Of the lavves of ecclesiasticall politie eight bookes. By Richard Hooker.

The second Booke: Concerning their first position who vrge refor∣mation in the Church of England; Namely That Scripture is the onely rule of all things which in this life may be done by men.

The matter contained in this second Boooke.

• 1 AN answere to their first proofe brought out of scripture. Prou. 2.9.
• 2 To their second. 1 Cor. 10.31.
• 3 To their third. 1. Tim. 4.5.
• 4 To their fourth. Rom. 14.23.
• 5 To their proofes out of Fathers, who dispute negatiuely from the authoritie of holy scripture.
• 6 To their proofe by the scriptures custome of disputing from diuine authoritie negatiuely.
• 7 An examination of their opinion concerning the force of arguments taken from humane authoritie for the ordering of mens actions and perswasions.
• 8 A declaration what the truth is in this matter.

AS that which in the title hath bene proposed for the mat∣ter whereof we treat, is onely the Ecclesiasticall lawe where∣by we are gouerned; So neither is it my purpose to main∣taine any other thing, then that which therein truth and rea∣son shall approue. For concerning the dealings of men who administer gouernment, and vnto whom the execu∣tion of that law belongeth; they haue their iudge who sit∣teth in heauen, and before whose tribunall seate they are accomptable for what∣soeuer abuse or corruption, which (being worthily misliked in this Church) the want eyther of care or of conscience in them hath bred. We are no Patrones of those things therfore; the best defence whereof is speedie redresse & amend∣ment. That which is of God we defend, to the vttermost of that habilitie which he hath giuen: that which is otherwise, let it wither euen in the roote from whence it hath sprung. Wherefore all these abuses being seuered and set apart, which rise from the corruption of men, and not from the lawes themselues: come we to those things which in the very whole intier forme of our Church-politie

haue bene (as wee perswade our selues) iniuriously blamed, by them who endeuour to ouerthrow the same, and in stead therof to establish a much worse▪ onely through a strong misconceipt they haue, that the same is grounded on diuine authoritie. Now whether it be that through an earnest longing desire to see things brought to a peaceable end, I do but imagine the matters whereof we contend, to be fewer then indeed they are; or else for that in truth they are fewer when they come to be discust by reason, then otherwise they seeme, when by heate of contention they are deuided into many slippes, and of euery branch an heape is made: surely as now wee haue drawne them together, choosing out those things which are requisite to bee seuerally all discust, and omitting such meane specialties as are likely (without any great labour) to fall afterwardes of themselues; I knowe no cause why either the number or the length of these controuersies should diminish our hope, of seeing them end with concord and loue on all sides; which of his infinite loue and goodnes the father of all peace and vnitie graunt. Vnto which scope that our endeuour may the more direct∣ly tend, it seemeth fittest that first those thinges be examined, which are as seedes from whence the rest that ensue haue growne. And of such the most generall is that, wherewith we are here to make our entrance; a question not mooued (I thinke) any where in other Churches, and therefore in ours the more likely to be soone (I trust) determined. The rather for that it hath grown from no other roote, then only a desire to enlarge the necessarie vse of the word of God; which desire hath begotten an error enlarging it further then (as we are perswaded) soundnesse of truth will beare. For whereas God hath left sun∣dry kindes of lawes vnto men, and by all those lawes the actions of men are in some sort directed: they hold that one onely lawe, the scripture, must be the rule to direct in all thinges, euen so farre as to the taking vp of a rush or strawe. About which point there should not neede any question to growe, and that which is growne might presently ende, if they did yeelde but to these two re∣straints: the first is, not to extend the actions whereof they speake so lowe as that instance doth import, of taking vp a strawe, but rather keepe themselues at the least within the compasse of morall actions, actions which haue in them vice or vertue; the second, not to exact at our hands for euery action the know∣ledge of some place of scripture out of which we stand bound to deduce it, as by diuerse testimonies they seeke to enforce, but rather as the truth is, so to ac∣knowledge, that it sufficeth if such actions be framed according to the lawe of reason; the generall axiomes, rules, and principles of which lawe being so fre∣quent in holy scripture, there is no let but in that regard, euen out of scripture such duties may be deduced by some kinde of consequence, (as by long circuite of deduction it may be that euen all truth out of any truth may be concluded); howbeit no man bound in such sort to deduce all his actions out of scripture, as if eyther the place be to him vnknowne whereon they may be concluded, or the reference vnto that place not presently considered of, the action shall in that respect be condemned as vnlawfull. In this we dissent, and this we are presently to examine.

1 In all parts of knowledge rightly so termed, thinges most generall are most strong: Thus it must be, in as much as the certaintie of our perswasion touching

particulars, dependeth altogether vpon the credite of those generalities out of which they growe. Albeit therefore euery cause admit not such infallible eui∣dence of proofe, as leaueth no possibilitie of doubt or scruple behind it; yet they who claime the generall assent of the whole world vnto that which they teach, and doe not feare to giue very hard and heauie sentence vpon as many as refuse to embrace the same, must haue speciall regard that their first foundations and grounds be more then slender probabilities. This whole question which hath bene mooued about the kinde of Church regiment, we could not but for our owne resolutions sake, endeuour to vnrip and sift; following therein as neare as we might, the conduct of that iudiciall method which serueth best for inuen∣tion of truth. By meanes whereof hauing found this the head theoreme of all their discourses, who pleade for the chaunge of Ecclesiasticall gouernment in England, namely, That the Scripture of God is in such sort the rule of humane actions, that simply whatsoeuer we doe, and are not by it directed thereunto, the same is sinne; wee hold it necessarie that the proofes hereof be waighed: be they of waight suffici∣ent or otherwise it is not ours to iudge and determine: onely what difficulties there are, which as yet withhold our assent, till we be further and better satisfied, I hope no indifferent amongst them will scorne or refuse to heare. First there∣fore whereas they alleage that wisedome doth teach men euery good way; and haue thereupon inferred, that no way is good in any kind of action, vnlesse wisedome do by scripture leade vnto it: see they not plainely how they restraine the ma∣nifold wayes which wisedome hath to teach men by, vnto one only way of tea∣ching, which is by scripture? The boundes of wisedome are large, and within them much is contayned. Wisdome was Adams instructor in Paradise: wisdome indued the fathers, who liued before the law, with the knowledge of holy things by the wisedome of the lawe of God, Dauid attained to excell others in vnder∣standing; & Salomon likewise to excell Dauid, by the selfe same wisdome of God teaching him many things besides the law. The waies of well-doing are in num∣ber euen as many, as are the kindes of voluntarie actions: so that whatsoeuer we do in this world and may do it ill, we shew our selues therein by well doing to be wise▪ Now if wisedome did teach men by scripture not onely all the wayes that are right and good in some certaine kind, according to that of a S. Paule concerning the vse of scripture; but did simply without any ma∣ner of exception, restraint, or distinction, teach euery way of doing well; there is no art but scrip∣ture should teach it, because euery art doth teach the way how to do some thing or other well. To teach men therefore wisedome professeth, and to teach them euery good way: but not euery good way by one way of teaching. Whatsoeuer either men on earth, or the Angels of heauen do know, it is as a drop of that vnemptiable fountaine of wisdom; which wisdom hath diuersly imparted her treasures vnto the world. As her waies are of sundry kindes, so her maner of teaching is not meerely one and the same. Some thinges she openeth by the sacred bookes of Scripture; some things by the glori∣ous works of nature: with some things she inspireth them frō aboue by spirituall

influence; in some things she leadeth and traineth them onely by worldly ex∣perience and practise. We may not so in any one speciall kinde admire her, that we disgrace her in any other; but let all her wayes be according vnto their place and degree adored.

2 That all things be done to the glory of God, the blessed Apostle (it is true) exhorteth. The glory of God is the admirable excellencie of that vertue diuine, which being made manifest, causeth men and Angels to extoll his greatnes, and in regard thereof to feare him. By beeing glorified, it is not meant that he doth receiue any augmentation of glory at our hands; but his name we glorifie, when we testifie our acknowledgement of his glorie. Which albeit we most effectu∣ally do by the vertue of obedience: neuerthelesse it may be perhaps a questi∣on, whether S. Paule did meane that wee sinne as oft as euer wee goe about a∣ny thing, without an expresse intent and purpose to obey God therein. He saith of himselfe, I do in all things please all men, seeking not mine owne commoditie, but ra∣ther the good of many, that they may be saued. Shall it hereupon be thought, that S. Paule did not moue eyther hand or foote, but with expresse intent euen there∣by to further the common saluation of men? We moue, we sleepe, wee take the cuppe at the hand of our friend, a number of thinges we oftentimes doe, onely to satisfie some naturall desire, without present expresse and actuall reference vnto any commaundement of God. Vnto his glory euen these thinges are done which we naturally performe, and not onely that which morally and spiritu∣ally we doe. For by euery effect proceeding from the most concealed instincts of nature, his power is made manifest. But it doth not therefore follow, that of necessitie we shall sinne, vnlesse we expressely intend this in euery such parti∣cular. But be it a thing which requireth no more then onely our generall pre∣supposed willingnesse to please God in all things; or be it a matter wherein wee cannot so glorifie the name of God as we should, without an actuall intent to doe him in that particular some speciall obedience: yet for any thing there is in this sentence alleaged to the contrarie, God may be glorified by obedience, and obeyed by performance of his will, and his will be performed with an actuall intelligent desire to fulfill that lawe which maketh knowne what his will is, although no speciall clause or sentence of scripture bee in euery such action set before mens eyes to warrant it. For scripture is not the onely lawe whereby God hath opened his will touching all thinges that may be done; but there are other kindes of lawes which notifie the will of God, as in the former booke hath beene prooued at large: Nor is there any law of God, whereunto he doth not account our obedience his glory. Doe therefore all thinges vnto the glory of God (saith the Apostle), be inoffensiue both to the Iewes and Graecians, and the Church of God; euen as I please all men in all thinges, not seeking mine owne commodi∣tie, but manies that they may be saued. In the least thing done disobediently to∣wardes God, or offensiuely against the good of men, whose benefite wee ought to seeke for as for our owne, we plainely shew that we doe not acknow∣ledge God to be such as indeede he is, and consequently that we glorifie him not. This the blessed Apostle teacheth: but doth any Apostle teach, that we cannot glorifie God otherwise, then onely in doing what wee finde that God in Scripture commaundeth vs to doe? The Churches dispersed amongest the

Heathen in the East part of the world, are by the Apostle S. Peter exhorted, to haue their conuersation honest amongest the Gentiles, that they which spake euill of them as of euill doers, might by the good workes which they should see, glorifie God in the day of visitation. As long as that which Christians did was good, and no way subiect vnto iust reproofe; their vertuous conuersation was a meane to worke the Hea∣thens conuersion vnto Christ. Seeing therefore this had beene a thing alto∣gether impossible, but that Infidels themselues did discerne, in matters of life and conuersation, when beleeuers did well, and when otherwise; when they glorified their heauenly father, and when not: it followeth that some thinges wherein God is glorified, may be some other way knowne, then onely by the sacred Scripture; of which Scripture the Gentiles being vtterly ignorant, did notwithstanding iudge rightly of the qualitie of Christian mens actions. Most certaine it is that nothing but onely sinne, doth dishonour God. So that to glorifie him in all things; is to do nothing whereby the name of God may be blasphemed; nothing whereby the saluation of Iew or Grecian or any in the Church of Christ may be let or hindered; nothing wherby his law is transgrest. But the question is, whether onely Scripture do shewe whatsoeuer God is glo∣rified in.

