Squadron, agmen equestre [equestrian column] , turma equestris [equestrian troop] . The earliest form of the term would have been agmen quadratum [square column], from which we can easily conclude that from the Italian word quadro the French coined the term scadron (as it was still being pronounced not even a century ago):

Ducange [2] on the other hand derives the word from the Low Latin scara :

The Spanish say escadro, per avar forma quadrada , [5] while the Germans call the squadron a schwadron , geswader or reuter schaar , which means a band of horsemen .

A squadron is a group of horsemen who are intended for use in combat. The number of horsemen and of the ranks and files, as well as the formation that the squadrons must adopt, have varied from one historical period to another and are still not fixed. Up to the present time these aspects have been decided in the light of the type and number of cavalrymen available, the conditions of battle and, above all, the judgment of the commanders.

The two oldest books we have on this subject – one sacred and the other profane – tell us nothing about how the cavalry was deployed. From Moses we learn only that the mounting of horses was known before his time, while Homer is silent as to how the Greeks and Trojans used their cavalries in the war that took place between them. [6] See Horsemanship. We shall therefore confine our attention to less remote periods of history, as is suggested by the cross-referencing in this work of the term Cavalry to the term Squadron . After saying something about the squadron’s usefulness, the services it performs, the successes it has enjoyed and so on, we shall explain those different cavalry formations to which the name of squadron has been applied.

The greatest military commanders have always held cavalry in high regard. The advantages they have derived from its use, the large number of decisive victories it has primarily been responsible for on the most crucial occasions (details of which are provided to us by history both ancient and modern) and, finally, the unanimous testimony of those writers whom we regard as our teachers in the art of warfare, are so many irrefutable proofs that the cavalry is not just a useful part of any army but an indispensable one.

Polybius expressly attributes the victories of the Carthaginians at Cannæ [216 BCE] and on the banks of the Ticino, as well as at the Battles of the Trebia [218 BCE] and Lake Trasimene [217 BCE], to the superiority of their cavalry. “The Carthaginians,” he says in Book III, Chapter XXIV, “were principally indebted for this victory [i. e. at Cannæ], as well as the preceding ones, to their cavalry, and so gave this important lesson to all those who have come after them that it is much better to have a larger cavalry and half your enemy’s numbers in infantry than to have equality with your enemy in both.”  [7]

The reputation that Polybius has enjoyed for almost twenty centuries as the author with the most consummate knowledge of all the various aspects of warfare would seem to put his opinion beyond doubt. What is more, he only ever wrote about what he had, as it were, seen with his own eyes. He supports his claim with all the facts with which his history is filled – Hannibal’s victories just as much as his defeat at the Battle of Zama. We can also see the Second Punic War as the period when the cavalry became fully established as an essential part of the army. Before this time the Greeks and Romans had very little in the way of cavalry because they did not know how to make use of it, and because in any case the Greeks had long fought only among themselves in a terrain that was insufficiently fertile to provide cavalry with the means of sustenance and which was also divided by mountains which rendered cavalry movements impracticable. The famous retreat of the Ten Thousand [8] is not in itself sufficient to prove that the Greeks were content to make do without cavalry: we have only to listen to them to assure ourselves that, on the contrary, they were fully convinced that it would have been of great usefulness to them: “the Greeks,” says Xenophon, referring to this retreat of which he himself was one of the leading commanders, “were greatly distressed when they reflected upon the fact that, due to a lack of cavalry, it would be impossible for them to retreat if they were defeated or to pursue the enemy or to profit from their success if they were victors, whereas Tissaphernes and the other generals whom they had to face could easily put their troops in a place of safety every time they were driven back.” [9] This passage definitely proves that if the Greeks had no cavalry at the time of the Persian Wars then it was because they simply could not afford one. While some of the Greeks were poor, and saw poverty as a “law of the state” because it formed a bulwark against spinelessness and all the vices associated with opulence (which is as dangerous in small states as it is necessary in large ones), the wealthier among their people felt obliged to turn their gaze mostly seawards: maintaining their naval fleet absorbed almost all the military funding that might otherwise have served to provide them with a cavalry.

