The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce.

The second Chapter. Of the partes of Logike, and the seuerall kindes of Argumentes. (Book 2)

THere bée two partes of Logike, Exposition of the na∣ture of argumentes, and Disposition of the same. Exposition is the first part of Logike which expoun∣deth the diuers kindes of argumentes by their seue∣rall affections and mutuall relations one to another, which for that it helpeth to inuent argumentes, is called Inuention. An argument is any seuerall conceipt apt to argue that wherevnto in reason it is referred.

First, an Argument is either inhaerent, or fet elsewhere. Inhaerent is that which is inuented by consideration of the na∣ture of the thing argued: and is either originall and first or se∣condary and deriued. First is that which hath his beginning of it selfe. It is agréeable or disagréeable. Agréeable is that which agréeth with the thing which it doth argue. The agrée∣able is either fully agréeable, or agréeable in part: fully agrée∣able is that, where there is a greater cohaerence and affinitie betwéene the argument and the thing argued: fully agréeable is first, the cause and the thing caused.

Annotations.

THe Art of Logike, as is declared already, layeth downe the right vse of naturall reason: and this that wée call shewing or declaring how to reason, is no giuing of reason to him that had it not, but an applying or directing of the minde to the view and contemplation of that, which of it selfe it might perceaue, if it were turned and framed therevnto. For, as Plato sayth, 7. de repub. the trueth of the things comprised in Arts is as na∣turally propounded to the viewe of the minde, as colours bée to the sight of the eye: and therefore Aristotle in his first booke

of Elenchs hath set downe that which common experience doth confirme, that euery common person or silly soule vseth Logike in some part, and practiseth of himselfe by naturall instinct that which artificiall Logike doth prescribe in her seuerall rules and constitutions. Artificiall Logike then is the polyshing of natural wit, as discouering the validitie of euerie reason, bée it necessary, wherof cometh science: or contingent, whence procée∣deth opinion. Although I knowe there is a great controuersie and contention among the auncient Philosophers, concerning these two: whilest some of them mayntayne onely Science, some others holde with opinion onely. Heraclitus called opi∣nion the falling sicknesse, for that thereby men many times fell headlong into diuers delusions and erronious conceiptes. So in like maner, the Stoikes held this for one of their Para∣doxes, that Sapiens nihil opinatur, a wise man is not opina∣tiue, a wise man neuer iudgeth according to opinion. On the other side Anaxarchus was of this opinion, that all mans iudg∣ment was but opinion, and that his vnderstanding coulde per∣fitly vnderstand nothing, which the Pyrrhonians taught after him, and the new Academikes: and a man may coniecture that Plato and Aristotle sometimes inclyned that way; for Plato in his booke called Timaeus, ascribeth truth to God and Gods chil∣dren, leauing nothing but truelike to mortall men, and Ari∣stotle in the second of his Metaphisikes compareth mans vn∣derstanding in respect of perfect knowledge of trueth to the dazeling eyes of a Batt in the broade day light. But yet not∣withstanding these forealledged places, both Plato and Aristotle haue elsewhere euidently declared that man is capable both of Science and certayne Knowledge, as in thinges contayned in Arts: and also of opinion, as in infinit affaires which are dayly incident: and this was long before their tyme, elegantly put downe by the famous Poet and Logician Parmenides.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Oportet verò te omnia nosse, Tùm veritatis suasufacilis sententiam, Tùm verò mortalium opiniones, quarum non amplius fid•…•…s vera.

Because of these two kinds of conceiptes, Aristotle would•…•… néedes make two Logikes, the one for Science, the other for Opinion: wherein (if so it may be sayde of so great a Phi∣losopher) it séemeth hée was but an Opinator. For although a∣mong thinges conceaued and knowne, some bée necessary and vnfallible, some doubtfull and contingent, yet the Arte of Knowing and Reasoning of the same (I meane Logike) is only one and the same, as the sight of the eye in perceyuing all co∣lours, bée they chaungeable or not chaungeable. And aswell might a man say there must be two arts of Grammer (if Gram∣mer bée a distinct Art) one for courtly spéeche, an other for coun∣try talke: or two distinct arts of making of cups, one for golden cuppes, an other for cuppes of siluer, as two Logikes, one for vnfallible Argumentes, and another for Contingent. There∣fore one Logike suffiseth to dispute of all thinges, necessary or contingent whatsoeuer. Yet this one Logike her selfe in re∣spect of her preceptes is alway necessary and neuer contingent, for otherwise it were no Art, but the application of it may bée in contingent causes aswell as necessary.

