The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce.

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Title
The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce.
Author
Fraunce, Abraham, fl. 1587-1633.
Publication
At London :: Imprinted by William How, for Thomas Gubbin, and T. Newman,
1588.
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Subject terms
Logic -- Early works to 1800.
Common law -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A01231.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 6, 2024.

Pages

The 14. Chapter. Of the first kinde of a connexiue Syllogisme.

THus much for the simple syllogisme. The com∣pound syllogisme is that wherein the whole que∣stion maketh the one part of the proposition affir∣med and compounded: And the argument inuen∣ted,

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maketh the other part of the proposition, or is conteyned in it.

To deny or remooue any part in a compound syllogisme is to set downe the speciall contradiction thereof.

The compound syllogisme is eyther connexiue, or dis∣iunctiue.

The connexiue is that whose proposition is connexiue, and is made after two sortes.

First when the former part of the proposition maketh the assumption, the later part the conclusion. As in this,

  • ...And if that my grandsire mee sayd bee true,
  • ...Sycker I am very sib to you.
  • If my grandsire tolde mée truth, I am sib to you,
  • But my grandsire tolde mée truth,
  • Therefore I am sib to you.
Maister Plowden Fol. 76. a.

  • Si le briefe est fait en le nosme du roy, et seale oue son seale, adonques est le fait le roy.
  • Mes icy, ceo briefe, est fayt en le nosme &c.
  • Ergò est le fait del roy.

Héere oftentimes the former parte of the proposition ma∣keth not the assumption, but that which is greater, and of more force to conclude then it is, as,

  • If there were none but other beasts thine enemies, yet oughtest thou to take héede,
  • But now the Fox also, the maister of collusion, is thine enemy,
  • Therefore much more oughtest thou to take héede.

Piers vseth this in May, in the gates spéech to her little one.

Kiddy, quoth she, thou kenst the great care I haue of thy wealth and thy welfare, Which many wilde beastes liggen in wayte For to intrap in thy tender state: But most, the Fox, maister of collusion, For he has vowed thy last confusion. For thy, my kiddy, be ruled by mee, And neuer giue trust to his trechery.

Page [unnumbered]

And if he chaunce come, when I am abroade, Sperr the yate fast, for feare of fraude: Ne for all his worst, nor for his best, Open the dore at his request.

Maister Plowden: Fol. 11. a.

  • Si nul forsques vn comen person est grauntée, on donée, vncore les parolles ambiguous serra prise pluis bene∣ficialment a luy.
  • Mes icy, le roy mesme est grauntée •…•…u donée,
  • Ergo, a multo fortiore, les parolles doubtfull ferra pluis beneficiall a le roy.

The same kinde of syllogisme or reasoning is framed by a coniunction of time, with the same force, which this con∣nexiue hath, As

  • When night drawes on, it's time to goe homeward,
  • But now night drawes on, Therefore
  • it's now time to get homeward.
Willy in March.
But see, the Welkin thicks apace, And stouping Phebus steepes his face, It's time to haste vs homeward.

Mayster Plowden: Fol. 263. a.

  • Quant sir Iames Hales mette luymesme en le eawe, don∣ques il forfetoit ses biens.
  • Mes il mette luymesme en le eawe, quant il fuit en vie,
  • Ergò, quant il estoit en vie, adonques il forfetoit ses biens.

Annotations.

THe speciall contradiction:] when that which was affir∣med in generall, is denyed in speciall: or contrarily, affir∣med, when it was denyed: and when the same thing in spe∣ciall, is both affirmed before and denyed after.

[Connexiue or disiunctiue:] So then of an axiome co∣pulatiue or discretiue, wée vnderstand, that no seuerall and peculier disposition ariseth.

Vide 10. E. 4. Lyttleton contra Danby: si le proper∣tie des biyus le mort soit en ascun, tunc serra in le testator,

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vel in les executors: mes est en ascun, ergò in l'un ou l'au∣ter: •…•…est connexiue: Then agayne:

  • Le propertie est in le testator, ou in les executors,
  • Mes nemy in le testator,
  • Ergò in les executors: cest vn disiunctiue.

In composito syllogismo, assumptio, praeter argumentum, nihil assumit quaestionis; quod tamen fit semper in simplici syllogismo.

If not the whole question, but onely the latter part of it bée conteyned together with the argument inuented, in the proposition, then the syllogisme is simple, although the pro∣position bée compound. For as I sayd elswhere, whenso∣euer the disposition is simple, there the syllogisme is simple, though the partes bée compound. So that in Catullus is a simple syllogisme. 1. Gen.

Si quicquam cupido{que} optanti{que} obtigit vnquam & insperanti, hoc est gratum animo propriè. Quarè hoc est gratum nobis, quo{que} charius auro, quod te restituis, Lesbia, mî cupido, Restituis cupido, at{que} insperanti ipsa refers to nobis: ô lucem candidiore nota. Quis me vno viuit foelicior? aut magis hac quid optandum vita dicere quis poterit?
  • Ramus format sic:
  • Quod optandum redierit, gratum est,
  • Lesbia Catullo optata redijt:
  • Optata igitur est.
  • So in 2. Gen.
  • Si quicquam sit homo, tum erit animal,
  • Lapis non est animal,
  • Lapis ergo non est homo.