3 And though meates and drinkes be said to be sanctified by the worde of God, and by prayer: yet neither is this a reason sufficient to prooue, that by scripture wee must of necessitie be directed in euery light and common thing which is incident into any part of mans life. Onely it sheweth that vnto vs the worde, that is to say, the Gospell of Christ, hauing not deliuered any such difference of thinges cleane and vncleane, as the law of Moses did vnto the Iewes; there is no cause but that we may vse indifferently all thinges, as long as wee doe not (like swine) take the benefite of them, without a thankefull acknowledgement of his liberalitie and goodnesse, by whose prouidence they are inioyed: and therefore the Apostle gaue warning before hand to take heede of such as should inioyne to abstaine from meates, which God hath created to be recei∣ued with thankes-giuing, by them which beleeue and know the truth. For euery creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be receiued with thankesgiuing, because it is sanctified by the word of God and praier. The Gospell by not making many thinges vncleane, as the lawe did, hath sanctified those thinges generally to all, which particularly each man vnto himselfe must sanctifie by a reuerend and ho∣ly vse: which will hardly be drawne so farre, as to serue their purpose, who haue imagined the word in such sort to sanctifie all thinges, that neither foode can bee tasted, nor rayment put on, nor in the world any thing done, but this deede must needes be sinne in them, which do not first knowe it appointed vnto them by scripture before they do it.

4 But to come vnto that which of all other things in scripture is most stood vpon; that place of S. Paule they say, is of all other most cleare, where speaking of those thinges which are called indifferent, in the ende he concludeth, that whatsoeuer is not of faith, is sinne. But faith is not but in respect of the worde of God. There∣fore whatsoeuer is not done by the worde of God, is sinne. Whereunto wee aun∣swere, that albeit the name of faith being properly and strictly taken, it must needes haue reference vnto some vttered worde, as the obiect of beliefe:

neuerthelesse sith the ground of credite is the credibilitie of thinges credited; and things are made credible, eyther by the knowne condition and qualitie of the vtterer, or by the manifest likelihood of truth which they haue in thēselues; hereupon it riseth, that whatsoeuer we are perswaded of, the same we are gene∣rally said to beleeue. In which generalitie, the obiect of faith may not so nar∣rowly be restrained, as if the same did extend no further then to the onely scrip∣tures of God. Though (saith our Sauiour) ye beleeue not me, beleeue my workes; that ye may know and beleeue that the father is in me, and I in him. The other Disciples said vn∣to Thomas, we haue seene the Lord; but his aunswere vnto them was, Except I see in his hands the print of the nailes, and put my finger into them, I will not beleeue. Can there be any thing more plaine, then that which by these two sentences appea∣reth, namely that there may be a certaine beliefe grounded vpon other assurance then Scripture; any thing more cleare, then that we are said not onely to be∣leeue the thinges which we knowe by anothers relation, but euen whatsoeuer we are certainly perswaded of, whether it be by reason, or by sense? For as much therefore as a it is graunted, that S. Paule doth meane nothing else by Fayth, but onely a full per∣swasion that that which we doe is well done; against which kinde of faith or perswasion, as S. Paule doth count it sinne to enterprise any thing, b so likewise some of the very Heathen haue taught, as Tully, that nothing ought to be done whereof thou doubtest whether it be right or wrōg; wherby it appea∣reth that euen those which had no knowledge of the word of God, did see much of the equitie of this which the Apostle requireth of a Christian man: I hope we shall not seeme altogether vnnecessarily to doubt of the soundnesse of their opinion, who thinke simply that nothing but onely the word of God, can giue vs assurance in any thing wee are to doe, and resolue vs that we doe well. For might not the Iewes haue beene fully perswaded that they did well to thinke (if they had so thought) that in Christ God the father was, although the onely ground of this their faith, had beene the wonderfull workes they saw him do? Might not, yea did not Thomas fully in the end perswade him∣selfe, that he did well to thinke that body, which now was raised, to bee the same which had bene crucified? That which gaue Thomas this assurance was his sense; Thomas because thou hast seene, thou beleeuest, saith our Sauiour. What scripture had Tully for his assurance? Yet I nothing doubt but that they who alleage him, thinke hee did well to set downe in writing a thing so consonant vnto truth. Finally, wee all beleeue that the Scriptures of God are sacred, and that they haue proceeded from God; our selues wee assure that wee doe right well in so beleeuing. Wee haue for this point a demonstration sound and infallible. But it is not the worde of God which doth or possibly can as∣sure vs, that wee doe well to thinke it his worde. For if any one booke of Scripture did giue testimonie to all; yet still that Scripture which giueth credite to the rest, would require another Scripture to giue credite vnto it:

neither could we euer come vnto any pause whereon to rest our assurance this way: so that vnlesse besides scripture there were some thing which might assure vs that we do well, we could not thinke we do well, no not in being assured that scripture is a sacred and holy rule of well doing. On which determination we might be contented to stay our selues without further proceeding herein, but that we are drawne on into larger speech by reason of their so great earnestnes, who beate more and more vpon these last alleaged words, as being of all other most pregnant. Whereas therefore they still argue, that wheresoeuer faith is wan∣ting, there is sinne, and in euery action not commaunded, faith is wanting; Ergo in euery action not commaunded, there is sinne: I would demaund of them, first for as much as the nature of things indifferent is neither to be commaunded nor forbidden, but left free and arbitrarie; how there can be any thing indifferent, if for want of faith sinne be committed, when any thing not commaunded is done. So that of necessitie they must adde somewhat, and at leastwise thus set it downe: In euery action not commaunded of God, or permitted with approbation, faith is wanting, and for want of faith there is sinne. The next thing we are to enquire is, what those things be which God permitteth with approbation, and how we may know them to be so permitted. When there are vnto one ende sundrie meanes, as for example, for the sustenance of our bodies many kindes of foode, many sorts of rayment to cloathe our nakednesse, and so in other things of like condition: here the end it selfe being necessary, but not so any one meane there∣unto; necessarie that our bodies should be both fed and cloathed, howbeit no one kinde of foode or rayment necessary; therefore we hold these things free in their owne nature and indifferent. The choice is left to our owne discretion, except a principall bond of some higher dutie remoue the indifferencie that such thinges haue in themselues. Their indifferencie is remoued, if eyther wee take away our owne libertie, as Anantas did, for whome to haue solde or helde his possesions it was indifferent, till his solemne vow and promise vnto God had strictly bound him one onely way: or if God himselfe haue precisely a∣bridged the same, by restraining vs vnto, or by barring vs from, some one or moe things of many, which otherwise were in themselues altogether indifferent. Many fashions of Priestly attire there were, wherof Aaron and his sonnes might haue had their free choice without sinne, but that God expressely tied them vnto one. All meates indifferent vnto the Iewe, were it not that God by name excep∣ted some, as swines flesh. Impossible therefore it is we should otherwise thinke, then that what thinges God doth neither commaund nor forbid, the same he permitteth with approbation either to be done or left vndone. All thinges are law∣full vnto mee, saith the Apostle, speaking as it seemeth, in the person of the Chri∣stian Gentile for maintenance of libertie in thinges indifferent: whereunto his answere is, that neuerthelesse All thinges are not expedient; in thinges indifferent there is a choice, they are not alwayes equally expedient. Now in thinges al∣though not commaunded of God, yet lawfull because they are permitted, the question is, what light shall shewe vs the conueniencie which one hath aboue another. For answere, their finall determination is, that whereas the Heathen did send men for the difference of good & euill to the light of reason, in such things the Apostle sendeth vs to the schoole of Christ in his word, which onely is able through faith to giue vs

assurance and resolution in our doings. Which word Only, is vtterly without possi∣bilitie of euer being proued. For what if it were true concerning things indiffe∣rent, that vnlesse the word of the Lord had determined of the free vse of them, there could haue bene no lawfull vse of them at all; which notwithstanding is vntrue, because it is not the Scriptures setting downe such thinges as indifferent, but their not setting downe as necessarie that doth make them to be indiffe∣rent: yet this to our present purpose serueth nothing at all. Wee inquire not now whether any thing be free to be vsed, which scripture hath not set downe as free: but concerning things knowne and acknowledged to be indifferent, whether particularly in choosing any one of them before another we sinne, if any thing but scripture direct vs in this our choice. When many meates are set before me, all are indifferent, none vnlawfull; I take one as most conuenient. If scripture require me so to do, then is not the thing indifferent, because I must do what scripture requireth. They are all indifferent, I might take any, scripture doth not require of me to make any speciall choice of one: I doe notwithstan∣ding make choice of one, my discretion teaching me so to doe. A hard case, that hereupon I should be iustly condemned of sinne. Nor let any man thinke, that following the iudgement of naturall discretion in such cases, we can haue no as∣surance that we please God. For to the author and God of our nature, how shall any operation proceeding in naturall sort bee in that respect vnacceptable? The nature which himselfe hath giuen to worke by, he cannot but be delighted with, when wee exercise the same any way with••ut commaundement of his to the contrarie. My desire is to make this cause so manifest, that if it were possible, no doubt or scruple concerning the same might remaine in any mans cogitation. Some truthes there are, the veritie whereof time doth alter: as it is now true that Christ is risen from the dead; which thing was not true at such time as Christ was liuing on earth, and had not suffered. It would be knowne therefore, whether this which they teach concerning the sinfull staine of all actions not commanded of God, be a truth that doth now appertaine vnto vs only, or a per∣petuall truth, in such sort that from the first beginning of the world vnto the last consummation thereof, it neither hath bene, nor can be otherwise. I see not how they can restraine this vnto any particular time, how they can thinke it true now and not alwaies true, that in euery action not commanded there is for want of faith sinne. Then let them cast backe their eyes vnto former generations of men, and marke what was done in the prime of the world. Seth, Enoch, Noah, Sem, Abraham, Iob, and the rest that liued before any syllable of the lawe of God was written, did they not sinne as much as we doe in euery action not commaun∣ded? That which God is vnto vs by his sacred word, the same he was vnto them by such like meanes as Eliphas in Iob describeth. If therefore we sinne in euery action which the scripture commaundeth vs not, it followeth that they did the like in all such actions as were not by reuelation from heauen exacted at their hands. Vnlesse God from heauen did by vision still shew them what to doe, they might do nothing, not eate, not drinke, not sleepe, not moue. Yea but euen as in darkenes candle light may serue to guide mens steps, which to vse in the day were madnes; so when God had once deliuered his lawe in writing, it may bee they are of opinion, that then it must needes bee sinne for men to doe any thing,

which was not there commaunded them to do, whatsoeuer they might do be∣fore. Let this be graunted, and it shall here upon plainely ensue, either that the light of Scripture once shining in the world, all other light of nature is ther with in such sort drowned, that now we need it not, neither may we longer vse it; or if it stand vs in any stead, yet as Aristotle speaketh of men whom nature hath fra∣med for the state of seruitude, saying They haue reason so farre forth as to conceiue when others direct them, but litle or none in directing themselues by themselues, so likewise our naturall capacity and iudgement must serue vs only for the right vnderstanding of that which the sacred Scripture teacheth. Had the Prophets who succeeded Moses, or the blessed Apostles which followed them, bene setled in this perswasion, neuer would they haue taken so great paines in gathering together naturall arguments, thereby to teach the faithfull their duties. To vse vnto thē any other motiue then Scriptum est, Thus it is written▪ had bene to teach them other grounds of their actions then scripture; which I graunt they alleage commonly, but not only. Only scripture they should haue alleaged, had they bene thus perswaded, that so far forth we do sinne, as we do any thing otherwise directed then by ••cripture. Saint Augustine was resolute in points of Christianity to credit none, how godly and learned soeuer he were, vnlesse he confirmed his sentence by the Scriptures, or by some reason not contrary to them. Let them therfore with Saint Augustine reiect and condemne that which is not grounded either on the Scripture, or on some reason not contrary to Scripture▪ and we are ready to giue them our hands in token of friendly consent with them.