[Two partes of Logike:] The Stoicall diuision of Logike into Inuention and Iudgement, although both Aristotle him∣selfe séeme to commend it in some places, as in 8. Topi. 3: Rhet: and Tully and Quintilian doo altogether obserue it▪ is yet re∣prehended of some, who thinke that Iudgement is not any se∣uerall part of Logike, but rather an adi•…•…ct or propertie gene∣rally incident to the whole Art: because, say they, there is vse of iudgement euen in inuention. But in my fancie they might better haue founde some fault with these wordes, Iudgement, and Inuention, then reprehended the distribution, which is most true, if they consider what the Stoikes did vnderstand by these woordes. For by the first part called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they intend the explication of the diuers kindes, natures, affections, relations, and proprieties of seuerall argumentes, which because it hel∣peth inuention, is called Inuention, as I sayd before: although indéede a man shall no more finde argumentes by this first part •…•…f Logike, then hée shall get Latine woords by Etymologie the first part of Grammer: which made me alter the woords, as not proper, but rather borowed from the Mathematikes, where two▪

or thrée numbers being receiued or put downe, a third or fourth number proportionable is found out, which of them is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Inuention.

And by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ Iudicium, Iudgement, is meant nothing els, but a Disposition, ordering or placing and setling of these seue∣rall argumentes alreadie inuented, to the intent that a man may the better iudge of them, so that here Iudgement is taken for Disposition, the effect for the cause, for Iudgement ariseth of the ordering and disposing of arguments.

They might therefore haue chaunged the woordes, and kept the thing, which yet they haue not done: but brought in new diuisions of Logike, correspondent to the setling and pla∣cing of Aristotles Logicall discourses in his booke called Orga∣non: sometimes into thrée partes, as Apodicticall, Topicall, Elenchticall, sometimes into two, by name Apodicticall and Dialecticall▪ Topicall, or Dialecticall they will haue to bée a se∣uerall kinde of Logike by probable argumentes. Apodicticall, that which disputeth by necessary conclusions, as though there were not one and the same Art, Science, and order of reasoning both by probable and necessary argumentes, as I sayde before, and the selfe same places of argumentes both in the one and in the other, as causes, effectes, subiectes, adiuncts, &c. both contin∣gent and necessary. For, as for that third kinde of Logike, which they call Elenchticall, séeing it is no Logike at all, but rather the abuse and peruersion of Logike, I sée no cause why it shoulde be taught in Logike: yet if any man thinke that the true preceptes of Logike once knowne, will not be sufficient to des•…•…ry the false∣nesse of sophisticall argumentations, he may for his contenta∣tion séeke for a full discourse thereof out of some commentarie, and not ouercharge the Art it selfe with vnnecessary instituti∣ons. I graunt there is something profitable in the Elenches, as also in some other tractates of the same kind, but if wée shall put downe all in Logike, for true Logike, which doth in any respect helpe Logike, wée shall neuer make an ende of Logike.

[Exposition is the first part:] As in Grammer, Aetymolo∣gie concerneth seuerall woords, and Syntaxis the due coherence of the same, so Exposition the first part of Logike, declareth the particular affection and nature of euery seuerall argument, and

Disposition the second part, by ordering and setling the same, causeth iudgement and vnderstanding. And as seuerall woords bée in respect of Grammer, so seuered reasons in respect of Lo∣gike, and as of many woords is made spéech, so of diuers argu∣ments arise axioms.

Exposition and Disposition are not two seuerall arts of Lo∣gike, as though wée should haue one Logike to expound the na∣tures of seuerall arguments, and another to iudge of the same by Disposition, but they bée two essentiall parts of the whole, which ioyned togither make one true Logike.

The doctrine of Inuention or Exposition is generall, and not restrained onely to the finding out of a Medium, which they commonly take for the onely argument, but absolutely and vni∣uersally appliable to the inuenting of any thing, either true or fained whatsoeuer.

Againe, the arguments in Inuention must bée considered se∣uerally, singlely, and alone, then after to bée disposed and orde∣red by certeine precepts, thereby to iudge of the truth or false∣nesse of the same: as for example.