However, once the Greeks had enriched themselves by despoiling the Persians they felt there was no better use for their new-found wealth than to expand their armies by adding a cavalry. There were some horsemen for example at the Battle of Leuctra [371 BCE], where the Theban cavalry made a substantial contribution to their side’s victory. At the Second Battle of Mantinea [362 BCE] we also find 5,000 horses among 50,000 men, and it was to his cavalry that Epaminondas largely owed his victory on this occasion. Indeed, it was to his wise foresight that the Thebans owed the introduction of this useful institution, and this period of Theban history must be seen as its Golden Age. Epaminondas, perhaps the greatest man that Greece has ever produced, had too subtle a grasp of the art of war to neglect such an essential aspect of it. From this moment on, the Greeks were no longer content with a defensive posture. We see them waging war as far as the extremities of the Orient, a plan that Alexander the Great would never have dared conceive if his army had been composed solely of infantry. We know that after the Thessalians begged Philip of Macedon to help them against their tyrants, he challenged the latter to combat and was thus able to win the support of the Thessalians, whose cavalry was then the best in the world. And it was the Thessalian cavalry in combination with the Macedonian phalanx which ensured so many victories for Philip and his son [Alexander]. It is this cavalry that Livy calls Alexandri fortitudo . [10] As for the Romans, it is quite true that in their earliest period they still had very few horsemen. History tells us that Romulus, even in the most highly developed armies of his reign, had only 1,000 horses among 46,000 foot soldiers, from which we can conclude that Romulus was not especially wealthy. The expense he would have needed to have gone to in order to acquire and maintain more horses would have far exceeded his means, especially at a time when he had so many other institutions to maintain. In any case, the environs of Rome (the only land that he possessed) and those of Italy in general were hardly suitable for warfare. Finally, the first wars the Romans fought were against their neighbors who, like them, were not in a position to furnish themselves with horsemen, and in this respect the two sides were in a state of equality. But the conquests and alliances that the Romans subsequently made gave them the resources to increase their cavalry. The horsemen that the subject peoples or allies of Rome maintained for the Romans at their own expense formed the principal force of the Roman armies, but this cavalry was poorly armed, and for many years the Romans did not know how to turn it to the best advantage. This inexperience can be seen as the principle source of all the misfortunes they suffered in the First and Second Punic Wars. In the former, Regulus was utterly defeated by the Carthaginian cavalry, while in the Second, as we have already said, Hannibal defeated the Romans on every occasion. The cavalry made up at least a fifth of Hannibal’s troops, so no sooner did Fabius find himself at the head of the Roman armies than he made the wise decision to avoid combat, and was obliged, so as not to come to any harm at the hands of the Carthaginian cavalry, to no longer lead his legions anywhere except the Alpine foothills. [11]

It was the Carthaginians who finally brought the message home to the Romans that they needed a strong cavalry. The Romans learned this lesson the hard way, and only began to breathe easily again when entire companies of Numidian cavalry had deserted to their side. [12] So much did these desertions weaken the Carthaginians that the Romans gradually acquired superiority over them. Hannibal, obliged to abandon Italy to go to the assistance of Carthage, no longer had access to this formidable cavalry with which he had won so many victories. Upon his arrival in Africa he was joined by 2,000 horses, but even this reinforcement left him far short of the resources available to Scipio, whose cavalry had been swelled by recruits from the newly-conquered Spain and by a collaboration with Masinissa, King of Numidia, who had learned from the Greeks the importance of a well-armed cavalry and of making good use of it. All historians are agreed that it was this superiority that decided the Battle of Zama [202 BCE]. “The cavalry,” writes Montesquieu in his Cause de la grandeur et de la décadence des Romains , “won the battle and brought the war to an end.” [13] The Romans therefore triumphed in Africa by the same arms that had caused them to be defeated so many times in Italy.

The Parthians also played their part in helping the Romans to understand how much of an advantage one had when fighting an enemy with a weak cavalry. “The strength of the Roman armies,” writes Montesquieu, “was due to them having the most resilient, the strongest and the best-disciplined infantry in the world. The Parthians did not have an infantry, but they did have a first-rate cavalry. They fought from a distance, out of reach of Roman arms. They preferred to besiege an army rather than engage with it, and it was useless to pursue them because, for them, to flee was to fight. The Parthians thus accomplished what no other nation before them had done (to avoid subjugation) and they did it not by being invincible but by being inaccessible.” [14] We might add that the Parthians struck terror into the Romans, and it was undoubtedly the threat that, on more than one occasion, this powerful rival posed to their Empire in the East which forced them to substantially increase the cavalry in their armies. This increase became all the more necessary as their frontiers were greatly extended and they found themselves unable to halt the barbarian incursions without numerous horsemen. Besides, the erosion of military discipline caused a gradual decline in the efficiency with which they fortified their camps, and their armies would have henceforward run considerable risks without a cavalry that was capable of resisting the attacks of their enemies’ horsemen. We can conclude by saying that almost all the disgraces that the Romans suffered, as well as most of the advantages they acquired, were due to, respectively, the inferiority or superiority of their cavalry.

