Of the lavves of ecclesiasticall politie eight bookes. By Richard Hooker.

The first Booke: Concerning Lawes, and their seuerall kindes in generall. (Book 1)

The matter conteined in this first Booke.

• 1 THe cause of writing this generall discourse concerning lawes▪
• 2 Of that lawe which God from before the beginning hath set for himselfe to doe all the things by.
• 3 The law which natural agents obserue, & their necessary maner of keeping it▪
• 4 The lawe which the Angels of God obey.
• 5 The lawe whereby man is in his actions directed to the imitation of God.
• 6 Mens first beginning to vnderstand that lawe.
• 7 Of mans will, which is the first thing that lawes of action are made to guide.
• 8 Of the naturall finding out of lawes by the light of reason to guide the will vnto that which is good.
• 9 Of the benefit of keeping that lawe which reason teacheth.
• 10 How reason doth lead men vnto the making of humane lawes whereby politique socie∣ties are gouerned, and to agreement about lawes whereby the fellowship or communion of independent societies standeth.
• 11 Wherefore God hath by scripture further made knowne such supernaturall lawes as do serue for mens direction.
• 12 The cause why so many naturall or rationall lawes are set downe in holy scripture.
• 13 The benefit of hauing diuine lawes written.
• 14 The sufficiencie of scripture vnto the end for which it was instituted.
• 15 Of lawes positiue conteined in scripture, the mutabilitie of certaine of them, and the generall vse of scripture.
• 16 A conclusion, shewing how all this belongeth to the cause in question.

HE that goeth about to perswade a multitude,* 1.1 that they are not so well gouerned as they ought to be, shal ne∣uer wāt attentiue & fauourable hearers; because they know the manifold defects whereunto euery kind of regiment is subiect, but the secret lets and difficulties▪ which in publike proceedings are innumerable & ineuitable, they haue not ordinarily the iudgement to consider. And bec••••se such as openly reproue supposed disorders of state are taken for principall friendes to the common benefite of all, and for men that carry singular freedome of mind; vnder this faire and plausible colour whatsoeuer they vtter passeth for

good and currant. That which wanteth in the waight of their speech, is sup∣plyed by the aptnes of mens minds to accept and beleeue it. Whereas on the other side, if we maintaine thinges that are established, wee haue not onely to striue with a number of heauie preiudices deepely rooted in the hearts of men, who thinke that herein we serue the time, and speake in fauour of the present state, because thereby we eyther hold or seeke preferment; but also to beare such exceptions as minds so auerted before hand vsually take against that which they are loath should be powred into them. Albeit therefore much of that we are to speake in this present cause, may seeme to a number perhaps tedious, perhaps obscure, darke, and intricate, (for many talke of the truth, which neuer soun∣ded the depth from whence it springeth, and therfore when they are led there∣unto they are soone weary, as men drawne from those beaten pathes where∣with they haue bene inured): yet this may not so farre preuaile, as to cut off that which the matter it selfe requireth, howsoeuer the nice humour of some be therewith pleased or no. They vnto whom we shall seeme tedious, are in no wise iniuried by vs, because it is in their owne hands to spare that labour which they are not willing to endure. And if any complaine of obscuritie, they must consider, that in these matters it commeth no otherwise to passe, then in sundry the workes both of art and also of nature, where that which hath greatest force in the very things we see, is notwithstanding it selfe oftentimes not seene. The statelinesse of houses, the goodlines of trees, when we behold them delighteth the eye; but that foundation which beareth vp the one, that roote which mini∣streth vnto the other nourishment and life, is in the bosome of the earth concea∣led; & if there be at any time occasion to search into it, such labour is then more necessary then pleasant, both to them which vndertake it, and for the lookers on. In like manner the vse and benefite of good lawes, all that liue vnder them may enioy with delight and comfort, albeit the groundes and first originall cau∣ses from whence they haue sprung be vnknowne, as to the greatest part of men they are. But when they who withdraw their obedience, pretend that the lawes which they should obey are corrupt and vitious; for better examination of their qualitie, it behoueth the very foundation and roote, the highest welspring and fountaine of them to be discouered. Which because wee are not oftentimes accustomed to doe, when wee doe it, the paines wee take are more needefull a great deale then acceptable, and the matters which wee handle seeme by reason of newnesse, (till the minde grow better acquainted with them) darke, intri∣cate and vnfamiliar. For as much helpe whereof as may be in this case, I haue endeuoured throughout the body of this whole discourse, that euery former part might giue strength vnto all that followe, and euery later bring some light vnto all before. So that if the iudgements of men doe but holde themselues in suspence as touching these first more generall meditations, till in order they haue perused the rest that ensue: what may seeme darke at the first will after∣wardes be founde more plaine, euen as the later particular decisions will ap∣peare I doubt not more strong, when the other haue beene read before. The lawes of the Church, whereby for so many ages together wee haue bene guided in the exercise of Christian religion and the seruice of the true God, our rites, customes, and orders of Ecclesiasticall gouernment, are called in

question; wee are accused as men that will not haue Christ Iesus to rule ouer them, but haue wilfully cast his statutes behinde their backes, hating to bee re∣formed, and made subiect vnto the scepter of his discipline. Behold there∣fore wee offer the lawes whereby wee liue vnto the generall triall and iudge∣ment of the whole world; hartily beseeching almightie God, whome wee desire to serue according to his owne will, that both wee and others (all kinde of partiall affection being cleane laide aside) may haue eyes to see, and hearts to embrace, the things that in his sight are most acceptable. And because the point about which wee striue is the qualitie of our lawes, our first entrance hereinto cannot better be made, then with consideration of the nature of lawe in generall, and of that lawe which giueth life vnto all the rest which are com∣mendable iust and good, n••mely the lawe whereby the Eternall himselfe doth worke. Proceeding from hence to the lawe, first of nature, then of scrip∣ture, we shall haue the easier accesse vnto those things which come after to be debated, concerning the particular cause and question which wee haue in hand.

2 All thinges that are, haue some operation not violent or casuall.* 1.2 Nei∣ther doth any thing euer begin to exercise the same, without some forecon∣ceiued ende for which it worketh. And the ende which it worketh for is not obteined, vnlesse the worke bee also fit to obteine it by. For vnto euery ende euery operation will not serue. That which doth assigne vnto each thing the kinde, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the forme and measure of working, the same we tearme a Lawe. So that no certaine ende could euer bee attained, vnlesse the actions whereby it is attained were regular, that is to say, made suteable, fit and correspondent vn∣to their ende, by some Canon rule or lawe. Which thing doth first take plac•• in the workes euen of God himselfe. All thinges therefore doe worke after a sort according to lawe: all other thinges according to a lawe, whereof some superiours vnto whome they are subiect is author; onely the workes and o∣perations of God, haue him both for their worker, and for the lawe whereby they are wrought. The being of God, is a kinde of lawe to his working: for that perfection which God is, giueth perfection to that hee doth. Those na∣turall, necessary, and internall operations of God, the generation of the Sonne, the proceeding of the Spirit, are without the compasse of my present intent: which is to touch onely such operations as haue their beginning and be∣ing by a voluntary purpose, wherewith God hath eternally decreed when and how they should bee. Which eternall decree is that wee tearme an eternall lawe. Dangerous it were for the feeble braine of man to wade farre into the doings of the most High; whome although to knowe bee life, and ioy to make mention of his name; yet our soundest knowledge is, to know that wee know him not as indeede hee is, neither can know him; and our safest eloquence con∣cerning him is our silence when we confesse without confession, that his glory is inexplicable, his greatnesse aboue our capacitie and reach. Hee is aboue, and wee vpon earth; therefore it behoueth our wordes to bee warie and fewe, Our God is one, or rather very onenesse, and meere vnitie, hauing nothing but it selfe in it selfe, and not consisting (as all things doe besides God) of many things. In which essentiall vnitie of God, a Trinitie personall neuerthelesse subsisteth,

after a maner far exceeding the possibilitie of mans conceipt. The works which outwardly are of God, they are in such sort of him being one, that each person hath in them somewhat peculiar and proper. For being three, and they all subsi∣sting in the essence of one deitie; from the Father, by the Sonne, through the Spirit,* 1.3 all things are. That which the Sonne doth heare of the Father, and which the Spirit doth receiue of the Father & the Sonne, the same we haue at the hāds of the Spirit, as being the last, and therfore the nearest vnto vs in order, although in power the same with the second and the first. The wise and learned among the very Heathens themselues, haue all acknowledged some first cause, whereupon originally the being of all things dependeth. Neither haue they otherwise spo∣ken of that cause, then as an Agent, which knowing what and why it worketh, ob∣serueth in working a most exact order or lawe. Thus much is signified by that which Homer mentioneth, a 1.4 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thus much acknowledged by Mer∣curius Trismegist. b 1.5 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Thus much cōfest by Anaxagoras & Plato terming the maker of the world an Intellectual worker. Fi∣nally the Stoikes, although imagining the first cause of all things to be fire, held neuerthelesse y^t the same fire hauing arte, did c 1.6 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. They all confesse therfore in the working of that first cause, that counsell is vsed, reason fol∣lowed, a way obserued, that is to say, constant order and law is kept, wherof it selfe must needs be author vnto it selfe. Otherwise it should haue some worthier and higher to direct it, and so could not it selfe be the first. Being the first, it can haue no other then it selfe to be the author of that law which it willingly worketh by▪ God therefore is a law both to himselfe, and to all other things besides. To him∣selfe he is a law in all those things whereof our Sauiour speaketh, saying, My Fa∣ther worketh as yet,* 1.7 so I. God worketh nothing without cause. All those things which are done by him, haue some ende for which they are done: and the ende for which they are done, is a reason of his will to do them. His will had not in∣clined to create woman, but that he saw it could not be wel if she were not crea∣ted,* 1.8 Non est bonum, It is not good man should be alone, Therfore let vs make an helper for him. That and nothing else is done by God, which to leaue vndone were not so good. If therfore it bee demanded, why God hauing power & hability infi∣nit, th'effects notwithstāding of that power are all so limited as wee see they are: the reason hereof is, the end which he hath proposed, and the lawe whereby his wisedome hath, stinted th'effects of his power in such sort, that it doth not worke infinitely, but correspōdently vnto that end for which it worketh, euen al things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.9 in most decent and comely sort, all things in measure, number, & waight. The generall ende of Gods external working, is the exercise of his most glorious and most abundant vertue: Which abundance doth shew it selfe in varietie, and for that cause this varietie is oftentimes in scripture exprest by the name of riches. The Lord hath made all things for his owne sake.* 1.10 Not that any thing is made to be be∣neficial vnto him,* 1.11 but all things for him to shew beneficence and grace in them. The particular drift of euery acte proceeding externally from God,* 1.12 we are not able to discerne, and therefore cannot alwaies giue the proper and certaine rea∣son of his works. Howbeit vndoubtedly a proper and certaine reason there is of euery finite worke of God, in as much as there is a law imposed vpon it; which if there were not, it should be infinite euen as the worker himselfe is. They erre therfore who think that of the will of God to doe this or that, there is no reason

besides his will. Many times no reason knowne to vs; but that there is no reason thereof, I iudge it most vnreasonable to imagine, in as much as hee worketh all things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not onely according to his owne will,* 1.13 but the counsell of his owne will. And whatsoeuer is done with counsell or wise resolution, hath of necessitie some reason why it should be done, albeit that reason bee to vs in somethings so secret, that it forceth the wit of man to stand, as the blessed A∣postle himself doth, amazed therat,* 1.14 O the depth of the riches both of the wisdome and knowledge of God, How vnsearchable are his iudgements, &c! That law eternall which God himself hath made to himselfe, and therby worketh all things wherof he is the cause and author; that law in the admirable frame wherof shineth with most perfect beautie the countenance of that wisdome which hath testified concer∣ning her self, The lord possessed me in the beginning of his way,* 1.15 euē before his works of old I was set vp; that lawe which hath bene the patterne to make, and is the Carde to guide the world by; that law which hath bene of God, and with God euerla∣stingly; that law the author and obseruer whereof is one only God to be blessed for euer; how should either men or Angels be able perfectly to behold? The booke of this law we are neither able nor worthy to open and looke into. That little thereof which we darkly apprehend, we admire; the rest with religious ig∣norance we humbly & meekly adore. Seeing therfore that according to this law he worketh, of whom, through whom, & for whom are all things; althogh there seeme vnto vs cōfusion & disorder in th'affaires of this present world▪* 1.16 Tamen quon! am bonus mund•• rector temperat, rectè fieri cuncta ne dubites, Let no man doubt but that euery thing is wel done, because the world is ruled by so good a guide,* 1.17 as trans∣gresseth not his owne law, then which nothing can be more absolute, perfect & iust. The law wherby he worketh, is eternall, and therfore can haue no shew or colour of mutability: for which cause a part of that law being opened in the pro∣mises which God hath made, (because his promises are nothing else but declara∣tions what God will do for the good of men) touching those promises the A∣postle hath witnessed, that God may as possibly denie himselfe and not be God;* 1.18 as faile to performe them. And cōcerning the counsel of God, he termeth it like∣wise a thing vnchangeable; the counsel of God,* 1.19 and that law of God wherof now we speake, being one. Nor is the freedome of the wil of God any whit abated, let or hindered by meanes of this; because the impositiō of this law vpō himselfe is his own free & volūtary act. This law therfore we may name eternal, being that order which God before al ages hath set down with himself, for himself to do all things by.

3 I am not ignorant that by law eternall the learned for the most part do vn∣derstand the order,* 1.20 not which God hath eternally purposed himselfe in all his workes to obserue, but rather that which with himselfe he hath set downe as ex∣pedient to be kept by all his creatures, according to the seuerall conditiō wher∣with he hath indued them. They who thus are accustomed to speake, apply the name of Lawe vnto that onely rule of working which superiour authority in po∣seth; whereas we somewhat more enlarging the sense thereof, terme any kind of rule or Canon whereby actions are framed, a lawe. Now that lawe which as it is laid vp in the bosome of God, they call eternall, receiueth according vnto the different kinds of things which are subiect vnto it, different and sundry kinds of names. That part of it which ordereth naturall agēts, we call vsually natures law: that which Angels doe clearely behold, and without any swaruing obserue, is a

law coelestiall and heauenly: the law of reason, that which bindeth creatures reaso∣nable in this world, and with which by reason they may most plainely perceiue themselues bound; that which bindeth them, and is not knowne but by speciall reuelation from God, Diuine law; humane law, that which out of the law either of reason or of God, men probably gathering to be expedient, they make it a lawe. All things therfore, which are as they ought to be, are conformed vnto this second law eternall, and euen those things which to this eternal law are not conformable, are notwithstanding in some sort ordered by the first eternall lawe. For what good or euill is there vnder the sunne, what action correspondent or repugnant vnto the law which God hath imposed vpō his creatures, but in or vpon it God doth worke according to the law which himselfe hath eternally purposed to keep, that is to say, the first law eternall? So that a twofold law eternall being thus made, it is not hard to conceiue how they both take place in a 1.21 all things. Wherfore to come to the law of nature, albeit therby we sometimes meane that manner of working which God hath set for each created thing to keepe: yet for as much as those things are tearmed most properly naturall agents, which keepe the lawe of their kind vnwittingly, as the heauens and elements of the world, which can do no otherwise then they doe; and for as much as we giue vnto intellectuall natures the name of voluntary agents, that so we may distinguish them from the other▪ expedient it will be, that we seuer the law of nature obserued by the one, from that which the other is tied vnto. Touching the former, their strict keeping of one tenure statute and law is spoken of by all, but hath in it more then men haue as yet attained to know, or perhaps euer shall attaine, seeing the trauell of wa∣ding herein is giuen of God to the sonnes of men, that perceiuing how much the least thing in the world hath in it more then the wisest are able to reach vn∣to, they may by this meanes learne humilitie. Moses in describing the worke of creation, attributeth speech vnto God, God said, Let there be light: Let there bee afir∣mamēt: Let the waters vnder the heauē be gathered together into one place: Let the earth bring forth: Let there be lights in the firmament of heauen. Was this only the intent of Moses, to signifie the infinite greatnes of Gods power by the easines of his ac∣complishing such effects, without trauell, paine or labour? Surely it seemeth that Moses had herein besides this a further purpose, namely, first to teach that God did not worke as a necessary, but a voluntary agent, intending before hand and decreeing with himselfe that which did outwardly proceed from him: se∣condly to shew that God did then institute a law natural to be obserued by crea∣tures, and therefore according to the manner of lawes, the institution thereof is described, as being established by solemne iniunction. His commaunding those things to be which are, and to be in such sort as they are, to keep that tenure and course which they do, importeth the establishment of natures law. This worlds first creation, & the preseruation since of things created, what is it but only so far forth a manifestation by execution, what the eternall lawe of God is concerning things natural? And as it cōmeth to passe in a kingdom rightly ordered, that after a law is once published, it presently takes effect far & wide, al states framing thē∣selues therunto; euen so let vs thinke it fareth in the naturall course of the world: since the time that God did first proclaime the edicts of his lawe vpon it, heauen & earth haue harkned vnto his voice, and their labour hath bene to do his will: He made a law for the raine, He gaue his decree vnto the sea, that the waters should not

passe his commandement. Now if nature should intermit her course, and leaue alto∣gether, though it were but for a while, the obseruation of her own lawes; if those principall & mother elemēts of the world, wherof all things in this lower world are made, should loose the qualities which now they haue; if the frame of that heauenly arch erected ouer our heads should loosen & dissolue it selfe; if celesti∣all spheres should forget their wonted motions, and by irregular volubilitie turne themselues any way as it might happen; if the prince of the lightes of hea∣uen, which now as a Giant doth runne his vnwearied course, should as it were through a languishing faintnes begin to stand & to rest himselfe;* 1.22 if the Moone should wander from her beaten way▪ the times and seasons of the yeare blend themselues by disordered and confused mixture, the winds breath out their last gaspe, the cloudes yeeld no rayne, the earth be defeated of heauenly influence; the fruites of the earth pine away as children at the withered breastes of their mother no longer able to yeeld them reliefe; what would become of man him∣selfe, whom these things now do all serue? See we not plainly that obedience of creatures vnto the lawe of nature is the stay of the whole world? Notwithstan∣ding with nature it cōmeth somtimes to passe as with arte. Let Phidias haue rude & obstinate stuffe to carue, though his arte do that it should, his worke will lacke that beautie which otherwise in fitter matter it might haue had. He that striketh an instrument with skill, may cause notwithstanding a very vnpleasant sound, if the string whereon hee striketh chaunce to bee vncapable of harmonie. In the matter whereof things naturall consist, that of Theophrastus taketh place,* 1.23 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, much of it is oftentimes such as will by no meanes yeeld to receiue that impression which were best and most perfect. Which defect in the matter of thinges naturall, they who gaue themselues vnto the contempla∣tion of nature amongst the heathen obserued often: but the true originall cause therof, diuine malediction, laid for the sinne of man vpon these creatures which God had made for the vse of niā; this being an article of that sauing truth which God hath reuealed vnto his Church, was aboue the reach of their meerely na∣turall capacitie and vnderstanding. But howsoeuer these swaruings are now and then incident into the course of nature, neuerthelesse so constantly the lawes of nature are by naturall agents obserued,* 1.24 that no man denieth but those thinges which nature worketh, are wrought either alwaies or for the most part after one and the same manner. If here it be demaunded what that is which keepeth na∣ture in obedience to her owne lawe, wee must haue recourse to that higher lawe wherof we haue already spoken, and because all other lawes do thereon depend,* 1.25 from thence we must borrow so much as shall neede for briefe resolution in this point. Although we are not of opinion therfore, as some are, that nature in wor∣king hath before her certaine exemplary draughts or patternes, which subsisting in the bosome of the Highest, and being thence discouered, shee sixeth her eye vpon them, as trauellers by sea vpon the pole starre of the world, and that accor∣ding there vnto she guideth her hand to worke by imitation: although wee ra∣ther embrace the Oracle of Hippocrates, that Each thing both in small and in great fulfilleth the taske which destenie hath set downe: and concerning the manner of exe∣cuting and fulfilling the same, What they doe they knowe not, yet is it in shewe and ap∣pearance, as though they did know what they doe, and the truth is they do not discerne the