Paris A good sheepheard. These two singly put downe as two arguments, to wit, the subiect and the adiunct, are afterwards disposed in an axiome, to iudge of the truth thereof, as thus: Paris is no good sheepheard.

But because this proposition is contingent and doubtfull (for the arguments bée but in part agréeable) therefore it is confir∣med by another argument, that is to say, by an effect and woor∣king of Paris, I meane that which Thomalin putteth downe in Iuly, in these woords.

But nothing such thylk sheepheard was whome Ida hill did beare: That left his flocke to fetch a lasse, whose loue he bought too deare.

So then, héere bée thrée seuerall arguments, or two ioyned in the axiome before, and the third following in these verses of Thomalin: which third they call, Medium, or third argument, thus:

• 1 Paris:
• 2 A good sheepheard.
• 3 To leaue his flocke to fetch a lasse.

Whereof it is concluded in this wise syllogistically, by dis∣ioyning the two first arguments, the subiect and adiunct, Paris, and, The good sheepheard.

• Hée that leaueth his flocke to fetch a lasse, is no good sheepheard:
• But Paris did leaue his flocke to fetch a lasse,
• Therefore Paris is no good shéepheard.

That which they call Medium, and third argument, is, as it were, an Arbiter honorarius, a determiner, a reconciler, a daies man: which if it agrée with both the other arguments, maketh the conclusion affirmatiue: but negatiue, if with one onely, as in the former example of Paris, the Medium, the arbiter, the de∣terminer, is that effect of Paris, To leaue his flocke to fetch a lasse: which because it is agréeable with the nature of Paris, but is flatly repugnant to the dutie of a good shéepheard, therefore is the conclusion negatiue, Paris is no good shéepeheard. So in Maister Ploidens reports, fol. 474. Saunders is a murderer. The Mediū is that effect of Saunders, to minister venim to the intent to poyson: which, because it agréeth as well with the nature of murder, as the affection of Saunders, maketh the conclusion affirmatiue, thus:

• Hée that dooth minister venim to poyson any one, is a murderer:
• But Saunders ministred venim to poyson one,
• Therefore Saunders is a murderer.

In this order, first of single arguments wée make axioms: which axioms, if of themselues they bée perceiued and graunted, they bée straightway iudged as true or false. And this is the first part of iudgement in axioms, called axiomaticall, determining only truth and falsenes in propositions or axioms. Now if these propositions bée doubtfull, then therof be made questions, which are to bée prooued by third arguments, fet from the affections of the other two which were ioyned in the axiome, and lastly are to be concluded by syllogisme, the onely iudge of all coherence or consequence: as finally, Methode hath only to deale with the ordering and setling of many axioms, thereby to giue sentence

of methodicall procéeding or vnorderly confusion. And therefore I sée no reason why I should with the common Logicians, cho•…•… in Canons, Maximaes, and rules of consequence, as they call them, applying them to euery argument of inuention, séeing that syllogismes, and onely syllogismes are the true and onely rules of consequence and inconsequence, as I said before.

The occasion, as I thinke, of this their errour, héereof arose: because if an Enthymeme be denied, we cōmonly confirme it by some axiome, which indéed is nothing els, but the supplying of the part wanting, as either the Maior, or Minor, as they terme them, or els some prosyllogisme. And this rule, Canon or Maxi∣ma, béeing so supplied, a plaine syllogisme procéedeth, the onelie determiner of coherence. And as all the force of consequence is in syllogismes, so all the vertue of arguing is in the seuerall affection of euery argument to the thinge argued: whiche af∣fection is truely and artificially put downe in Inuention: in such sort that from euerie definition, and precept in Inuention, such rules, maximaes, canons, axioms, consectaries, corollaries, or howsoeuer you tearme them, may easily bée deduced: and, when necessitie requireth, shall be of vs put downe distinctly in their seuerall places. For, as for most of those outworne maxi∣maes hudled vp in schooles, they be either vnnecessarie, and may bée easily perceaued by the definitions and explications of the ar∣guments, or els not generally true, but in part: and therefore in no wise to bée put downe in art, but rather to be reserued for Commentaries, as that, Quod efficit tale, magis est tale, &c. which cannot stand, but by a number of friuolous and sophisti∣call distinctions. Let him read Beurhusius, if any list to sée the true canons of Ramus his Logike, compared at large with these lame rules. It shal suffice at this time to vnderstand, that y^e true maximaes, or canons of Inuention, are nothing els but certain rules concerning the seuerall force or affection of arguments: The canons of axioms, such precepts as declare the vse & force of axioms: and so, in a woord, the canons of syllogisms and me∣thode, are precepts touching the consequence and inconsequence of the one, & the perspicuitie or confusion of the other. Neither are there any rules of consequence at all, but only those of syllo∣gisms. I haue in my text kept my selfe onely to such maximaes