5 But against this it may be obiected, and is, that the Fathers do nothing more vsually in their books, then draw arguments from the Scripture negatiue∣ly in reproofe of that which is euill; Scriptures teach it not, auoid it therefore; these disputes with the Fathers are ordinary, neither is it hard to shew that the Pro∣phets themselues haue so reasoned. Which arguments being sound and good, it should seeme that it cannot be vnsound or euill to hold still the same assertion against which hitherto we haue disputed. For if it stand with reason thus to ar∣gue, Such a thing is not taught vs in Scripture, therefore we may not receiue or allow it; how should it seeme vnreasonable to thinke, that whatsoeuer we may lawfully do, the Scripture by commanding it must make it lawful. But how far such arguments do reach, it shall the better appeare by considering the matter wherein they haue bene vrged. First therefore this we constantly deny, that of so many testimonies as they are able to produce for the strength of negatiue ar∣guments, any one doth generally (which is the point in question) condemne either all opinions as false, or all actions as vnlawfull, which the scripture tea∣cheth vs not. The most that can be collected out of thē is onely, that in some ca∣ses a negatiue argument taken from scripture is strong; whereof no man indued with iudgement can doubt. But doth the strength of some negatiue argumen•• proue this kind of negatiue argument strong, by force whereof all things are denied which Scripture affirmeth not, or all things which Scripture prescribeth not, condemned▪ The question betweene vs is concerning matter of action, what things are lawfull or vnlawfull for men to do. The sentences alleaged out of the Fathers, are as peremptory and as large in euery respect for matter of o∣pinion, as of action▪ which argueth that in truth they neuer meant any other∣wise

to tye the one then the other vnto scripture, bothe being thereunto equally tyed, as far as each is required in the same kind of necessitie vnto saluation. If therefore it be not vnlawful to know, and with full perswasion to belieue, much more then scripture alone doth teach; if it be against all sense and reason to con∣demne the knowledge of so many arts and sciences as are otherwise learned then in holy scripture, notwithstanding the manifest speeches of auncient Ca∣tholike fathers, which seeme to close vp within the bosome thereof all manner good and lawfull knowledge▪ wherefore should their words be thought more effectuall, to shew that we may not in deedes and practise, then they are to proue that in speculation and knowledge, we ought not to go any farther then the scripture? Which scripture being giuen to teach matters of beliefe no lesse then of action▪ the Fathers must needs be, and are euen as plaine against credit, be∣sides the relation; as against practise, without the iniunction of the scripture. Saint Augustine hath sayd, Whether it be question of Christ, or whether it be question of his Church, or of what thing soeuer the question be; I say not if we, but if an Angell from heauen shall tell vs any thing beside that you haue receiued in the scripture vnder the Law and the Gospel, let him be accursed. In like sort Tertullian, We may not giue our selues this liberty to bring in any thing of our will, nor choose any thing that other men bring in of their will; we haue the Apostles themselues for authors, which themselues brought nothing of their owne wil, but the discipline which they receiued of Christ they deliuered faithfully vnto the people. In which place, the name of dis∣cipline importeth not as they who alleage it would faine haue it construed; but as any man who noteth the circumstance of the place, and the occasion of vttering the words, will easily ac∣knowledge; euen the selfe same thing it signifieth which the name of doctrine doth, and as well might the one as the other there haue bene vsed. To helpe them farther, doth not Saint Ierome after the selfe same maner dispute, We beleeue it not because we reade it not? Yea, We ought not so much as to knowe the things which the booke of the Lawe containeth not, sayth Saint Hilarie. Shall we hereupon then conclude that we may not take knowledge of, or giue credit vnto any thing, which sense or experience or report or art doth propose, vnlesse we find the same in scripture? No, it is too plaine that so farre to ex∣tend their speeches, is to wrest them against their true intent and meaning. To vrge any thing vpon the Church, requiring thereunto that religious assent of Christian beliefe, wherewith the words of the holy Prophets are receiued; to vrge any thing as part of that supernaturall and Celestially reuealed truth which God hath taught, and not to shewe it in Scripture, this did the auncient Fathers euermore thinke vnlawfull, impious, execrable. And thus as their spee∣ches were meant, so by vs they must be restrained. As for those alleaged words of Cyprian, The christian religion shall find, that out of this scripture, rules of all doctrines haue spr••ng, and that from hence doth spring and hether doth returne whatsoeuer the Ec∣clesiasticall discipline doth cōteine: surely this place would neuer haue bin brought forth in this cause, if it had bene but once read ouer in the author himselfe out of whom it is cited. For the words are vttered concerning that one principall commaundement of loue, in the honour whereof he speaketh after this sort:

Surely this commaundement containeth the Law and the Prophets, and in this one word is the abridgement of al the volumes of scripture. This nature and reason and the authori∣ty of thy word O Lord doth proclaime, this we haue heard out of thy mouth, herein the perfection of all re∣ligion doth consist. This is the first commandement and the last: thing being written in the booke of life, is (as it were) an euerlasting lesson both to men and Angels. Let Christian religion reade this one word, and medi∣tate vpon this commaundement, and out of this scrip∣ture it shall find the rules of all learning to haue sprung, and from hence to haue risen, and hither to returne, whatsoeuer the Ecclesiasticall discipline containeth; and that in all things it is vaine and bootelesse which charity confirmeth not. Was this a sentence (trow you) of so great force to proue that Scripture is the onely rule of all the actions of men? Might they not hereby euen as well proue, that one commandement of Scripture is the onely rule of all things, and so exclude the rest of the Scripture, as now they do all meanes besides Scripture? But thus it fareth when too much desire of contradiction causeth our speech rather to passe by number, then to stay for waight. Well, but Tertullian doth in this case speake yet more plainely: The scripture▪ sayth he, denieth what it noteth not: which are indeed the words of Ter∣tullian. But what? the scripture reckoneth vp the Kings of Israell, and amongst those Kings Dauid: the scripture reckoneth vp the sonnes of Dauid, and amongst those sonnes Salomon. To proue that amongst the Kings of Israell there was no Dauid but only one, no Salomon but one in the sonnes of Dauid, Tertullians argu∣ment will fitly proue. For in as much as the scripture did propose to recken vp all, if there were moe it would haue named them. In this case the scripture doth de∣ny the thing it noteth not. Howbeit I could not but thinke that man to do me some peece of manifest iniury, which would hereby fasten vpon me a generall opinion, as if I did thinke the scripture to deny the very raigne of King Henry the eight, because it no where noteth that any such King did raigne. Tertullians speech is probable concerning such matter as he there speaketh of. There was, saith Tertullian, no second Lamech like to him that had two wiues; the scripture denieth what it noteth not. As therefore it noteth one such to haue bene in that age of the world; so had there beene moe, it would by likelihood as well haue noted many as one. What infer we now hereupon? There was no second Lamech; the scripture denieth what it noteth not. Were it consonant vnto reason to diuorce these two sentences, the former of which doth shew how the later is restrained; and not marking the former, to conclude by the later of them, that simply what∣soeuer any man at this day doth thinke true, is by the scripture denied, vnlesse it be there affirmed to be true? I wonder that a cause so weake and feeble hath bene so much persisted in. But to come vnto those their sentences wherein mat∣ters of action are more apparantly touched; the name of Tertullian is as before, so here againe pretended; who writing vnto his wife two bookes, and exhorting her in the one to liue a widdow, in case God before her should take him vnto his mercy; and in the other, if she did marry, yet not to ioyne her selfe to

an infidel, as in those times some widowes Christian had done for the aduance∣ment of their estate in this present world, he vrgeth very earnestly Saint Paules words, onely in the Lord: whereupon he demaundeth of them that thinke they may do the contrary, what Scripture they can shew where God hath dispensed and graunted licence to do against that which the blessed Apostle so strictly doth inioyne. And because in defence it might perhaps be replied, seeing God doth will that couples which are maried when bothe are infidels, if either party chaunce to be after conuerted vnto Christianity, this should not make separa∣tion betweene them, as long as the vnconuerted was willing to reteine the o∣ther on whom the grace of Christ had shined; wherefore then should that let the making of mariage, which doth not dissolue mariage being made? after great reasons shewed why God doth in Conuerts being maried allow continu∣ance with infidels, and yet disallow that the faithfull when they are free should enter into bonds of wedlocke with such, concludeth in the end concerning those women that so mary, They that please not the Lord, do euen thereby offend the Lord, they do euen thereby throw themselues into euill: that is to say, while they please him not by marying in him, they do that whereby they incurre his displeasure, they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an offer of themselues into the seruice of that enemy with whose seruants they linke themselues in so neere a bond. What one syllable is there in all this, preiudiciall any way to that which we hold? For the words of Ter∣tullian as they are by them alleaged, are two wayes misunderstood; both in the former part, where that is extended generally to all things in the neuter gender, which he speaketh in the feminine gender of womens persons; and in the later, where receiued with hurt, is put in stead of wilfull incurring that which is euill. And so in summe Tertullian doth neither meane nor say as is pretended, Whatsoeuer pleaseth not the Lord displeaseth him, and with hurt is receiued; but Those women that please not the Lord by their kind of marying, do euen thereby offend the Lord, they do euen thereby throw themselues into euill. Somewhat more shew there is in a second place of Tertullian, which notwithstanding, when we haue examined it, will be found as the rest are. The Romaine Emperours custome was at certaine so∣lemne times to bestowe on his souldiers a Donatiue; which Donatiue they receiued, wearing garlands vpon their heads. There were in the time of the Emperors Seuerus and Antoninus, many who being souldiers, had bene conuerted vnto Christ, and notwithstan∣ding continued still in that militarie course of life. In which number, one man there was a∣mongst all the rest, who at such a time comming to the Tribune of the army to receiue his Do∣natiue, came but with a garland in his hand, and not in such sort as others did. The Tribune of∣fended hereat demaundeth, what this great sin∣gularitie should meane. To whom the souldier, Christianus sum, I am a Christian. Many there were so besides him, which yet did otherwise at that time; whereupon grew a questi∣on, whether a Christian souldier might herein do as the vnchristian did, and

weare ••s they wore. Many of them which were very sound in Christian be∣liefe, did rather commend the zeale of this man, then approue his action. Ter∣tullian was at the same time a Montanist, and an enemy vnto the Church for condemning that propheticall Spirite, which Monta••••s and his followers did boast they had receiued; as if in them Christ had performed his last promise; as if to them he had sent the Spirit that should be their perfecter and finall in∣structer in the mysteries of Christian truth. Which exulceration of mind made him apt to take all occasions of contradiction. Wherefore in honour of that action, and to gall their minds who did not so much commend it, he wrote his booke De corona militis, not dissembling the stomacke wherewith he wrote it. For first the man he commendeth as one more constant then the rest of his brethren, Who presumed, sayth he, that they might well enough serue two Lords. Af∣terwards choller somewhat more rising within him, he addeth, It doth euen re∣maine that they should also deuise how to rid themselues of his martyrdomes, towards the prophecies of whose holy spirit they haue already shewed their disdaine. They mutter that their good and long peace is now in hazard. I doubt not but some of them send the Scrip∣tures before, trusse vp bagge and baggage, make themselues in a readinesse, that they may flye from Citie to Citie. For that is the only point of the Gospell which they are carefull not to forget. I knowe euen their Pastors very well what men they are, in peace Lions, Harts in time of trouble and feare. Now these men, saith Tertullian, They must be aunswered where we do find it written in Scripture that a Christian man may not weare a gar∣land. And as mens speeches vttered in heate of distempered affection, haue often times much more egernes then waight; ••o he that shall marke the proofes alleaged, and the answers to things obiected in the booke, will now and then perhaps espie the like imbecillity. Such is that argument whereby they that wore on their heads garlands, are charged as transgressors of natures lawe, and guilty of sacrilege against God the Lord of nature, in as much as flowers in such sort worne, can neither be smelt nor seene well by those that weare them▪ and God made flowers sweet and beautifull, that being seene and smelt vnto, they might so delight. Neither doth Tertullian bewray this weaknes in striking only, but also in repelling their strokes with whom he contendeth. They aske sayth he, What scripture is there which doth teach that we should not be crowned? And what scripture is there which doth teach that we should? For in requiring on the contrary part the aide of scripture, they do giue sentence before hand that their part ought also by scripture to be aided. Which answer is of no great force. There is no necessitie, that if I confesse I ought not to do that which the scripture forbiddeth me, I should thereby acknowledge my selfe bound to do nothing which the Scrip∣ture commandeth me not. For many inducements besides Scripture may leade me to that, which if scripture be against, they all giue place, and are of no value▪ yet otherwise are strong and effectuall to perswade. VVhich thing himselfe well enough vnderstanding, and being not ignorant that Scripture in many things doth neither commaund nor forbid, but vse silence; his resolution in fine is; that in the Church a number of things are strictly obserued▪ whereof no law of scripture maketh mention one way or other; that of things once receiued and confirmed by vse, long vsage is a law sufficient; that in ciuill affaires when there is no other law▪ custome it selfe doth stand for lawe; that in as much as law doth

