The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce.

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE FIRST BOOKE.

What Logike is. Logike is an Art of Reasoning. Annotations.

ALthough this woord, Logike, bée generally receaued of Englishmen, and vsed euen of them that know no Logike at all, yet for that it was a stranger at the first, I thinke it not impertinent to séeke from whence it came, and what it doth betoken: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, therefore in Gréeke signifieth Rea∣son, of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is deriued this word, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that is to say, Reaso∣nable, or belonging to Reason, which although it bée an ad∣iectiue, and must haue some such like woord, as Arte, Science, or Facultie, to be adioyned vnto it as his substantiue, yet is it substantiuely taken and vsed in Latine, as also in our Eng∣lish tongue.

Sturmius and some •…•…ers, deriue this woord Logike from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 betokeneth •…•…éech or talke: whose opinion, although the other name of this Act (which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to speak or talke) doe in some respect séeme to confirme, yet for that the whole force and vertue of Logike consisteth in reasoning, not in talking: and because reasoning may be without talking, as in solitary meditations and deliberations with a mans selfe, some holde the first deriuation as most significant.

Dialectica & Logica, saith Hotoman, dictae sunt a sermone siue oratione, sed illa propriè ab eo genere sermonis, qui cùm altero interrogando & respondendo commiscetur. Fictum enim ver∣bum est 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quod est, verba cum altero commutare, colloqui, disputare, sermocinari, sermones caedere. Nam cùm phi∣losophorū consuetudo haec esset, vt de rebus ad artes suas perti∣nentibus saepè inter se commentarentur, eruditas illas collocutio∣nes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (vt Laertius in Platone scribit) apellarunt, earum{que} habendarum artem, Dialecticam, qua de causa eandem Laertius

eodem loco definit artem sermonis, per quam ex eorum quibu∣scū sermo est interrogatione, & responsione aliquid vel confir∣matur vel refellitur. Quod cùm ita sit, difficile dictu est, diale∣cticae nomen non eius sermonis esse proprium, qui in dialogis ha∣betur, cum perpetua non continuatur oratio, sed in rebus singu∣lis insistitur & intelligitur quid quis{que} concedat aut abnuat, vt ex concessis disputatio concludatur. Et infra.

Ex quo intelligi potest, cùm & Graecorum & Latinorum consuetudin̄e, nihil quicqual•…•… inter dialecticae & Logicae verbum, preter vocis sonum intersit, videri tamen Logicae vo∣cabulum, ad eam disserendi rationem quae perpetua oratione constat, & quà hodie plurimum vtimur, ac multo magis ad eas disputationes quae literis mandantur, accommodatum esse. Thus farre Hottoman.

Some others haue sayd, that this art may bée called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the internall forme, essence, and nature thereof consisting in reason: but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the externall maner and order of woor∣king, which is commonly doone by speache and talke, as that woord importeth, although Ramus vse them both as one, follow∣ing Plato herein, who expoundeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is to vse reason.

Diogenes Laertius in the life of Plato, writeth, that Plato was the first who called this Arte Dialectica, and Valla repor∣teth that Aristotle was the first that named it Logica.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hathe a certaine relation to accompts, wherevpon 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 it selfe whence both they come, are vsed for accompting and deducting of summes, and by a Metaphoricall sence are applied to Logike, but especi∣ally to Disposition the second part of Logike, where discoursing and drawing of one reason from another is put downe. But vse hath accepted them in a generall sence for the whole Arte of Lo∣gike, as wée shall sée hereafter the like in those Latine woordes, Disserere and disputare.

[Is in Art:] An Art is a Methodicall disposition of true and coherent preceptes, for the more easie perceiuing and better re∣membring of the same: and this Methodicall or orderly disposi∣tion of diuers preceptes is taught in Logike, as perteining es∣sentially therevnto. So that Logike was deseruedly called the

Art of Arts, the iustrument of instrumentes, the hand of Philo∣sophie, because by the helpe thereof, not onely the groundes of naturall reason are artificially put downe, but all other Arts also are made to be Arts, as wée shall hereafter shew when wée come to the place appoynted for the due explication of Methode.

It is therefore said here, that Logike is an Art, to distinguish artificiall Logike from naturall reason. Artificiall Logike is gathered out of diuers examples of naturall reason, which is not any Art of Logike, but that ingrauen gift and facultie of wit and reason shining in the perticuler discourses of seuerall men, whereby they both inuent, and orderly dispose, thereby to iudge of that they haue inuented. This as it is to no man giuen in full perfection, so diuers haue it in sundrie measure. And because the true note and token resembling nature, must bée estéemed by the most excellent nature, therefore the preceptes of artificiall Logike both first were collected out of, and alwayes must be conformable vnto those sparkes of naturall reason, not lurking in the obscure head-péeces of one or two loytering Fry∣ers, but manifestly appearing in the monumentes and disputa∣tions of excellent autors. And then is this Logike of Art more certaine then that of nature, because of many particulers in na∣ture, a generall and vnfallible constitution of Logike is put downe in Art. So that, Art, which first was but the scholler of nature, is now become the maystres of nature, and as it were a Glasse wherein shée séeing and viewing herselfe, may washe out those spottes and blemishes of naturall imperfection. For there is no one particuler nature so constant and absolute, but by examining and perusing her owne force, shée may bée bette∣red: no nature so weake and imperfit, which by the helpe of Art is not confirmed.

