdome and strength of bodie. For he that thinks there is no good to be done but by hand-strokes, is so farre off from being valiant, that he is rather to be esteemed rash, hare-braind, and furious.

Cicero in his booke of inuention saith, That there are of dis∣creetnesse three parts, Memorie, Skill, and Fore-cast, Memo∣rie, whereby things past are called to mind againe; Skill, which knoweth and vieweth things present; and Fore-cast, which considereth what may happen afore it come. Others doe set downe eight parts of discreetnesse; to wit, Remem∣brance, Fore-cast, Skil, Reason, Quickenesse of wit, Teacha∣blenesse, Experience, and Warinesse. I count him a discreet man that is sufficient to gouerne others. For the doing wher∣of foure things are to be considered; first the good wherunto the discreet man leadeth others, wherein it behoueth him to haue remembrance and fore-cast. The maner of gouerning, for the which it behooueth him to bee a man of skill and reason. In his leading of other men he must haue cunning and liueli∣nesse of wit, and he must be teachable and easie to beleeue good counsell. And in respect of all those whome hee gouer∣neth he must be of good experience, and wel-aduised, that he may refuse the euill and chuse the good. The contrarie to discreetnesse, is vndiscreetnesse or wilfull ignorance, when a man neither knoweth nor will learne to know any thing, (which is the thing that most troubleth the life of man; and as Plato saith in his Lawes, That man is ignorant which musli∣keth the good, and loueth that which is noughtworth.) And when the will is bent against skil and reason, which naturally beareth chiefe sway.

Discreetnesse then is a vertue of the mind proceeding from a good vnderstanding and iudgement, which is encrea∣sed by knowledge and experience, and consisteth in the loo∣king into things, to the end that men may find them easie and readie to be delt with, afore they goe in hand with them, foreseeing what may or should ensue by things already past.

And because the euents of things (as saith Aristotle) yeeld not themselues vnto our wils, we must apply our wils to the euents, howbeit so as our wils be ruled by discretion. For mans life is like a game at tables, where if a man meet with a cast of the dice that he would not haue, he must amend it by his cunning in play, as good table-players doe. The effects of dis∣creation are to take deliberation, to discouer good and euill, and whatsoeuer els is to be followed or shunned in this life, to vse all maner of goods honestly, to be of good conuersation with all men, to foresee occasions and aduentures, and to haue experience of good and profitable things. As touching me∣morie and quicknesse of wit, experience and knowledge, ei∣ther they be helps to discretion, as experience and memorie; or els they make a part of discretion, as skill and quicknesse of wit. Thus you see what wisdome is, the which Aristotle, spea∣king of the vertues, doth rightly terme the queen of al other vertues, as which sheweth vs the order that we ought to keepe in all things, which driueth away all incumberance and feare out of our mind, maketh vs to liue in tranquilitie, and quencheth all the heat of lust and couetousnesse. S. Iohn Chrysostome vpon the thirteenth Psalme, calleth it the lan∣terne of the soule, the queene of thoughts, and the schoole∣mistresse of good and honest things. It is a vertue royall in deed, and the helme and helue of kings, without the which they cannot gouerne well. This is it that made kings at the beginning (as I haue said heretofore) and chose them out of the people, as most discreet and worthie of all the multitude. By wisdome men dispose of things present, & foresee things to come. By it we bridle our affections, & purchase honour, as Salomon saith in the fourth of the Prouerbs, It maketh vs to gouerne orderly, both in matters of peace and war; and suffe∣reth vs not to fall nor to be surprised vnawares: It maketh vs to doe the good, and to eschew the euill. For Wisdome (as Alexander of Aphrodyse saith) is the skil what is to be done, and what is to be left vndone. Therefore only the wise man is worthy to gouerne And (as Plato saith) happie be those com∣mon-weales

and kingdomes, where Philosophers are kings, or the kings be Philosophers. For the wise man or Philoso∣pher hath this prerogatiue aboue othermen, that he liueth after the rule of vertue, without musing vpon lawes, because he vseth reason for his law, as Antist••enes and Aristippus said, insomuch that if all lawes were abolished, yet would he not cease to liue vprightly, as one that knoweth what is honest, and what is vnhonest.

Aristotle being demaunded what profit he reaped of Phi∣losophie, answered, That I doe those things vncommaunded, which other men doe for feare of lawes. For the law is not set downe for the righteous, but for the vnrighteous, saith S. Paul▪ And therefore, if he that raigneth be not wise, his kingdome cannot be happie. Cursed is that kingdome where a babe raigneth, because the babe wanting the vse of reason, cannot order his affaires with aduised Discretion. Cirus was woont to say, That no man ought to take vpon him the charge of commaunding, vnlesse he were better than they whom hee is to commaund. For he that is a good man and commaundeth well, is commonly well obayed. When one had said that Lacedemon had bin vpheld by the skilful∣nesse of the kings to commaund well; nay (quoth Theopompus) but rather by the skill of the inhabitants to obay wel. For the cōmandement of the prince & the obediēce of the subiects, are answerable either to other. For commonly men mislike to obay those, which haue no skil to cōmaund wel. Insomuch that the faithful obediēce of the subiect dependeth vpon the sufficiencie of a good prince to commaund well. For he that well guideth, causeth himselfe to be well followed. And like as the perfection of the art of riding and of the rider, consi∣steth in making the horse obedient, and in subduing him to reason: euen so the principall effect of a kings skill, is to teach his subiects to obay well.