stand vpon reason, to alleage reason serueth as well as to cite scripture; that whatsoeuer is reasonable, the same is lawfull whosoeuer is author of it; that the authoritie of Custome is great; finally that the custome of Christians was then and had bene a long time not to weare garlands, and therefore that vndoubtedly they did offend, who presumed to violate such a custome by not obseruing that thing, the very inueterate obseruation whereof was a law sufficient to bind all men to obserue it, vnlesse they could shew some higher law, some law of scrip∣ture to the cōtrary. This presupposed, it may stand then very well with strength and soundnesse of reason, euen thus to answer; Whereas they aske what scripture forbiddeth them to weare a garland, we are in this case rather to demaund what scripture commandeth them. They cannot here alleage that it is permitted which is not forbidden them: no, that is forbidden them which is not permitted. For long receiued Custome forbidding them to do as they did (if so be it did forbid them) there was no excuse in the world to iustifie their act, vnlesse in the scripture they could shewe some lawe, that did licence them thus to breake a receiued custome. Now whereas in all the bookes of Tertullian besides, there is not so much found as in that one, to proue not onely that we may do, but that we ought to do sundry things which the Scripture commaundeth not; out of that verie booke these sentences are brought to make vs belieue that Tertullian was of a cleane con∣trary minde. We cannot therefore hereupon yeeld, we cannot graunt, that hereby is made manifest the argument of Scripture negatiuely to be of force, not only in doctrine and ecclesiasticall discipline, but euen in matters arbitrary. For Tertullian doth plainely hold euen in that booke, that neither the matter which he intreateth of was arbitrary but necessarie, in as much as the receaued custome of the Church did tye and bind them not to weare garlands as the Heathens did; yea and further also he reckoneth vp particularly a number of things, whereof he expresly concludeth; Harum & aliarum eiusmodi disciplinarum si legem expostules scripturarum, nullam inuenies; which is as much as if he had sayd in expresse words, Many things there are which concerne the discipline of the Church and the duties of men, which to abrogate and take away, the scriptures negatiuely vrged may not in any case perswade vs, but they must be obserued, yea although no scripture be found which requireth any such thing. Tertullian therefore vndoubtedly doth not in this booke shew himselfe to be of the same mind with them by whom his name is pretended.

6 But sith the sacred scriptures themselues affoord oftentimes such argu∣ments as are taken from diuine authoritie both one way and other, The Lord hath commaunded, therefore it must be; And againe in like sort, He hath not, therefore it must not be; some certainty concerning this point seemeth requisite to be set downe. God himselfe can neither possibly erre, nor leade into error. For this cause his testimonies, whatsoeuer he affirmeth, are alwaies truth and most infal∣lible certainty. Yea further, because the things that proceed frō him are perfect without any manner of defect or maime; it cannot be but that the words of his mouth are absolute, & lacke nothing which they should haue, for performance of that thing whereunto they tend. Wherupon it followeth, that the end being knowne wherunto he directeth his speech, the argumēt euen negatiuely is euer∣more strōg & forcible, cōcerning those things that are apparātly requisit vnto the

same ende. As for example, God inten∣ding to set downe sundry times that which in Angels is most excellent, hath not any where spoken so highly of them as he hath of our Lord and Sauiour Iesus Christ; therefore they are not in dignitie equall vnto him. It is the Apostle Saint Paules argument. The purpose of God was to teach his people, both vnto whom they should offer sacrifice▪ and what sacrifice was to be offered. To burne their sonnes in fire vnto Baal hee did not commaund them, he spake no such thing▪ neither came it into his mind: therefore this they ought not to haue done. VVhich argu∣ment the Prophet Ieremie vseth more then once, as being so effectuall and strong, that although the thing hee reproueth were not onely not commaunded but forbidden them, and that expresly; yet the Prophet chooseth rather to charge them with the fault of making a lawe vnto themselues, then with the crime of transgressing a lawe which God had made. For when the Lord hath once himselfe precisely set downe a forme of executing that wherein we are to serue him, the fault appeareth greater to do that which we are not, then not to do that which we are commaunded. In this we seeme to charge the Lawe of God with hardnesse onely▪ in that with foolishnesse; in this we shew our selues weake and vnapt to be doers of his will, in that we take vpon vs to be controllers of his wisedome; in this we faile to performe the thing which God seeth meete, conuenient and good, in that we presume to see what is meete and conuenient better then God himselfe. In those actions therefore the whole forme whereof God hath of purpose set downe to be obserued, we may not otherwise do then exactly as he hath pre∣scribed; in such things negatiue arguments are strong. Againe, with a negatiue argument Dauid is pressed concerning the purpose he had to build a Temple vnto the Lord; Thus sayth the Lord, thou shalt not build me an house to dwell in. Wheresoeuer I haue walked with all Israell, spake I one word to any of the Iudges of Israel, whom I commaunded to feed my people, saying▪ Why haue ye not built me an house? The Iewes vrged with a negatiue argument touching the ayde which they sought at the hands of the King of AEgypt, Woe to those rebellious children (sayth the Lord) which walke forth to go downe into AEgypt, and haue not asked counsell at my mouth, to strengthen themselues with the strength of Pharao. Finally, the league of Ioshua with the Gabeonites is likewise with a negatiue argument touched. It was not as it should be: And why? The Lord gaue them not that aduise; They sought not counsell at the mouth of the Lord. By the vertue of which examples▪ if any man should suppose the force of negatiue arguments approued, when they are taken from Scripture in such sort as we in this question are pres∣sed therewith, they greatly deceiue themselues. For vnto which of all

these was it said, that they had done amisse in purposing to do, or in doing any thing at all which the Scripture commanded them not? Our question is, whether all be sinne which is done without direction by scripture, and not whether the Israelites did at any time amisse by following their owne minds, without asking counsell of God. No, it was that peoples singular priuiledge, a fauour which God vouchfafed them aboue the rest of the world, that in the affaires of their estate, which were not determinable one way or other by the scripture, himselfe gaue them extraordinarily direction and counsell as oft as they sought it at his hands. Thus God did first by speech vnto Moses; after by Vrim and Thummim vnto Priests; lastly by dreames and visions vnto Prophets, from whom in such cases they were to receiue the aunswere of God. Concerning Iosua therefore thus spake the Lord vnto Moses saying, He shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall aske counsell for him by the iudgement of Vrim before the Lord: whereof had Iosua bene mindfull, the fraud of the Gabeonites could not so smoothly haue past vn∣espied till there was no helpe. The Iewes had Prophets to haue resolued them from the mouth of God himselfe, whether Egyptian aides should profite them yea or no: but they thought themselues wise enough, and him vnworthy to be of their Counsell. In this respect therfore was their reproofe, though sharpe, yet iust, albeit there had bene no charge precisely geuen them that they should al∣wayes take heed of Egypt. But as for Dauid, to thinke that he did euill in deter∣mining to build God a Temple, because there was in scripture no commande∣ment that he should build it, were very iniurious: the purpose of his hart was re∣ligious and godly, the act most worthy of honour and renowne; neither could Nathan choose but admire his vertuous intent, exhort him to go forward, and beseech God to prosper him therein. But God saw the endlesse troubles which Dauid should be subiect vnto during the whole time of his regiment, and there∣fore gaue charge to differre so good a worke till the dayes of tranquilitie and peace, wherein it might without interruption be performed. Dauid supposed that it could not stand with the duty which he owed vnto God, to set himselfe in an house of Cedar trees, and to behold the Arke of the Lords Couenant vn∣setled. This opinion the Lord abateth, by causing Nathan to shew him plainely, that it should be no more imputed vnto him for a fault, then it had bene vnto the Iudges of Israell before him, his case being the same which theirs was, their times not more vnquiet then his, nor more vnfit for such an action. Wherefore concerning the force of negatiue arguments so taken from the authority of Scripture as by vs they are denied, there is in all this lesse then nothing. And touching that which vnto this purpose is borro∣wed frō the controuersies sometime handled be∣tweene M. Harding, and the worthiest Diuine that Christendome hath bred for the space of some hūdreds of yeres, who being brought vp together in one Vniuersitie, it fell out in them which was spoken of two others, They learned in the same, that which in contrary Cāps they did practise: Of these two the one obiecting that with vs arguments taken from authority negatiuely are ouer common,

the Bishops answer hereunto is, that This kind of argument is thought to be good, whensoeuer proofe is taken of Gods word, and is vsed not only by vs, but also by Saint Paul, and by many of the Catholique Fathers. Saint Paule saith, God said not vnto Abraham, In thy seeds all the nations of the earth shall be blessed, but in thy seed which is Christ, and thereof he thought he made a good argument. Likewise sayth Origen, The bread which the Lord gaue vnto his disciples, saying vnto them, Take and eate, he differred not, nor com∣manded to be reserued till the next day. Such arguments Origen and other learned Fa∣thers thought to stand for good, whatsoeuer misliking Maister Harding hath found in thē. This kind of proofe is thought to hold in Gods commaundements, for that they be full and perfect, and God hath specially charged vs, that we should neither put to them, nor take fro them: and therefore it seemeth good vnto them that haue learned of Christ, Vnus est ma∣gister vester Christus, & haue heard the voyce of God the Father from heauen, Ipsum au∣••ite. But vnto them that adde to the word of God what them listeth, and make Gods will subiect vnto their will, and breake Gods commaundements for their owne traditions sake, vnto them is seemeth not good. Againe, the English Apologie alleaging the example of the Greekes how they haue neither priuate Masses, nor mangled Sacraments, nor Purgatories, nor pardons; it pleaseth Maister Harding to iest out the matter, to vse the helpe of his wits where strength of truth failed him, & to answer with scoffing at negatiues. The Bishops defence in this case is, The auncient learned Fa∣thers hauing to deale with impudent heretiques, that in defence of their errors auouched the iudgement of all the old Bishops and Doctors that had bene before them, and the gene∣rall consent of the primitiue and whole vniuersall Church, and that with as good regard of truth, and as faithfully as you do now; the better to discouer the shamelesse boldnes & na∣kednes of their doctrine, were oftentimes likewise forced to vse the negatiue, & so to driue the same heretiques as we do you, to proue their affirmatiues, which thing to do it was neuer possible. The ancient father Irenaeus thus stayed himselfe, as we do by the negatiue, Hoc ne∣que Prophetae praedicauerunt, néque Dominus docuit, néque Apostoli tradiderunt, This thing neither did the Prophets publish, nor our Lord teach, nor the Apostles deliuer. By a like negatiue Chrysostome saith, This tree neither Paule planted, nor Apollo wa∣tered, nor God increased. In like sort Leo saith, What needeth it to beleeue that thing that neither the Lawe hath taught, nor the Prophets haue spoken, nor the Gospell hath prea∣ched, nor the Apostles haue deliuered? And againe, How are the new deuises brought in that our Fathers neuer knew? S. Augustine hauing reekoned vp a great number of the Bishops of Rome, by a generall negatiue saith thus, In all this order of succession of Bishops, there is not one Bishop found that was a Donatist▪ Saint Gregory being himselfe a Bishop of Rome, and writing against the title of vniuersall Bishop, saith thus, None of all my prede∣cessors euer consented to vse this vngodly title, No Bishop of Rome euer tooke vpon him this name of Singularity. By such negatiues, M. Harding, we reproue the vanity and nouelty of your religion; we tell you none of the catholique ancient learned Fathers either Greeke or Latine euer vsed either your priuate Masse, or your halfe communion, or your barbarous vnknowne prayers. Paule neuer planted them, Apollo neuer watered them, God neuer in∣creased them, they are of your selues, they are not of God. In all this there is not a syllable which any way crosseth vs. For cōcerning arguments negatiue euen taken from humane authority••, they are here proued to be in some cases very strong and forcible. They are not in our estimation idle reproofes, when the authors of needlesse innouations are opposed with such negatiues, as that of Leo, How are