If we read Caesar’s war commentaries closely we can see that this great man, who owed his principal successes to his inimitable speed of movement, deployed his cavalry so effectively that we can regard his writings as the best instruction book that we have on this subject.

While it might be true that the ancients managed without a cavalry, this does not mean that we ourselves should not make use of it today, any more than it would be worth claiming that one could wage war without cannon. These two statements are quite similar in nature, but these are arrangements to which one could only lend one’s support if all warlike nations agreed between them to simultaneously abolish the use of horsemen and of cannon.

But to speak only of our own time and our greatest generals (the Turennes and the Condés), we know that Turenne owed most of his success – not to say all of it – to the cavalry. [15] The motto of this general, who was without question comparable to the greatest personages of antiquity, was work on the enemy by points of detail , a maxim that he could not have put into effect unless he had had plenty of cavalry. Consequently, his armies were almost always composed of a larger number of horsemen than of foot soldiers.

The famous battle of Rocroi [1643] shows us how much importance the great Condé attached to cavalry and how well he knew how to use it to advantage. This victory, which occurred right at the beginning of the reign of Louis XIV, was the defining moment of the greatest period in the history of the French nation.

On that famous day the cavalry maneuvers were executed with as much order, precision and discipline as one might expect to find in a prison camp, thanks to some closely coordinated movements [ évolutions ]. [16] No general engagement of the ancient world had ever displayed such characteristics of foresight and valor as were to be found in this victory, which brought together in one encounter all the individual events, typical of cavalry action, that have characterized other battles. As Voltaire put it, “France had never fought a more glorious battle, nor a more important one. She owed her success to the highly intelligent leadership of the Duke of Enghien, who won it single-handed thanks to the sort of observational powers that can simultaneously identify threats and opportunities. It was the Duke who, at the head of the cavalry, attacked the Spanish foot soldiers on three separate occasions, finally breaking through an infantry that had hitherto proved invincible. Thanks to him, the respect that the Spanish foot soldiers formerly enjoyed was nullified, and French arms, which had passed through several epochs that had proved nothing but fatal to their reputation, began to be respected. Above all, that day her cavalry earned the reputation of being the finest in Europe.” [17]

It is in no way surprising that the greatest men have shared more or less the same ideas about the need for cavalry. We have only to closely follow the operations of war to convince ourselves of how important it is that an army has a skillful and sizable body of horsemen.

If we look at the starting-position of two armies we can see that the one with the stronger cavalry must inevitably impose its will on the other, either by seizing the most favorable spots for encampment or by forcing the other, through continual engagements, to flee either its own country or that of which it might have made itself the master.

Alexander, in his crossing of the Granicus [334 BCE], and Hannibal, in his early campaigns in Italy and at the Battle of Ticinus, furnish us with two examples that give this statement evidential force.

The fact that all the glory in these two victories was earned by the cavalry and that the victories had such a great impact on subsequent events go to prove how essential cavalry assistance is in the early operations of a campaign. If we are seeking some more modern characteristics that are more analogous to our own ways of waging war then we can find them in almost every one of the successes of the French army, as well as in some engagements that turned out less happily.

In the finer points of war there are certain maneuvers, all of them very essential, which would simply be impracticable for an army without a cavalry. If there is a plan to be feigned perhaps, or a body of troops or a post to be concealed, then it is the cavalry that takes on these tasks. Turenne raised the siege of Cazal in 1640 by assembling all his cavalry on the same front: the enemy, deceived by this maneuver, lost courage and fled. As Turenne’s biographer says, never did the French enjoy a more complete victory. [18]

At the Battle of Fleurus (1690) the Duke of Luxembourg ordered his cavalry to make an almost identical maneuver to Turenne’s, which caused Prince Waldeck to change his mind and so lose the battle. This was, says De Feuquières, one of the Duke of Luxembourg’s cleverest actions. [19]

Superiority in cavalry also makes it possible to form numerous detachments, some of which seize defiles, woods, bridges, outlets or fords, while others make feigned marches to deceive the enemy and tire it out by requiring it to make diversions.