things which they looke on: neuerthelesse for as much as the works of nature are no lesse exact, then if she did both behold and studie how to expresse some abso∣lute shape or mirror alwayes present before her; yea such her dexteritie and skill appeareth, that no intellectuall creature in the world were able by capacitie to do that which nature doth without capacitie and knowledge; it cannot bee, but nature hath some director of infinite knowledge to guide her in all her wayes.* 1.26 Who the guide of nature, but onely the God of nature? In him wee liue, moue, and are. Those thinges which nature is said to do, are by diuine art perfor∣med, vsing nature as an instrument: nor is there any such art or knowledge di∣uine in nature her selfe working, but in the guide of natures worke. Whereas therefore things naturall which are not in the number of voluntary agents (for of such onely we now speake and of no other) do so necessarily obserue their certaine lawes, that as long as they keepe those a 1.27 formes which giue them their being, they cannot possibly be apt or inclinable to do otherwise then they doe; seeing the kindes of their operations are both constantly and exactly framed ac∣cording to the seuerall ends for which they serue, they themselues in the meane while though doing that which is fit, yet knowing neither what they doe, nor why: it followeth that all which they do in this sort, proceedeth originally from some such agent, as knoweth, appointeth, holdeth vp, and euen actually frameth the same. The manner of this diuine efficiencie being farre aboue vs, we are no more able to conceiue by our reason, then creatures vnreasonable by their sense are able to apprehend after what manner we dispose and order the course of our affaires. Only thus much is discerned, that the naturall generation and processe of all thinges receiueth order of proceeding from the setled stabili∣tie of diuine vnderstanding. This appointeth vnto them their kinds of working, the disposition whereof in the puritie of Gods owne knowledge and will is rightly tearmed by the name of Prouidence. The same being referred vnto the things themselues here disposed by it, was woont by the auncient to bee called naturall destinie. That lawe the performance whereof we behold in things natu∣rall, is as it were an authenticall, or an originall draught written in the bosome of God himselfe; whose spirite being to execute the same, vseth euery particular nature, euery meere naturall agent, onely as an instrument created at the begin∣ning, and euer since the beginning vsed to worke his owne will and pleasure withall.* 1.28 Nature therefore is nothing else but Gods instrument: in the course whereof Dionysius perceiuing some suddaine disturbance, is said to haue cried out, Aut Deus naturae patitur, aut mundi machina dissolu••tur, Either God doth suffer impediment, and is by a greater then himselfe hindered; or if that be impossible, then hath he determined to make a present dissolution of the world, the exe∣cution of that law beginning now to stand stil, without which the world cannot stand. This workman, whose seruitor nature is, being in truth but onely one, the Heathens imagining to be moe, gaue him in the skie the name of Iupiter, in the aire the name of Iuno, in the water the name of Neptune, in the earth the name of Vesta and sometimes of Ceres, the name of Apollo in the Sunne, in the Moone the name of Diana, the name of Aeolus and diuers other in the windes; and to conclude euen so many guides of nature they dreamed of, as they sawe there were kindes of thinges naturall in the world. These they honored, as ha∣uing

power to worke or cease accordingly as men deserued of them. But vnto vs there is one onely guide of all agents naturall, and hee both the creator and the worker of all in all, alone to be blessed, adored and honoured by all for euer. That which hitherto hath beene spoken, concerneth naturall agents conside∣red in themselues. But we must further remember also (which thing to touch in a word shall suffice) that as in this respect they haue their law, which lawe di∣recteth them in the meanes whereby they tende to their owne perfection. So likewise an other lawe there is, which toucheth them as they are sociable partes vnited into one body; a lawe which bindeth them each to serue vnto others good, and all to preferre the good of the whole before whatsoeuer their owne particular; as we plainely see they doe, when things naturall in that regard for∣get their ordinary naturall woont, that which is heauie mounting sometime vp∣wardes of it owne accord, and forsaking the center of the earth, which to it selfe is most naturall, euen as if it did heare it selfe commaunded to let goe the good it priuately wisheth, and to relieue the present distresse of nature in com∣mon.

* But now that wee may lift vp our eyes (as it were) from the footstoole to the throne of God, and leauing these naturall,* 1.29 consider a little the state of hea∣uenly and diuine creatures; touching Angels which are spirits immateriall and intellectuall, the glorious inhabitants of those sacred pallaces, where nothing but light and blessed immortalitie, no shadow of matter for teares, discontent∣ments, griefes, and vncomfortable passions to worke vpon, but all ioy▪ tranqui∣litie, and peace, euen for euer and euer doth dwell;* 1.30 as in number and order they are huge, mightie, and royall armies; so likewise in perfection of obedi∣ence vnto that lawe, which the Highest, whom they adore, loue, and imitate,* 1.31 hath imposed vpon them, such obseruantes they are thereof, that our Sauiour himselfe being to set downe the perfect idea of that which wee are to pray and wish for on earth, did not teach to pray or wish for more, then onely that heere it might be with vs, as with them it is in heauen.* 1.32 God which mooueth meere naturall agents as an efficient onely, doth otherwise mooue intellectuall crea∣tures, and especially his holy Angels. For beholding the face of God,* 1.33 in admi∣ration of so great excellencie they all adore him; and being rapt with the loue of his beautie, they cleaue inseparably for euer vnto him.* 1.34 Desire to resemble him in goodnesse, maketh them vnweariable,* 1.35 and euen vnsatiable in their longing to doe by all meanes all maner good vnto all the creatures of God,* 1.36 but especi∣ally vnto the children of men; in the countenance of whose nature looking downeward they behold themselues beneath themselues,* 1.37 euen as vpwarde in God, beneath whom themselues are, they see that character which is no where but in themselues and vs resembled. Thus farre euen the Painims haue appro∣ched; thus farre they haue seene into the doings of the Angels of God; Orpheus confessing, that the fiery throne of God is attended on by those most industri∣ous Angels, carefull how all things are performed amongst men; and the mir∣ror of humaine wisedome plainely teaching, that God mooueth Angels, euen as that thing doth stirre mans heart, which is thereunto presented amiable.* 1.38 An∣gelicall actions may therefore be reduced vnto these three generall kindes; first,* 1.39 most delectable loue, arising from the visible apprehension of the puritie, glory,* 1.40

and beautie of God, inuisible sauing onely vnto Spirites that are pure; secondly adoration,* 1.41 grounded vpon the euidence of the greatnes of God, on whom they see how all things depende; thirdly imitation, bred by the presence of his exem∣plary goodnes,* 1.42 who ceaseth not before them daily to fill heauen and earth with the rich treasures of most free and vndeserued grace. Of Angels wee are not to consider onely what they are, and doe, in regard of their owne being; but that also which concerneth them as they are lincked into a kinde of corporation a∣mongst themselues, and of societie or fellowship with men. Consider Angels each of them seuerally in himself, and their law is that which the Prophet Dauid mentioneth, All ye his Angels praise him. Consider the Angels of God asso∣ciated,* 1.43 and their lawe is that which disposeth them as an Army, one in order and degree aboue an other.* 1.44 Consider finally the Angels as hauing with vs that communion which the Apostle to the Hebrewes noteth,* 1.45 and in regard whereof Angels haue not disdained to professe themselues our fellowseruants; from hence there springeth vp a third law,* 1.46 which bindeth them to workes of ministeriall im∣ployment. Euery of which their seuerall functions are by them performed with ioy. A part of the Angels of God notwithstanding (we know) haue fallen, and that their fall hath beene through the voluntary breach of that lawe, which did require at their hands continuance in the exercise of their high and admirable vertue. Impossible it was that euer their will should chaunge or incline to remit any part of their dutie, without some obiect hauing force to auert their conceit from God, and to draw it an other way; and that before they attained that high perfection of blisse, wherein now the elect Angels are without possibilitie of falling. Of any thing more then of God they could not by any meanes like, as long as whatsoeuer they knew besides God, they apprehended it not in it selfe without dependencie vpon God; because so long God must needes seeme infi∣nitely better then any thing which they so could apprehend. Thinges beneath them could not in such sort be presented vnto their eyes, but that therein they must needs see alwayes how those things did depend on God. It seemeth there∣fore that there was no other way for Angels to sinne, but by reflex of their vn∣derstanding vpon themselues; when being held with admiration of their owne sublimitie and honor, the memorie of their subordination vnto God and their dependencie on him was drowned in this conceipt; whereupon their adora∣tion, loue, and imitation of God, could not choose but be also interrupted. The fall of Angels therefore was pride. Since their fall, their practises haue beene the cleane contrary vnto those before mentioned. For being dispersed some in the ayre,* 1.47 some on the earth, some in the water, some amongest the minerals, dennes,* 1.48 and caues, that are vnder the earth: they haue by all meanes laboured to effect an vniuersall rebellion against the lawes, and as farre as in them lyeth, vtter destruction of the workes of God.* 1.49 These wicked Spirites the Heathens honoured in stead of Gods,* 1.50 both generally vnder the name of Dii inferi Gods infernall;* 1.51 and particularly, some in Oracles, some in Idoles, some as household Gods, some as Nymphes; in a word no foule and wicked spirite which was not one way or other honored of men as God, till such time as light appeared in the world, and dissolued the workes of the diuell. Thus much therefore may suffice for Angels, the next vnto whom in degree are men.

5 God alone excepted, who actually and euerlastingly is whatsoeuer he may be, and which cannot hereafter be that which now he is not;* 1.52 all other things besides are somewhat in possibilitie, which as yet they are not in act. And for this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby they incline to something which they may be: and when they are it, they shall be perfecte•• then now they are. All which perfections are contained vnder the generall name of Goodnesse. And because there is not in the world any thing wherby an∣other may not some way be made the perfecter, therefore all things that are, are good. Againe sith there can be no goodnesse desired which proceedeth not from God himselfe, as from the supreme cause of all things; and euerie effect doth after a sort conteine, at least wise resemble the cause from which it procee∣deth: all things in the world are sayd in some sort to seeke the highest,* 1.53 and to couet more or lesse the participation of God himselfe. Yet this doth no where so much appeare as it doth in man:* 1.54 because there are so many kindes of perfe∣ctions which man seeketh. The first degree of goodnesse is that generall perfe∣ction which all things do seeke▪ in desiring the continuance of their beeing. All thinges therefore coueting as much as may be to be like vnto God in being euer, that which cannot hereunto attaine personally, doth seeke to continue it selfe another way, that is by ofspring and propagation. The next degree of goodnesse, is that which each thing coueteth by affecting resemblance with God, in the constancy and excellencie of those operations which belong vnto their kind. The immutabilitie of God they striue vnto, by working either al∣wayes or for the most part after one and the same manner; his absolute exactnes they imitate, by tending vnto that which is most exquisite in euery particular.* 1.55 Hence haue risen a number of axiomes in Philosophie, shewing, how The workes of nature do alwayes ayme at that which cannot be bettered. These two kinds of goodnesse rehe••rsed are so neerely vnited to the things themselues which de∣si••e them, that we scarcely perceiue the appetite to stirre in reaching foorth her hand towards them. But the desire of those perfections which grow externally is more apparent; especially of such as are not expressely desired vnlesse they be first knowne, or such as are not for any other cause then for knowledge it selfe desired. Concerning perfections in this kind, that by proceeding in the knowledge of truth, and by growing in the exercise of vertue, man amongst the creatures of this inferiour world, aspireth to the greatest conformity with God;* 1.56 this is not only knowne vnto vs, whom he himselfe hath so instructed, but euen they do acknowledge, who amongst men are not iudged the neerest vnto him.* 1.57 With Plato what one thing more vsuall, then to excite men vnto the loue of wisedome, by shewing how much▪ wise men are thereby exalted aboue men; how knowledge doth rayse them vp into heauen; how it maketh them, though not Gods, yet as Gods, high, admirable and diuine? And Mercurius Trismegisl••s speaking of the vertues of a righteous soule, Such spirits (sayth he) are neuer cl••yed with praising and speaking well of all men, with doing good vnto euery one by word and deed, because they studie to frame themselues according to THE PATERNE of the father of spirits.

6 In the matter of knowledge, there is betweene the Angels of God and the children of men this difference.* 1.58 Angels alreadie haue full and complete

knowledge in the highest degree that can be imparted vnto them: men if we view them in their spring, are at the first without vnderstanding or knowledge at all. Neuerthelesse from this vtter vacuitie they grow by degrees, till they come at length to be euen as the Angels themselues are. That which agreeth to the one now, the other shall attaine vnto in the end; they are not so farre dis∣ioyned and seuered, but that they come at length to meete. The soule of man being therefore at the first as a booke, wherein nothing is, and yet all thinges may be imprinted; we are to search by what steppes and degrees it riseth vnto perfection of knowledge. Vnto that which hath bene alreadie set downe con∣cerning naturall agents this we must adde, that albeit therein we haue compri∣sed as well creatures liuing, as void of life, if they be in degree of nature beneath men; neuerthelesse a difference we must obserue betweene those naturall agents that worke altogether vnwittingly, and those which haue though weake, yet some vnderstanding what they do, as fishes, foules, and beasts haue. Beasts are in sensible capacitie as ripe euen as men themselues, per∣haps more ripe. For as stones, though in dignitie of nature inferior vnto plants, yet exceed them in firmenesse of strength or durability of being; and plants though beneath the excellency of creatures indued with sense, yet exceed them in the faculty of vegetation and of fertility: so beasts though otherwise behind men, may notwithstanding in actions of sense and phancie go beyond them; because the endeuors of nature, when it hath an higher perfection to seeke, are in lower the more remisse, not esteeming thereof so much as those things do, which haue no better proposed vnto them. The soule of man therefore being capable of a more diuine perfection, hath (besides the faculties of growing vn∣to sensible knowledge which is common vnto vs with beasts) a further hability▪ whereof in thē there is no shew at all,* 1.59 the ability of reaching higher then vnto sensible things. Till we grow to some ripenesse of yeares, the soule of man doth only store it selfe with conceipts of things of inferiour and more open qualitie, which afterwards do serue as instruments vnto that which is greater: in the meane while aboue the reach of meaner creatures it ascendeth not. When once it comprehendeth any thing aboue this, as the differences of time, affirmations, negations▪ and contradictions in speech; we then count it to haue some vse of naturall reason. Whereunto if afterwards there might be added the right helpes of true art and learning, (which helpes I must plainely confesse this age of the world, carying the name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor greatly regard) there would vndoubtedly be almost as great difference in maturitie of iudgement betweene men therewith inured, and that which now men are, as betweene men that are now and innocents. Which speech if any condemne, as being ouer hyperbolicall, let them consider but this one thing. No art is at the first finding out so perfect as industrie may after make it. Yet the very first man that to any purpose knew the way we speake of and followed it, hath alone thereby performed more very neere in all parts of naturall knowledge, then sithence in any one part thereof, the whole world besides hath done. In the pouertie of that other new deuised aide, two things there are notwithstanding singular.* 1.60 Of maruellous quicke dispatch it is, and doth shew them that haue it as much almost in three dayes, as if it dwell threescore yeares with them. A∣gaine

because the curiositie of mans wit, doth many times with perill wade far∣ther in the search of things, then were conuenient: the same is thereby restrai∣ned vnto such generalities▪ as euery where offering themselues, are apparant vn∣to men of the weakest conceipt that need be. So as following the rules & pre∣cepts thereof, we may find it to be, an Art which teacheth the way of speedy discourse, and restraineth the minde of man that it may not waxe ouer wise. Education and instruction are the meanes, the one by vse, the other by precept, to make our naturall faculty of reason, both the better and the sooner able to iudge rightly betweene truth and error, good and euill. But at what time a man may be sayd to haue attained so farre foorth the vse of reason, as sufficeth to make him capable of those lawes, whereby he is thē bound to guide his actions; this is a great deale more easie for common sense to discerne, then for any man by skill and learning to determine: euen as it is not in Philosophers, who best know the nature both of fire and of gold, to teach what degree of the one will serue to purifie the other, so well as the artisan (who doth this by fire) dis∣cerneth by sense when the fire hath that degree of heate which sufficeth for his purpose.

7 By reason man attaineth vnto the knowledge of things that are and are not sensible:* 1.61 It resteth therfore that we search how mā attaineth vnto the know∣ledge of such things vnsensible, as are to be knowne that they may be done. See∣ing then that nothing can moue vnlesse there be some end, the desire whereof prouoketh vnto motion; how should that diuine power of the soule, that Spirit of our mind as the Apostle termeth it, euer stir it selfe vnto action,* 1.62 vnlesse it haue also the like spurre? The end for which we are moued to worke, is somtimes the goodnes which we conceiue of the very working it selfe, without any further respect at all; and the cause that procureth action is the meere desire of action, no other good besides being thereby intended.* 1.63 Of certaine turbulent wits it is said, Illis quieta mouere magna merces videbatur, They thought the very disturbāce of things established an hyre sufficient to set them on worke. Sometimes that which we do is referred to a further end, without the desire whereof we would leaue the same vndone, as in their actions that gaue almes to purchase thereby the prayse of men.* 1.64 Man in perfection of nature being made according to the likenes of his maker, resembleth him also in the maner of working; so that what∣soeuer we worke as men, the same we do wittingly worke and freely; neither are we according to the maner of naturall agents any way so tied, but that it is in our power to leaue the things we do vndone. The good which either is got∣ten by doing, or which consisteth in the very doing it selfe, causeth not action, vnlesse apprehending it as good, we so like and desire it. That we do vnto any such ende, the same we choose and preferre before the leauing of it vndone. Choice there is not, vnlesse the thing which we take, be so in our power that we might haue refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another. And to will is to bend our soules to the hauing or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodnesse is seene with the eye of the vnderstanding. And the light of that eye, is reason. So that two principall fountaines there are of humaine action, Knowledge and Will; which will in things

tending towards any end is termed Choice. Concerning knowledge, Behold sayth Moses,* 1.65 I haue set before you this day good and euill, life and death. Concerning Will, he addeth immediatly, Choose life; that is to say, the things that tend vnto life, them choose. But of one thing we must haue speciall care, as being a matter of no small moment, and that is, how the will properly and strictly taken, as it is of things which are referred vnto the end that man desireth, differeth greatly from that inferiour naturall desire which we call appetite. The obiect of appe∣tite is whatsoeuer sensible good may be wished for; the obiect of wil is that good which reason doth leade vs to seeke. Affections, as ioy, and griefe, and feare, and anger, with such like, being as it were the sundry fashions and formes of appe∣tite, can neither rise at the conceipt of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power, whether we will be stirred with affections or no: whereas actions which issue from the dispositiō of the wil, are in the power therof to be performed or staied. Finally appetite is the wils sollicitor, and the will is appetites controller; what we couet according to the one, by the other we often reiect: neither is any o∣ther desire termed properly will, but that where reason and vnderstanding, or the shew of reason, prescribeth the thing desired. It may be therfore a question, whether those operations of men are to be counted voluntary, wherein that good which is sensible prouoketh appetite, and appetite causeth action, reason being neuer called to councell; as when we eate or drinke, or betake our selues vnto rest, and such like. The truth is, that such actions in men hauing attained to the vse of reason are voluntary. For as the authoritie of higher powers hath force euen in those things which are done without their priuitie, and are of so meane reckening that to acquaint them therewith it needeth not: in like sort voluntarily we are said to do that also▪ which the will if it listed might hinder from being done, although about the doing thereof we do not expressely vse our reason or vnderstanding, and so immediatly apply our wils thereunto. In cases therefore of such facility, the will doth yeeld her assent, as it were with a kind of silence, by not dissenting; in which respect her force is not so apparant, as in expresse mandates or prohibitions, especially vpon aduice and consultati∣on going before. Where vnderstanding therefore needeth, in those things rea∣son is the director of mans will, by discouering in action what is good. For the lawes of well doing are the dictates of right reason. Children which are not as yet come vnto those yeares whereat they may haue; againe innocentes which are excluded by naturall defect from euer hauing; thirdly mad men which for the present cannot possibly haue the vse of right reason to guide themselues, haue for their guide the reason that guideth other men, which are tutors ouer them to seeke and to procure their good for them. In the rest there is that light of reason, whereby good may be knowne from euill, and which discouering the same rightly is termed right. The will notwithstanding doth not incline to haue or do that which reason teacheth to be good, vnlesse the same do also teach it to be possible. For albeit the appetite, being more generall, may wish any thing which seemeth good,* 1.66 be it neuer so impossible: yet for such things the reasonable will of man doth neuer seeke. Let reason reach impossibilitie in any thing, and the will of man doth let it go; a thing impossible it doth not

affect, the impossibility thereof being manifest. There is in the will of man na∣turally that freedome, whereby it is apt to take or refuse any particular obiect whatsoeuer being presented vnto it. Whereupon it followeth; th••t there is no particular obiect so good, but it may haue the shew of some dif••icultie or vnple∣sant qualitie annexed to it; in respect whereof the will may shrinke and decline it: contrariwise (for so things are blended) there is no particular euill, which hath not some appearance of goodnes whereby to insinuate it selfe.* 1.67 For euill as euill cannot be desired: if that be desired which is euill, the cause is the good∣nes which is or seemeth to be ioyned with it. Goodnesse doth not moue by be∣ing, but by being apparant; and therefore many things are neglected which are most pretious, onely because the value of them lyeth hid. Sensible goodnesse is most apparent, neere, and present; which causeth the appetite to be therewith strongly prouoked. Now pursuit & refusall in the will do follow, the one the af∣firmation, the other the negation of goodnes; which the vnderstanding appre∣hendeth▪ grounding it selfe vpon sense, vnlesse some higher reason do chance to teach the cōtrary. And if reason haue taught it rightly to be good, yet not so ap∣parently that the mind receiueth it with vtter im••ossibility of being ot••erwise; still there is place left for the will to take or leaue. Whereas therefore amongst so many things as are to be done, there are so few, the goodnes wherof reasō in such sort doth or easily can discouer; we are not to m••ruaile at the choyce of euill, euē then when the cōtrary is probably knowne. Hereby it cometh to passe, that custome inuring the mind by lō•• practise, & so leauing there a sensible impressi∣on, preuaileth more thē reasonable perswasiō wh••t way so euer. Reason therfore may rightly discerne the thing which is good, & yet the will of mā not incline it selfe theru••to, is oft as the preiudice of sensible experience doth ouersway. Nor let any man thinke that this doth make any thing for the iust excuse of iniquity. For there was neuer sin cōmitted, wherein a lesse good was not preferred before a greater, & that wilfully; which cānot be done without the singular disgrace of nature, & the vtter disturbance of that diuine order, wherby the preeminence of chiefest acceptation is by the best things worthily chalenged. There is not that good which cōcerneth vs, but it hath euidence ••nough for it selfe, if reason were diligent to search it out. Through neglect thereof, abused we are with the shew of that which is not; somtimes the subtilty of Satan inueagling vs, as it did a 1.68 Eue;* 1.69 sometimes the hastinesse of our wils preuenting the more considerate aduice of foūd reasō, as in b 1.70 the Apostles, whē they no sooner saw what they liked not, but they forthwith were desirous of fit frō heauen; sometimes the very custome of euil making the hart obdurate against whatsoeuer instructions to the cōtrary, as in thē ouer whō our Sauior spake weeping, c 1.71 O Ierusalē how often, & thou wouldst not? Still therfore that wherw••th we stand blameable, & can no way excuse it is, In doing euill, we prefer a lesse good before a greater the greatnes whereof is by reasō inuestigable & may be known. The search of knowledge is a thing painful; & the painfulnes of knowledge is that which maketh the will so hardly inclina∣ble thereunto. The root hereof, diuine maledictiō▪ wherby the d 1.72 instrumēts be∣ing weakned wherwithall the soule (especially in reasoning) doth worke, it pre∣ferreth rest in ignorance, before wearisome labour to know. For a spurre of diligence therefore we haue a naturall thirst after knowledge ingrafted in vs. But by reason of that originall weaknesse in the instruments, without which the

vnder∣standing part is not able in this world by discourse to worke, the very con∣ceipt of painefulnesse is as a bridle to stay vs.* 1.73 For which cause the Apostle who knew right well that the wearines of the flesh is an heauy clog to the will, striketh mightily vpon this key, Awake thou that sleepest, Cast off all which presseth downe, Watch, Labour, striue to go forward and to grow in knowledge.