these new deuises brought in which our fathers neuer knew? When their graue and reuerend superiours do recken vp vnto them, as Augustine did vnto the Do∣natists, large Catalogues of Fathers wondered at for their wisdome, piety, and learning, amongst whom for so many ages before vs, no one did euer so thinke of the Churches affaires, as now the world doth begin to be perswaded; surely by vs they are not taught to take exception hereat, because such arguments are negatiue. Much lesse when the like are taken from the sacred authority of Scrip∣ture, if the matter it selfe do beare them. For in truth the question is not, whe∣ther an argument from scripture negatiuely may be good, but whether it be so generally good, that in all actions men may vrge it. The fathers I graunt do vse very generall and large tearmes, euen as Hiero the King did in speaking of Ar∣chimedes, From henceforward whatsoeuer Archimedes speaketh, it must be belieued. His meaning was not that Archimedes could simply in nothing be deceiued, but that he had in such sort approued his skill, that he seemed worthy of credit for euer after in matters appertaining vnto the science he was skilfull in. In speaking thus largely it is presumed, that mens speeches will be taken according to the matter whereof they speake. Let any man therefore that carieth indifferency of iudge∣ment, peruse the Bishops speeches, and consider well of those negatiues con∣cerning scripture, which he produceth out of Irenaeus, Chrysostome, & Leo; which three are chosen from amongst the residue, because the sentences of the others (euen as one of theirs also) do make for defence of negatiue arguments taken from humane authority, and not from diuine onely. They mention no more restraint in the one then in the other: yet I thinke themselues will not hereby iudge, that the Fathers tooke both to be strong, without restraint vnto any spe∣ciall kind of matter wherein they held such arguments forcible. Nor doth the Bishop either say or proue any more, then that an argument in some kinds of matter may be good, although taken negatiuely from Scripture.

7 An earnest desire to draw all things vnto the determination of bare and naked Scripture, hath caused here much paines to be taken in abating the estimation and credite of man. Which if we labour to maintaine as farre as truth and reason will beare, let not any thinke that we trauaile about a matter not greatly needful. For the scope of all their pleading against mans authoritie is, to ouerthrowe such orders, lawes, and constitutions in the Church, as depen∣ding thereupon if they should therefore be taken away, would peradueture leaue neither face nor memory of Church to continue long in the world, the world especially being such as now it is. That which they haue in this case spo∣ken, I would for breuities sake let passe, but that the drift of their speech being so dangerous, their words are not to be neglected. Wherefore to say that simply an argument taken from mans authority doth hold no way, neither affirmatiuely nor negatiuely, is hard. By a mans authority we here vnderstād, the force which his word hath for the assurance of anothers mind that buildeth vpon it; as the Apostle somewhat did vpon their report of the house of Cloe, and the Samari∣tanes in a matter of farre greater moment vpon the report of a simple woman.

For so it is sayd in Saint Iohns Gospell, Many of the Samaritans of that City belieued in him for the saying of the woman, which testified, He hath told me all things that euer▪ I did. The strength of mans authority is affirmatiuely such, that the waightiest affaires in the world depend ther••on. In iudgement and iustice are not here∣vpon proceedings grounded? Sayth not the law that in the mouth of two or three witnesses euery word shalbe confirmed? This the law of God would not say, if there were in a mans testimony no force at all to prooue any thing. And if it be ad∣mitted that in matter of fact there is some credite to be giuen to the testimonie of man, but not in matter of opinion and iudgement; we see the contrary both acknowledged and vniuersally practised also throughout the world. The sen∣tences of wise and expert men were neuer but highly esteemed. Let the title of a mans right be called in question; are we not bold to relie and build vpon the iudgement of such as are famous for their skill in the lawes of this land? In mat∣ter of state, the waight many times of some one mans authority is thought rea∣son sufficient, euen to sway ouer whole nations. And this not onely with the simpler sort; but the learneder and wiser we are, the more such arguments in some cases preuaile with vs. The reason why the simpler sort are mooued with authority, is the conscience of their owne ignorance; whereby it commeth to passe, that hauing learned men in admiration, they rather feare to dislike them, then know wherefore they should allow and follow their iudgements. Con∣trariwise with them that are skilfull, authority is much more strong and forci∣ble; because they only are able to discerne how iust cause there is, why to some mens authority so much should be attributed. For which cause the name of Hippocrates (no doubt) were more effectuall to perswade euen such men as Galen himselfe, then to moue a silly Empiricke. So that the very selfe same argu∣ment in this kind which doth but induce the vulga•• sort to like, may constraine the wiser to yeeld. And therefore not Orators only with the people, but euen the very profoundest disputers in all faculties haue hereby often with the best learned preuailed most. As for arguments taken from humaine authority and that negatiuely; for example sake, if we should thinke the assembling of the peo∣ple of God together by the sound of a bell, the presenting of infants at the holy font by such as commonly we call their Godfathers, or any other the like recei∣ued custome to be impious, because some men of whom we thinke very reue∣rendly, haue in their bookes and writings no where mentioned nor taught that such things should be in the Church; this reasoning were subiect vnto iust re∣proofe, it were but feeble, weake and vnsound. Notwithstanding euen nega∣tiuely an argument from humaine authority may be strong, as namely thus; The Chronicles of England mention no moe then onely sixe kings bearing the name of Edward, since the time of the last conquest; therefore it cannot be there should be moe. So that if the question be of the authority of a mans testimony, we cannot simply auouch, either that affirmatiuely it doth not any way hold, or that it hath only force to induce the simpler sort, and not to constraine men of vnderstanding and ripe iudgement to yeeld assent, or that negatiuely it hath in it no strength at all. For vnto e••uery of these the contrary is most plaine. Nei∣ther doth that which is alleaged concerning the infirmitie of men, ouerthrow or disproue this. Men are blinded with ignorance and errour; many things may

escape them, and in many things they may bee deceiued; yea those things which they do knowe, they may either forget, or vpon sundry indirect consi∣derations let passe; and although themselues do not erre, yet may they through malice or vanity, euen of purpose deceiue others. Howbeit infinite cases there are wherein all these impediments and lets are so manifestly excluded, that there is no shew or colour whereby any such exception may be taken, but that the testimony of man will stand as a ground of infallible assurance. That there is a City of Rome, that Pius Quintus and Gregory the 13. and others haue beene Popes of Rome, I suppose we are certainely enough perswaded. The ground of our perswasion, who neuer saw the place nor persons before named, can be nothing but mans testimony. Will any man here notwithstanding alleage those mentioned humaine infirmities, as reasons why these things should be mistru∣sted or doubted of? Yea that which is more, vtterly to infringe the force and strength of mans testimony, were to shake the very fortresse of Gods truth. For whatsoeuer we beleeue concerning saluation by Christ, although the scripture be therein the ground of our beliefe; yet the authority of man is if we marke it the key, which openeth the dore of entrance into the knowledge of the scrip∣ture. The scripture could not teach vs the things that are of God, vnlesse we did credite men who haue taught vs that the words of Scripture do signifie those things. Some way therefore, notwithstanding mans infirmitie, yet his authority may enforce assent. Vpon better aduise and deliberation so much is percei∣ued, and at the length confest, that argu∣ments taken from the authority of men may not onely so farre forth as hath bene declared, but further also be of some force in humaine sciences; which force be it neuer so smal, doth shew that they are not vtterly naught. But in matters diuine it is still main∣tained stifly, that they haue no manner force at all. Howbeit the very selfe same reasō, which causeth to yeeld that they are of some force in the one, will at the length constraine also to acknowledge, that they are not in the other altogether vnforcible. For if the naturall strength of mans wit may by experience and study attaine vnto such ripenes in the knowledge of things humaine, that men in this respect may presume to build somewhat vpon their iudgement; what reason haue we to thinke but that euen in matters diuine, the like wits furnisht with necessary helpes, exercised in scripture with like diligence, and assisted with the grace of almighty God, may growe vnto so much perfection of knowledge, that men shall haue iust cause, when any thing pertinent vnto faith and religion is doubted of, the more willingly to in∣cline their mindes towards that which the sentence of so graue, wise, and lear∣ned in that faculty shal iudge most sound. For the controuersie is of the waight of such mens iudgements. Let it therefore be suspected, let it be taken as grosse, corrupt, repugnant vnto the truth, whatsoeuer concerning things diuine aboue

nature shall at any time be spoken as out of the mouthes of meere naturall men, which haue not the eyes wherwith heauenly thinges are discerned. For this we contend not. But whom God hath indued with principall giftes to aspire vnto knowledge by, whose exercises, labours, and diuine studies he hath so bles••, that the world for their great and rare skill that way, hath them in singular ad∣miration; may wee reiect euen their iudgement likewise, as being vtterly of no moment? For mine owne part I dare not so lightly esteeme of the Church, and of the principall pillars therein. The truth is, that the minde of man desireth e∣uermore to knowe the truth according to the most infallible certaintie which the nature of thinges can yeeld. The greatest assurance generally with all men, is that which we haue by plaine aspect and intuitiue beholding. Where we can∣not attaine vnto this; there what appeareth to bee true by strong and inuincible demonstration, such as wherein it is not by any way possible to be deceiued, thereunto the minde doth necessarily assent, neither is it in the choice thereof to do otherwise. And in case these bothe do faile; then which way greatest proba∣bilitie leadeth, thither the mind doth euermore incline. Scripture with Christiā men being receiued as the word of God, that for which we haue probable, yea that which we haue necessary reason for, yea that which wee see with our eyes is not thought so sure, as that which the scripture of God teacheth; because wee hold that his speech reuealeth there what himselfe seeth, & therefore the stron∣gest proofe of all, and the most necessarily assented vnto by vs (which do thus re∣ceiue the scripture,) is the scripture. Now it is not required or can bee exacted at our handes, that we should yeeld vnto any thing other assent, then such as doth answere the euidence which is to be had of that we assent vnto. For which cause euen in matters diuine, concerning some thinges we may lawfully doubt and suspend our iudgement, inclining neither to one side or other, as namely tou∣ching the time of the fall both of man and Angels; of some thinges we may very well retaine an opinion that they are probable & not vnlikely to be true, as whē we hold that men haue their soules rather by creation then propagation, or that the mother of our Lord liued alwaies in the state of virginitie as well after his birth as before (for of these two, the one her virginitie before, is a thing which of necessitie we must belieue; the other her continuance in the same state alwaies, hath more likelihood of truth then the contrary;) finally in all things then are our consciences best resolued, and in most agreeable sort vnto God and nature fe••ed, when they are so farre perswaded as those groundes of perswasion which are to be had will beare. Which thing I doe so much the rather set downe, for that I see how a number of soules are, for want of right informatiō in this point, oftentimes grieuously vexed. When bare and vnbuilded conclusions are put into their mindes, they finding not themselues to haue therof any great certain∣tie, imagine that this proceedeth only from lacke of faith, and that the spirite of God doth not worke in them, as it doth in true beleeuers; by this meanes their hearts are much troubled, they fall into anguish & perplexitie: wheras the truth is, that how bold and confident soeuer we may be in words, when it commeth to the point of triall, such as the euidence is which the truth hath eyther in it selfe or through proofe, such is the hearts assent thereunto, neither can it bee stronger, being grounded as it should be. I grant that proofe deriued frō the au∣thoritie