both in Inuention and Disposition, as are put downe order∣ly by Ramus, and are essentially belonging to this art: yet for the satisfiyng of the expectation of some yoong Logicians, some∣what vnacquainted with this newfound Logike, as it pleaseth some to tearme it, I will héereafter, as occasion shall serue, put downe in the annotations, some of the other stampe.

But héere may a doubt arise? For, séeing that euery axiome and rule of Inuention is a part of Iudgement (because it is an axiome, and euery axiome is of iudgement) it may séeme that Inuention and Iudgement be not distinct parts, but rather, as was obiected before out of Carpentar, confounded the one with the other. I answere, the rules and precepts of Inuention bée indéed axioms, and therefore consequently procéed from Iudge∣ment: but so, as you must take them to be the fruits of Iudge∣ment already shewed in ordering the axiomes and rules of In∣uention: or examples of Iudgement, teaching the part of In∣uention: Not as though these precepts were put downe in In∣uention to teach a man how to iudge, either axiomatically, syl∣logistically, or methodically, which onely belongeth to the se∣cond part of Logike called Iudgement or Disposition: And if you so take them, then euerie axiome is not straight way a part of Iudgement: but onely such rules and precepts, as teach to make, order, and frame axioms. For otherwise, euery precept of euery art, because it is an axiome, should bée taken for a part of Iudgement in Logike: whereas indéed they bée but the fruites and examples of that Logicall iudgement appéering in the or∣derly constitution of euery art. And so in Inuention, euery rule is an axiome, euery rule doth iudge, but euery rule teacheth not how to frame an axiome, euery rule sheweth not how to iudge, which onely is the peculiar duetie of Logicall iudge∣ment.

The art and doctrine of euery argument, is distinct, firme, constant, and immutable: yet the affection of arguments may bée altered, changed, and diuersly considered, either in the same things diuersly compared among themselues, or in one thing referred to diuers, as in those examples, put downe by Beurhu∣sius and Talaeus,

God	Created man.	So the affectiō is of the	Cause procreant wt the effect.
Preserueth man.	Cause conseruant wt the effect
Is not man.	Disparats among thēselues.
Is not like man.	Unlikes among themselues.

Where the things be as they were, I meane, God, and Man, which are héere compared togither, yet the diuers kinds of rela∣tions and respectes, make the selfe same thinges haue diuers names and titles, according to their seuerall and diuers affec∣tions.

In like manner also it is, if one thing be referred to many, and drawne, as it were, through the places of arguments, al∣though some arguments bée not incident to some things:

As, Man referred vnto	God, his maker,	hath ye affec∣tion of	Effect procreated.
Body, his matter,	Effect materiall.
Reason his forme,	Effect formed.
Gods glory, his end,	Effect finall.
Actions, his effects,	Cause.
Body, his part,	Whole.
World, his whole,	Part.
Liuing creature, general,	Speciall.
Paule, speciall,	Generall.
Earth, subiect,	Adiunct.
Riches, adiuncts,	Subiect.
Trée, his disparate,	Disparate.
Beast, contrary,	Contrary.
Homo ab humo, the notation.	Name inter∣preted.
Reasonable, liuing,	The thing de∣fined.
Creature, definition,
Angell, equall,	Equall.
Blub, like,	Like.

Yet the art is certeine and immutable, for, that which is a cause, can neuer bée an effect in the same respect and relation, which relation chaunging, altereth the argument, not the art.