* 1.748▪ Wherefore to returne to our former intent of discouering the naturall way, whereby rules haue bene found out concerning that goodnes wherewith the wil of man ought to be moued in humaine actions; As euery thing naturally and necessarily doth desire the vtmost good and greatest perfection whereof na∣ture hath made it capable, euen so man. Our felicitie therefore being the obiect and accomplishment of our desire, we cannot choose but wish and couet it. All particular things which are subiect vnto action, the will doth so farre foorth in∣cline vnto, as reason iudgeth them the better for vs, and consequently the more auaileable to our blisse. If reason erre, we fall into euill, and are so farre forth de∣priued of the generall perfection we seeke. Seeing therefore that for the fra∣ming of mens actions the knowledge of good from euill is necessarie; it onely resteth that we search how this may be had. Neither must we suppose that there needeth one rule to know the good,* 1.75 and another the euill by. For he that kno∣weth what is straight, doth euen thereby discerne what is crooked, because the absence of straightnesse in bodies capable thereof is crookednesse. Goodnesse in actions is like vnto straitnesse▪ wherfore that which is done well we terme right. For as the straight way is most acceptable to him that trauaileth, because by it he commeth soonest to his iourneys end: so in action, that which doth lye the euenest betweene vs and the end we desire, must needes be the fittest for our vse. Besides which fitnes for vse, there is also in rectitude, beauty; as contrariwise in obliquity, deformity. And that which is good in the actions of men, doth not onely delight as profitable, but as amiable also. In which consideration the Grecians most diuinely haue giuen to the actiue perfection of men, a name ex∣pressing both beauty and goodnesse,* 1.76 because goodnesse in ordinary speech is for the most part applied onely to that which is beneficiall. But we in the name of goodnesse, do here imploy both. And of discerning goodnes there are but these two wayes; the one the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other the obseruation of those signes and tokens, which being annexed alwaies vnto goodnes, argue that where they are found, there also goodnes is, although we know not the cause by force whereof it is there. The former of these is the most sure & infallible way, but so hard that all shunne it, and had rather walke as men do in the darke by hap hazard, then tread so long and intricate mazes for knowledge sake. As therefore Physitians are many times forced to leaue such methods of curing as themselues know to be the fittest, and being ouerruled by their patients impatiency are fame to try the best they can, in taking that way of cure, which the cured will yeeld vnto: in like sort, cōsidering how the case doth stād with this present age full of tongue & weake of braine, behold we yeeld to the streame thereof; into the causes of goodnes we will not make any curious or deepe inquiry; to touch them now & then it shalbe sufficient, when they are so neere at hand that easily they may be conceiued without any farre remoued dis∣course: that way we are contented to proue, which being the worse in it selfe, is

notwithstanding now by reason of common imbecillity the fitter & likelier to be brookt. Signes and tokens to know good by, are of sundry kinds: some more certaine▪ and some lesse. The most certaine token of euident goodnesse is, if the generall perswasion of all men do so account it. And therefore a common re∣ceiued error is neuer vtterly ouerthrowne, till such time as we go from signes vnto causes, and shew some manifest root or fountaine thereof common vnto all, whereby it may clearly appeare how it hath come to passe that so many haue bene ouerseene. In which case surmises and sleight probabilities will not serue; because the vniuersall consent of men is the perfectest and strongest in this kind which comprehendeth onely the signes and tokens of goodnesse. Things ca∣suall do varie, and that which a man doth but chaunce to thinke well of, cannot still haue the like hap. Wherefore although we know not the cause, yet thus much we may know, that some necessary cause there is, whensoeuer the iudge∣ments of all men generally or for the most part run one & the same way, especi∣ally in matters of naturall discourse. For of things necessarily & naturally done there is no more affirmed but this, a 1.77 They keepe either alwaies or for the most part one tenure. The generall and perpetuall voyce of men is as the sentence of God him∣selfe. b 1.78 For that which all men haue at all times learned, nature her selfe must needes haue taught; and God being the author of nature, her voyce is but his instrument. By her from him we receiue whatsoeuer in such sort we learne. Infi∣nite duties there are, the goodnes wherof is by this rule sufficiently manifested, although we had no other warrant besides to approue them. The Apostle S. Paul hauing speech cōcerning the Heathen saith of thē, c 1.79 They are a law vnto thēselues▪ His meaning is, that by force of the light of reasō, wherewith God illuminateth euery one which cometh into the world, mē being inabled to know truth from falshood, and good from euill, do thereby learne in many things what the will of God is; which will himselfe not reuealing by any extraordinary meanes vnto them, but they by naturall discourse attaining the knowledge thereof, seeme the makers of those lawes which indeed are his, and they but onely the finders of them out. A law therefore generally taken, is a directiue rule vnto goodnesse of operation. The rule of diuine operations outward, is the definitiue appointmēt of Gods owne wisedome set downe within himselfe. The rule of naturall agents that worke by simple necessity, is the determination of the wisedome of God▪ known to God himselfe the principall director of them, but not vnto them that are directed to execute the same. The rule of naturall agents which worke after a sort of their owne accord, as the beasts do, is the iudgement of common sense or phancy concerning the sensible goodnes of those obiects wherwith they are moued. The rule of ghostly or immateriall natures, as spirits & Angels, is their intuitiue intellectual iudgement concerning the amiable beauty & high good∣nes of that obiect, which with vnspeakeable ioy and delight doth set them on worke. The rule of voluntary agents on earth, is the sentence that reason giueth cōcerning the goodnes of those things which they are to do. And the sentences which reason giueth, are some more, some lesse general, before it come to define in particular actiōs what is good. The maine principles of reason are in thēselues apparent. For to make nothing euidēt of it selfe vnto mās vnderstāding, were to take away al possibility of knowing any thing. And herein that of Theophras••us is

true,* 1.80 They that seeke a reason of all things do vtterly ouerthrow reason. In euery kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being proposed, the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibilitie of error, cleare and manifest without proofe. In which kind, axiomes or principles more generall are such as this, That the greater good is to be chosen before the lesse. If therefore it should be de∣manded, what reason there is why the will of man, which doth necessarily shun harme and couet whatsoeuer is pleasant and sweete, should be commanded to count the pleasures of sinne gall, & notwithstanding the bitter accidents wher∣with vertuous actions are compast, yet stil to reioyce and delight in them; surely this could neuer stand with reason: but that wisedome thus prescribing, groun∣deth her lawes vpon an infallible rule of comparison, which is, that small diffi∣culties, when exceeding great good is sure to ensue; and on the other side mo∣mentanie benefites, when the hurt which they drawe after them is vnspeake∣able, are not at all to be respected. This rule is the ground whereupon the wise∣dom of the Apostle buildeth a law, inioyning patience vnto himselfe; The present lightnes of our affliction worketh vnto vs euen with aboundance vpon aboundance an e∣ternall waight of glory,* 1.81 while we looke not on the things which are seene, but on the things which are not seene. For the things which are seene are temporal, but the things which are not seene eternall. Therefore Christianity to be embraced, whatsoeuer calami∣ties in those times it was accompanied withall. Vpon the same ground our Sa∣uiour proueth the law most reasonable, that doth forbid those crimes which mē for gaines sake fall into. For a man to win the world, if it be with the losse of his soule,* 1.82 what benefit or good is it? Axiomes lesse generall, yet so manifest that they need no further proofe, are such as these, God to be worshipped, Parents to be honored, Others to be vsed by vs as we our selues would by them. Such things, as soone as they are alleaged, all men acknowledge to be good; they require no proofe or further discourse to be assured of their goodnes. Notwithstanding whatsoeuer such principle there is, it was at the first found out by discourse, & drawne from out of the very bowels of heauen and earth. For we are to note, that things in the world are to vs discernable, not onely so farre forth as serueth for our vitall preseruation, but further also in a twofold higher respect. For first if all other vses were vtterly taken away; yet the mind of man being by nature speculatiue and delighted with cōtemplation in it selfe, they were to be known euen for meere knowledge and vnderstandings sake. Yea further besides this, the knowledge of euery the least thing in the whole world, hath in it a secōd peculiar benefit vnto vs, in as much as it serueth to minister rules, Canons, and lawes for men to di∣rect those actions by, which we properly terme humane. This did the very Heathens themselues obscurely insinuate, by making Themis which we call Ius or Right to be the daughter of heauen and earth. Wee knowe things either as they are in themselues, or as they are in mutuall relation one to another. The knowledge of that which man is in reference vnto himselfe, and other things in relation vnto man, I may iustly terme the mother of al those principles, which are as it were edicts, statutes, and decrees in that law of nature, wherby humaine actions are framed. First therefore hauing obserued that the best things, where they are not hindered, do still produce the best operations; (for which cause where many things are to concurre vnto one effect, the best is in all congruity

of reason to guide the residue, that it preuailing most, the worke principally done by it may haue greatest perfection:) when hereupon we come to obserue in our selues, of what excellencie our soules are in comparison of our bodies, and the diuiner part in relation vnto the baser of our soules; seeing that all these concurre in producing humaine actions, it cannot be well vnlesse the chiefest do commaund and direct the rest.* 1.83 The soule then ought to con∣duct the bodie, and the spirit of our mindes the soule. This is therefore the first lawe, whereby the highest power of the minde requireth generall obedi∣ence at the hands of all the rest concurring with it vnto action. Touching the seuerall graund mandates, which being imposed by the vnderstanding fa∣cultie of the minde, must be obeyed by the will of man, they are by the same method found out, whether they import our dutie towardes God or to∣wards man. Touching the one, I may not here stand to open, by what de∣grees of discourse the mindes euen of meere naturall men, haue attained to knowe, not onely that there is a God, but also what power, force, wisedome, and other properties that God hath, and how all thinges depend on him. This being therefore presupposed, from that knowne relation which God hath vn∣to vs a 1.84 as vnto children, and vnto all good thinges as vnto effectes, whereof himselfe is the b 1.85 principall cause, these axiomes and lawes naturall concerning our dutie haue arisen; c 1.86 That in all things we go about, his ayde is by prayer to be craued; d 1.87 That he cannot haue sufficient honor done vnto him, but the vttermost of that we can do to honour him we must; which is in effect the same that we read, e 1.88 Thou shalt loue the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soule, and with all thy mind. Which law our Sauiour doth terme the f 1.89 First and the great Commaundement. Touching the next, which as our Sauiour addeth, is like vnto this (he meaneth in amplitude and largenesse▪ in as much as it is the roote out of which all laws of dutie to men-ward haue growne, as out of the former all offices of religion towards God) the like naturall inducement hath brought men to know, that it is their duty no lesse to loue others then themselues. For seeing those things which are equall, must needes all haue one measure: if I cannot but wish to re∣ceiue al good, euen as much at euery mans hand as any man can wish vnto his owne soule; how should I looke to haue any part of my desire herein satisfied, vnlesse my self be careful to satisfie the like desire, which is vndoubtedly in other men, we all being of one and the same nature? To haue any thing offered them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieue them as much as me: so that if I do harme, I must looke to suffer; there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of loue to me, then they haue by me shewed vnto them. My desire therefore to be loued of my equals in nature as much as pos∣sible may be, imposeth vpon me a naturall dutie of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection. From which relation of equalitie betweene our selues and them that are as our selues, what seuerall rules and Canons naturall reason hath drawne for direction of life, no man is ignorant; as namely, g 1.90 That because we would take no harme, we must therefore do none; That sith we would not be in any thing extreamely dealt with, we must our selues auoide all extremitie in our dealings; That from all violence and wrong wee are vtterly to abstaine, with such like; which further to wade in would bee tedious, and to our present purpose

not altogether so necessary,* 1.91 seeing that on these two generall heads alreadie mentioned all other specialties are dependent. Wherefore the naturall measure wherby to iudge our doings, is the sentence of reason, determining and setting downe what is good to be done. Which sentence is either mandatory, shewing what must be done; or else permissiue, declaring onely what may be done; or thirdly admonitorie, opening what is the most conuenient for vs to doe. The first taketh place, where the comparison doth stand altogether betweene doing and not doing of one thing which in it selfe is absolutely good or euill; as it had bene for Ioseph to yeeld or not to yeeld to the impotent desire of his lewd mistresse,* 1.92 the one euill, the other good simply. The second is, when of diuerse things euill, all being not euitable, we are permitted to take one; which one sauing only in case of so great vrgency were not otherwise to be taken;* 1.93 as in the matter of diuorce amongst the Iewes. The last, when of diuers things good, one is principall and most eminent;* 1.94 as in their act who sould their possessions and layd the price at the Apostles feete, which possessions they might haue retained vnto themselues without sinne; againe in the Apostle S. Paules owne choyce to maintaine himselfe by his owne labour,* 1.95 whereas in liuing by the Churches maintenance, as others did, there had bene no offence committed. In goodnes therefore there is a latitude or extent, whereby it commeth to passe that euen of good actions some are better then other some; whereas otherwise one man could not excell another, but all should be either absolutely good, as hitting iumpe that indiuisible point or Center wherein goodnesse consisteth; or else missing it they should be excluded out of the number of wel-doers. Degrees of wel doing there could be none, except perhaps in the seldomnes & oftennes of doing well. But the nature of goodnesse being thus ample, a lawe is proper∣ly that which reason in such sort defineth to be good that it must be done. And the law of reason or humaine nature is that, which men by discourse of natu∣rall reason haue rightly found out themselues to be all for euer bound vnto in their actions. Lawes of reason haue these markes to be knowne by. Such as keepe them, resemble most liuely in their voluntarie actions, that very manner of working which nature her selfe doth necessarily obserue in the course of the whole world. The workes of nature are all behoouefull, beautifull, with∣out superfluitie or defect: euen so theirs, if they be framed according to that which the law of reason teacheth. Secondly those lawes are inuestigable by rea∣son, without the helpe of reuelation supernaturall and diuine. Finally in such sort they are inuestigable, that the knowledge of them is generall, the world hath alwayes bene acquainted with them; according to that which one in So∣phocles obserueth corcerning a branch of this law,* 1.96 It is no child of two dayes or yea∣sterdayes birth, but hath bene no man knoweth how long sithence. It is not agreed vpon by one, or two, or few, but by all: which we may not so vnderstand, as if eue∣ry particular man in the whole world did know and confesse whatsoeuer the law of reason doth conteine; but this lawe is such that being proposed no man can reiect it as vnreasonable and vniust. Againe there is nothing in it, but any man (hauing naturall perfection of wit, and ripenesse of iudgement) may by la∣bour and trauaile find out. And to conclude, the generall principles thereof are such, as it is not easie to find men ignorant of them. Law rationall there∣fore,

which men commonly vse to call the law of nature, meaning thereby the law which humaine nature knoweth it selfe in reason vniuersally bound vnto, which also for that cause may be termed most fitly the lawe of reason▪ this law, I say, comprehendeth all those things which men by the light of their naturall vnderstanding euidently know, or at least wife may know, to be besee∣ming or vnbeseeming, vertuous or vitious; good or euill for them to do.* 1.97 Now although it be true, which some haue said, that whatsoeuer is done amisse, the law of nature and reason therby is transgrest; because euen those offences which are by their speciall qualities breaches of supernaturall lawes, do also, for that they are generally euill violate in generall that principle of reason, which wil∣leth vniuersally to flie from euill: yet do we not therfore so far extend the law of reason, as to conteine in it all maner lawes whereunto reasonable creatures are bound; but (as hath bene shewed) we restraine it to those onely duties, which all men by force of naturall wit either do or might vnderstand to be such duties as concerne all men. Certaine half waking men there are, (as Saint Augustine noteth) who neither altogether asleepe in folly, nor yet throughly awake in the light of true vnder∣standing, haue thought that there is not at all any thing iust and righteous in it selfe: but looke wherwith nations are inured, the same they take to be right and iust. Wherupon their conclusion is, that seeing each sort of people hath a different kind of right from other, and that which is right of it owne nature must be euery where one and the same, therefore in it selfe there is nothing right. These good folke (saith he, that I may not trouble their wits with rehearsal of too many things) haue not looked so far into the world as to perceiue, that Do as thou wouldest be done vnto, is a sentence which all nations vnder heauen are agreed vpon. Refer this sentence to the loue of God, & it extinguisheth all heinous crimes▪ referre it to the loue of thy neighbor, and all grieuous wrongs it banisheth out of the world. Wherefore as touching the law of reason, this was (it seemeth) Saint Augustines iudgement, namely, that there are in it some things which stand as principles vniuersally agreed vpon: and that out of those principles, which are in them∣selues euident, the greatest morall duties we owe towards God or man, may without any great difficultie be concluded. If then it be here demaunded, by what meanes it should come to passe (the greatest part of the law morall being so easie for all men to know) that so many thousands of men notwithstanding haue bene ignorant euen of principall morall duties, not imagining the breach of them to be sinne: I deny not but lewd and wicked custome; beginning per∣haps at the first amongst few, afterwards spreading into greater multitudes, and so continuing from time to time, may be of force euen in plaine things to smo∣ther the light of naturall vnderstanding, because men will not bend their wits to examine, whether things wherewith they haue bene accustomed, be good or euill. For examples sake, that grosser kind of heathenish idolatrie, wherby they worshipped the very workes of their owne hands, was an absurdity to reason so palpable, that the Prophet Dauid comparing idols and idolaters together, ma∣keth almost no ods betweene them, but the one in a maner as much without wit and sense as the other, They that make them are like vnto them, and so are all that trust in them. That wherein an idolater doth seeme so absurb and foolish,* 1.98 is by the Wiseman thus exprest, He is not ashamed to speake vnto that which hath no life,* 1.99 he cal∣leth on him that is weake for health, he prayeth for life vnto him which is dead, of him which hath no experience he requireth helpe, for his iourney be s••••th to him which is not

able to go, for gaine and worke and successe in his affaires he seeketh furtherance of him that hath no maner of power. The cause of which senselesse stupidity is afterwards imputed to custome.* 1.100 When a father mourned grieuosly for his son that was taken away suddenly, he made an image for him that was once dead, whom now he worshipped as a God, ordeining to his seruants ceremonies & sacrifices. Thus by processe of time this wicked cu∣stome preuailed, & was kept as a law; the authority of Rulers, the ambition of crafts∣men, and such like meanes thrusting forward the ignorant, and increasing their superstition. Vnto this which the Wiseman hath spoken, somwhat besides may be added. For whatsoeuer we haue hitherto taught, or shal hereafter, cōcerning the force of mans naturall vnderstanding, this we alwayes desire withall to be vnderstood, that there is no kind of faculty or power in man or any other crea∣ture, which can rightly performe the functions alotted to it, without perpetuall aide & concurrence of that supreme cause of all things. The benefit whereof as oft as we cause God in his iustice to withdraw, there can no other thing follow▪ then that which the Apostle noteth, euen men indued with the light of reason to walke notwithstanding in the vanity of their mind, hauing their cogitations dark∣ned* 1.101 & being strangers from the life of God through the ignorance which is in them, be∣cause of the hardnes of their harts. And this cause is mētioned by the Prophet Esay▪ speaking of the ignorance idolaters, who see not how the manifest reason condemneth their grosse iniquity and sinne.* 1.102 They haue not in them, saith he▪ so much wit as to thinke, shall I bow to the stocke of a tree? All knowledge and vnderstan∣ding is taken from them. For God hath shut their eyes that they cannot see. That which we say in this case of idolatry, serueth for all other things, wherein the like kind of generall blindnes hath preuailed against the manifest lawes of reason. Within the compasse of which lawes we do not onely comprehend whatsoeuer may be easily knowne to belong to the duty of all men; but euen whatsoeuer may pos∣sibly be known to be of that quality, so that the same be by necessary consequence deduced out of cleere and manifest principles. For if once we descend vnto pro∣bable collections what is conuenient for men, we are then in the territory where free and arbitrarie determinations, the territory where humane lawes take place, which lawes are after to be considered.