Antonie the Meeke was a vertuous and wise emperor, and so well aduised in all his doings, that he neuer repented him of any thing that he did. Wherat a Senator of Rome marue∣ling,

asked him how it came to passe, that his affaires had so good successe, that he neuer repented him of any thing that he did, that he was neuer denied any thing that he asked, and that he neuer commaunded any thing which was not obayed. It is (quoth he) because I make all my doings confor∣mable to reason; I demaund not any thing which is not right∣full, and I commaund not any thing which redoundeth not more to the benefit of the commonweale, than to mine own profit. To conclude, Wisdome is a shield against all misfor∣tune. Men in old time were wont to say, that a wise man might shape his fortune as he listed; supposing that misfortune, be it neuer so ouerthwart, is wonderfully well ouer ruled by the discreation of a wise and sage person. And as Plutarch saith in the life of Fabius, The Gods doe send men good lucke and prosperitie, by means of vertue and discreation, notwithstan∣ding that the euents of fortune be not all in our power, as said Siramnes, who being demaunded why his so goodly & so wise discourses had not euents answerable to their deserts; because (quoth he) to say and to doe what I list is in mine owne power, but the sequele and successe thereof, is altogether in fortune, and in the king. Therefore when Phocion the Athenian had resisted Leosthenes in a certaine case, wherof notwithstanding the euent was prosperous, and saw that the Athenians glori∣ed of the victorie which Leosthenes had gotten, I am well con∣tented (quoth he) that this is done, but yet would I not but that the other had bin councelled. Iulius Caesar gloried in his good fortune, but yet his bringing of his great enterprises to passe, was by his good gouernment and experience in feats of warre. To be short, the wise and discreet man findeth nothing strange, neither feareth he any thing, no not though the whole frame of the world (as Horace saith) should fall vpon him. The reason wherof is, that he had minded it long time afore∣hand, and had fore-considered what might happen vnto him, and had prouided remedie for all by his foresight and discrea∣tion. For as Salomon saith, The mind of the wise shall not be attainted, no not euen with feare. Such folke are not subiect,

neither too great greefe, nor too excessiue ioy: they neuer wāt hope, neither do they quaile for any misfort••ne: so that they be hard to be ouercome, because they be fully resolued of all things that may betide them, and do take order for all things aforehand by their wisedome. For wisedome (saith Salomon) is to his ownour as a liuely fountaine, as a deepe water, and as a flowing streame. And as a ioint of timber closed together in the foundation of a building, cannot be disioined, so also can∣not the heart that is stablished in the thoughts of discretion. And as S. Austin sayth, Wisdome teacheth vs to continue at one stay, both in prosperitie and aduersitie, like vnto the hand which changeth not his name, but is alwaies one, whether it be held out, or gathered vp together. And albeit that wisdome be a gift of God, and come of a well disposed mind, and of a good vnderstanding, yea and of a body that is well tempered, as witnesseth Galen in his first booke of Temperatures, where he sayth, That the first action of a man of good temperature, is Discretion; yet is it gotten by learning and discipline. For the true desire of discipline is the beginning of wisdome. Also it is gotten by long experience and knowledge of things past, and by continuall exercise in dealing, with sundrie affairs. For as Afranius sayd (by report of Aulus Gellius) Wisedome is be∣gotten by vse, and conceiued by memorie; meaning thereby, that it consisteth in bookes, which put vs in remembrance of things past, and in experience which is the vse and practise of wisedome. In so much that neither he that hath but only lear∣ning, nor he that hath but only experience, is able to attain vn∣to wisdome: but he that will deale perticularly and vniuer∣sally in all affairs, must haue them both, as well the one as the other. And as Aristotle saith, there are three things needfull to the obtainment of Wisdome, namely, Nature, Learning, and Exercise. For it is in vaine to striue against Nature, Lear∣ning must be had at learned mens hands, and Exercise is the perfection of learning. And therefore it will not be amisse to treat of Learning and Experience.

Notes

• What it is to know ones selfe.
• To know God, it behooueth a man to know himselfe.
• The first point of wisedome is to know ones selfe.
• The better sort ought to rule the wor∣ser.
• Cicero in his Academiks.
• Cicero in his books of Duties.
• The excellen∣cie of Wis∣dome.
• Wisdome the mother of all good things.
• Wisdome go∣eth before all other ver∣tues.
• Of Wisdome.
• Plutarch in his treatise of Morall ver∣tue.
• Wisdome is not subiect to doubting.
• All vertue consisteth in action.
• A man must not vphold things vn∣known, for knowne.
• Plutarch in the life of Ti∣moleon.
• Of Discreet∣nesse.
• Discreetnesse is not gotten but by adui∣sed delibera∣tion.
• The definiti∣on of Dis∣creetnesse.
• The diffe∣rence be∣tweene a dis∣creet man, and a wel-ad∣uised man.
• Cicero in his Duties.
• Cicero in his Cato.
• The Lace∣demonians made more account of an exploit done by poli∣cie, than of an exploit done by force of arms.
• VVilfull igno∣rance.
• Cicero in his booke of Lawes.
• Therence in his Adelphis.
• The effects of Discreation.
• The praises of Wisdome.
• The wise stand not vp∣on lawes, but line by the rule of vertue.
• S. Paul to Ti∣mothie.
• The com∣maundement of the prince, and the obe∣dience of the subiect, are answerable either to o∣ther.
• Plutarch in the life of Li∣curgus.
• He that well guideth, is wel followed.
• Wisdome is a shield against all misfor∣tune.
• Prosperitie commeth of wisdome.
• The first actiō of a man of good tempe∣rature, is Dis∣cretion.