[An Argument:] Euery thing hath his seuerall name ac∣cording to his naturall proprietie, or by the imposition and fan∣cie of man, but Logike respecting a second vse in these seuerall

thinges, hath giuen them an artificiall and secondary name. As, fire hath this his name vsually knowne: but because it is sometimes considered of Logicians, as a cause of heate, therefore hath it his second note and name, and is called a Cause, one of the arguments, for that it argueth heate as his effect, and so in others. And by this affection wée learne whe∣ther one argument agrée or disagrée with another, and how it agréeth, whether as a cause with his effect (which is an abso∣lute and full agréement) or as an adiunct with his subiect, which is but an agréement in part, and after a certeine man∣ner, and so of the rest. So that argumentes bée nothing els, but singularum rerum affectiones extra collocationem consi∣deratae, quibus ad arguendum sunt affectae & comparatae, sed vt Grammatica non voces, non vocum significationes, sed vo∣cum affectiones, sic Logica non res, non rerum naturas, sed re∣rum inter se habitudines explicat. Ita{que} omnia argumenta sunt relata: sed quia istae relationes variae sunt, ita{que} varia sunt argumentorum genera. This affection of argumentes is by Hottoman expounded in this manner. Affectio ista est ratio quam quae{que} res habet ad alterā. Graeci 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 appellant; itaque commodius rationem appellare possemus, sed vitandae ambi∣guitatis causa, nomen affectionis delegimus, quo eodem Cicero, & in topicis, & in {per}artitionibus hac eadem in re est vsus. Ra∣tionis autē verbū á Mathematicis sumptum est, qui 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 de∣finiunt duarum eiusdem generis quantitatum comparationem; interpretes proportionem Latinè nominarunt: quidam habi∣tudinem: nonnulli habitum: qui commodius, respectum: bar∣bari fortasse correspondentiam appellarent. Huius vis ac fa∣cultas ea est, vt declaret, quaenam rei cuius{que} cum altera ratio sit, quemadmodum inuicem affectae sint, quomodò se inter se habeant, qualis inter ipsas comparatio aut affectio sit, sitne pars an totū, genus an species, consentanea an dissentanea, &c.

[To argue:] To argue, is generall; either in inuenting onely one argument by the affection of the other, as when by the notion of the cause we séeke the effect, or els in placing them axiomatically, syllogistically, or methodically, wée ar∣gue some other thing either by explication or confirmation. The first consideration is of arguments seuerally conceaued

and alone by themselues, the second as they bée placed by dis∣position: and therfore Piscators animaduersion in this place is to small purpose, whereas hée reprehendeth Ramus, for say∣ing that euery seuerall thing considered alone is an argu∣ment. For he in so saying meaned not, that an argument should bée so alone, as though it had no affection or relation to any other thing, but so seuerally considered, as that in In∣uention we should not intermeddle with axiomaticall, syllo∣gisticall, or methodicall conioining and setting together of the same seuerall arguments, for that dooth wholy and only belong to Disposition.

[Any seuerall conceipt:] Except those woordes which doo but bind and knit together the parts of spéech, as coniunc∣tions, which signifie no seueral and distinct thing in nature. Except againe copious and Rhetoricall phrases, where ma∣ny woordes expresse but one thing, as, A man of an excellent and heauenly wit, where the woords be many, the arguments but two, that is, the subiect and the adiunct. Lastly, except full comparisons, diuisions, definitions, and descriptions, where the argument is put downe in a whole proposition. This is Beurhusius exception, although to small purpose: for Ramus saith not, all such woordes as are alone, but all such reasons, conceipts, and thinges as are alone, and by themselues con∣ceaued seuerally, as these arguments bée which hée héere ex∣cepteth: for though there bée many woordes, yet they all ex∣presse but one conceipt of reason, and that is this single and sole argument which wée héere talke of.

But to let that passe, hée that taketh this woord Argu∣ment, onely for a proofe or confirmation, deceaueth himselfe, and bereaueth Logike of halfe hir dignitie. Indéede it is vsually taken for that thing onely which dooth prooue and confirme, but héere it hath a more generall signification, and betokeneth not onely confirmations, but also declarati∣ons without any syllogisme or forme of concluding, and so doth arguere in Latine signifie, declarare, ostendere, per∣spicuum manifestum{que} facere, vt in Virgilio,

Degeneres animos timor arguit, id est, ostendit.

Yet neuerthelesse the same kinde of argument may com∣monly

serue both to declare and to confirme (although some there bée which onely declare) so in the end of the first Aeg∣loge of the shepheardes Kalender, Hobbinol vseth an argu∣ment of the cause, onely for explication sake.

Ah faithlesse Rosalynde, and voide of grace, Thou art the roote of all this ruthfull woe.

And in the ninth Aegloge, Diggon Dauy vseth the same kinde of argument to the same purpose.

Their ill hauiour garres men missay, Both of their doctrine and of their fay.