* 1.1039 Now the due obseruation of this law which reason teacheth vs, cannot but be effectuall vnto their great good that obserue the same. For we see the whole world and each part thereof so compacted, that as long as each thing per∣formeth onely that worke which is naturall vnto it, it thereby preserueth both other things, and also it selfe. Contrariwise let any principall thing, as the Sun, the Moone, any one of the heauēs or elemēts, but once cease or faile, or swarue; and who doth not easily conceiue, that the sequele thereof would be ruine both to it selfe, & whatsoeuer dependeth on it? And is it possible that man, being not only the noblest creature in the world, but euen a very world in himselfe, his transgressing the law of his nature should draw no maner of harme after it? Yes, tribulation and anguish vnto euerie soule that doth euill. Good doth followe vn∣to all things by obseruing the course of their nature, and on the contrarie side euill by not obseruing it: but not vnto naturall agents that good which wee call Reward, not that euill which wee properly tearme Punishment. The reason whereof is, because amongst creatures in this world, onely mans obser∣uation of the lawe of his nature is Righteousnesse, onely mans transgression Sinne.

And the reason of this is the difference in his maner of obseruing or transgres∣sing the lawe of his nature. Hee doth not otherwise then voluntarily the one or the other. What we do against our wils, or constrainedly, we are not properly said to do it, because the mo••iue cause of doing it is not in our selues but carrieth vs, as if the winde should driue a feather in the aire, wee no whit furthering that whereby we are driuen. In such cases therefore the euill which is done, moueth compassion; men are pi••••ied for it, as being rather miserable in such respect thei•• culpable. Some things are likewise done by man, though not through outward force and impulsion, though not against, yet without their wils; as in alienation of minde, or any the like ineuitable vtter absence of wit and iudgement. For which cause, no man did euer thinke the hurtfull actions of furious men and in∣nocents to be punishable. Againe some things wee doe neither against nor with∣out, and yet not simply and meerely with our wils; but with our wils in such sor•• moued, that albeit there b•• no impossibilitie but that wee might, neuerthe∣lesse we are not so easily able to doe otherwise. In this consideration one euill deede is made more pardonable then an other. Finally, that which we do being euill, is notwithstanding by so much more pa••donable, by how much the exi∣gence of so doing, or the difficultie of doing otherwise is greater; vnlesse this necessitie or difficultie haue originally risen from our selues. It is no excuse therefore vnto him, who being drunke committeth incest, and alleageth that his wits were not his owne, in as much as himselfe might haue chosen whether his wits should by that meane haue been taken from him. Now rewards and pu∣nishments do alwaies presuppose some thing willingly done well or ill▪ without which respect though we may sometimes receiue good or harme, yet then the one is only a benefite, and not a reward; the other simply an hurt, not a punish∣ment. From the sundry dispositions of mans will, which is the roote of all his actions, there groweth varietie in the sequeie of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: Take away the will, and all actes are equall: That which we doe not and would doe, is commonly accepted as done.* 1.104 By these and the like rules mens actions are determined of and iudged, whether they bee in their owne nature rewardable or punishable. Rewards and punishments are not receiued, but at the handes of such as being aboue vs, haue power to exa∣mine and iudge our deedes. How men come to haue this authoritie one ouer an other in externall actions, wee shall more diligently examine in that which followeth. But for this present, so much all do acknowledge, that sith euery mans hart and conscience doth in good or euill, euen secretly committed and knowne to none but it selfe, either like or disallow it selfe, and accordingly eyther reioyce, very nature exulting as it were in certain hope of reward, or else grieue as it were in a sense of future punishment; neither of which can in this case bee loo∣ked for from any other, sauing only from him, who discerneth and iudgeth the very secrets of all hearts: therefore he is the onely rewarder and reuenger of all such actions, although not of such actions onely,* 1.105 but of all whereby the lawe of nature is broken, whereof himselfe is author. For which cause••▪ the Romane lawes called the lawes of the twelue tables, requiring offices of inward affection, which the eye of man cannot reach vnto, threaten the neglecters of them with none but diuine punishment.

10 That which hitherto wee haue set downe, is (I hope) sufficient to shew their brutishnes,* 1.106 which imagine that religion and vertue are only as men wil ac∣compt of them; that we might make as much accompt, if we would, of the con∣trarie, without any harme vnto our selues, and that in nature they are as indiffe∣rent one as the other. Wee see then how nature it selfe teacheth lawes and sta∣tutes to liue by. The lawes which haue bene hitherto mentioned, doe bind men absolutely, euen as they are mē, although they haue neuer any setled fellowship, neuer any solemne agreemēt amongst themselues what to doe or not to do. But for as much as we are not by our selues sufficient, to furnish our selues with com∣petent store of thinges needfull for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignitie of man: therefore to supply those defectes and imperfections which are in vs liuing single and solely by our selues, wee are naturally induced to seeke communion and fellowship with others. This was the cause of mens v∣niting themselues at the first in politique societies; which societies could not bee without gouernment, nor gouernment without a distinct kind of law from that which hath bene alreadie declared. Two foundations there are which beare vp publique societies; the one, a naturall inclination, wherby al men desire sociable life & fellowship; the other, an order expresly or secretly agreed vpon, touching the manner of their vnion in liuing together. The later is that which wee call the law of a common weale, the very soule of a politique body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on worke in such actions as the common good requireth. Lawes politique, ordained for externall order and regiment a∣mongst men, are neuer framed as they should be, vnlesse presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and auerse from all obediēce vnto the sacred lawes of his nature•• in a word, vnlesse presuming man to be in regard of his depraued minde little better then a wild beast, they do accordingly prouide notwithstanding so to frame his outward actions, that they bee no hinderance vnto the common good for which societies are instituted: vnlesse they doe this, they are not perfect. It resteth therefore that we consider how nature findeth out such lawes of gouernmēt, as serue to direct euen nature depraued to a right end. All men desire to lead in this world an happie life. That life is led most happily, wherein all vertue is exercised without impedimēt or let.* 1.107 The Apostle in exhor∣ting men to contentment, although they haue in this world no more then very bare food and raiment, giueth vs thereby to vnderstand, that those are euen the lowest of thinges necessary, that if we should be stripped of al those things with∣out which we might possibly be, yet these must be left; that destitution in these is such an impedimēt, as till it be remoued, suffereth not the mind of man to ad∣mit any other care.* 1.108 For this cause first God assigned Adam maintenance of life and then appointed him a law to obserue. For this cause after mē began to grow to a number,* 1.109 the first thing we reade they gaue thēselues vnto, was the tilling of the earth,* 1.110 and the feeding of cattle. Hauing by this meane whereon to liue, the principall actions of their life afterward are noted by the exercise of their religi∣on.* 1.111 True it is that the kingdome of God must be the first thing in our purposes & desires. But in as much as righteous life presupposeth life, in as much as to liue vertuously it is impossible except we liue; therefore the first impediment, which naturally we endeuor to remoue, is penurie and want of thinges without which we cannot liue. Vnto life many implements are necessary; moe, if we seeke (as

all men naturally doe) such a life as hath in it ioy, comfort, delight and pleasure. To this end we see how quickly sundry artes Mechanical were found out in the very prime of the world.* 1.112 As things of greatest necessitie are alwaies first proui∣ded for, so things of greatest dignitie are most accounted of by all such as iudge rightly. Although therefore riches be a thing which euery man wisheth; yet no man of iudgement can esteeme it better to be rich, then wise, vertuous & religi∣ous. If we be both or either of these, it is not because we are so borne. For into the world we come as emptie of the one as of the other, as naked in minde as we are in body. Both which necessities of man had at the first no other helpes and supplies, then only domesticall; such as that which the prophet implieth, saying, Can a mother forget her child? such as that which the Apostle mentioneth, saying▪* 1.113 He that careth not for his owne is worse then an Infidell;* 1.114 such as that concerning Abra∣ham, Abraham will commaund his sonnes and his household after him that they keepe the way of the Lord. But neither that which we learne of our selues, nor that which o∣thers teach vs can preuaile, where wickednes and malice haue takē deepe roote. If therefore when there was but as yet one only family in the world, no meanes of instruction humane or diuine could preuent effusion of bloud:* 1.115 how could it be chosen but that when families were multiplied and increased vpon earth, af∣ter seperation each prouiding for it selfe, enuy, strife, cōtention & violence must grow amongst thē? for hath not nature furnisht man with wit & valor, as it were with armor, which may be vsed as well vnto extreame euill as good? yea, were they not vsed by the rest of the world vnto euill; vnto the contrary only by Seth,* 1.116 Enoch, and those few the rest in that line? We all make complaint of the iniquitie of our times: not vniustly; for the dayes are euill. But compare them with those times, wherein there were no ciuil societies, with those times wherein there was as yet no maner of publique regimēt established, with those times wherin there were not aboue 8. persons righteous liuing vpon the face of the earth:* 1.117 and wee haue surely good cause to thinke that God hath blessed vs exceedingly, and hath made vs behold most happie daies. To take away all such mutuall greeuances, iniuries & wrongs, there was no way but only by growing vnto compositiō and agreement amongst thēselues, by ordaining some kind of gouernment publike, and by yeelding themselues subiect thereunto; that vnto whom they graunted authoritie to rule & gouerne, by them the peace, tranquilitie, & happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men alwaies knew that when force and iniurie was offered, they might be defendors of themselues; they knew that howsoeuer men may seeke their owne cōmoditie, yet if this were done with iniury vnto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men and by all good means to be withstood, finally they knew that no man might in reason take vpon him to determine his owne right, and according to his owne determination proceed in maintenance therof, in as much as euery man is towards himselfe, and them whom he greatly affecteth partiall; and therfore that strifes & troubles would bee endlesse, except they gaue their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree vpon: without which consent, there were no reason that one man should take vpon him to be Lord or Iudge ouer an other; because although there be ac∣cording to the opinion of some very great and iudicious men, a kind of naturall right in the noble, wise, and vertuous,* 1.118 to gouerne them which are of seruile dis∣position; neuerthelesse for manifestation of this their right, & mens more peace∣able

contentment on both sides, the assent of them who are to be gouerned, see∣meth necessarie. To fathers within their priuate families nature hath giuen a su∣preme power; for which cause we see throughout the world euen from the first foundation therof, all men haue euer bene taken as lords & lawfull kings in their own houses. Howbeit ouer a whole grand multitude, hauing no such dependē∣cie vpon any one, & consisting of so many families as euery politique societie in the world doth, impossible it is that any should haue complet lawful power but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not hauing the naturall superioritie of fathers, their power must needs be either vsurped, & then vnlawfull; or if lawfull, then either graunted or consented vnto by them ouer whom they exercise the same, or else giuen extraordinarily frō God, vnto whom all the world is subiect.* 1.119 It is no improbable opinion therefore which the Arch∣philosopher was of, that as the chiefest person in euery houshold was alwaies as it were a king; so when numbers of housholds ioyned themselues in ciuill socie∣tie together, kings were the first kind of gouernors amongst them. Which is also as it seemeth the reason, why the name of Father continued still in them, who of fathers were made rulers: as also the ancient custome of gouernors to do as Mel∣chisedec, and being kings to exercise the office of priests, which fathers did at the first, grew perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit not this the only kind of regi∣ment that hath bene receiued in the world. The inconueniences of one kinde haue caused sundry other to be deuised. So that in a word all publike regimēt of what kind soeuer, seemeth euidently to haue risen from deliberate aduice, con∣sultation, & compositiō betweene men, iudging it cōuenient & behoueful; there being no impossibilitie in nature considered by it self, but that men might haue liued without any publike regiment. Howbeit the corruption of our nature be∣ing presupposed, we may not deny but that the lawe of nature doth now require of necessitie some kinde of regiment; so that to bring things vnto the first course they were in, & vtterly to take away all kind of publike gouernmēt in the world, were apparantly to ouerturn the whole world. The case of mans nature standing therfore as it doth, some kind of regiment the law of nature doth require; yet the kinds therof being many, nature tieth not to any one, but leaueth the choice as a thing arbitrarie. At the first when some certaine kinde of regiment was once ap∣proued, it may be that nothing was then further thought vpon for the maner of gouerning, but all permitted vnto their wisedome and discretion which were to rule; a 1.120 till by experience they found this for all parts very inconuenient; so as the thing which they had deuised for a remedie, did indeede but increase the soare which it should haue cured. They saw that to liue by one mans will, became the cause of all mens misery. This constrained them to come vnto lawes, wherein all men might see their duties before hand, and know the penalties of transgressing them. ^b If things be simply good or euill, and withall vniuersally so acknowled∣ged, there needs no new law to be made for such things. The first kind therefore of things appointed by lawes humane, containeth whatsoeuer being in it selfe naturally good or euill, is notwithstanding more secret then that it can be discer∣ned by euery mans present conceipt, without some deeper discourse and iudge∣ment. In which discourse, because there is difficultie and possibilitie many waies to erre, vnlesse such things were set downe by lawes, many would be ignorant of their duties which now are not; & many that know what they should do, would

neuerthelesse dissemble it, and to excuse themselues pretend ignorance and sim∣plicitie which now they cannot.* 1.121 And because the greatest part of men are such as prefer their owne priuate good before all things, euen that good which is sen∣suall before whatsoeuer is most diuine; & for that the labor of doing good, toge∣ther with the pleasure arising from the cōtrary, doth make men for the most part slower to the one, & proner to the other, then that dutie prescribed them by law can preuaile sufficiently with them: therefore vnto lawes that men do make for the benefit of mē, it hath seemed alwaies needful to ad rewards which may more allure vnto good then any hardnes deterreth from it, & punishments which may more deterre from euil then any sweetnes therto allureth. Wherin as the genera∣litie is naturall, Vertue rewardable and vice punishable: so the particular determinati∣on of the rewarde or punishment, belongeth vnto them by whom lawes are made. Theft is naturally punishable, but the kinde of punishment is posi∣tiue, and such lawfull as men shall thinke with discretion conuenient by lawe to appoint. In lawes that which is naturall bindeth vniuersally, that which is posi∣tiue not so. To let goe those kind of positiue lawes which men impose vpon thē∣selues, as by vow vnto God, contract with men, or such like; somewhat it will make vnto our purpose a little more fully to cōsider, what things are incident in∣to the making of the positiue lawes for the gouernment of thē that liue vnited in publique societie. Lawes do not onely teach what is good, but they inioyne it, they haue in thē a certain cōstraining force. And to cōstraine mē vnto any thing inconuenient doth seeme vnreasonable. Most requisite therefore it is, that to de∣uise lawes which all men shal be forced to obey, none but wise mē be admitted. Lawes are matters of principall consequence; men of cōmon capacitie & but or∣dinary iudgemēt are not able (for how should they?) to discerne what things are fittest for each kind and state of regiment. Wee cannot be ignorant how much our obedience vnto lawes dependeth vpon this point. Let a man though neuer so iustly, oppose himselfe vnto thē that are disordered in their waies, & what one amongst them commonly doth not stomacke at such contradiction, storme at reproofe, and hate such as would reforme them? Notwithstanding euen they which brooke it worst that men should tell them of their duties, when they are told the same by a lawe, thinke very wel & reasonably of it. For why? They pre∣sume that the lawe doth speake with all indifferencie, that the lawe hath no side respect to their persons, that the law is as it were an oracle proceeded from wise∣dome and vnderstanding. Howbeit laws do not take their constraining force frō the qualitie of such as deuise them, but from that power which doth giue them the strength of lawes. That which we spake before concerning the power of go∣uernment, must here be applyed vnto the power of making lawes wherby to go∣uerne; which power God hath ouer all; and by the naturall lawe whereunto hee hath made all subiect, the lawfull power of making lawes to commaund whole politique societies of men, belongeth so properly vnto the same intire societies, that for any Prince or potentate of what kinde soeuer vpon earth to exercise the same of himselfe, and not either by expresse commission immediatly and perso∣nally receiued from God, or else by authoritie deriued at the first frō their con∣sent vpon whose persons they impose lawes, it is no better then meere tyrannie. Lawes they are not therefore which publique approbation hath not made so. But approbation not only they giue who personally declare their assent by voice

sign or act, but also whē others do it in their names by right originally at the least deriued from them. As in parliaments, councels, & the like assemblies, although we be not personally our selues present, notwithstanding our assent is by reasō of others agents there in our behalfe. And what we do by others, no reason but that it should stand as our deede, no lesse effectually to binde vs then if our selues had done it in person. In many things assent is giuen, they that giue it not imagining they do so, because the manner of their assenting is not apparent. As for example, when an absolute Monark commandeth his subiects that which seemeth good in his owne discretion, hath not his edict the force of a law, whether they approue or dislike it? Againe that which hath bene receiued long sithence and is by cu∣stome now established, we keep as a law which we may not transgresse; yet what consent was euer thereunto sought or required at our hands? Of this point there∣fore we are to note, that sith men naturally haue no ful & perfect power to com∣maund whole politique mul••itudes of men; therefore vtterly without our con∣sent we could in such sort be at no mans commandement liuing. And to be com∣manded we do consent, when that societie wherof we are part, hath at any time before consented, without reuoking the same after by the like vniuersall agree∣ment. Wherfore as any mans deed past is good as long as himself continueth: so the act of a publique societie of men done fiue hundred yeares sithence, standeth as theirs, who presently are of the same societies, because corporations are immortall: we were then aliue in our predecessors, and they in their succes∣sors do liue stil. Lawes therefore humaine of what kinde soeuer are auaileable by consent. If here it be demaunded how it commeth to passe, that this being com∣mon vnto all lawes which are made, there should be found euen in good lawes so great varietie as there is: wee must note the reason hereof to bee, the sundry particular endes, whereunto the different disposition of that subiect or matter for which lawes are prouided, causeth them to haue especiall respect in ma∣king lawes.* 1.122 A lawe there is mentioned amongst the Graecians, whereof Pit∣tacus is reported to haue bene author: And by that lawe it was agreed, that hee which being ouercome with drinke did then strike any man, should suffer punishment double as much as if hee had done the same being sober. No man coulde euer haue thought this reasonable, that had intended there∣by onely to punish the iniury committed, according to the grauitie of the fact. For who knoweth not, that harme aduisedly done is naturally lesse pardonable, and therefore worthy of the sharper punishment? But for as much as none did so vsually this way offende as men in that case, which they wittingly fell into, euen because they would bee so much the more freely outragious: it was for their publique good where such disorder was growne, to frame a positiue lawe for remedie thereof accordingly. To this appertaine those knowne lawes of making lawes; as that lawemakers must haue an eye to the place where, and to the men amongst whome; that one kinde of lawes cannot serue for all kindes of regiment: that where the multi∣tude beareth sway, lawes that shall tend vnto the preseruation of that state, must make common smaller offices to go by lot, for feare of strife and deuision likely to arise; by reason that ordinary qualities sufficing for discharge of such offices, they could not but by many bee desired, and so with daun∣ger contended for, and not missed without grudge and discontentment,