Nay, which is more, the syllogisme may bée simple, though all the partes bée conditionall and compound, thus:

  • Si sit honestum, erit laudabile,
  • Si sit iustum, erit honestum,
  • ...Ergò si sit iustum, erit laudabile.
As Ramus more at large putteth downe in his French Logike.

Page [unnumbered]

Elenchs. There bée two other connexiue syllogismes different from these already rehearsed: but because they are not certayne, constant, and alwayes infallible: therefore they be not put downe in the text, as precepts of Art: yet are they diligently to •…•…e obserued, for they are often in autors: especially the first, which is very vsuall: but the second is not so common.

The first kinde is that which taketh away the former part, that it may also take away the later. Terence in A∣dolphis.

Dem: Caeterum. Placet tibi factum Mitio? Mr: Non, si queam mutare: •…•…nc cum non queo, aequo animo fero.

Cicero for Muraena.

Etenim si largitionem factam esse confiterer, idque recte esse factum defenderem, facerem improbe, etiamsi alius legem tulisset. Cum verò nihil commissum esse contra legem defendam, quid est quod meam defensionem latio legis impediat?

Ouid in his second booke of sorrowfull songs.

Si, quoties peccant homines, sua fulmina mittat Iupiter, exiguo tempore mermis erit: Nunc vbi detonuit, strepitu{que} exterruit orbem, Purum discussis aera reddit aquis. Iure igitur, genitor{que} deûm, rector{que} vocatur: Iure, capax mundus nil Ioue maius habet.

Caesar in Salust. Si digna poena pro factis corum reperitur, no∣uum consilium approbo: sin magnitudo sceleris omnium in∣genia exuperat, his vtendum censeo, quae legibus comparata sunt.

Colyn in Iune hath the like.

But if in mee some little drops would flow Of that the spring was in his learned head, I soone would learne these woods to wayle my woe, And teach the trees their trickling teares to shed. Then should my plaints, causd of discurtesie, As messengers of this my plainfull plite, Flye to my loue where euer that she bee,

Page 111

And pierce her hart with poynt of worthy wite, As she deserues that wrought so deadly spite. And thou Menalcas that by trechery Didst vnderfong my lasse to wexe so light, Shouldst well be knowne for such thy villany.
But since I am not as I wish I were, Ye gentle shepheards which your flocks doo feede, Whether on hils, or dales, or otherwhere, Beare witnesse all of this so wicked deede, And tell the lasse whose flower is waxe a weede, And fautles fayth is turnd to faythles pheare, That she the truest shepheards hart made bleede That liues on earth, and loued her most deare.

For, although all the examples of this kinde bée not false and deceiptfull, but good and sufficient, as in these now re∣hearsed; yet, false may bée concluded by the selfe same dispo∣sition, as

  • Si arbor equus est, viueret:
  • Sed arbor equus non est:
  • Non igitur arbor viuit.

In which example, the proposition and assumption are both true, yet the conclusion is false: but it is the office of a syllogisme, as hath béene sayde, to lay downe, a necessary, perpetuall, and immutable rule, by the which, vppon the premisses once graunted, the consequence must bée ne∣cessary.

The second, which is not so vsuall, is that which taketh the latter parte, that it may also haue the former concluded, as in that of Ouide in the fourth booke of his transforma∣tions.

Quem si cura deûm tam certa vindicat ira, Ipse precor serpens in longam porrigar aluum: Dixit; et, vt serpens, in longam tenditur aluum.

The argumentation is thus:

  • Si dij statuêrunt vindicare Cadmum, fiat serpens:
  • Sed fit serpens:
  • Ergo dij statuêrunt vindicare Cadmum.

Page [unnumbered]

Take an other example, and you shall sée, that by the same rule you may conclude that which is starke false, As

  • Si arbor equus esset, viueret:
  • Sed viuit arbor:
  • E•…•…go, arbor equus est.

For heere the forerunning axiomes being both true, the conclusion for all that, is manifestly false. This is called of Aristotle an Elench of the consequent: yet in trueth it is no Elench of argument, but of argumentation: when wée are perswaded foolishly that the consequution is reciprocall, and that the putting downe of the one bringeth in of necessitie the other, and contrarily, As,

  • Si cygnus est, albus est color.
This followeth.
  • Sed albus est color,
It followeth not.
  • Cygnus igitur est.

So, that of Melissus.

  • Si quid factum est, habet principium,
  • Ergo si principium habet, etiam factum est

The consequution, sayth Aristotle, is not reciprocall.

Ramus in the 20. of his Logicall animaduersions, the sixt Chapter sayth thus.

Theophrastus autem & Eudemus docuerunt in connexo, Antecedentis negati, & consequentis affirmati tolli posse an∣tecedens, vt tollatur consequens; & consequens retineri, vt re∣tineatur antecedens. In quo genere, etsi rarus error est, est ta∣men aliquando: Vt,

  • Si nullum animal est irrationale, omnis homo est ratio∣nalis.
  • Sed aliquod animal est irrationale:
  • Ergo aliquis homo non est rationalis.
  • Item,
  • Sed omnis homo est rationalis,
  • Ergo nullum animal est irrationale.

Cum maius aliquid concluditur, videntur esse tres termini, sed reuera, res illa maior contine •…•…rem ante propositam in se, & quiddam amplius: Ita{que} tres tantum termini sunt.

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