An army as it takes the field is a body composed of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and the baggage train. This body is perfect only in so far as it does not lack any one of its members. Removing one of these members weakens it, for it is in the union of the whole that all its strength resides, and it is this union that ensures, respectively, the security and support of each member. In the comparison that the Athenian general Iphicrates made between an army and the human body the cavalry was represented by the foot, the light infantry by the hand, the center by the chest and the general by the head.  [20] We shall not dwell on these comparisons: to understand how lucky one is to be equipped with a cavalry it is enough to examine how it is arranged when one wishes to deploy it. It is the cavalry from which the head, tail, and flanks of an army are formed; the cavalry protects, as it were, all the other parts which, without it, run the risk of being at any moment halted, divided in two or even surrounded; if the troops are on the march then it is the cavalry that protects them from harassment; it is the cavalry that ensures the security of the camps, which are dependent upon its advanced guard; the more numerous the cavalry is, the more guards there will be, which means that patrols to ensure good order and to guard against surprise attacks will be more frequent, and communications more secure; finally, since the camps will need to be expanded to accommodate the cavalry, they will be better equipped with the necessities of life, for they will have water, victuals, wood, and forage which will not have to be imported at great expense and with great effort and risk.

We should note that, of two armies, the one that is superior in cavalry will be the one that is on the offensive, always ready to act according to the time and the place, and always filled with the ardor one feels when attacking, whereas the other will be obliged to remain on the defensive and will always be constrained by the limitations of the adverse circumstances that a large enemy cavalry can create at any moment. The enemy’s soldiers will always be liable to surprise, will have low morale, and will certainly have less confidence than the attacker. When an army has a sizable cavalry then detachments can be made with greater ease. Every day new sorties can be sent out which, by ceaselessly haunting the enemy, will hamper it in all their operations, harry it on its marches, deprive it of its detachments and guards, and finally succeed in destroying it “by points of detail,” something one could never expect from an army with a weak cavalry, however strong it might be in other respects. On the contrary, reduced to closeting itself in a camp from which it dare not emerge it will be unaware of all the enemy’s plans and will never enjoy the abundant supplies that regular convoys ensure – indeed, it will be deprived of all of them. If some of the garrison do escape, then they will not be able to approach the enemy except with the greatest difficulty. It is the cavalry that ensures abundant supplies within the camp, for without it there would be no security for the convoys. If there is no cavalry to ensure safety of transport then inevitably an army will eventually be deprived of everything: victuals, fodder, new recruits, money, artillery – absolutely nothing will get through.

The escorting of generals and their lieutenants is another of the cavalry’s responsibilities and is, indeed, exclusive to it. Warfare is done with the eye: a general who wants to reconnoiter the country and judge for himself the position of the enemy would run excessive risks if he were escorted solely by infantrymen. In addition to not being able to go so far or so quickly he would also put himself in danger of being isolated and captured before he had even spotted the enemy cavalry entrusted with this task. The sole option available to a general without cavalry is to not dispense with ordinary guards; for what can one expect from someone who, unable to scout out the enemy’s disposition for himself, is forced to rely on the testimony of spies, and how can one have any confidence that his operations will be well directed if, for want of cavalry, he can neither acquire intelligence, nor send someone out to reconnoiter, nor reconnoiter the locations for himself?

Speed, as Montecuccoli notes, is good for secrecy, because it does not allow time for one’s plans to be divulged. [21] This enables opportunities to be seized as they arise, and it is this quality that particularly distinguishes the cavalry: ready to move anywhere that its assistance might be required, we have often seen it resolve through its promptness of action situations where the least delay might have had serious consequences. Its agility enables it to exploit the slightest disorder in the enemy, and even if it does not always have the advantage of victory, then at least by being able to withdraw, it has the merit of never suffering total defeat. Victory, when it is the work of the cavalry, is always complete, whereas that which the infantry alone accomplishes never is.

War is full of situations in which one cannot accept combat without risk. There are others, too, where one is obliged to force engagement. It is cavalry that gives you the freedom to choose which you wish to do.

An army cannot do without victuals, hospitals, artillery and stores. It also needs fodder for the various kinds of horses, including those to be used by the generals and staff officers. If there is no cavalry to transport this then the infantry will not be able on its own to take further steps to acquire it, for it will never be able to intercept the enemy’s forage trains or capture its foragers. The supply chain it would form would neither cover a sufficiently large area nor be deep enough to withstand the shock of the enemy cavalry.

If one objectively considers the variety of operations in which an army must engage and the extent of its needs, then it is impossible to claim that infantry alone is sufficient.