whereas at an vncertaine lot none can find themselues grieued on whomsoeuer it lighteth; contrariwise the greatest; whereof but few are capable, to passe by popular election, that neither the people may enuie such as haue those ho∣nours, in as much as themselues bestow them, and that the chiefest may bee kindled with desire to exercise all partes of rare and beneficiall vertue; knowing they shal not loose their labour by growing in same and estimation amongst the people: if the helme of chiefe gouernment bee in the handes of a few of the wealthiest, that then lawes prouiding for continuance thereof must make the punishment of contumelie and wrong offered vnto any of the common sorte sharpe and grieuous, that so the euill may be preuented, whereby the rich are most likely to bring themselues into hatred with the people, who are not wonte to take so great offence when they are excluded from honors and offices, as whē their persons are contumeliously troden vpon. In other kindes of regiment the like is obserued concerning the difference of positiue lawes, which to be euerie where the same is impossible and against their nature.* 1.123 Now as the learned in the lawes of this land obserue, that our statutes sometimes are onely the affirmation or ratification of that which by common law was held before: so heere it is not to be omitted, that generally all lawes humaine which are made for the order∣ing of politike societies, bee either such as establish some dutie whereunto all men by the law of reason did before stand bound; or else such as make that a du∣tie now which before was none. The one sort wee may for distinctions sake call mixedly, and the other meerely humane. That which plaine or necessary reason bindeth men vnto, may be in sundrie considerations expedient to be ratified by humane law: For example, if confusion of blood in marriage, the libertie of ha∣uing many wiues at once, or any other the like corrupt and vnreasonable cu∣stome doth happen to haue preuailed far, and to haue gotten the vpper hand of right reason with the greatest part, so that no way is left to rectifie such soule dis∣order, without prescribing by law the same thinges which reason necessarilie doth enforce, but is not perceiued that so it doth; or if many be grown vnto that which thapostle did lament in some, concerning whom he writeth saying,* 1.124 that Euen what things they naturally know, in those very things as beasts void of reason they corrupted themselues; or if there be no such speciall accident, yet for as much as the common sort are led by the sway of their sensuall desires, and therefore doe more shun sinne for the sensible euils which follow it amongst men, then for a∣ny kinde of sentence which reason doth pronounce against it▪ this very thing is cause sufficient why duties belonging vnto each kinde of vertue, albeit the law of reason teach them, should notwithstanding be prescribed euen by humane law. Which law in this case we terme mixt, because the mat••er whereunto it bindeth, is the same which reason necessarily doth require at our handes, and from the law of reason it differeth in the maner of binding onely. For whereas men before stoode bound in conscience to doe as the law of reason teacheth, they are now by vertue of humane law become constrainable, and if they out∣wardly transgresse, punishable. As for lawes which are meerely humane, the matter of them is any thing which reason doth but probably ••each to bee fit and conuenient; so that till such time as law hath passed amongst men about it, of it selfe it bindeth no man. One example whereof may be this. Landes are by hu∣mane

law in some places after the owners decease diuided vnto all his children▪ in some all descendeth to the eldest sonne. If the lawe of reason did necessarily require but the one of these two to be done, they which by lawe haue receiued the other, should be subiect to that heauy sentence, which denounceth against all that decree wicked vniust, & vnreasonable things, woe. Whereas now which so∣euer be receiued,* 1.125 there is no law of reason transgrest; because there is probable reason why eyther of them may be expedient, and for eyther of them more then probable reason there is not to bee found. Lawes whether mixtly or meerely humane are made by politique societies: some, onely as those societies are ci∣uilly vnited; some, as they are spiritually ioyned and make such a body as wee call the Church. Of lawes humane in this later kinde wee are to speake in the third booke following. Let it therefore suffice thus far to haue touched the force wherewith almightie God hath gratiously endued our nature, and thereby in∣abled the same to finde out both those lawes which all men generally are for e∣uer bound to obserue, and also such as are most fit for their behoofe who leade their liues in any ordered state of gouernment. Now besides that lawe which simply concerneth men as men, and that which belongeth vnto them as they are men linked with others in some forme of politique societie; there is a third kinde of lawe which toucheth all such seuerall bodies politique, so farre forth as one of them hath publique commerce with another. And this third is the Lawe of nations. Betweene men and beastes there is no possibilitie of sociable commu∣nion; because the w••lspring of that communion is a naturall delight which man hath to transfuse from himselfe into others, and to receiue from others into himselfe, especially those things wherein the excellencie of his kinde doth most consist. The chiefest instrument of humane communion therefore is speech, be∣cause thereby we impart mutually one to another the conceiptes of our reaso∣nable vnderstanding.* 1.126 And for that cause seeing beasts are not hereof capable, for as much as with them wee can vse no such conference, they being in degree al∣though aboue other creatures on earth to whom nature hath denied sense, yet lower then to be sociable companions of man to whome nature hath giuen rea∣son;* 1.127 it is of Adam said that amongst the beastes Hee found not for himselfe any meete companion. Ciuill societie doth more content the nature of man, then any pri∣uate kinde of solitary liuing; because in societie this good of mutuall participati∣on is so much larger then otherwise. Herewith notwithstanding wee are not sa∣tisfied, but we couet (if it might be) to haue a kinde of societie & fellowship euen withal mākind. Which thing Socrates intending to signifie, professed himselfe a Citizen,* 1.128 not of this or that cōmon-welth, but of the world. And an effect of that very natural desire in vs, (a manifest••token that we wish after a sort an vniuersall fellowship with all men) appeareth by the wonderfull delight men haue, some to visit forrein countries, some to discouer natiōs not heard of in former ages, we all to know the affaires & dealings of other people, yea to be in league of amitie with them:* 1.129 & this not onely for traffiques sake, or to the end that when many are cōfederated each may make other the more strong;* 1.130 but for such cause also as mo∣ued the Queene of Saba to visit Salomon;* 1.131 & in a word because nature doth pre∣sume that how many mē there are in the world, so many Gods as it were ther are, or at least wise such they should be towardes men. Touching lawes which are to

serue men in this behalfe; euen as those lawes of reason, which (man retaining his original integritie) had bin sufficient to direct each particular person in all his af∣faires & duties, are not sufficient but require the accesse of other lawes, now that man and his offspring are growne thus corrupt & sinfull; againe as those lawes of politie & regiment, which would haue serued men liuing in publique societie to∣gether with that harmlesse disposition which then they should haue had▪ are not able now to serue when mens iniquitie is so hardly restrained within any tolerable bounds in like maner the nationall lawes of mutuall commerce be••weene socie∣ties of that former and better qualitie might haue bene other then now, when na∣tions are so prone to offer violence, iniurie and wrong. Here upon hath growne in euery of these three kinds, that distinction between Primarie & Secundarie lawes; the one grounded vpon sincere, the other built vpon depraued nature. Primarie lawes of nations are such as concerne embassage, such as belong to the courteous entertainment of forreiners and strangers, such as serue for commodious traffique and the like. Secundary lawes in the same kinde, are such as this present vnquiet world is most familiarly acquainted with, I meane lawes of armes▪ which yet are much better known then kept. But what matter the law of nations doth containe I omit to search. The strength and vertue of that law is such, that no particular na∣tiō can lawfully preiudic•• the same by any their seueral laws & ordinances, more then a man by his priuate resolutions the law of the whole cōmon-welth or state wherin he liueth. For as ciuill law being the act of a whole body politique, doth therfore ouerrule each seuerall part of the same body: so there is no reason that a∣ny one commō-welth of it self, should to the preiudice of another annihilate that whereupon the whole world hath agreed. For which cause the Lacedemonians forbidding all accesse of strangers into their coasts,* 1.132 are in y^• respect both by Iose∣phus & Theodoret deseruedly blamed, as being enimies to that hospitality which for cōmon humanities sake al the nations on earth should embrace. Now as there is great cause of cōmuniō, & consequently of laws for the maintenance of cōmu∣nion, amongst nations: So amongst nations Christian the like in regard euen of Christianitie hath bene a••waies iudged needfull. And in this kinde of correspon∣dence amongst natiōs, the force of general councels doth stand: For as one & the same law diuine, wherof in the next place we are to speak, is vnto al Christiā chur∣ches a rule for the chiefest things, by meanes whereof they al in that respect make one Church, as hauing all but One Lord, one faith, and one baptisme:* 1.133 So the vrgent necessitie of mutual communion for preseruation of our vnitie in these things, as also for order in some other things cōuenient to be euery where vniformly kept, maketh it requisit that the church of God here on earth haue her lawes of spiritu∣all commerce betweene Christian nations, lawes by vertue wherof all Churches may enioy freely the vse of those reuerend religious and sacred consultations which are termed councels generall. A thing whereof Gods owne blessed spirit was the author; a thing practised by the holy Apostles themselues;* 1.134 a thing alwaies afterwardes kept and obserued throughout the world; a thing neuer otherwise then most highly esteemed of, till pride ambition and ••yranny began by factious and vile endeuors, to abuse that diuine inuention vnto the funherance of wicked purposes. But as the iust authoritie of ciuill courtes and Parliaments is not there∣fore to be abolished, because sometime there is cunning vsed to frame them ac∣cording

to the priuate intents of men ouer-potent in the common-welth: So th•• grieuous abuse which hath bene of councels, should rather cause men to studie how so gratious a thing may againe be reduced to that first perfection, then in regard of staines and blemishes sithens growing be held for euer in extreame dis∣grace. To speake of this matter as the cause requireth, would require very long discourse. All I will presently say is this. Whether it be for the finding out of a∣ny thing whereunto diuine lawe bindeth vs, but yet in such sort, that men are not thereof on all sides resolued; or for the setting downe of some vniforme iudgement to stand touching such thinges, as being neither way matters of ne∣cessitie, are notwithstanding offensiue and scandalous when there is open oppo∣sition about them; be it for the ending of strifes touching matters of Christian be∣liefe, wherein the one part may seeme to haue probable cause of dissenting from the other; or be it concerning matters of politie, order, and regiment in the Church;* 1.135 I nothing doubt but that Christiā men should much better frame them∣selues to those heauenly precepts, which our Lord and Sauiour with so great instancie gaue as concerning peace and vnitie, if we did all concurre in desire to haue the vse of auncient councels againe renued, rather then these proceedings continued, which eyther make all contentions endlesse, or bring them to one onely determination, and that of all other the worst, which is by sword. It follow∣eth therefore that a new foundation being laid, wee now adioyne hereunto that which commeth in the next place to be spoken of, namely, wherefore God hath himselfe by scripture made knowne such lawes as serue for direction of men.

* 1.13611 Al things (God only excepted) besides the nature which they haue in thē∣selues, receiue externally some perfection frō other things, as hath bene shewed. In so much as there is in the whole world no one thing great or small, but either in respect of knowledge or of vse it may vnto out perfectiō adde somewhat. And whatsoeuer such perfection there is which our nature may acquire, the same we properly terme our good; our soueraign good or blessednes, that wherin the highest degree of all our perfectiō consisteth, that which being once attained vnto, there cā rest nothing further to be desired, & therfore with it our soules are fully cōtent & satisfied, in that they haue they reioyce & thirst for no more▪ wherfore of goo•• things desired, some are such that for themselues we couet them not, but only be∣cause they serue as instruments vnto that for which we are to seeke, of this sorte are riches: an other kind there is which although we desire for it selfe, as health & vertue & knowledge, neuerthelesse they are not the last marke whereat we aime, but haue their further end whereunto they are referred; so as in them we are not satisfied as hauing attained the vtmost we may, but our desires doe still proceede. These things are linked and as it were chained one to another, we labour to eate, and we eate to liue, and we liue to do good, & the good which we do is as seede sowne a 1.137 with reference vnto a future haruest. But we must come at the length to some pause. For if euery thing were to bee desired for some other without any stint, there could be no certaine end proposed vnto our actions, we should go on we know not whether, yea whatsoeuer we do were in vaine, or rather nothing at all were possible to be done. For as to take away the first efficient of our being, were ••o annihilate vtterly our persons; so we cannot remoue the last finall cause of our working, but we shall cause whatsoeuer we worke to cease. Therfore some

thing there must be desired for it selfe simply and for no other. That is simply for it selfe desirable, vnto the nature wherof it is opposite & repugnant to be desired with relation vnto any other. The oxe and the asse desire their food, neither pro∣pose they vnto themselues any end wherfore; so that of them this is desired for it selfe; but why? By reason of their imperfection which cannot otherwise desire it: whereas that which is desired simply for it selfe, the excellencie thereof is such as permitteth it not in any sort to be referred to a further end. Now that which man doth desire with reference to a further end, the same he desireth in such measure as is vnto that end conuenient: but what he coueteth as good in it selfe, towardes that his desire is euer infinite. So that vnlesse the last good of all which is desired altogether for it selfe, be also infinite; we doe euill in making it our end: euen as they who placed their felicitie in wealth or honour or pleasure or any thing here attained; because in desiring any thing as our finall perfection which is not so, we do amisse. Nothing may be infinitly desired, but that good which in deed is infinite. For the better, the more desirable; that therefore most desirable,* 1.138 wherin there is infinitie of goodnes; so that if any thing desirable may be infinit, that must needes be the highest of all things that are desired. No good is infinite but onely God: therefore he our felicitie and blisse. Moreouer desire tendeth vnto vnion with that it desireth. If then in him we be blessed, it is by force of participation & coniunction with him. Againe, it is not the possession of any good thing can make them happie which haue it, vnlesse they inioy the thing wherewith they are possessed. Then are we happie therfore, when fully we enioy God, as an obiect wherein the powers of our soules are satisfied euen with euerlasting delight: so that although we be mē, yet by being vnto God vnited, we liue as it were the life of God. Happines therfore is that estate wherby we attaine, so far as possibly may be attained, the ful possession of that which simply for it selfe is to be desired, and containeth in it after an eminent sorte the contentation of our desires, the high∣est degree of all our perfection. Of such perfection capable we are not in this life. For while we are in the world, subiect we are vnto sundry a 1.139 imperfections, griefe of body, defectes of minde; yea the best thinges we doe are painefull, and the ex∣ercise of them grieuous, being continued without intermission; so as in those very actions whereby we are especially perfected in this life, wee are not able to persist, forced we are with very wearines & that often to interrupt thē; which te∣diousnes cannot fall into those operations that are in the state of blisse, when our vnion with God is complete. Complete vnion with him must be according vnto euery power and facultie of our mindes apt to receiue so glorious an obiect. Ca∣pable we are of God both by vnderstanding and will; by vnderstanding as hee is that soueraigne truth, which comprehendeth the rich treasures of all wisdom▪ by will, as he is that sea of goodnesse, whereof who so tasteth shall thirst no more. As the wil doth now worke vpon that obiect by desire, which is as it were a motion towards the end as yet vnobtained; so likewise vpon the same hereafter receiued it shall worke also by loue. Appetitus inhiantis fit amor fruentis, saith Saint Augu∣stine, The longing disposition of them that thirst, is chaunged▪ into the sweete affection of them that taste and are replenished. Whereas wee now loue the thing that is good, but good especially in respect of benefit vnto vs▪ we shall then loue the thing that is good, only or principally for the goodnes of beauty in it self. The soule being in this sorte as it is actiue, perfected by loue of that infinite good; shall as it is recep∣tiue,

be also perfected with those supernaturall passions of ioy peace & delight. All this endlesse and euerlasting.* 1.140 Which perpe••uitie, in regard whereof our bles∣sednes is termed a crowne which withereth not, doth neither depend vpon the na∣ture of the thing it selfe,* 1.141 nor proceede from any naturall necessitie that our soules should so exercise themselues for euer in beholding and louing God, but from the wil of God, which doth both freely perfect our nature in so high a degree, & continue it so perfected. Vnder man no creature in the world is capable of felici∣tie and blisse; first, because their chiefest perfection consisteth in that which is best for thē, but not in that which is simply best, as ours doth; secondly, because what∣soeuer externall perfection they tende vnto, it is not better then themselues, as ours is. How iust occasiō haue we therfore euen in this respect with the Prophet to admire the goodnes of God; Lorde what is man that thou shouldest exalt him aboue the workes of thy hands, so farre as to make thy selfe the inheritance of his rest,* 1.142 and the substance of his felicitie? Now if men had not naturally this desire to be happie, how were it possible that all men should haue it? All men haue. Therefore this desire in man is naturall. It is not in our power not to do the same: how should it then be in our power to doe it coldly or remissely? so that our de∣sire being naturall, is also in that degree of earnestnes whereunto nothing can be added. And is it probable that God should frame the hearts of all mē so desirous of that which no man may obtaine? It is an axiome of nature, that naturall desire cannot vtterly be frustrate.* 1.143 This desire of ours being natural should be frustrate, if that which may satisfie the same were a thing impossible for man to aspire vnto. Man doth seeke a triple perfection, first a sensual, consisting in those things which very life it selfe requireth, either as necessary supplements, or as beauties & orna∣ments therof; then an intellectuall, consisting in those things which none vnder∣neth man is either capable of or acquainted with; lastly a spirituall & diuine, con∣sisting in those things wherunto we tend by supernatural means here, but cānot here attaine vnto them. They that make the first of these three the scope of their whole life, are said by the Apostle to haue no God, but onely their bellie, to be earthly minded men. Vnto the second they bend themselues, who seeke especi∣ally to excell in all such knowledge & vertue as doth most cōmend men. To this branch belongeth the lawe of morall & ciuil perfection.* 1.144 That there is somewhat higher then either of these two, no other proofe doth neede, then the very pro∣cesse of mans desire, which being naturall should be frustrate, if there were not some farther thing wherin it might rest at the length contented, which in the for∣mer it cannot do. For man doth not seeme to rest satisfied either with fruition of that wherewith his life is preserued, or with performance of such actions as ad∣uance him most deseruedly in estimation; but doth further couet, yea oftentimes manifestly pursue with great sedulitie & earnestnes, that which cannot stand him in any stead for vitall vse; that which exceedeth the reach of sense; yea somwhat aboue capacitie of reason, somewhat diuine and heauenly, which with hidden exultation it rather surmiseth then conceiueth; somwhat it seeketh and what▪ that is directly it knoweth not, yet very intentiue desire thereof doth so incite it, that all other knowne delightes and pleasures are laide aside, they giue place to the search of this but onely suspected desire. If the soule of man did serue onely to giue him beeing in this life, then thinges appertaining vnto this life would content him, as wee see they doe other creatures: which creatures

inioying what they liue by, seeke no further, but in this contentation do shew a kind of acknowledgemēt, that there is no higher good which doth any way be∣lōg vnto thē. With vs it is otherwise. For although the beauties, riches, honors, sciences, virtues and perfections of all men liuing, were in the present possession of one: yet somewhat beyond and aboue all this there would still be sought and earnestly thirsted for. So that nature euen in this life doth plainly claime & call for a more diuine prefectiō, then either of these two that haue bene mentioned. This last and highest estate of perfection whereof we speake, is receiued of men in the nature of a a 1.145 reward. Rewards do alwayes presuppose such duties perfor∣med as are rewardable. Our naturall meanes therefore vnto blessednesse are our workes: nor is it possible that nature should euer find any other way to saluati∣on then onely this. But examine the workes which we do, and since the first foundation of the world what one can say, My wayes are pure? Seeing then all flesh is guilty of that for which God hath threatned eternally to punish, what possibility is there this way to be saued? There resteth therefore either no way vnto saluation, or if any, then surely a way which is supernaturall, a way which could neuer haue entred into the heart of man as much as once to conceiue or imagine, if God himself had not reuealed it extraordinarily. For which cause we terme it the mystery or secret way of saluation. And therfore S. Ambrose in this matter appealeth iustly from man to God, b 1.146 Caeli mysterium doceat me Deus qui con∣didit, non homo qui seipsum ignorauit, Let God himselfe that made me, let not man that knows not himselfe, be my instructor concerning the mysticall way to heauen. c 1.147 When men of excellent wit (saith Lactantius) had wholly betaken thēselues vnto study, after farewell bidden vnto all kind as well of priuate as publique action, they spared no labour that might be spent in the search of truth; holding it a thing of much more price to seeke and to find out the reason of all affaires as well diuine as humaine, thē to stick fast in the toile of piling vp riches and gathering together heapes of honors. Howbeit they bothe did faile of their purpose, and got not as much as to quite their charges; because truth which is the secret of the most high God, whose proper handiworke all things are, cannot be compassed with that wit and those senses which are our owne. For God and man should be very neere neighbors, if mans cogitations were able to take a suracy of the counsels and appointments of that ma∣iestie euerlasting. Which being vtterly impossible, that the eye of man by it selfe should looke into the bosome of diuine reason; God did not suffer him being desirous of the light of wisedome, to stray any longer vp & downe, and with bootlesse expense of trauaile to wander in darknesse that had no passage to get out by. His eyes at the length God did open; and be∣stow vpon him the knowledge of the truth by way of Donatiue; to the end that man might both be clearly conuicted of folly, and being through error out of the way, haue the path that leadeth vnto immortality layd plaine before him. Thus far Lactantius Firmianus to shew that God himselfe is the teacher of the truth, wherby is made knowne the supernaturall way of saluation & law for thē to liue in that shall be saued. In the natural path of euerlasting life, the first beginning is that hability of doing good, which God in the day of mans creation indued him with; frō hence obedience vnto the will of his creator, absolute righteousnes and integrity in all his actions; and last of al the iustice of God rewarding the worthinesse of his deserts with the crowne of eternall glory. Had Adam continued in his first estate, this had bene