of mans iudgement, is not able to worke that assurance which doth grow by a stronger proofe; and therfore although ten thousand generall Coun∣cels would set downe one & the same definitiue sentence concerning any point of religion whatsoeuer, yet one demonstratiue reason alleaged, or one mani∣fest testimonie cited from the mouth of God himself to the contrary, could not choose but ouerweigh them all; in as much as for them to haue bene deceiued, it is not impossible; it is, that demonstratiue reason or testimonie diuine should deceiue. Howbeit in defect of proofe infallible, because the minde doth rather follow probable perswasions, then approue the things that haue in them no likelihood of truth at all; surely if a question cōcerning matter of doctrine were proposed, and on the one side no kind of proofe appearing, there should on the other be alleaged and shewed that so a number of the learnedest diuines in the world haue euer thought; although it did not appeare what reason or what scrip∣ture led them to be of that iudgement, yet to their very bare iudgement some∣what a reasonable man would attribute, notwithstanding the common imbe∣cilities which are incident into our nature. And whereas it is thought, that espe∣cially with the Church, and those that are called & perswaded of thauthority of the word of God, mans authoritie with them especially should not preuaile; it must & doth preuaile euen with them, yea with them especially as far as equitie requireth, & farther we maintain it not. For men to be tyed & led by authoritie, as it were with a kind of captiuity of iudge¦ment, and though there be reason to the contrary, not to listen vnto it, but to follow like beastes the first in the heard, they know not nor care not whether, this were bru∣tish. Againe that authoritie of men should preuaile with men either against or aboue reason, is no part of our beliefe. Compa∣nies of learned men be they neuer so great and reuerend, are to yeeld vnto reason; the waight whereof is no whit preiudiced by the simplicitie of his person which doth alleage it, but being found to be sound and good, the bare opinion of men to the con∣trary, must of necessitie stoope and giue place. Irenaeus writing against Marcion, which held one God author of the old Te∣stament, and another of the new, to proue that the Apostles preached the same God which was knowne before to the Iewes, hee copiously alleageth sundry their ser∣mons and speeches vttered concerning that matter, and recorded in Scripture. And least any should be wearied with such store of allegations, in the ende hee concludeth. While we labour for these demonstrations out of Scripture, and doe sum∣marily declare the thinges which many wayes haue beene spoken, bee contented quietly to heare, and doe not thinke my speech tedious: Quoniam ostensiones quae sunt in scrip∣turis

non possunt ostendi nisi ex ipsis scripturis; Because demonstrations that are in scrip∣ture, may not otherwise be shewed, then by citing them out of the scriptures themselues where they are. Which wordes make so little vnto the purpose, that they seeme as it were offended at him which hath called them thus solemnely foorth to say nothing. And concerning the verdict of Ierome, If no man, be he neuer so well learned, haue after the Apostles any authoritie to publish new doctrine as from heauen, and to require the worldes assent as vnto truth receiued by propheticall reuelation; doth this preiudice the credite of learned mens iudge∣ments in opening that truth, which by being conuersant in the Apostles wri∣tinges, they haue themselues from thence learned? Saint Augustine exhor∣teth not to heare men, but to hearken what God speaketh. His purpose is not (I thinke) that wee should stop our eares against his owne exhortation, and therefore hee cannot meane simply that audience should altogether bee denied vnto men; but eyther that if men speake one thing and God himselfe teach an other, then hee, not they to bee obeyed; or if they both speake the same thing, yet then also mans speech vnworthy of hearing, not simply, but in comparison of that which proceedeth from the mouth of God. Yea but wee doubt what the will of God is. Are wee in this case forbidden to heare what men of iudgement thinke it to be? If not, then this allegation also might very well haue beene spared. In that auncient strife which was betweene the Catholique fathers and Arrians, Donatistes, and others of like peruerse and frowarde disposition, as long as to fathers or Councells alleaged on the one side, the like by the contrarie side were opposed, impossible it was that euer the question should by this meane growe vnto any issue or ende. The scripture they both beleeued, the scripture they knew could not giue sentence on both sides, by scripture the controuersie betweene them was such as might be determined. In this case what madnesse was it with such kindes of proofes to nourish their contention, when there were such effectuall meanes to end all con∣trouersie that was betweene them? Hereby therefore it doth not as yet appeare, that an argument of authoritie of man affirmatiuely is in matters diuine no∣thing worth. Which opinion being once inserted into the mindes of the vul∣gar sort, what it may growe vnto God knoweth. Thus much wee see, it hath alreadie made thousandes so headstrong euen in grosse and palpable errors, that a man whose capacitie will scarce serue him to vtter fiue wordes in sensible man∣ner, blusheth not in any doubt concerning matter of scripture to think his owne bare Yea as good as the Nay of all the wise, graue, and learned iudgements that are in the whole world. Which insolencie must be represt, or it will be the very bane of Christian religion. Our Lordes Disciples marking what speech hee vt∣tered vnto them, and at the same time calling to minde a common opinion held by the Scribes, betweene which opinion and the wordes of their Maister, it seemed vnto them that there was some contradiction, which they could not themselues aunswere with full satisfaction of their owne mindes; the doubt they propose to our Sauiour saying, Why then say the Scribes that Elias must first come? They knew that the Scribes did erre greatly▪ and that many waies euen in matters of their owne profession. They notwithstanding thought the iudgement of the very Scribes in matters diuine to bee of some value;

some probabilitie they thought there was that Elias should come, in as much as the Scribes said it. Now no truth can contradict any truth; desirous therefore they were to be taught, how bothe might stand together, that which they knew▪ could not be false, because Christ spake it; and this which to them did seeme true, onely because the Scribes had said it. For the scripture from whence the Scribes did gather it, was not then in their heads. Wee doe not finde that our Sauiour reprooued them of error, for thinking the iudgement of Scribes to be worth the obiecting, for esteeming it to be of any moment or value in matters concerning God. We cannot therefore be perswaded that the will of God is, we should so farre reiect the authoritie of men, as to recken it nothing. No, it may be a question, whether they that vrge vs vnto this, be themselues so perswaded indeede. Men do sometimes bewray that by deedes, which to con∣fesse they are hardly drawne. Marke then if this be not generall with all men for the most part. When the iudgements of learned men are alleaged against them; what do they but eyther eleuate their credite, or oppose vnto them the iudgements of others as learned? Which thing doth argue that all men acknow∣ledge in them some force and waight, for which they are loath the cause they maintaine should be so much weakened as their testimony is auaileable. Againe what reason is there why alleaging testimonies as proofes, men giue them some title of credite, honour, and estimation whom they alleage, vnlesse before hand it be sufficiently knowne who they are; what reason hereof but only a common in grafted perswasion, that in some men there may be found such qualities as are able to counteruaile those exceptions which might be taken against them, and that such mens authoritie is not lightly to be shaken off? Shall I adde further, that the force of arguments drawne from the authoritie of scripture it selfe, as scrip∣tures commonly are alleaged, shall (being sifted) be found to depende vpon the strength of this so much despised and debased authoritie of man? Surely it doth, and that oftner then we are aware of. For although scripture be of God, and therefore the proofe which is taken from thence must needes be of all other most inuincible; yet this strength it hath not, vnlesse it auouch the selfe same thing for which it is brought. If there be eyther vndeniable apparance that so it doth, or reason such as cannot deceiue, then scripture-proofe (no doubt) in strength and value exceedeth all. But for the most part, euen such as are readiest to cite for one thing fiue hundred sentences of holy scripture; what warrant haue they, that any one of them doth meane the thing for which it is alleaged? Is not their surest ground most commonly, eyther some probable coniecture of their owne, or the iudgement of others taking those Scriptures as they doe? Which notwithstanding to meane otherwise then they take them, it is not still altogether imposible. So that now and then they ground them∣selues on humane authoritie, euen when they most pretend diuine. Thus it fareth euen cleane throughout the whole controuersie about that discipline which is so earnestly vrged and laboured for. Scriptures are plentifully allea∣ged to proue, that the whole Christian worlde for euer ought to embrace it. Hereupon men terme it The discipline of God. Howbeit examine, sift, and re∣solue their alleaged proofes, till you come to the very roote from whence they spring, the heart wherein their strength lyeth; and it shall clearely

appeare vnto any man of iudgement, that the most which can be inferred vpon such plentie of diuine testimonies is onely this, That some thinges which they maintaine, as far as some men can probably coniecture, doe seeme to haue bene out of scripture not absurdly gathered. Is this a warrant sufficient for any mans consci∣ence to builde such proceedinges vpon, as haue beene and are put in vre for the stablishment of that cause? But to conclude, I would gladly vnderstand how it commeth to passe, that they which so peremptorily doe maintaine that humane authoritie is nothing worth, are in the cause which they fauour so care∣full to haue the common sort of men perswaded, that the wisest, the godliest, and the best learned in all Christendome are that way giuen, seeing they iudge this to make nothing in the world for them. Againe how commeth it to passe, they cannot abide that authoritie should be alleaged on the other side, if there be no force at all in authorities on one side or other? Wherefore labour they to strip their aduersaries of such furniture as doth not helpe? Why take they such need∣lesse paines to furnish also their owne cause with the like? If it be voyd and to no purpose that the names of men are so frequent in their bookes; what did moue them to bring them in, or doth to suffer them there remaining? Ignorant I am not how this is salued, They do it not but after the truth made manifest first by reason or by scripture, they doe it not but to controule the enemies of the truth, who beare them∣selues bold vpon humane authority, making not for them but against them rather. Which answeres are nothing. For in what place or vpon what consideration soeuer it be they doe it, were it in their owne opinion of no force being done, they would vndoubtedly refraine to doe it.

