ABout the obiect of freewill, there are three opi∣nions; The first of Pet. Lombard, Occam, Gabriel, who hold, that all things which are present, are ne∣cessary, and cannot be otherwise; and therefore that future actions alone are in the power of freewill.
The second of Gregorius Ariminensis (vpon 1. Sent. d. 39.) which thinkes, that the entring into an action, euen for the present, may be free, but that some continuance, is altogether necessary.
The third is more common in Schooles, and more true, which is declared and defended by Io. Sco∣tus, Capreolus, and Hersubcus: that freewill hath in his power, not onely future, but present actions, and not onely in their entrance, but continuance also. Bellar. ibid. cap. 13. pag. 251.