A learned commendation of the politique lawes of Englande vvherin by moste pitthy reasons & euident demonstrations they are plainelye proued farre to excell aswell the ciuile lawes of the Empiere, as also all other lawes of the world, with a large discourse of the difference betwene the. ii. gouernements of kingdomes: whereof the one is onely regall, and the other consisteth of regall and polityque administration conioyned. written in latine aboue an hundred yeares past, by the learned and right honorable maister Fortescue knight ... And newly translated into Englishe by Robert Mulcaster.

¶So muche knowledge of the lawe as is necessary for a Prince, is soone had. Cha. 8.

ARistotle in the firste booke of his naturall Philosophy saith, y^e then we suppose our selues to haue the knowlege of e∣uerye thinge, when wee know the causes and be∣ginninges therof euen to the principles, vppon the which text the comenta∣tour saieth that the philo∣sopher by beginninges or principles did vnderstāde the causes efficient, by y^e terme Causes he vnder∣stoode causes finall, & by Elementes matter and fourme. But in the lawe there are no matter and fourme, as in thinges na¦tural, and compounde.

How beit ther be in them certeine Elementes, out of the which they procede as out of mater & fourm.

These are custōs, statuts & the lawe of nature: of y^e which all the ••awes of the roialme haue their begin¦ning, euen as all natural thinges haue of matter & fourme, and as all things that are written and read do cōsist of letters, which also are called elementes. But Principles, or bee∣ginninges, whiche are as the commentarye saieth, causes efficient, they are certein vniuersal proposi∣tions, which they that bee learned in the lawes of England and likewyse y^e Mathematicals do terme Maximes: the Rethorici∣ans do call the same Pa∣radoxes: and the Ciuiliās terme thē rueles of the law. These in dede cānot bee proued by force of

argumentes, or by demō∣stracions logicall, but as it is saide in the seconde booke of Posterior̄, they are knowen by induction by the waye of sense and memorye. Wherefore in the firste booke of hys na¦turall Philosophye Ari∣stotle sayth that princi∣ples are not made of o∣thers, nor one of them of an other, but all other bee made of them. And accor∣dinge thereunto in the firste booke of his To∣pikes hee writeth, that euery principle is a suffi∣cient proofe of it selfe.

And therefore the Philo∣sopher saieth that suche as denye them ought not to bee disputed or reasoned withall: because that as hee writeth in the sixthe

booke of his morall Phi∣losophie, there is no reasō to be geuen for principlez Wherefore whosoeuer they be that couet to pro∣fite in y^e knowlege of any faculties, they must nedez first be furnished w^t prin∣ciples. For by them are opened the causes finall, vnto the which by the di∣rection of reason through the knowledge of y^e prin∣ciples we doe attaine.

wherfore these iii. vz prī∣ciples, causes, and elem̄tz beinge vnknowen, the science whereof they are is altogether vnknowen And the same .iii. beeinge knowen, the science also whereof they are is tho∣ught to be knowē, not de¦terminatly or p̄cisely, but su{per}ficially after a cōfuse

& vniuersall sorte.

Thus wee thinke our selues to haue the know∣ledge of godds lawes, when wee vnderstande our selues to knowe faith charitie, and hope, and al¦so the Sacramentes of the churche, and the com∣maundementes of God, leauynge to the prelates of the Churche the other misteries of theologye.

Wherefore the lord saith vntoo his disciples: To you it is geeuen to know the misterie of the kyng∣dome of God, but to o∣ther in Parables, that seeynge they maye not see. And the Apostle say∣eth: Not to bee wyser then it beehoueth.

And in another place.

Not beeinge highe in wisedome. In like maner O moste worthy Prince, it shall not bee needefull for you with longe study to searche out the secrete misteries of the lawe of Englande. It shall suf∣fice for you as you haue profited in grammer, so also to profite in lawe.

Vntoo the perfection of grammer springinge out of Etimologie, Ortho∣graphie, Prosodie, & Con¦struction as out of .iiii. fountaines, you haue not exactlye attayned, and yet you are so sufficient∣ly grounded in grammer that you may well be cal∣led a Gramarrien. Like∣wise shal you be wel wor¦thy to be called a lawier, if you serch out y^e prīciplz

& causes of y^e lawes euen to y^e elementz after y^e ma¦ner of a scholar or a lear∣ner. For it shal not be needefull or expediēt for you by the trauel of your owne wytte to studie out the hydde mysteries of y^e lawe. But let y^e geare be lefte to your iudges & mē of lawe, whiche in the ro¦yalme of Englande are called Seriauntz at lawe and to other professours of the lawe commēly cal∣led apprentices. For you shall better execute iudge¦mentes by other, then by your self. Neither hathe it bene seēe that any kynge of Englonde hathe pro∣nounced iudgement with his owne mouthe. And yet neuerthelesse all the iudgements of the

royalme are his, thoughe by other they be vttered and pronoūced. Lyke as also kynge Iosaphat af∣firmed the sentences of all the iudges to bee the iudgemēts of god. Wher¦fore most gracious prīce you shall in shorte tyme with little labour be suf∣ficiently learned in the lawes of Englād, so that you do applie your mynd to the obteynynge therof For Seneca in an epis∣tle to Lucillus sayethe: There is nothīge which earnest traueill and dili∣gent care atchieueth not And so wel do I knowe the prompte towardnes of your nature, y^• I dare be bolde to saye, that in those lawes (thoughe the

exacte knowelege of thē suche as is required ī iud¦ges can skante be gotten in the space of xx. yeares) you shall sufficiently in one yeare attayne to so∣muche vnderstandynge, as is cōueniēt for a prīce Neither in the meāe time shall you neglect and o∣mitt the studie of marti∣all discipline, wherevnto you are so feruently ge∣uen, but durynge all the same yeare in steade of re¦creatiō you shall vse the practise thereof of at your pleasure.