8 But to the end it may more plainely appeare, what we are to iudge of their sentences, and of the cause it selfe wherein they are alleaged; first it may not well be denied, that all actions of men endued with the vse of reason are generally eyther good or euill. For although it be granted that no action is properly tear∣med good or euill, vnlesse it be voluntarie; yet this can be no let to our former assertion, that all actions of men indued with the vse of reason are generally either good or euill; because euen those thinges are done voluntarily by vs, which other creatures do naturally, in as much as wee might stay our doing of them if wee would. Beastes naturally doe take their foode and rest, when it offereth it selfe vnto them. If men did so too, and could not do otherwise of themselues; there were no place for any such reproofe as that of our Sauiour Christ vnto his disciples, could ye not watch with me one houre? That which is volun∣tarily performed in things tending to the end, if it be well done, must needes be done with deliberate consideration of some reasonable cause, wherefore wee ra∣ther should do it thē not. Wherupō it seemeth that in such actions only those are said to be good or euil, which are capable of deliberatiō: so y^t many things being hourely done by men, wherein they need not vse with themselues any manner of consultation at all, it may perhaps hereby seeme that well or ill doing belon∣geth onely to our waightier affaires, and to those deeds which are of so great im∣portance that they require aduise. But thus to determine were perilous, and per∣aduenture vnsound also. I do rather incline to thinke, that seeing all the vnforced actiōs of mē are volūtary; & al volūtary actiōs tēding to the end haue choice; & al choise presupposeth the knowledge of some cause wherfore we make it: wher

the reasonable cause of such actiōs so readily offereth it self, that it needeth not to be sought for; in those things though we do not deliberat, yet they are of their na∣ture apt to be deliberated on, in regard of the wil which may encline either way, and would not any one way bend it self, if there were not some apparent motiue to lead it. Deliberatiō actuall we vse, when there is doubt what we should incline our willes vnto. Where no doubt is, deliberation is not excluded as impertinent vnto the thing, but as needlesse in regard of the agent, which seeth already what to resolue vpon. It hath no apparent absurditie therefore in it to thinke, that all actions of men indued with the vse of reason, are generally either good or euill. Whatsoeuer is good; the same is also approued of God: and according vnto the sundrie degrees of goodnesse, the kindes of diuine approbation are in like sort multiplyed. Some things are good, yet in so meane a degree of goodnesse, that men are only nor disproued nor disalowed of God for them. No man hateth his owne flesh. If ye doe good vnto them that doe so to you, the very Publicans themselues doe as much. They are worse then Infidels that haue no care to prouide for their owne. In actions of this sorte, the very light of nature alone may discouer that which is so farre forth in the sight of God allowable. Some thinges in such sorte are allowed, that they be also required as necessary vnto sal∣uation, by way of direct immediate and proper necessitie finall; so that without performance of them we cannot by ordinary course be saued, not by any means be excluded from life obseruing them. In actions of this kind, our chiefest direc∣tion is from scripture, for nature is no sufficient teacher what we should do that we may attaine vnto life euerlasting. The vnsufficiencie of the light of nature, is by the light of scripture so fully and so perfectly herein supplied, that further light then this hath added there doth not neede vnto that ende. Finally some thinges although not so required of necessitie, that to leaue them vndone exclu∣deth from saluation, are notwithstanding of so great dignitie and acceptation with God, that most ample rewarde in heauen is laide vp for them. Hereof we haue no commandement either in nature or scripture which doth exact them at our handes: yet those motiues there are in bothe, which drawe most effectually our mindes vnto them. In this kind there is not the least action but it doth some∣what make to the accessory augmentation of our blisse. For which cause our Sa∣uiour doth plainely witnesse, that there shall not bee as much as a cup of colde water bestowed for his sake without reward. Herevpon dependeth whatsoeuer difference there is betweene the states of Saints in glory: hither we referre what∣soeuer belongeth vnto the highest perfection of man by way of seruice towards God: hereunto that feruor and first loue of Christians did bend it selfe, causing them to sell their possessions, and lay downe the price at the blessed Apostles feet: hereat S. Paul vndoubtedly did a••me, in so far abridging his owne libertie, and exceeding that which the bond of necessarie and enioyned dutie tied him vnto. Wherfore seeing that in all these seuerall kindes of actions, there can be nothing possibly euill which God approueth; and that he approueth much more then he doth commaund; and that his very commandements in some kinde, as namely his precepts comprehended in the law of nature, may be otherwise known then onely by scripture; and that to do them, howsoeuer we know them, must needs▪ be acceptable in his sight▪ let them with whom we haue hitherto disputed consi∣der

wel, how it can stand with reasō to make the bare mādate of sacred scripture the only rule of all good and euill in the actions of mortall men. The testimonies of God are true, the testimonies of God are perfect, the testimonies of God are all sufficient vnto that end for which they were giuen. Therfore accordingly we do receiue them; we do not think that in thē God hath omitted any thing need∣ful vnto his purpose, & left his intent to be accomplished by our diuisings. What the scripture purposeth, the same in all points it doth performe. Howbeit, that here we swerue not in iudgement, one thing especially we must obserue, namely that the absolute perfection of scripture is seene by relatiō vnto that end wherto it tendeth. And euen hereby it commeth to passe, that first such as imagine the generall and maine drift of the body of sacred scripture not to be so large as it is▪ nor that God did thereby intend to deliuer, as in truth he doth, a full instruction in al things vnto saluatiō necessary, the knowledge wherof man by nature could not otherwise in this life attaine vnto: they are by this very mean induced, either still to looke for new reuelations from heauen, or else daungerously to ad to the word of God vncertaine tradition, that so the doctrine of mans saluation may be compleate, which doctrine we constantly hold in all respectes without any such thing added to be so cōpleat, that we vtterly refuse as much as once to acquaint our selues with any thing further. Whatsoeuer to make vp the doctrine of mans saluation is added, as in supply of the scriptures vnsufficiencie, we reiec•• it. Scrip∣ture purposing this, hath perfectly and fully done it. Againe the scope and pur∣pose of God in deliuering the holy scripture, such as do take more largely thē be∣houeth, they on the contrary side racking & stretching it further thē by him was meant, are drawn into sundry as great incōueniences. These pretēding the scrip∣tures perfection, inferre therupon, that in scripture all things lawfull to be done must needs be contained. We count those things perfect which want nothing requisite for the end wherto they were instituted. As therfore God created eue∣ry part and particle of man exactly perfect, that is to say▪ in all pointes sufficient vnto that vse for which he appointed it; so the scripture, yea euery sentence there∣of is perfect, & wanteth nothing requisite vnto that purpose for which God de∣liuered the same. So that if hereupon wee conclude, that because the scripture is perfect, therfore all things lawful to be done are comprehended in the scripture▪ we may euen as wel conclude so of euery sentence, as of the whole sum and bo∣dy therof, vnlesse we first of all proue that it was the drift, scope and purpose of almightie God in holy scripture, to comprise all things which man may practise. But admit this, and marke▪ I beseech you, what would follow▪ God in deliuering scripture to his Church, should cleane haue abrogated amongst them the law of nature; which is an infallible knowledge imprinted in the mindes of all the chil∣dren of men, whereby both generall principles f•••• directing of humane actions are comprehended, and conclusions deriued from them; vpon which conclu∣sions groweth in particularitie the choise of good and euill in the daily affaires of this life. Admit this; and what shall the scripture be but a snare and a torment to weake consciences, filling thē with infinite perplexities, scrupulosities, doubts insoluble, and extreame despaires? Not that the scripture it selfe doth cause any such thing, (for it tendeth to the cleane contrarie, and the fruite thereof is resolute assurance and certaintie in that it teacheth:) but the necessities

of this life vrging men to doe that which the light of nature, common discreti∣on and iudgement of it selfe directeth them vnto▪ on the other side this doc∣trine teaching them that so to doe were to sinne against their owne soules, and that they put forth their hands to iniquitie, whatsoeuer they go about and haue not first the sacred scripture of God for direction; how can it choose but bring the simple a thousand times to their wits end; how can it choose but vexe and a∣maze them? For in euery action of commō life to find out some sentence clear∣ly and infallibly setting before our eyes what wee ought to doe, (seeme wee in scripture neuer so expert) would trouble vs more then wee are aware. In weake and tender mindes wee little knowe what miserie this strict opinion would breede, besides the stoppes it would make in the whole course of all mens liues and actions. Make all thinges sinne which we doe by direction of na∣tures light, & by the rule of common discretiō without thinking at all vpō scrip∣ture; admit this position, and parents shall cause their children to sinne, as oft as they cause them to do any thing, before they come to yeares of capacitie and be ripe for knowledge in the scripture. Admit this, and it shall not be with ma∣sters, as it was with him in the Gospell; but seruants being commaunded to goe shall stand still, till they haue their errand warranted vnto them by scripture. Which as it standeth with Christian dutie in some cases, so in common affaires to require it, were most vnfit. Two opinions therefore there are concerning suf∣ficiencie of holy scripture, each extreamly opposite vnto the other, & bothe re∣pugnant vnto truth. The schooles of Rome teach scripture to be so vnsufficient, as if, except traditions were added, it did not conteine all reuealed and superna∣turall truth, which absolutely is necessary for the children of men in this life to know that they may in the next be saued. Others iustly condemning this opini∣on, growe likewise vnto a dangerous extremitie, as if scripture did not only con∣taine all thinges in that kinde necessary, but all thinges simply, and in such sorte that to doe any thing according to any other lawe, were not onely vnnecessary, but euen opposite vnto saluation, vnlawfull and sinfull. Whatsoeuer is spoken of God, or thinges appertaining to God, otherwise then as the truth is; though it seeme an honour, it is an iniurie. And as incredible praises giuen vnto men, doe often abate and impaire the credit of their deserued commendation; so we must likewise take great heed, least in attributing vnto scripture more then it can haue, the incredibilitie of that do cause euen those thinges which indeed it hath most aboundantly, to be lesse reuerendly esteemed. I therefore leaue it to themselues to consider, whether they haue in this first point or not ouershot themselues; which God doth knowe is quickly done, euen when our meaning is most sincere, as I am verily perswaded theirs in this case was.

Notes

• T.C. l. 1. p. 59. & 60.
• The first pre∣tended proofe of the first position out of scrip∣ture. Pro. 2.9. T.C .l. 1. p. 20. I say that the word of God containeth whatsoeuer things can fall into any part of mans life. For so Salomon saith in the 2. chapter of the Prouerbes, My sonne, if thou receiue my words &c. then thou shalt vn∣derstand iu∣stice, and iudge∣ment, & equi∣tie, and euery goodway.
• Psal. 119.95.
• a

  2. Tim. 3 16. The whole Scripture is giuen by inspiration of God, and is profitable to teach, to improue, to correct, and to instruct in righteousnes, that the man of God may be absolute being made perfect vnto all good works. He meaneth all and only those good workes, which belong vnto vs as we are men of God, and which vnto saluation are necessary. Or if we vnderstand by men of God, Gods Ministers▪ there is not required in them an vniuersall skill of euery good worke or way, but an habilitie to teach whatsoeuer men are bound to doe that they may be saued. And with this kinde of knowledge the scripture sufficeth to furnish them as touching matter.
• The second proofe out of Scripture. 1. Cor. 10.31. T.C. l. 1. p. 16. S. Paul saith that whether we eat or drink or whatsoeuer we do, we must do it to the glo∣ry of God. But no man can glorifie God in any thing but by obedience; and there is no obedience but in respect of the commaunde∣ment and word of God: There∣fore is followeth that the word of God direct∣eth a man in all his actions.
• 1. Pet. 2.12.
• Rom. 2.34.
• 1. Cor. 10.32.
• Rom. 2.23.
• The third scripture prof. 1. Tim. 4.5. And that which S. Paul said of meats & drink•• that they are sanctified vnto vs by the word of God, the same is to b•• vnderstanded of all things els whatsoeuer we haue the vse of. T.C. l. 1. p. 20.
• 1. Tim. 4.
• The fourth Scripture-proofe. Rom. 14.23. T.C. lib. 1, p. 27.
• Psal. 19.8. Apoc. 3.14.
• 2. Cor. 1.18.
• Ioh. 10.38.
• Ioh. 20.25.
• a

  And if any will say, that S. Paule meaneth there a full 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and perswasion that that which hee doth is well done, I graunt it. But from whence can that spring but from faith? how can wee perswade and assure our selues that wee doe well, but whereas we haue the word of God for our warrant? T.C. lib. 1. cap. 27.
• b

  What also that some euen of those Heathen men haue taught, that nothing ought to be done, whereof thou doubtest whether it be right or wrong? Whereby it ap∣peareth, that euen those which had no knowledge of the worde of God, did see much of the equitie of this which the Apostle requireth of a Christian man: and that the chiefest difference is, that where they sent men for the difference of good and euill to the light of reason, in such things the Apostle sendeth them to the Schoole of Christ in his worde, which onely is able through faith to giue them assurance and resolution in their doings. T.C. lib. 1. pag. 60.
• Ioh. 20.29.
• T.C. li. 2. p. 5••.
• Act. 5.
• Exod 28.4.43. Leuit. 11.
• 1. Cor. 6.12.
• Iob. 4.19.
• Arist. Pol. 1.
• August, Ep. 18.
• The first asser∣tion indeuou∣red to be pro∣ued by the vse of taking ar∣guments ne∣gatiuely from the authority of Scripture: which kind of disputing is vsuall in the Fathers.
• August-contr. liter. Petil. li. 3. cap. 6.
• Tertull. de prescrip. ad∣uers.
• T.C. l. 2. p. 8••. Augustine sayth▪ Whether it be question of Christ, or whether it be question of his Church, &c.