Hottoman in the third Chapter of his first booke hath these woordes: Estne igitur dialectica quaedam naturalis, quaedam arti∣ficiosa? nequa quam: sed eius initia & semina quaedam in homi∣num mentibus natura ingenerauit, quae cum praeceptis ac discipli∣na, tùm vsu & assiduitate excoluntur. Eadem{que} cum aliarū artiū omniū, tùm praecipuè Musicae ratio est. Nā omnibus a natura ru∣dis quaedā canēdi facultas data est: ab arte vero, quā naturae notatio at{que} animaduersio peperit, certa ratio traditur. Nō enim ars naturā

imitatur tantummodò, verumetiam, vt veteres docuerunt, confir∣mat & amplificat: causam{que}, cur quid{que}, vel hoc vel illo modo fieri debeat, reddit, quod praestare natura non potest, ea{que} sola re artifex ab inscio discernitur.

Wasserleider therefore in séeking to reforme Ramus his Lo∣gike, bewrayeth his owne ignoraunce; for hauing first gene∣rally defined Logike to bée an Art, hée afterwardes diuideth it into naturall Logike and artificiall, as though the naturall facultie of reason were an Art of reasoning, which is contra∣rie to all reason, and includeth in it selfe a manifest contradic∣tion. To conclude this poynt, there ought nothing to bée put downe in Art, whereof there is no ground in nature, for ars imitari debet naturam, and as that paynter is most cunning who can moste liuely expresse his face whose counterfaite hée is to drawe, so hée that teacheth Logike must set foorth no idle con∣ceiptes of extrauagant braynes, but the true vse of naturall reason and vnderstanding: which is a necessary confutation of that absurditie mayntayned by Logicians, and inuented in Cloysters, that ficta, yea falsa exempla, bée good enough to make preceptes playne, whereas Plato in Theaeteto calleth ex∣amples, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sponsores & praedes rationes, tanquam ab eis fideiussum persolueretur. And Aristotle in the eight of his Topikes requireth such examples as Homer can affoord, not such as the pelting Poet Chaerilus did inuent.

[Of Reasoning:] This our English woord, Reasoning, is more proper and fit to expresse the nature of Logike, then either that other woord, of disputing, deriued from disputare, or the like, as disserere, and docere, vsed of Cicero and Melanchton: al∣though I knowe that Beurehusius standeth in defence of these woordes, disserere, and disputare, which Ramus also vseth: and I am not much to mislike them in respect of any other Latine woord, yet not altogether to compare them with this our Eng∣lish woord of reasoning. For the word, disputing, which com∣meth of disputare, it is Metaphoricall, as Varro reporteth, and so is disserere: the one being borrowed of the Uinemayster, the other fet from the sower: for as the first cutteth off superfluous branches in his Uine, which is properly disputare, so the other disperseth his séed in diuers places, and not confusedly throweth

all on one heape, which is the natural signification of this woord, disserere. Now because the Logician cutteth of all idle and vn∣necessarie curiosities, whereof there is no vse in reasoning, se∣uereth truth from falshood, that which followeth from that which followeth not, order from confusion, and handleth diuers argu∣ments and axiomes in diuers places distinctly, not euerie thing in euerie place disorderly: therefore hath hée friendly presumed vpon the good nature of these two countreymen, in vsing their woords of husbandrie, to expresse a more elegant conceipt, al∣though at the first not properly, yet by continuance of time, so conueniently, as that the Metaphoricall sence is now better knowne than the naturall signification. Yet for that both these rehearsed properties of Logike, be rather particular functions of methode, than general operations of the whole art, it is plaine, that this woord disputing, with his originall disputare, and that, disserere, if you respect the naturall signification thereof, cannot expresse the whole nature of Logike. Although I am not igno∣rant, as I said before, that Ramus and his interpreter Beurhusi∣us, applie these woords to the generall vse of this art, not restrai∣ning them to those two functions belonging to methode: whose iudgement as vse alloweth, so I doo not reiect, yet by their leaue leaue their Latine woords behind our English.