the way of life vnto him & all his posterite. Wherin I confesse notwithstanding with the a 1.148 wittiest of the Schoole diuines, that if we speake of strict iustice, God could no way haue bene bound to require mans labours in so large and ample maner as humaine felicitie doth import: in as much as the dignity of this ex∣ceedeth so far the others value. But be it that God of his great liberality had de∣termined in lieu of mans endeuors to bestow the same, by the rule of that iu∣stice which best beseemeth him, namely the iustice of one that requiteth no¦thing mincingly, but all with pressed and heaped and euen ouer-inlarged mea∣sure: yet could it neuer hereupon necessarily bee gathered, that such iustice should adde to the nature of that reward the property of euerlasting continu∣ance; sith possession of blisse, though it should be but for a moment, were an a∣boundant retribution. But we are not now to enter into this consideration, how gratious and bountifull our good God might still appeare in so rewarding the sonnes of men, albeit they should exactly performe▪ whatsoeuer duty their na∣ture bindeth thē vnto. Howsoeuer God did propose this reward, we that were to be rewarded must haue done that which is required at our hands; we failing in the one, it were in nature an impossibility that the other should be looked for. The light of nature is neuer able to find out any way of obtaining the reward of blisse, but by performing exactly the duties and works of righteousnes. From saluation therefore and life all flesh being excluded this way, behold how the wisedome of God hath reuealed a way mysticall and supernaturall, a way dire∣cting vnto the same end of life by a course which groundeth it selfe vpon the guiltinesse of sinne, and through sinne desert of condemnation and death. For in this way the first thing is the tender compassion of God respecting vs drow∣ned and swallowed vp in miserie; the next is redemption out of the same by the pretious death and merite of a mighty Sauiour, which hath witnessed of himselfe saying b 1.149 I am the way, the way that leadeth vs from miserie into blisse. This supernaturall way had God in himselfe prepared before all worlds. The way of supernaturall dutie which to vs he hath prescribed, our Sauiour in the Gospell of Saint Iohn doth note, terming it by an excellency the worke of God: c 1.150 This is the worke of God that ye beleeue in him whom he hath sent. Not that God doth require nothing vnto happinesse at the hands of men sauing onely a naked be∣liefe, (for hope and Charity we may not exclude:) but that without beliefe all other things are as nothing, & it the ground of those other diuine vertues. Con∣cerning faith, the principall obiect whereof is that eternall veritie which hath discouered the treasures of hidden wisedome in Christ; concerning hope, the highest obiect wherof is that euerlasting goodnesse which in Christ doth quic∣ken the dead; concerning charity, the finall obiect whereof is that incompre∣hensible beauty which shineth in the countenance of Christ the sonne of the liuing God; concerning these vertues, the first of which beginning here with a weake apprehensiō of things not seene, endeth with the intuitiue vision of God in the world to come; the second beginning here with a trembling expectation of things far remoued, and as yet but onely heard of, endeth with reall and actu∣all fruition of that which no tongue can expresse; the third beginning here with a weake inclination of heart towards him vnto whom we are not able to ap∣proch, endeth with endlesse vnion, the mistery wherof is higher then the reach of the thoughts of men; concerning that faith hope & charity without which

there can be no saluation; was there euer any mention made sauing only in that law which God himselfe hath from heauen reuealed? There is not in the world a syllable muttered with certaine truth cōcerning any of these three, more then hath bene supernaturally receiued from the mouth of the eternall God. Lawes therefore concerning these things are supernaturall, both in respect of the ma∣ner of deliuering them which is diuine, and also in regard of the things deliue∣red, which are such as haue not in nature any cause from which they flow, but were by the voluntary appointment of God ordeined besides the course of na∣ture, to rectifie natures obliquity withall.

12 a 1.151 When supernaturall duties are necessarily exacted, naturall are not reie∣cted as needlesse. The law of God therefore is though principally deliuered for instruction in the one, yet fraught with precepts of the other also. The scrip∣ture is fraught euen with lawes of nature. In so much that, b 1.152 Gratian defining naturall right (whereby is meant the right which exacteth those generall du∣ties, that concerne men naturally euen as they are men) termeth naturall right that which the bookes of the Lawe and the Gospell do containe. Neither is it vaine that the Scripture aboundeth with so great store of lawes in this kind. For they are either such as we of our selues could not easily haue found out, and then the benefit is not small to haue them readily set downe to our hands▪ or if they be so cleere & manifest that no man indued with reason can lightly be ignorant of them, yet the spirite as it were borrowing them from the schoole of nature as seruing to proue things lesse manifest, and to induce a perswasion of somewhat which were in it selfe more hard and darke, vnlesse it should in such sort be cleared, the very applying of them vnto cases particular is not without most singular vse and profite many wayes for mens instruction. Be∣sides, be they plaine of themselues or obscure, the euidence of Gods owne te∣stimonie added vnto the naturall assent of reason concerning the certaintie of them, doth not a little comfort and confirme the same. Wherefore in as much as our actions are conuersant about things beset with many circumstan∣ces, which cause men of sundry wits to be also of sundry iudgements concer∣ning that which ought to be done: requisite it cānot but seeme the rule of diuine law should herein helpe our imbecillity, that we might the more infallibly vn∣derstand what is good & what euill. The first principles of the law of nature are easie, hard it were to find men ignorant of them: but concerning the duty which natures law doth require at the hands of men in a number of things particular, so c 1.153 farre hath the naturall vnderstanding euen of sundry whole nations bene darkned, that they haue not discerned no not grosse iniquity to bee sinne. A∣gaine, being so prone as we are to fawne vpon our selues, and to be ignorant as much as may be of our owne deformities; without the feeling sense whereof we are most wretched, euen so much the more, because not knowing thē we cannot as much as desire to haue them taken away: how should our fest••ed sores be cu¦red, but that God hath deliuered a law as sharpe as the two edged sword, pear∣cing the very closest and most vnsearchable corners of the heart, which the law of nature can hardly, humaine lawes by no meanes possible reach vnto? Here∣by we know euen secret concupiscence to be sinne, and are made fearefull to offend though it be but in a wandering cogitation. Finally of those things

which are for direction of all the parts of our life needfull, and not impossible to be discerned by the light of nature it selfe, are there not many which few mens naturall capacitie, and some which no mans hath bene able to find out? They are, sayth Saint Augustine, but a few and they indued with great ripenes of wit and iudgement, free from all such affaires as might trouble their meditations, in∣structed in the sharpest and the subtlest points of learning, who haue, and that very hardly, bene able to find out but onely the immortality of the soule. The resurrection of the flesh what man did euer at any time dreame of, hauing not heard it otherwise then from the schoole of nature? Whereby it appeareth how much we are bound to yeeld vnto our creator the father of all mercy eternall thankes, for that he hath deliuered his law vnto the world, a law wherein so ma∣ny things are laid open cleere and manifest; as a light which otherwise would haue bene buried in darknesse, not without the hazard, or rather not with the hazard, but with the certaine losse of infinite thousands of soules most vndoub∣tedly now saued. We see therefore that our soueraigne good is desired natu∣rally; that God the author of that naturall desire had appointed naturall meanes whereby to fulfill it; that man hauing vtterly disabled his nature vnto those meanes, hath had other reuealed from God, and hath receaued from heauen a law to teach him how that which is desired naturally must now supernaturally be attained, finally we see that because those later exclude not the former quite and cleane as vnnecessary, therefore together with such supernaturall duties as could not possibly haue beene otherwise knowne to the world, the same lawe that teacheth them, teacheth also with them such naturall duties as could not by light of nature easily haue bene knowne.

* 1.15413. In the first age of the world God gaue lawes vnto our fathers, and by rea∣son of the number of their daies, their memories serued in steed of books; wher∣of the manifold imperfections and defects being knowne to God, he merciful∣ly relieued the same by often putting them in mind of that whereof it behoued them to be specially mindfull. In which respect we see how many times one thing hath bene iterated vnto sundry euen of the best and wisest amongst them▪ After that the liues of men were shortned, meanes more durable to preserue the lawes of God from obliuion and corruption grew in vse, not without pre∣cise direction from God himselfe. First therefore of Moyses it is sayd, that he wrote all the words of God;* 1.155 not by his owne priuate motion and deuise: for God taketh this act to himselfe,* 1.156 I haue written. Furthermore were not the Prophets following commanded also to do the like? Vnto the holy Euangelist Saint Iohn how often expresse charge is giuen,* 1.157 Scribe, write these things? Concerning the rest of our Lords Disciples the words of Saint Augustine are, Quic quid ille de suis factis & dictis nos legere voluit▪* 1.158 hoc scribendū illis tanquā suis manibus imperauit. Now although we do not deny it to be a matter meerely accidentall vnto the law of God to be written; although writing be not that which addeth authority and strength thereunto, finally though his lawes do require at our hands the same obedience howsoeuer they be deliuered; his prouidēce notwithstanding which hath made principall choice of this way to deliuer them, who seeth not what cause we haue to admire and magnifie? The singular benefit that hath growne vnto the world by receiuing the lawes of God, euen by his owne appointment

committed vnto writing, we are not able to esteeme as the value thereof deser∣ueth▪ When the question therefore is, whether we be now to seeke for any re∣uealed law of God other where then onely in the sacred Scripture, whether we do now stand bound in the sight of God to yeeld to traditions-vrged by the Church of Rome the same obedience and reuerence we do to his written lawe, honouring equally and adoring both as Diuine: our answer is, no. They that so earnestly pleade for the authority of Tradition, as if nothing were more safely conueyed then that which spreadeth it selfe by report, and descendeth by relati∣on of former generations vnto the ages that succeed, are not all of the them (surely a miracle it were if they should be) so simple, as thus to perswade themselues; howsoeuer if the simple were so perswaded, they could be content perhaps very well to enioy the benefit, as they accompt it, of that common error. What ha∣zard the truth is in when it passeth through the hands of report, how maymed and deformed it becommeth; they are not, they cannot possibly be ignorant. Let them that are indeed of this mind, consider but onely that litle of things Di∣uine, which the Heathen haue in such sort receiued.a 1.159 How miserable had the state of the Church of God beene long ere this, if wanting the sacred Scripture▪ we had no record of his lawes but onely the memory of man, receiuing the same by report and relation from his predecessors? By Scripture it hath in the wisedome of God seemed meete to deliuer vnto the world much but personal∣ly expedient to be practised of certaine men; many deepe and profound points of doctrine, as being the maine originall ground whereupon the precepts of du∣ty depend▪ many prophecies the cleere performance whereof might confirme the world in beliefe of things vnseene; many histories to serue as looking glasses to behold the mercy, the truth, the righteousnesse of God towards all that faith∣fully serue▪ obey and honor him; yea many intire meditations of pietie, to be as patternes and presidents in cases of like nature; many things needfull for ••••∣plication▪ many for applicatiō vnto particular occasions, such as the prouidence of God from time to time hath taken to haue the seuerall bookes of his holy or∣dinance written. Be it them that together with the principall necessary lawes of God, there are sundry other things written, whereof we might happily be ig∣norant, and yet be saued. VVhat shall we hereupon thinke them needlesse? shall we esteeme them as riotous branches wherewith we sometimes behold most pleasant vines ouergrown? Surely no more then we iudge our hands, on our eies ••••perfluou••▪ or what part soeuer, which if our bodies did want, we might not∣withstāding any such defect reteine still the complete being of men. As therfore a complete man is neither destitute of any part necessary, and hath some partes wherof though the want could not depriue him of his essence, yet to haue ••hem standeth him in singular stead in respect of the special vses for which they serues in 〈…〉〈…〉 all those writings which conteine in them the law of God, all those ••••n••r••ble bookes of Scripture, all those sacred tomes and volumes of holy wri••, ••••ey are with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither 〈◊〉〈◊〉 any thing, the lacke whereof might depriue vs of life; nor any thing in such wise aboundeth, that as being superfluous; vnfruitfull▪ and altogether needlesse, we should thinke it no losse or danger at all if we did want it.

14▪ Although the scripture of God therefore be stored with infinite varietie

of matter in all kinds, although it abound with all sorts of lawes, yet the princi∣pal intent of scripture is to deliuer the lawes of duties supernaturall. Oftentimes it hath bene in very solemne maner disputed,* 1.160 whether all things necessary vnto saluation be necessarily set downe in the holy Scriptures or no. If we define that necessary vnto saluation, whereby the way to saluation is in any sort made more plaine, apparent, and easie to be knowne; then is there no part of true Philosophie, no art of account, no kind of science rightly so called, but the Scripture must conteine it. If onely those things be necessary, as surely none else are, without the knowledge and practise whereof it is not the will and pleasure of God to make any ordinary graunt of saluation; it may be notwith∣standing,* 1.161 and oftentimes hath bene demanded, how the bookes of holy Scrip∣ture conteine in them all necessary things, when of things necessary the very chiefest is to knowe what bookes we are bound to esteeme holy; which point is confest impossible for the Scripture it selfe to teach. Whereunto wee may aunswere with truth, that there is not in the world any Arte or Science, which proposing vnto it selfe an ende (as euery one doth some ende or other) hath bene therefore thought defectiue, if it haue not deliuered simply what∣soeuer is needfull to the same ende: but all kinds of knowledge haue their cer∣taine bounds and limits; each of them presupposeth many necessary things learned in other sciences and knowne before hand. He that should take vpon him to teach men how to be eloquent in pleading causes, must needes deliuer vnto them whatsoeuer precepts are requisite vnto that end, otherwise he doth no•• the thing which he taketh vpon him. Seeing then no man can pleade elo∣quently, vnlesse he be able first to speake, it followeth that habilitie of speech is in this case a thing most necessary. Notwithstanding euery man would thinke it ridiculous, that he which vndertaketh by writing to instruct an Orator, should therfore deliuer all the precepts of Grammar; because his profession is to deliuer precepts necessarie vnto eloquent speech, yet so, that they which are to re∣ceiue them bee taugt before hand, so much of that which is thereunto ne∣cessarie as comprehendeth the skill of speaking. In like sort, albeit Scripture do professe to conteine in it all thinges which are necessarie vnto saluation; yet the meaning cannot bee simply of all things which are necessarie, but all things that are necessary in some certaine kind or forme; as all things that are necessarie, and either could not at all, or could not easilie be knowne by the light of naturall discourse; all things which are necessarie to be knowne that we may be saued, but knowne with presupposall of knowledge cōcerning certaine principles, wherof it receaueth vs already perswaded, and then instructeth vs in all the residue that are necessary. In the number of these principles one is the sacred authority of Scripture. Being therefore perswaded by other meanes that these Scriptures are the oracles of God▪ themselues do then teach vs the rest, and lay before vs all the duties which God requireth at our hands as necessary vnto saluation. Further, there hath bene some doubt likewise, whether conteining in scripture do import expresse setting downe in plaine tearmes, or else comprehen∣ding in such sort that by reason we may frō thence conclude all things which are necessary. Against the former of these two constructions, instance hath sundrie wayes bene geuen. For our beliefe in the Trinity, the Coeternity of the Sonne

of God with his Father, the proceeding of the Spirite from the Father and the Sonne, the duty of baptizing infants, these with such other principall points, the necessity wherof is by none denied, are notwithstanding in Scripture no where to be found by expresse literall mention, only deduced they are out of scripture by collection. This kind of cōprehension in scripture being therefore receiued, still there is no doubt how far we are to proceed by collection, before the full and complete measure of things necessary be made vp. For let vs not thinke that as long as the world doth endure▪ the wit of man shalbe able to found the bottome of that which may be concluded out of the scripture; especially if things contei∣ned by collection do so far extend, as to draw in whatsoeuer may be at any time out of scripture but probably and coniecturally surmised. But let necessary col∣lection be made requisite, and we may boldly deny, that of all those things which at this day are with so great necessitie vrged vpon this Church vnder the name of reformed Church discipline, there is any one which their bookes he∣therto haue made manifest to be conteined in the Scripture. Let them if they can alleage but one properly belonging to their cause, and not common to them and vs, and shew the deduction thereof out of scripture to be necessarie. It hath beene already shewed, how all things necessarie vnto saluation in such sort as before we haue maintained, must needes be possible for men to knowe; and that many things are in such sort necessarie, the knowledge whereof is by the light of nature impossible to be attained. Whereupon it followeth, that ei∣ther all flesh is excluded from possibility of saluation, which to thinke were most barbarous; or else that God hath by supernaturall meanes reuealed the way of life so far forth as doth suffice. For this cause God hath so many times and waies spoken to the sonnes of men. Neither hath he by speech only, but by wil∣ting also instructed and taught his Church. The cause of writing hath bene to the end that things by him reuealed vnto the world, might haue the longer cō∣tinuance, and the greater certainty of assurance; by how much that which stan∣deth on record, hath in both those respects preeminence aboue that which pas∣seth from hand to hand, and hath no pennes but the toongs, no bookes but the eares of men to record it. The seueral bookes of scripture hauing had each some seuerall occasion and particular purpose which caused them to be written, the contents thereof are according to the exigence of that speciall end whereunto they are intended. Hereupon it groweth, that euery booke of holy scripture doth take out of all kinds of truth, a 1.162 naturall, b 1.163 historicall, c 1.164 forreine, d 1.165 supernaturall, so much as the matter handled requireth. Now for as much as there hath bene rea∣son alleaged sufficient to conclude, that all things necessary vnto saluation must be made knowne, and that God himselfe hath therefore reuealed his will, be∣cause otherwise men could not haue knowne so much as i•• necessary; his surcea∣sing to speake to the world since the publishing of the Gospell of Iesus Christ, and the deliuery of the same in writing, is vnto vs a manifest token that the way of saluation is now sufficiently opened, and that we neede no other meanes for our full instruction, then God hath already furnished vs withall. The maine drift of the whole newe Testament,* 1.166 is that which Saint Iohn set∣teth downe as the purpose of his owne Historie▪ These things are written, that yee might beleeue that Iesus is Christ the Sonne of God, and that in beleeuing yee

might haue life through his name. The drift of the olde, that which the Apostle mentioneth to Timothie, The holy Scriptures are able to make thee wise vnto salu••∣tion.* 1.167 So that the generall ende both of olde and newe is one; the difference betweene them consisting in this, that the olde did make wise by teaching saluation through Christ that should come; the newe by teaching that Christ the Sauiour is come, and that Iesus whom the Iewes did crucifie, and whom God did raise againe from the dead, is he. When the Apostle therefore affir∣meth vnto Timothie, that the old was able to make him wise to saluation, it was not his meaning that the olde alone can do this vnto vs which liue sithence the publication of the newe. For he speaketh with presupposall of the do∣ctrine of Christ knowne also vnto Timothie; and therefore first it is sayd, Conti∣nue thou in those things which thou hast learned and art perswaded, knowing of whom thou hast bene taught them.* 1.168 Againe those Scriptures hee graunteth were able to make him wise to saluation;* 1.169 but he addeth, through the faith which is in Christ. VVherefore without the doctrine of the new Testament teaching that Christ hath wrought the redemption of the world, which redemption the olde did foreshewe he should worke; it is not the former alone which can on our be∣halfe performe so much as the Apostle doth auouch, who presupposeth this when he magnifieth that so highly. And as his words concerning the bookes of auncient Scripture, do not take place but with presupposall of the Gospell of Christ embraced: so our owne wordes also when wee extoll the complete sufficiency of the whole intire body of the Scripture, must in like sorte bee vnderstood with this caution, that the benefite of natures light be not thought excluded as vnnecessarie, because the necessitie of a diui∣ner light is magnified. There is in Scripture therefore no defect, but that any man what place or calling soeuer he hold in the Church of God, may haue thereby the light of his naturall vnderstanding so perfected, that the one being relieued by the other, there can want no part of needfull instru∣ction vnto any good worke which God himselfe requireth, be it naturall or supernaturall, belonging simply vnto men as men, or vnto men as they are vnited in whatsoeuer kinde of societie. It sufficeth therefore that na∣ture and Scripture do serue in such full sort, that they both ioyntly, and not seuerally either of them, be so complete, that vnto euerlasting felicitie we need not the knowledge of any thing more then these two may easily furnish our mindes with on all sides: and therefore they which adde tradi∣tions as a part of supernaturall necessarie truth, haue not the truth, but are in errour. For they onely pleade, that whatsoeuer God reuealeth as necessary for all Christian men to do or beleeue, the same we ought to embrace, whe∣ther we haue receiued it by writing or otherwise; which no man deni∣eth: when that which they should confirme who claime so great reuerence vnto traditions is, that the same traditions are necessarily to bee acknowled∣ged diuine and holy. For wee doe not reiect them onely because they are not in the Scripture, but because they are neither in Scripture, nor can o∣therwise sufficiently by any reason be proued to be of God. That which is of God, and may be euidently proued to be so, we deny not but it hath in his kind, although vnwritten, yet the selfe same force and authoritie with the

written lawes of God. It is by ours acknowledged,* 1.170 that the Apostles did in euery Church institute and ordeene some ••i••es and customes seruing for the seemelenesse of Church regiment, which rites and customes they haue not committed vnto writing. Those rites and customes being knowne to be Apostolicall, and hauing the na∣ture of things changeable, were no lesse to be accompted of in the Church then other things of the like degree, that is to say, capable in like sort of alte∣ration, although set downe in the Apostles writings. For bothe being knowne to be Apostolicall, it is not the manner of deliuering them vnto the Church▪ but the author from whom they proceed, which doth giue them their force and credite.