Philosophus in primo Phisico∣rum dicit, quod tunc vnumquod∣que scire arbitra∣mur, cum causas et principia eius cognoscamus vs∣que ad elementa. Super quem tex∣tum cōmentator dicit qd’ Aristot{us} {per} principia intel∣lexit causas effici∣entes, {per} causas in∣tellexit causas fina¦les, et per elemēta materiam et for∣mam. In legibus vero non sunt ma¦teria et forma, vt in Phisicis et com¦positis. Sed tamen sunt in eis elemē∣ta quaedam, vnde ipsae {pro}fluūt, vt ex materia et forma,

quae sunt consue∣tudines, statuta, et ius naturae, ex qui∣bus sunt omnia iura regni, vt ex materia et forma sunt quae{que} natu∣ralia: et vt ex litte¦ris, quae etiam ele∣menta appellan∣tur, sunt omnia quae leguntur.

Principia autem, quae commenta∣tor dicit esse cau∣sas efficientes, sūt quaedam vniuer∣salia, quae in legi∣bus Angliae docti, similiter et Mathe¦matici, maximas vocant: Rethori∣ci, paradoxas: & Ciuilistae, regulas iuris denomināt: ipsa reuera non

argumētorum vi, aut demonstrati∣onibus logicis di∣noscuntur. Sed, vt secundo post∣eriorum docetur inductione, via sensus, et memo∣riae adipiscuntur, quare et primo phisicorum philo∣sophus dicit: qd’ principia non fi∣unt ex aliis, neque ex alterutris, sed ex illis alia fiunt; quô primo topi∣corum scribitur, quod vnūquod{que} principiorum est sibi ipsi fides. Vn∣de, cum neganti∣bus ea, dicit philo¦sophus non est disputandum: quia, vt scribitur vi. Ethicorum.

ad Principia non est ratio.

Igitur principiis imbuendi sunt, quiqui gliscunt a∣liquas intelligere facultates. Ex eis etenim, reuelan∣tur causae finales, ad quas rationis ductu, per princi∣piorum agnitio∣nem peruenitur, vnde his tribus, videlicet princi∣pijs, causis, et ele∣mentis ignoratis scientia de qua ip∣sa sunt, penitus ig¦noratur. Et his cognitis, etiam scientiam illam cognitam esse, non determinatè, sed inconfusô et

vniuersaliter arbī¦tratur.

Sic Legem diui∣nam nos nosse in dicamus, dum fi∣dem, charitatem et spem, sacramē∣ta quo{que} ecclesiae, ac dei mandata nos intelligere sē∣tiamus, cetera the¦ologiae misteria ec¦clesiae presidenti∣bus relinquentes. Quare dominus discipulis suis ait. Vobis datum est nosse misterium regni dei, ceteris autem in parabo∣lis, vt videntes non videant &c. Et Apostolus dixit, non plus sapere quam opor¦tet sapere, & alibi

non alta sapiētes. Sic et tibi prīceps necesse non erit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 misteria legis an¦gliae longo disci∣plinatu rimare, suf¦ficiēt tibi vt ī gra∣matica tu profe∣cisti, etiā & in legi¦bus proficias. Gra¦maticae vero per∣fectionem que ex Ethimologia, Or∣tographia, Proso∣dia, et Syntaxi, quasi ex quatuor fontibus profluit, non specie tenus induisti, et tamen gramatica suffici∣enter eruditus es, ita vt merito gra∣maticus denomi¦noris. Consimilit{er} quo{que} denomīari legista mereberis, si legum prīcipia,

et causas, vsq̄ ad ••∣limenta, discipuli more indagaueris Nō enī expediet tibi {pro}pria sensus indagine legis sa∣cramenta rimar•• sed relinquātur il¦la iudicibus tuis et aduocatis, qui in regno Angliae, ser¦uientes ad legem appellātur, simili∣ter et aliis iuris {per}i¦tis, quos apprentī¦cios vulgus deno¦minat, Melius enī per alios, quā per te ipsum iuditia reddes, quó pro∣prio ore nullus re¦gum Angliae iudi¦cium proferre vi∣sus ē, et tamē sua sunt ōnia iudicia

regni licet per ali¦os ipsa reddātur, sicut et Iudicum oīm sententias Io¦saphat asseruit es∣se iuditia dei.

Quare tu prīceps serenissime paruo tempore, parua in¦dustria, sufficien∣ter eris in legibus regni Angliae eru∣ditus, dummodo ad eius apprehen¦tionem tu confe∣ras animum tuū. Dicit nam{que} Se∣neca in epistola ad Lucillum. Nil est quod pertinax opera et diligens cura non expug∣nat. Nosco nam∣que ingenii tui {per}spicacitatē, quo audact’ {pro}nuncio, qd. in legibus illis licet earū peritia

qualis, iudicibus necessaria est, vix viginti annorum lugubris adquira¦tur, tu doctrinam principi congruā in anno vno suffi¦cienter nancisce∣ris, nec īterim mi∣litarem disciplinā ad quam tam ar∣dēt’ anhelas neg∣liges, sed ea recre¦ationis loco, eti∣am anno illo tu ad libitum per∣frueris.