Melanchton vseth this woord, docere: Docere, is to teach, and Logike is an art of teaching: but then marke what I meane by teaching, for you must not restraine the signification of it in such sort, as though there were no teaching but onely in schooles among Philosophers and schoolemaisters, or in pulpits among doctors and diuines: but generally, hée teacheth, whosoeuer ma∣keth anie other man know that, whereof before hée was igno∣rant, whether hée doo it by explication and illustration, or proofe and conclusion: and thus if wée take this woord, docere, it is somewhat more generall than disputare, or disserere, put downe by Tully and Ramus: yet not so ample, as the nature of this art, whose vertue is séene not onely in teaching others, but also in learning thy selfe, in discoursing, thinking, meditating, and fra∣ming of thine owne, as also in discussing, perusing, searching and examining what others haue either deliuered by speach, or put downe in writing: this is called Analysis, that Genesis,

and in them both consisteth the whole vse of Logike.

As farre then as mans reason can reach, so farre extendeth it selfe the vse and vertue of this art of reasoning, wh•…•…se most am∣ple and almost infinite vse and power, hath neuer had in anie toong a more generall and yet proper name, than this of reaso∣ning, as wée vse it now adaies. Men reason in schooles as Phi∣losophers, in Westminster as Lawyers, in Court as Lords, in Countrey as worldly husbands: whatsoeuer it bée, nay whatso∣euer thou canst imagine to bée, although it bée not, neuer was, nor neuer shall bée, yet by reason it is inuented, taught, ordered, confirmed: as the description of fame in Virgil, of famine in Ouid, of Elysian fields, of Styx, of Acheron, of the golden apples, and a thousand such poeticall imaginations. And therefore Lo∣gike hath béene of a loong time vntollerably abused by those mi∣serable Sorbonists, & dunsicall Quidditaries, who thought there was no reasoning without, Arguitur quod sic: Probatur quod non: no part of Logike without Ergo and Igitur. Whereas in∣déede the true vse of Logike is as well apparant in simple playne, and easie explication, as in subtile, strict, and concised probation. Reade Homer, reade Demosthenes, reade Virgill, read Cicero, reade Bartas, reade Torquato Tasso, reade that most worthie ornament of our English tongue the Countesse of Pen∣brookes Arcadia, and therein sée the true effectes of natural Lo∣gike which is the ground of artificiall, farre different from this rude and barbarous kind of outworne sophistrie: which if it had anie vse at all, yet this was all, to féede the vaine humors of some curious heades in obscure schooles, whereas the Art of reasoning hath somewhat to doe in euerie thing, and nothyng is any thing without this one thing. Same Artes are appliable onely so some certayne subiect, but Logike is scientia scientia∣rum, as I sayd before, not tyed to one thing, but apt for anie thing, frée from all, yet fit for all, framing orderly, proouing strongely, expounding playnly, perswading forcibly, any Arte, any cause, any question, any man whatsoeuer.

What then, will some man say, néede wée any other Arts, if Logike alone can suffice for all? I aunswere, Logike alone is sufficient to helpe all, yet Logike suffiseth not for all. Logike •…•…elleth how to reason, dispute, examine, prooue, or disprooue any

thing▪ but the thing that is to bee reasoned, disputed, examined, prooued or disprooued, that Logike cannot affoord, and therefore it is to bée sought for at such Arts, as professe suche thinges, so that Logike is profitable vnto all, and yet not any of them vn∣profitable: but euen as they without this bée mangled and confused, so this without them is bare and naked. Logike is necessary for a diuine, yet Logike yéeldeth no diuinitie: but when a Preacher hath by continuall perusing of the sacred Scriptures furnished himselfe with store of matter, then Lo∣gike wil teach him how to teach others, & not onely that, but al∣so how to learne himselfe, to defend, to confute, to instruct, to reprehend. Logike sheweth generally what an argument is, and how to vse an argument, but the seuerall argumentes are else where to be had. For as Arithmetike teacheth to counte money, not to finde money, and Geometrie to measure ground, not to purchase grounde: so Logike can tell you howe to rea∣son of thinges, and yet reserueth the peculier doctrine of the same thinges to the seuerall professors thereof. I doe not denie, but one and the same man may purchase ground, measure ground, and also reason of the same ground, but hée purchaseth it by one Art, measureth it by another, and reasoneth of it by a third, hée purchaseth it as a worldling, measureth it as a Geo∣meter, reasoneth of it as a Logician: and although one man may be furnished with all these thrée properties, yet euery Art must haue her owne by the lawe of Iustice, confusion must bée auoyded, and the preceptes of euery Art distinctly put downe, although the vse of the same preceptes may be common and con∣curre altogether in one man, if one man bée skilfull in all these Artes.

Ramus addeth this woord, well, in the ende of the definition, which me thinkes were as well left out as put in, for although it may séeme to seuer the perfection of Art from the imbecilitie of nature, yet indéede, the very name of an Art, includeth this woord, well: euery Art being an habite of dooing that well whereof it is an Art. Howsoeuer it bée, it appeareth, that to reason well and artificially, is the duetie and ende of Logike: for it is not essentiall vnto Logike alwayes to perswade, no more then to a Phisitian alway, to heale, but to performe those

thinges which are prescribed in his Art, although the hoped euent and successe doo not alwayes ensue.