15 Lawes being imposed either by each man vpon himselfe,* 1.171 or by a pub∣lique societie vpon the particulars thereof, or by all the nations of men vpon euery seuerall societie, or by the Lord himselfe vpon any or euerie of these, there is not amongst these foure kinds any one, but containeth sundry both naturall and positiue lawes. Impossible it is but that they should fall into a number of grosse errors, who onely take such lawes for positiue, as haue bene made or inuented of men, and holding this position hold also, that all posi∣tiue and none but positiue lawes are mutable. Lawes naturall do alwayes bind; lawes positiue not so, but onely after they haue bene expresly and wit∣tingly imposed. Lawes positiue there are in euery of those kindes before mentioned. As in the first kinde the promises which we haue past vnto men, and the vowes we haue made vnto God; for these are lawes which we tye our selues vnto, and till we haue so tied our selues they bind vs not. Lawes posi∣tiue in the second kind are such the ciuill constitutions peculiar vnto each particular common weale. In the third kind the law of Heraldy in wa••re is po∣sitiue: and in the last all the iudicials which God gaue vnto the people of Israell to obserue. And although no lawes but positiue be mutable, yet all are not mu∣table which be positiue. Positiue lawes are either permanent or else changeable▪ according as the matter it selfe is concerning which they were first made. Whe∣ther God or man be the maker of them, alteration they so far forth admit, as the matter doth exact. Lawes that concerne supernaturall duties, are all positiue▪ and either cōcerne men supernaturally as men, or else as parts of a supernaturall society, which society we call the Church. To concerne men as men superna∣turally, is to concerne them as duties which belong of necessitie to all, and yet could not haue bene knowne by any to belong vnto them, vnlesse God had opened them himselfe, in as much as they do not depend vpon any naturall ground at all out of which they may be deduced, but are appoi••••ed of God to supply the defect of those naturall wayes of saluation, by which we are not now able to attaine thereunto. The Church being a supernaturall societie, doth differ from naturall societies in this; that the persons vnto whom wee asso∣ciate our selues, in the one are men simply considered as men; but they to whom we bee ioyned in the other, are God, Angels, and holy men. Againe the Church being both a society, and a society supernaturall; although as it is a society, it haue the selfe same originall grounds which other politique societes haue, namely the naturall inclination which all men haue vnto so∣ciable life, and consent to some certaine bond of association, which bond is

the law that appointeth what kind of order they shall be associated in: yet vnto the Church as it is a societie supernaturall this is peculiar, that part of the bond of their association which belong to the Church of God, must be a lawe supernaturall, which God himselfe hath reuealed concerning that kind of worship which his people shall do vnto him. The substance of the seruice of God therefore, so farre forth as it hath in it any thing more then the lawe of rea∣son doth teach, may not be inuented of men, as it is amongst the Heathens; but must be receiued from God himselfe, as alwaies it hath bene in the Church, sauing only when the Church hath bene forgetfull of her dutie. Wherefore to end with a generall rule concerning all the lawes which God hath tyed men vnto:* 1.172 those lawes diuine that belong whether naturally or supernaturally, ei∣ther to men as men, or to men as they liue in politique societie, or to men as they are of that politique societie which is the Church, without any further respect had vnto any such variable accident as the state of men and of so∣cieties of men and of the Church it selfe in this world is subiect vnto; all lawes that so belong vnto men, they belong for euer, yea although they be positiue lawes, vnlesse being positiue God himselfe which made them al∣ter them. The reason is, because the subiect or matter of lawes in generall is thus farre foorth constant: which matter is that for the ordering whereof lawes were instituted, and being instituted are not chaungeable without cause, neither can they haue cause of chaunge, when that which gaue them their first institution, remaineth for euer one and the same. On the other side lawes that were made for men or societies or Churches, in regard of their being such as they doe not alwayes continue, but may perhaps bee cleane otherwise a whil•• after, and so may require to bee otherwise orde∣red then before: the lawes of God himselfe which are of this nature, no man indued with common sense will euer denie to bee of a different con∣stitution from the former, in respect of the ones constancie, and the muta∣bilitie of the other. And this doth seeme to haue beene the very cause why Saint Iohn doth so peculiarly tearme the doctrine that teacheth saluation by Iesus Christ,* 1.173 Euangelium aeternum, an eternall Gospell; because there can be no reason wherefore the publishing thereof should be taken away, and any other in stead of it proclaimed,* 1.174 as long as the world doth continue: where as the whole lawe of rites and Ceremonies, although deliuered with so great so∣lemnitie, is notwithstanding cleane abrogated, in as much as it had but tem∣porary cause of Gods ordeining it. But that we may at the length con∣clude this first generall introduction vnto the nature and originall birth, as of all other lawes, so likewise of those which the sacred Scripture contei∣neth, concerning the author wherof, euen infidels haue confessed, that he can neither erre nor deceiue; albeit about things easie and manifest vnto all men by common sense there needeth no higher consultation, because as a man whose wisedome is in waighty affaires admired, would take it in some disdaine to haue his counsell solemnely asked about a toye, so the meannesse of some things is such that to search the Scripture of God for the ordering of them were to derogate from the reuerend authoritie and dignitie of the Scripture, no lesse then they do by whom Scriptures are in ordinarie talke very idly ap∣plyed

vnto vaine and childish trifles: yet better it were to bee superstitious, then prophane; to take from thence our direction euen in all things great or small, then to wade through matters of principall waight and moment, with∣out euer caring what the lawe of God hath, either for or against our dissei∣gnes. Concerning the custome of the very Paynimes, thus much Strab•• wit∣nesseth, a 1.175 Men that are ciuill do leade their liues after one common lawe appointing them what to do. For that otherwise a multitude should with harmony amongest them∣selues, concurre in the doing of one thing, (for this is ciuilly to liue) or that they should in any sort menage communitie of life, it is not possible. Nowe lawes or statutes are of two sorts. For they are either receiued from Gods, or else from men. And our auncient predecessors did surely most honor and reuerēce that which was from the Gods; for which cause consultation with Oracles was a thing very vsuall and frequent in their times. Did they make so much account of the voyce of their Gods, which in truth were no Gods: and shall we neglect the pretious benefite of conference with those Oracles of the true and liuing God, whereof so great store is left to the Church, and wherunto there is so free, so plaine, and so easie accesse for al men? b 1.176 By the Commandements (this was Dauids confession vnto God) thou hast made me wiser then mine enemies. Againe, I haue had more vnderstanding then all my teachers, because thy testimonies are my meditations. What paynes would not they haue be∣stowed in the study of these bookes, who trauailed sea and land to gaine the treasure of some fewe dayes talke, with men whose wisedome the world did make any reckoning of? c 1.177 That litle which some of the Heathens did chance to heare, concerning such matter as the sacred Scripture plentifully conteineth, they did in wonderfull sort affect; their speeches as oft as they make mention thereof are strange, and such as themselues could not vtter as they did other things, but still acknowledged that their wits which did euery where else con∣quer hardnesse, were with profoundnesse here ouer-matched. Wherfore seeing that God hath indued vs with sense, to the end that we might perceiue such things as this present life doth need, and with reason, least that which sense can∣not reach vnto, being both now and also in regard of a future estate hereafter necessary to be knowne, should lye obscure; finally with the heauenly support of ^d propheticall reuelation, which doth open those hidden mysteries that rea∣son could neuer haue bene able to find out,* 1.178 or to haue knowne the necessitie of them vnto our euerlasting good: vse we the pretious gifts of God vnto his glory and honour that gaue them, seeking by all meanes to know what the will of our God is, what righteous before him, in his fight what holy, perfect, and good, that we may truly and faithfully do it.

16 Thus farre therefore we haue endeuoured in part to open,* 1.179 of what na∣ture and force lawes are, according vnto their seuerall kinds; the lawe which God with himselfe hath eternally set downe to follow in his owne workes; the law which he hath made for his creatures to keepe, the law of naturall and ne∣cessarie agents; the law which Angels in heauen obey; the lawe whereunto by the light of reason men find themselues bound in that they are men; the lawe which they make by composition for multitudes and politique societies of men to be guided by; the law which belongeth vnto each nation; the lawe that concerneth the fellowship of all; and lastly the lawe which God himselfe

hath supernaturally reuealed. It might peraduenture haue beene more popu∣lar and more plausible to vulgar eares, if this first discourse had beene spent in extolling the force of lawes, in shewing the great necessity of them when they are good; and in aggrauating their offence by whom publique lawes are iniuri∣ously traduced. But for as much as with such kind of matter the passions of men are rather stirred one way or other, then their knowledge any way set forward vnto the triall of that whereof there is doubt made; I haue therefore turned aside from that beaten path, and chosen though a lesse easie, yet a more profita∣ble way in regard of the end we propose. Least therefore any man should mar∣uail•• whereunto all these things tend, the drift and purpose of all is this, euen to shew in what manner as euery good and perfect gift,* 1.180 so this very gift of good and perfect lawes is deriued from the father of lights; to teach men a reason why iust and reasonable lawes are of so great force, of so great vse in the world; and to enforme their minds with some methode of reducing the lawes where∣of there is present controuersie vnto their first originall causes, that so it may be in euery particular ordinance thereby the better discerned, whether the same be reasonable iust and righteous or no. Is there any thing which can either be throughly vnderstood, or soundly iudged of, till the very first causes and principles from which originally it springeth bee made manifest? If all parts of knowledge haue beene thought by wise men to bee then most or∣derly deliuered and proceeded in,* 1.181 when they are drawne to their first originall▪ seeing that our whole question concerneth the qualitie of Ecclesiasticall lawes, let it not seeme a labour superfluous that in the entrance thereunto all these se∣uerall kinds of lawes haue beene considered, in as much as they all concurre as principles, they all haue their forcible operations therein, although not all in like apparent and manifest maner. By meanes whereof it commeth to passe, that the force which they haue is not obserued of many. Easier a great deale it is for men by law to be taught what they ought to do, then instructed how to iudge as they should do of law; the one being a thing which belongeth generally vn∣to all, the other such as none but the wiser and more iudicious sorte can per∣forme.* 1.182 Yea the wisest are alwayes touching this point the readiest to acknow∣ledge, that soundly to iudge of a law is the waightiest thing which any man can take vpon him. But if we wil giue iudgement of the laws vnder which we liue, first let that law eternall be alwayes before our eyes, as being of principall force and moment to breed in religious minds a dutifull estimation of all lawes, the vse and benefite whereof we see; because there can be no doubt but that lawes apparently good, are (as it were) things copied out of the very tables of that high euerlasting law, euen as the booke of that law hath said concerning it selfe, By me Kings raigne, and by me Princes decree iustice. Not as if men did behold that booke,* 1.183 and accordingly frame their lawes; but because it worketh in them▪ be∣cause it discouereth and (as it were) readeth it selfe to the world by them, when the lawes which they make are righteous. Furthermore although we perceiue not the goodnesse of lawes made; neuerthelesse sith things in themselues may haue that which we peraduenture; discerne not; should not this breed a feare in our harts, how we speake or iudge in the worse part concerning that, the vn∣aduised disgrace whereof may be no meane dishonour to him, towards whom

we professe all submission and awe? Surely there must be very manifest iniqui∣tie in lawes, against which we shall be able to iustifie our contumelious inuec∣tiues. The chiefest roote whereof, when we vse them without cause, is igno∣rance how lawes inferiour are deriued from that supreme or highest lawe. The first that receiue impression from thence are naturall agents. The lawe of whose operations might be happily thought lesse pertinent, when the question is a∣bout lawes for humane actions, but that in those very actions which most spi∣ritually and supernaturally concerne men, the rules and axiomes of naturall operations haue their force. What can be more immediate to our saluation, then our perswasion concerning the lawe of Christ towardes his Church? What greater assurance of loue towards his Church, then the knowledge of that mysti∣call vnion whereby the Church is become as neare vnto Christ, as any one part of his flesh is vnto other? That the Church being in such sort his, he must needes protect it; what proofe more strong, then if a manifest lawe so require, which law it is not possible for Christ to violate? And what other lawe doth the Apo∣stle for this alleage, but such as is both common vnto Christ with vs, and vnto vs with other things naturall, No man hateth his owne flesh, but doth loue and cherish it? The axiomes of that lawe therefore, whereby naturall agentes are guided,* 1.184 haue their vse in the morall, yea euen in the spirituall actions of men, and con∣sequently in all lawes belonging vnto men howsoeuer. Neither are the Angels themselues, so farre seuered from vs in their kind and manner of working, but that betweene the lawe of their heauenly operations, and the actions of men in this our state of mortalitie, such correspondence there is, as maketh it expedi∣ent to know in some sort the one, for the others more perfect direction.* 1.185 Would Angels acknowledge themselues fellow seruants with the sonnes of men, but that both hauing one Lord, there must be some kinde of lawe which is one and the same to both, whereunto their obedience being perfecter, is to our weaker both a paterne and a spurre?* 1.186 Or would the Apostle speaking of that which be∣longeth vnto Saintes, as they are linked together in the bond of spirituall socie∣tie, so often make mention how Angels are therewith delighted, if in thinges publiquely done by the Church we are not somewhat to respect what the An∣gels of heauen doe? Yea so farre hath the Apostle S. Paule proceeded,* 1.187 as to signifie that euen about the outward orders of the Church which serue but for comelinesse, some regard is to be had of Angels; who best like vs when we are most like vnto them in all partes of decent demeanor. So that the law of Angels wee cannot iudge altogether impertinent vnto the affaires of the Church of God. Our largenesse of speech how men do finde out what thinges reason bin∣deth them of necessitie to obserue, and what is guideth them to choose in things which are left as arbitrary; the care we haue had to declare the different nature of lawes which seuerally concerne all men, from such as belong vnto men ey∣ther ciuilly or spiritually associated, such as pertaine to the fellowship which na∣tions, or which Christian nations haue amongst themselues, and in the last place such as concerning euery or any of these, God himselfe hath reuealed by his holy wor••, all serueth but to make manifest, that as the actions of men are of sundry distinct kindes, so the lawes thereof must accordingly be distinguished. There are in men operations some naturall, some rationall, some supernaturall,

some politique, some finally Ecclesiasticall. Which if we measure not each by his owne proper law, whereas the things themselues are so different; there will be in our vnderstanding and iudgement of them confusion. As that first error sheweth whereon our opposites in this cause haue grounded themselues. For as they rightly maintaine, that God must be glorified in all thinges, and that the actions of men cannot tend vnto his glory, vnlesse they be framed after his law: So it is their error, to thinke that the only law which God hath appointed vnto men in that behalfe is the sacred Scripture. By that which we worke naturally, as when we breath,* 1.188 sleepe, mooue, we set forth the glory of God as naturall a∣gents doe, albeit we haue no expresse purpose to make that our end, nor any ad∣uised determination therein to follow a law, but doe that we doe (for the most part) not as much as thinking thereon. In reasonable and morall actions ano∣ther law taketh place,* 1.189 a law by the obseruation whereof we glorifie God in such sort, as no creature else vnder man is able to doe; because other creatures haue not iudgement to examine the qualitie of that which is done by them, and ther∣fore in that they doe, they neither can accuse nor approue themselues. Men doe bothe,* 1.190 as the Apostle teacheth; yea those men which haue no written lawe of God to shewe what is good or euill, carrie written in their hearts the vniuersall lawe of mankind, the law of reason, whereby they iudge as by a rule which God hath giuen vnto all men for that purpose. The lawe of reason doth somewhat direct men how to honour God as their Creator; but how to glorifie God in such sort as is required, to the end he may be an euerlasting Sauiour, this we are taught by diuine law, which law both ascertaineth the truth and supplieth vn∣to vs the want of that other lawe. So that in morall actions, diuine law helpeth exceedingly the lawe of reason to guide mans life; but in supernaturall it alone guideth. Proceed wee further, let vs place man in some publique societie with others, whether Ciuill or Spirituall: and in this case there is no remedie but we must adde yet a further lawe. For although euen here likewise the lawes of nature and reason be of necessary vse; yet somewhat ouer and besides them is necessary, namely humane and positiue lawe, together with that lawe which is of commerce betweene grand societies, the law of nations and of nations Chri∣stian. For which cause the lawe of God hath likewise said, Let euery soule be subiect to the higher powers.* 1.191 The publique power of all societies is aboue euery soule contained in the same societies. And the principall vse of that power is to giue lawes vnto all that are vnder it; which lawes in such case we must obey, vnlesse there be reason shewed which may necessarily enforce, that the lawe or reason or of God doth enioyne the contrarie. Because except our owne priuate, and but probable resolutions, be by the lawe of publique determinations ouerruled; we take away all possibilitie of sociable life in the worlde. A plainer example whereof then our selues we cannot haue. How commeth it to passe that wee are at this present day so rent with mutuall contentions, and that the Church is so much troubled about the politie of the Church? No doubt if men had bene willing to learne how many lawes their actions in this life are subiect vnto, and what the true force of each lawe is, all these controuersies might haue dyed the very day they were first brought forth. It is both commonly said, and truly, that the best men otherwise are not alwayes the best in regard of societie. The

reason wherof is, for that the law of mens actions is one, if they be respected on∣ly as men; and another, whē they are considered as parts of a politique body.* 1.192 Many men there are, then whom nothing is more commendable when they are singled. And yet in societie with others, none lesse fit to answere the duties which are looked for at their handes. Yea I am perswaded, that of them with whom in this cause we striue, there are whose betters among men would bee hardly found, if they did not liue amongst men, but in some wildernesse by themselues. The cause of which their disposition so vnframable vnto socie∣ties wherein they liue, is for that they discerne not aright: what place and force these seuerall kindes of lawes ought to haue in all their actions. Is there que∣stion eyther concerning the regiment of the Church in generall, or about con∣formitie betweene one Church and another, or of ceremonies, offices, powers▪ iurisdictions in our owne Church? Of all these things they iudge by that r••le which they frame to themselues with some shew of probabilitie; and what see∣meth in that sort conuenient, the same they thinke themselues bound to prac∣tise, the same by all meanes they labour mightily to vpholde; whatsoeuer any law of man to the contrarie hath determined they weigh it not. Thus by fol∣lowing the law of priuate reason, where the law of publique should take place, they breede disturbance. For the better inu••ing therefore of mens mindes with the true distinction of lawes and of their seuerall force, according to the di••fe∣rent kind and qualitie of our actions, it shal no•• peraduenture be amisse to shew in some one example how they all take place. To seeke no further, let but that be considered then which there is not any thing more familiar vnto vs, our foode. What thinges are foode, and what are not, we iudge naturally by sense,* 1.193 neither neede we any other law to be our director in that behalfe then the selfe∣same which is common vnto vs with beastes.* 1.194 But when we come to consider of foode, as of a benefite which God of his bounteous goodnes hath prouided for all thinges liuing; the law of reason doth here require the dutie of thanke∣fulnesse at our handes, towards him at whose hands we haue i••. And least appe∣tite in the vse of foode, should leade vs beyond that which is meere▪ we owe in this case obedience to that law of reason, which teacheth mediocritie in meates and drinkes. The same things diuine lawe teacheth also, as at large we haue shewed it doth all partes of morall dutie, whereunto we all of necessitie stand bound, in regard of the life to come. But of certaine kindes of foode the Iewes sometime had, and we our selues likewise haue, a mysticall, reli••ious, and super∣naturall vse; they of their Pas•• all lambe and oblations, wee of our bread and wine in the Eucharist; which vse none but diuine law could institute. Now as we liue in ciuill societie, the state of the common wealth wherein we liue, both may and doth require certaine lawes concerning foode; which lawes, sauing onely that we are members of the common wealth where they are of force, we should not neede to respect a•• rules of action, whereas now in their place and kinde they must be respected and obeyed. Yea the selfe same matter is also a subiect wherein sometime Ecclesiasticall lawes haue place; so that vnlesse wee will bee authors of confusion in the Church, our priuate discretion, which o∣therwise might guide vs a contrary way, must here submit it selfe to bee that way guided, which the publike iudgement of the Church hath thought better.