And yet here the cause argueth the effect, although there bée no syllogisticall probation intended, for that the propo∣sition of it selfe séemed to Diggon true inough. And in our lawe, In euery count, barre, replication, reioynder, &c. Argumentes of asseueration and exposition bée asmuch vsed as those of proofe and conclusion. Now for the other parte, no man doubteth but that an argument of the cause may bée very well vsed for confirmation, wherof examples are euery where apparant. Let no man therefore thinke there is no Logike, where there is no syllogisticall conclusion, for euery argument serueth not euery where onely for confirmation.

[Inhaerent:] I vse this woord till I méete with a bet∣ter. I meane not so Inhaerent, as though it should alwayes agrée with the thing argued, for many times it is flatly re∣pugnant therevnto, but so conioyned, as that the thing ar∣gued in maner offereth the argument to the Inuention of the Logician, and this is true in disagréeable argumentes: otherwise it is in testimonies, which bée as it were bor∣rowed from other matters, and brought to the Logician to bée framed accordingly.

Ramus diuideth an argument into artificiall and inarti∣ficiall, whervpon Piscator tooke occasion of reprehension. For I sée no reason, sayth hée, why testimonies shoulde bée called inartificiall argumentes, séeing that there is as good Arte shewed in applying them, as in finding other argumentes: and if in Art there ought to bée nothing without Art, either Inuention wanteth Art, or testimonies are not inartificiall, they answere him thus. They bée not called Inartificiall, for

that they want Art, but because they argue not of thēselues, but by the force of some artificiall: Which answere doth not fully satisfie mée: For the testimonie of God argueth moste absolutely of it selfe, neither can wée well say, that his testi∣monie were not to bée beléeued, vnlesse hée were verus, bo∣nus, iustus &c. sith wée cannot distinguishe these so from his diuine essence, but that whatsoeuer is in God, is God: and therefore it is an vnfallible argument, God spake it, there∣fore it is so, ipse dixit, is here sufficient, neyther néede wée séeke for any artificiall argument to confirme it, as wée doe in the testimonies of men.

I holde on the same course which Ramus dooth in deui∣ding still by certaine steps and degrées, till I come at last to the lowest. For it were against Platoes precept and all Arte, to iumpe abruptly from the highest and most generall, to the lowest and most speciall, without passing by the subalternal.

[First:] First may bée conceiued of it selfe, without respect had to any other, as not depending on those that fol∣low. So the cause may be knowne without any mention of a definition, but the definition can neuer bée conceiued with∣out notice of the cause, as being made thereof: therefore the cause is first and originall, the definition secondary.

[Fully agreeable:] Seribonio & Piscatori non placet ista distinctio: nam si Logicè considerentur, aequalis & eadem est consensio: nam subiecta & adiuncta aequè non possunt alterum esse abs{que} altero, at{que} causa & effectū: sin physicè, tùm accidentalis illa consensio est ae{que} in his & illis: nam fa∣ber po•…•…est non facere, quomodò puer potest non esse tinctus literis. Et nec omnis causa essentialiter conuenit cum effecto, nec omne subiectum accidentaliter cum suo adiuncto. haec illi. Quia tamen diuersi sunt gradus dissentaneorum, ideò & consentaneorum videntur esse eodem modo. Ita{que} hic nihil mutaui. haereo.

These generall heades of argumentes haue béene diuersly tearmed of diuers Philosophers, as appeareth by Diogenes Laertius, and Aristotle. For sometimes they are called Ca∣tegoremes, and the handling or discoursing of the same, Ca∣tegories, both which are Gréeke woordes of like signification,

borrowed from the place of iudgement, and applyed to phy∣losophicall conceipts. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth to say, or affirme one thing of an other, as in accusations it is vsually •…•…éene, and in arguments easily perceaued: where one thing added to an other, is affirmed of the same, or else denied. Other∣whiles the preceptes of them bée called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, wherevpon, Aristotles bookes where these bée handled, are intituled 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a place, and therefore Tully called them in La∣tine, locos, sedes, fontes, places, seates, springes or foun∣taynes of argumentes. Sometimes they haue more apt and easie titles, as when they bée called Principles, Ele∣mentes, Reasons, Proofes, Argumentes, Termini and Media. Of all which, I vse for the most part, this woord Ar∣gument, and sometimes Reason, and Proofe, as most vsuall and significant, the rest béeing rather straunge and meta∣phoricall.