  And least the answerer should restraine the generall saying of Augustine ••nto the doctrine of the Gospell▪ so that he would thereby shut out the discipline▪ euen Tertullian himself•• before he was embrued with the Heresie of Mon∣tanus, g••ueth testimony vnto the discipline in these words, VVe may not giue our selues, &c.
• Hieron. contra Heluid.
• Hilar. in Psal. 132.
• T.C. l. 2. p. 8. Let him heare what Cyprian sayth: The Christian Reli∣gion (sayth he) shall find, that &c.
• Ver•• hoc mandatum legem complectitur & Prophetas, & in hoc verbo omnium scripturarum volumina coarcta••iur. Hoc natura, hoc ratio▪ hoc, Domin••, verbi tui clamat au∣thoritas, hoc ex ere tuo Iudiuimu••, h••c inuenit consumma∣tionem omnis religio. Primum est hoc mandatum & vlti∣mum▪ hoc in libro vitae conscriptum indeficientem & ho∣minibus & Angelis exhibet lectionem. Legat hoc vnum verbum & in hoc mandato meditetur christiana relig••o, & inueniet ex H AC scriptura omnium doctrinarum re∣gulas emanasse, & hinc nasci & huc reuerti quicquid ecclesiastica continet disciplina, & in omnibus irritum esse & friuolum quicquid dilectio non confirmat.
• Tertul. lib▪ de Monog. T. C. l. 2. p. 81. And in another place Tertul∣lian sayth, that the scripture denieth that which it noteth not.
• T. C. l. ••. p. 80. And that in indifferent things it is not enough that they be not against the word, but that they be according to the word, it may appeare by o∣ther places, where he sayth, that whatsoeuer, pleaseth, not the Lord, displeaseth him, and with hurt is receiued. lib. 2. ad vxorem.
• Qua domino non placent, v∣ti{que} Dominum offendunt▪ vti{que} Malo se infe∣runt.
• T. C. l. 2. p. 81.
• And to come yet neerer, Where he disputeth against the wearing of crowne or garland, (which is indifferent of it selfe) to those which obiecting asked, where the scripture saith that a man might not weare a crowne; he answereth by asking where the scripture sayth that they may weare? And vnto them replying that it is permitted which is not forbidden; he answereth, that it is forbidden which is not permitted. Whereby appeareth, that the argument of the scriptures negatiuely holdeth, not onely in the doctrine and ecclesiasticall discipline, but euen in matters arbitrary and variable by the aduise of the Church. Where it is not inough that they be not forbidden, vnlesse there be some word which doth permit the vse of them: it is not enough that the scrip∣ture speaketh not against them, vnlesse it speake for them: and finally where it displeaseth the Lord which pleaseth him not, we must of necessitie haue the word of his mouth to declare his pleasure.
• Tert. de coro∣na militis.
• The first asser∣tion endeuou∣red to be con∣firmed by the scriptures cu∣stome of dis∣puting frō di∣uine authority negatiuely. 1. Iohn. 2.5▪ God is light, and there is in him no dark∣nesse at all. Hebr. 6.18. It is impos∣ble that God should lye. Num. 23.19. God is not as man that he should lye.
• T. C. l. 2. p. 48▪ It is ••er hard to shew that the Prophets haue reasoned negatiuely. A•• whe•• in the person of the Lord the Prophet sayth▪ Whereof I haue not spoken▪ Ieremie 19.5. and▪ Wh••ch neuer entered into my heart▪ Ier••mie 7.31.32. and where he condemne••h them because▪ They haue not asked counsell at the mouth of the Lord, Esay. 30 2. And it may be shewed▪ that the same kind of argument hath bene vsed, in things which are not of the substance of saluation or damna∣tion, and whereof there was no commaund••ment to the con∣trary (as in the former there was▪ Leuit. 18.21. & 20.3. Deut. 17.16.) In Iosua the children of Israel are charged by the Prophet that they asked not counsell of the•• mouth of the Lord when they entered into couenant with the Gabeonites, Iosh. 9.14. And yet that couenant was not made contrarie vnto anie commaundement of God. Moreouer we reade that when Dauid had taken this counsell to build a temple vnto the Lord, albeit the Lord had reuealed before in his word that there should be such a standing place▪ where the Arke of the couenant and the seruice should haue a certaine abiding▪ and albeit there was no word of God which ••orbad Dauid to build the Temple: yet the Lord (with commen∣dation of his good affection and zeale hee had to the ad∣uancement of his glorie) concludeth against Dauid•• resolu∣tion to build the Temple, with this reason▪ namely that he had giuen no commandement of this who should build it. 1. Chr. 17.6.
• Leuit. 18.21. & 20.3. Deut. 28.10.
• 1. Chro. 17, ••.
• Esay. 30.1
• Iosh. 9.14.
• Num. 27.21.
• 1. Chron. 17.
• T. C. l. ••. p. 50. M. Harding reprocheth the B. of Salisbury with this kind of reasoning: vnto whom the B. answereth, The argument of authority negatiuely, is taken to be good, whensoeuer proofe is taken of Gods word, and is vsed not onely by vs, but also by many of the Catholique Fathers. A litle after he sheweth the reason why the argument of authority of the scripture negatiuely is good, namely for that the word of God is perfect. In another place vnto M. Harding casting him in the teeth with negatiue argu∣ments, be alleageth places out of Iren••••us, Chrysostom, Leo, which reasoned negatiuely of the authoritie of the Scrip∣tures. The places which he alleageth be very full and plaine in generality, without any such restraint as the Answerer imagineth, as they are there to be seene. •• Vell. Patere. Iugurtha as Marius sub codem Africano militantes, in ijsdem castris didicere qua postea in contrarijs facere••t.
• Art. 1. Diuis. 29.
• Gal. 3.
• Orig. in. Leuit∣ho. 5.
• Math. 23.
• Math. 17.
• Desen. par. 5. ca. 15. diuis. ••.
• Lib. 1. cap. 1••
• De incomp. nat. Dei hom. 3.
• Epist. 9••. ca. 12
• Epist. 97. ca. 3. Epist. 16••. Lib. 4. ep. 32.
• Their opinion cōcerning the force of argu∣ments taken from humane authority for the ordering of mens actiō•• or perswasiōs.
• T. C. l. 1. p. 25. When the question is of the authority of a man, it holdeth neither affirmatiuely nor negatiuely. The reason is, because the infirmitie of man can neither attaine to the perfection of any thing whereby he might speake all things that are to be spoken of it; neither yet be free from error in those things which he speaketh or giueth out. And therefore this argument neither affirmatiuely nor nega∣tiuely compelleth the hearer, but only induceth him to some liking or disliking of that for which it is brought, and is ra∣ther for an Orator to perswade the simpler sort, then for a disputer to enforce him that is learned.
• 1. Cor. 1.11.
• Iohn. 4.35.
• Deut. 19.15.
• Mat. 18.16.
• T. C. l. 1. p. 10. Although that kind of argument of authoritie of men is good, neither in humaine nor diuine sciences; yet it hath some small force in humaine sciences, for as much as naturally, & in that he is a man, he may come to some ripenes of iudgement in those sciences; which in diuine matters hath no force at all, as of him which naturally, and as he is a man, can no more iudge of them shew a blind man of colours. Yea so farre is it from drawing credit if it be barely spoken without reason and testimony of scrip∣ture, that it carieth also a suspition of vntruth whatsoeuer pro∣ceedeth from him, which the Apostle did well note when to signifie a thing corruptly spoken and against the truth, he saith, that it is spoken according vnto man. Rom. 3. He saith not as a wicked and lying man, but simply as a man. And although this corruption be reformed in many; yet for so much as in whome the knowledge of the truth is most aduanced, there remaineth both ignorance and disordered affections (whereof either of them turneth him from speaking of the truth;) no mans authority, with the Church especi∣ally, and those that are called and perswaded of the authority of the word of God, can bring any assurance vnto the conscience.
• T. C. l. 2. p. 21. Of diuers sentences of the fathers themselues (wher∣by some haue likened them to brute beastes without reason, which suffer themselues to be led by the iudgement and authority of others▪ some haue preferred the iudgemēt of ou•• simple rude man alleaging reason vnto companies of learned men) I will content my selfe at this time with two or three sentences. Irenaeus saith, whatsoeuer is to be shewed in the scripture, canne, bee shewed but out of the scrip∣tures themselues▪ lib. 3•• cap. 12. Ierome saith. No man be he neuer so holy or eloquent, hath any authoritie after the Apostles in Ps. 86. Augustine saith, that he will beleeue none, how godly and learned soeuer he be, vnlesse he confirme his sentence by the scriptures, or by some reason not contrary to them Epist. 18. And in another place, Heare this, the Lord saith, heare not this, Donatus saith, Rogatus saith, Vincentius saith, Hylarius saith, Ambrose saith, Augustine saith, but hearken to this the Lord saith, Epist. 48. And againe hauing to do with an Arrian, he affirmeth that neither he ought to bring forth the councell of Nice, nor the other the councell of Ari∣mine, thereby to bring preiudice each to other; neither ought the Arrian to be holden by the authoritie of the one, nor himselfe by the authoritie of the other, but by the scriptures which are witnesses proper to neither, but common to both▪ matter with matter, cause with cause, reason with reason ought to be debated. contra Maxim. Arian. 3.14. ca. And in an other place against Petilian the Dona∣tist he saith, Let not these wordes be heard betweene vs, I say, you say, let vs heare this, Thus saith the Lord. And by and by speaking of the scriptures he saith, There let vs seeke the Church, there let vs try the cause. De vnita. Eccles. cap. 3. Hereby it is manifest, that the argument of the authoritie of man affirmatiuely is nothing worth.
• Matth. 17.10.
• T. C. l. 2.21. If at any time it happened vnto Augustine (as it did against the Donatists and others) to al∣leage the autho¦rity of the aun∣cient Fathers which had bin before him; yet this was not done before he had laid a sure foundation of his cause in the scriptures, and that also being prouoked by the aduersaries of the truth, who bare themselues high of some counsell, or of some man of name that had fauoured that part.
• A declaration what the truth is in this ma••∣ter.
• Math. 26.40.
• Ephes. 5.29. Matth. 5.46. 1. Tim. 5.8.
• Matth. 10.42.
• Act. 4.31. 1. Thes. 2.7.9.
• T. C. l. 2. p. 6. Where this doc∣trine is accused of bringing men to despaire, it hath wrong. For when doubting it the way to dis∣paire, against which this doc∣trine offereth the remedie; it must needs be that it bringeth comfort and ••••y to the conscienc•• of man.
• Due. 7.8.