In which case that of Zonaras concerning f••stes may be remembred. Fastinges are good,* 1.195 but let good things be done in good and conueni••nt maner. He that transgresseth in his fasting the orders of the holy fathers, the positiue lawes of the Church of Christ▪ must be plainely tolde that good thinges doe loose the grace of their goodnesse, when in good sort they are not performed. And as here mens priuate phansies must giue place to the higher iudgement of that Church which is in authoritie a mo∣ther ouer them: so the very actions of whole Churches, haue in regard of com∣merce and fellowship with other Churches, bene subiect to lawes concerning foode,* 1.196 the contrarie vnto which lawes had else bene thought more conuenient for them to obserue; as by that order of abstinence from strangled and bloud may appeare; an order grounded vpon that fellowship which the Churches of the Gentiles had with the Iewes. Thus we see how euen one and the selfe same thing is vnder diuers considerations conueyed through many lawes; and that to measure by any one kind of law all the action of men, were to confound the admirable order wherein God hath disposed all lawes, each as in nature, so in degree, distinct from other. Wherefore that here we may briefly ende, of lawe there can be no lesse acknowledged, then that her seate is the bosome of God, her voyce the harmony of the world, all things in heauen and earth doe her homage, the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power; both Angels and men and creatures of what condition so euer, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with vniforme consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and ioy.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The cause of writing this generall dis∣course.
• * 1.2

  Of that lawe which God from before the beginning hath set for himselfe to do all things by.
• * 1.3

  Ioh. 1••.13.14.15.
• a 1.4

  Iupiter•• Counsell was accomplished.
• b 1.5

  The creator made the whole world, not with hands, but by Reason. Stob in eclog. phys.
• c 1.6

  Proceed by a certaine and a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Waie in the making of the world.
• * 1.7

  Ioh. 5.17.
• * 1.8

  Gen. 2.18.
• * 1.9

  Sap. 8.1. Sap. 11.17.
• * 1.10

  Eph. 1.7.
• * 1.11

  Phil. 4.19. Col. ••.3.
• * 1.12

  prou. 16.6.
• * 1.13

  Ephe. 1.13.
• * 1.14

  Rom. 11.33.
• * 1.15

  prou. ••.23.
• * 1.16

  Rom. 11.10. Bor••. lib. 4▪ des
• * 1.17

  Consol. philo••
• * 1.18

  2. Tim. 2.13.
• * 1.19

  Heb. 6.17.
• * 1.20

  The lawe which natural ag••nts haue giuen t••em to obserue, and their necessary maner of kee∣ping it.
• a 1.21

  Id omne quod in rebus creatis fit, est materia legis oeternae. Th 1.2. q 93. art 4 ••.6. Nul∣lo modo ali∣quid legibus summi creato ris ordinatio∣ni{que} subtrahi∣tur, a quo pax vniuersitatis administratur. August. de ciu. de•• lib. 19. c. 22. Immo & pece••∣tum, quatenus •• Deo ••ustè per∣mittitu••, cadit ••n legemaeter∣••am. E••••a••le∣g••aetern•• sub∣••icitur pecca∣tum▪ quatenus Voluntaria le∣gis transgressio poenale quodd•• incommodum animae ••••ser••t, ••uxta ill••d Au∣gustini, Ius••isti D••mine & sic est, vt poe••ia su ••sib•• sit om∣nis animus in∣ordin••tus. Co••fe••. lib 1. c. 1•• Nec male sc••ola••t••ci. Quemadmo∣dum inquiunt videmus res naturales con∣tingentes, hoc ipso quod à fi∣ne particular•• suo at{que} adeu à lege aeternâ exor••itant, in candem legem ae ernam inci∣dere, qu••t••nu∣cons••q iu••tur alium fine •• à lege ••riam ae∣ternâ ipsis in casu particula∣ri consti••utum: sic verisimile e••t homines e∣tiam cù n pec∣cant & descis∣cunt à lege ae∣ternâ ••••praeci∣piente, re nei∣dere in ordinē aeternae legisvt punientis.
• * 1.22

  psal. 19.5.
• * 1.23

  Pheophr. in Metaph.
• * 1.24

  Arist. Rhet. 1. cap. 39.
• * 1.25

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.26

  Act. 17.2••.
• a 1.27

  Forme in o∣ther creatures, is a thing pro∣portionable vnto the soule in liuing crea∣tures. Sensible it is not, nor o∣therwise dis∣cernable, then only by effects. According to the diuersitie of inward formes, things of the world are distingui∣shed into their kindes.
• * 1.28

  Vide Thom. in Compend. theol, cap. 3. Omne quod mouetur ab aliquo est quasi instru∣mentum quoddam pri∣mi mouentis. Ridiculum est autem e••am apud indoctos ponere instru∣mentum mo∣ueri non ab aliquo princi∣pale agente.
• * 1.29

  The law which Angels doe worke by. Psal. 104.4. Heb. 1.7. Eph. 3.10.
• * 1.30

  Dan. 7.10. Matth. 26.53.
• * 1.31

  Heb. 12.22. Luc. 2.13.
• * 1.32

  Matth. 6.10.
• * 1.33

  Matth. 18.10.
• * 1.34

  Psal. 91.11.12. Luc. 15.7.
• * 1.35

  Heb. 1.14.
• * 1.36

  Act. 10.3. Dan. 9.23.
• * 1.37

  Matth. 1••.••0. Dan. 4.10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.38

  Arist. Metaph. 12. cap. 7.
• * 1.39

  Iob. 38.7.
• * 1.40

  Math. 18.10.
• * 1.41

  psal. 148.2. Heb. 1.6. Esa. 6.3.
• * 1.42

  This is intima∣ted wheresoe∣uer we finde them termed the sonnes of God: as Iob. 1.6. & 38.7. ••. pet. 2.4. Ep. Iud. ver. 6.
• * 1.43

  psal. 148.2. Luk. 2.13.
• * 1.44

  Matth▪ 26.53. psal. 148.2.
• * 1.45

  Heb. 12.22.
• * 1.46

  Apoc, 22.9.
• * 1.47

  Ioh. 8.44▪ 1. pet. 5.8.
• * 1.48

  Apoc. 9.11. Gen. 3.15.
• * 1.49

  1. Chr. 21, 1, Iob. 1.7, & 2, 5
• * 1.50

  Ioh. 13, 27,
• * 1.51

  Act. 5, 3, Apoc. ••0, 8.
• * 1.52

  The law wher¦by man is in his actions di∣rected to the imitation of God.
• * 1.53

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.54

  Arist. de an. lib. 2. cap. 4.
• * 1.55

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ari. 2. de cael. ca. 5.
• * 1.56

  Matth. 5.48. Sap. 7.27.
• * 1.57

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.58

  Mens first be∣ginning to grow to the knowledge of that law which the•• are to ob∣serue. vide Isa. 7.16.
• * 1.59

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Merc. Trism. Aristot••li••all demonstration
• * 1.60

  A••misty.
• * 1.61

  Of mans will which is the thing that lawes of acti∣on are made to guide.
• * 1.62

  Eph. 4.23.
• * 1.63

  Salust.
• * 1.64

  Matth. 6.2.
• * 1.65

  Deut. 30.19.
• * 1.66

  O mihi prae∣ter••tos referat si Iupiter an∣nos.
• * 1.67

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Paulo post▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A cin de doge ma••. Pla••.
• a 1.68

  2. Cor. 11.3.
• * 1.69

  co••ruptible body is heauy vnto the soule and the earth∣ly mansion keepeth down the min•• that is ful of cares.

  And hardly can we discern the things that are vpō earth, & with great labor find we out the things which are be∣fore vs. VVho can then seeke out the things that are in heauen?
• b 1.70

  Luc. 9.••4.
• c 1.71

  Math. 23.37
• d 1.72

  Sap 9.15.
• * 1.73

  Eph. 5.14. Heb. 1••.1.12 1. Cor. 16 13. Prou 2.4. Luc. 13.••4.
• * 1.74

  Of the natu∣ral way of fin∣ding out laws by reason, ••o guide ••he will vnto that which is good.
• * 1.75

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉A••••st. de an. L. 1.
• * 1.76

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• a 1.77

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. Rhet. 1. cap. 39.
• b 1.78

  Non potest error contin∣gere, vbi om∣nes idem opi∣nantur. Monti∣cat. in 1. Polit. Quicquid in omnibus indi∣uiduis vniu•• ••peciei com∣muniter inest, id cause•• cō∣munem habe∣at opo••tet, qua∣est eorum in∣diuiduorum species & na∣tura. Idem. Quod à t••ta aliqua specie fit, vniuersali•• particularis{que} naturae fit in∣stinctu Ficin. de. Christ▪ re∣lig. Si pro••icer•• cupis, primo firmé id ve••um puta quod san∣men•• omniū hominum at∣testatur. Cusa. in compend. cap. 1. Non li∣••er naturalé v∣niuersalé{que} ho∣minum iudi∣cium falsum van um{que} exi∣stima••e Teles▪ 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ A••ist. Eth. 10. cap. 2.
• c 1.79

  Rom. 2.14.
• * 1.80

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Theoph. i•• Metaph.
• * 1.81

  ••. Cor. 4.17.
• * 1.82

  Matth. 16.26.
• * 1.83

  Arist. Polit. ••. cap. 5.
• a 1.84

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plat. in Theaet.
• b 1.85

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist▪ Metop. lib. 1. cap. 2.
• c 1.86

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plat. in Tim.
• d 1.87

  Arist. Ethi^•. lib. 8. ca. vlt.
• e 1.88

  Deut. 6.5.
• f 1.89

  Math. 22.2••.
• g 1.90

  Quod quis in se approbat, in alio repro∣bare nō posse. ••an arenam C. de ino••. test. Quod quisque iuris in alium sta••u••••it, ip∣sum quo{que} co∣dem vti debe∣re. l. quod quisque. Ab omni penitu•• iniu••••â atque vi. abstinendū. l. 1 § 1. quod vi. autclam.
• * 1.91

  Matth. 22.40. On these two commande∣ments han∣geth the whole law.
• * 1.92

  Gen. 39.9.
• * 1.93

  Mar. 10.4.
• * 1.94

  Act. 4.37. Act. 5.4.
• * 1.95

  ••. Thes. 3.8.
• * 1.96

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Soph. Anti.
• * 1.97

  Th. 1.2. q. 94. art. 3. Omnia peccata sunt in vniuersum contra ratio∣nem & naturae legem. Aug. de ciu. dei. lib. 12. ••ap. 1. Omne vitium naturae noc••t, ac per hoc contra na∣turam est. De doctr. Christ. lib. 3. cap. 14.
• * 1.98

  Psal. 35.18.
• * 1.99

  Sapi. 13.17.
• * 1.100

  S••pi. 1••.12.
• * 1.101

  Eph. 4.17.
• * 1.102

  Esay. 44.19.18.
• * 1.103

  The benefit of keeping that law which rea∣son teacheth.
• * 1.104

  Voluntate sub∣la••â omnem actum parem esse. l. ••oedissi∣mam C. de adult.

  Bonam volun∣tatem plerun•• que pro facto reputari. l. si quis in testa∣men.
• * 1.105

  Diuo•• cast•• adeunto, pi••∣tatent adhi••bento. Qui secus faxir, Deus ipsi ••in•• dex crit.
• * 1.106

  How reason doth leade men vnto the making of hu∣mane lawes, whereby poli∣tique societies are gouerned, and to agree∣ment about lawes, where∣by the fellow∣ship or com∣munion of in∣dependent so∣cieties stādeth. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. Rhet. 1
• * 1.107

  1. Tim. 6.8.
• * 1.108

  Gen. 1.29. Gen. 2.17.
• * 1.109

  Gen. 4.2.
• * 1.110

  Gen. 4.26.
• * 1.111

  Mat. 6.33
• * 1.112

  Gen. 4.20.21.••2.
• * 1.113

  Esay. 49.15. 1. Tim. 5.8.
• * 1.114

  Gen. 18.19.
• * 1.115

  Gen. 4.8.
• * 1.116

  Gen. 6.5. Gen. 5.
• * 1.117

  2. Pet. 2.5.
• * 1.118

  Arist. Pol. l▪ ••. & 4.
• * 1.119

  Arist. polit. lib. 1. cap. 3. Vide & platonem in 3. de legi∣bus.
• a 1.120

  Cum preme∣retur initio multitudo ab lis qui maiores opes habebāt, ad vnum ali∣quem confu∣giebant vir∣tute praestan∣tem; qui cum prohiberet in∣iuriâ tenuio∣res, aequitate constituendâ summos cum infimis pari iu re retinebat. Cum id minus contingeret, le∣ges sunt inuen∣tae. Cic. off. lib. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Arist. Rhet. ad Alex.
• * 1.121

  Tanta est e∣nim vis volup∣tatum, vt & ig∣norantiam pro telet in occasi∣onem, & con∣scientiam cor∣rumpat in dis∣simulationem. Tertul. lib. de Spectacul.
• * 1.122

  Arist. polit. lib. ••. c. v••t.
• * 1.123

  Staundf. pref, to the pleas of the Crowne.
• * 1.124

  Epis. Iud. v. 10 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. Ethi. lib. 10 cap. 10.
• * 1.125

  Esa. 10.1.
• * 1.126

  Arist. pol. 1. c.
• * 1.127

  Gen. 2.20.
• * 1.128

  Cic. Tusc. 5. & 1. de legib.
• * 1.129

  1. Reg. 10.1.
• * 1.130

  2. Chr. 9.1.
• * 1.131

  Math. 13.42. Luk. 11.31.
• * 1.132

  Iose. lib. 2. con¦tra Applou. Theod. lib. 9. de Sanand 〈◊〉〈◊〉 affec••▪
• * 1.133

  Eph. 4.••.
• * 1.134

  Act. 1••.••9.
• * 1.135

  Ioh. 14.27••
• * 1.136

  Wherfore God hath by scrip∣ture further made knowne such supernatu¦rall lawes as do serue for mens direction.
• a 1.137

  Gal. 6.8. Hee that soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reape life euer∣lasting.
• * 1.138

  Vide Arist Eth 10. cap. 10. & Metaph. 12. ca 6. & cap. 4. & cap. 30.
• a 1.139

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Mercur. Tris∣meg. Aug. de trin. lib. 9. ca. vl••.
• * 1.140

  Math. 25. The iust shall goe into life euer∣lasting▪
• * 1.141

  Math. 22. They shalbe a•• the Angels of God. ••. Tim. 4.••. 1. Pet. 1.4.
• * 1.142

  Psal. ••.
• * 1.143

  Comment in proaem. 2. Me∣••••ph.
• * 1.144

  Phil. 3.1••.
• a 1.145

  Math. ••.1••. Reioyce and be glad▪ for great is your reward in hea∣uen. Aug. de doct. Christ. cap. 6. Summa merces est vt ipso per••ru••∣mur.
• b 1.146

  Ambros. contra Sym.
• c 1.147

  Magno & ex∣cellenti inge∣nio viri, cum se doctrinae peni∣tus dedidis∣sent, quicquid laborit poterat impendi (con∣temptis omni∣bus & priuatis & publicis actionibus) ad inquirendae veritatis studi•• contulerunt; existimentes multo esse prae∣clarius huma∣narum diuina∣rum{que} rerum inuestigare ac scire rationem, quàm struēdi•• o••ibus aut cu∣••nulandis ho∣noribus in hae∣rere. Sed nequ•• adepti sunt id quod vole∣bant▪ & ope∣ram simul at{que} industriam pe•• diderunt▪ quia veritas, id est arcanum sum∣mi Dei qui fe∣cit omnia, in∣genio ac pro∣priis sensibu•• non potest cō∣prehendi. Alio∣qui nihil inter deum homi∣némque dista∣ret, si consilia & dispositio∣nes illius maie∣statis aeternae cogitatio asse∣queretur hu∣••lana. Quod quia fieri non potuit vt homini per seipsum ratio diuina notesceret, non est passus hominem Deus lumen sapientiae requirentem diutiùs a berrare, ac sine vllo laboris effectu vagari pertenebras inextricabiles. A peruit oculo•• e∣ius aliquando, & noti••nem veritati•• munus suum fecit, vt & humanam sapientiam nullam esse monstraret, & erranti ac vago ••••am consequendae immortalitatis ostenderet. Lactan. lib. 1. cap. 1.
• a 1.148

  Scot. lib. 4. Sent. dict. 49.6 Loquendo de strictâ iustitiâ, Deus nulli nostrum prop∣ter quaecun•• que merita est debitor perfec∣tionis redden∣dae tam inten∣sae, propter im∣moderatū ex∣cessum illius perfectionis vl∣tra illa merita. Sed esto quod ex liberalitate suâ determi∣nasset meritis conserre actum tam perfectum tanquam prae∣mium, tali qui∣dem iustitiâ qualis decet c∣um, scilicet supererogantis in praemus: ta∣men non se∣quitur ex hoc necessatiò quòd perillam iu••titiam sit reddenda per∣fectio perennis tanquam prae∣mium, imo a∣bundans fieret retributio in beatitudine v∣nius momen∣ti.
• b 1.149

  Iohn. 14.6.
• c 1.150

  Iohn 6.29.
• a 1.151

  The cause why so many naturall or ra∣tional laws are ••et downe in hol▪ Scripture.
• b 1.152

  Ius naturale est quod in le∣ge & Euāgelio continetur. p. 1. d. 1.
• c 1.153

  Iosephus lib. secūdo contra Appio. Lacedae monii quomo∣do nō sunt ob inhospitalitatē reprehendēdi, ••aedúm{que} neg∣lectum nuptia∣rum? Elien••e•• verò & Th••∣bani ob coitū cum malculis planè impu∣dentē & con∣tra naturam; quem recte & vtiliter exerce∣re pu••abant? Cumque hae•• Comninò per∣petrarēt, etiam luis legibus miscu ere. vide. Th. 12. q. 49.4.5.6. Lex natu∣rae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 corrupt•• suit apud 〈◊〉〈◊〉 manos, ve 〈◊〉〈◊〉 trocinium ti•••••• reputarēt pec∣catum. August. aut quisquis author est lib. de quaest. non. & vet. test. quis nescia••, quid bonae vitae cō∣ueniat, aut ig∣nor••t▪ quia quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sien non vultali••s minime deb••∣at facere? At verò vbi natu∣rali•• lex qua n••st oppressa, consuetudine delinquendi, tunc oportuit manifestari scriptis, vt dei iudicium om∣nes audiren••: non quod pe∣nitus oblitera ta est, sed qui•• maxima eius authoritate carebat, idololatriae studebatur, timor dei in terris nō erat, fornicatio operabatur, circa rem pro∣ximi auida erat concupiscentia. Data ergo lex est, vt quae sciebantur authoritatem haberent, & quae latere caeperant mani∣festarentur.
• * 1.154

  The benefit of hauing di∣uine lawes written.
• * 1.155

  Exod. 24.4.
• * 1.156

  Ose. 8.1••.
• * 1.157

  Apoc. 1•• 11. & 14.13.
• * 1.158

  Aug. lib. 1. de cons. Euang. cap. v••c.
• a 1.159

  I mean those historical mat∣ters cōcerning the anciēt state of the first world, the de∣luge, the sons of Noah, the children of Is∣raels deliue∣rance out of Aegypt, the life and doings of Moses their Captaine, with such like: the certaine truth whereof deli∣uered in holy Scripture, is of the Heathen which had thē onely by re∣port, so inter∣mingled with fabulous vani∣ties, that the most which remaineth in them to bee seene, is the shew of darké and obscure steps, where some part of the truth hath gone.
• * 1.160

  The sufficien∣cy of Scripture vnto the end for which it was instituted. V••rum cogni∣tio supernatu∣ralis necessaria viatori, sit suf∣ficienter tradi∣ta in sacrâ scripturâ.
• * 1.161

  This question proposed by Scotus, i•• affir∣matiuely con∣cluded.
• a 1.162

  Eph. 5.29.
• b 1.163

  2. Tim. 3.8.
• c 1.164

  Tit. 1.12.
• d 1.165

  2. Pet. 2.4.
• * 1.166

  Iohn. ••0.31.
• * 1.167

  2. Tim. ••.15▪
• * 1.168

  2. Tim. 3.14.
• * 1.169

  Verse. 15.
• * 1.170

  VVhitake••us aduersu. B••l∣larmin quaest. 6. cap. 6.
• * 1.171

  Of lawe•• posi∣tiue conteined in scripture, the mutability of certaine of them, and the generall vse of scripture.
• * 1.172

  Esa. 29.13. Their feare towards me was taught by the precept of men.
• * 1.173

  Apoc. 14.6.
• * 1.174

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plat. in sine. 2. Polit.
• a 1.175

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Stra. Geogr. lib. 16.
• b 1.176

  Psal. ••19.98▪
• c 1.177

  Vide Orphei carmina.
• * 1.178

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.179

  Philo de Mos. A conclusion shewing how all this belon∣geth to the cause in que∣stion.
• * 1.180

  Iam. 117.
• * 1.181

  Arist. Phys. II. 1. cap. 1.
• * 1.182

  Arist. Eth. 10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Intelligit de legum quali∣tate iudicium.
• * 1.183

  Prou. 8.15.
• * 1.184

  Eph. 5.29.
• * 1.185

  Apoc. 19.10.
• * 1.186

  1. Pet. 1.12. Eph. 3.10. 1. Tim. 5.21.
• * 1.187

  1. Cor. 11.10
• * 1.188

  Ps. 148.7, 8, 9.
• * 1.189

  Rom. 1.21.
• * 1.190

  Rom. 2.15.
• * 1.191

  Rom. 13.1.
• * 1.192

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. Eth. 5. cap. 3.
• * 1.193

  Iob. 34.3.
• * 1.194

  Ps. 14••.15.16.
• * 1.195

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Zonarin can. Apo••t. 66.
• * 1.196

  Act. 15.20.