In plain warfare [22] and in all those circumstances – which are certainly very numerous – where a little extra speed is of the essence, who can deny the great need for cavalry? If a river has to be crossed either by swimming or fording then it is the cavalry that facilitates the traversal by using the strength of its squadrons to impede the current; alternatively, each horseman can carry an infantryman as a pillion rider. If one wishes to present a wide front to the enemy to outflank or surround it then it is by means of the cavalry that this is achieved. It is by sending groups of horsemen out on detachment that the good order so necessary to an army is maintained, for they prevent deserters and marauders from escaping from the camp, keep watch to ensure that no spies or other equally dangerous persons enter it, ensure the general safety of the local civilians, and guarantee their freedom to deliver supplies to the camp.

With the exception of sieges, which are a type of operation which can proceed only slowly and, as it were, inch by inch, we shall not perhaps find any occasions in warfare which do not require diligence and, therefore, in which the services of the cavalry are not very advantageous. Besides, everyone knows that in sieges the cavalry has a unique function, which we saw it perform at the last siege of Bergen op Zoom, [23] and that it can even share the role of the infantry, although this is not the only example of how useful a dismounted cavalry can be. [24]

The first and most important role of the cavalry in siege warfare is that of investing the town that one wishes to besiege before the enemy has been able to infiltrate reinforcements to support the garrison. If, on the other hand, one wishes to assist a town that is threatened by siege or even one that is already subject to it then it is again to the cavalry that one turns. The great Condé has provided us with an example in the service that he rendered on one such occasion, when he was required to infiltrate reinforcements into the town of Cambrai, at that time under siege by Turenne. [25] Time was short, and Condé was obliged to hastily assemble eighteen squadrons , take command of them, get them to force their way through the guards, and break through as far as the counterscarp. [26] Turenne was forced to raise the siege. In a sense, it was a single detachment of one hundred horses that actually led to the last siege of Bergen op Zoom, which will always hold a place of glory in the annals of the King’s arms and those of the general who commanded them, for it is presumed that the siege would have been postponed or abandoned altogether if the main cavalry guards that the Dutch and their allies had in the vanguard had held out long enough to give them the chance to dispatch their own cavalry and then the rest of their army, which was on the other side in order to establish themselves between the town and the French camp. These guards, however, put up little resistance, with one part being scattered and the other put to flight.

Cavalry is no less necessary when a town, city or other place has to be defended. If those under siege did not have any cavalry then they would be unable to make sorties; alternatively, their infantry would run the risk of being cut down by the enemy cavalry when they sallied forth.

A state without cavalry could perhaps protect its territories for a time with infantry alone, but in such cases how many infantrymen would it need, and what use would its territories be to it if the enemy could use its cavalry to penetrate to the very heart of the realm?

The raising and maintenance of a cavalry corps requires money to be spent, but surely the contributions that it raises when far afield, the victuals and forage that it derives from them, the safety of the convoys that it ensures, and so many other services that it alone is capable of rendering are ample compensation for the expense to which it gives rise?  [27] Besides, since the cavalry has a wider range of usefulness in the operations of war we cannot say that it is a heavier burden on the state than the infantry, since it does not cost any more to raise a squadron than an infantry battalion, and the maintenance costs of the latter are also much higher.

Finally, if we look at the deeds of the great commanders then we shall be forced to admit that the side with the superior cavalry always has the upper hand.

For two thousand years Cyrus, Alexander, Hannibal and Scipio have all enjoyed a reputation that they owe to the success of their cavalries. Cyrus and Hannibal had a very large cavalry. Alexander, out of all the Greek commanders, had the largest cavalry as a proportion of his total forces. We certainly cannot see that the Greeks under Alexander, any more than the Persians and the Carthaginians in the time of Cyrus, were in decline: on the contrary, it seems that the lifetimes of these great men coincided with the Golden Ages of their respective nations.

If the Romans, after their defeat by the cavalry of the Carthaginians, finally triumphed over them, then it was because the latter suffered the loss of their cavalry, whom Scipio effectively stole from them by means of his alliances and conquests. As a result, this war, which had begun by being a shameful experience for the Roman people, concluded with the most glorious period in their history. [28]

The opinions of those modern authors who have best described the military arts coincide with those of the greatest commanders and the best writers of antiquity. For the excellent La Noue, 2,500 infantry sufficed for 4,000 lancers: “No one will contradict me,” says this author, “when I say that it is always necessary to maintain a goodly number of gendarmerie , but as for the infantry, some say that one can dispense with them all together in peacetime.” [29] But we must remember that La Noue was writing at a time (1587) when the infantry counted for very little, because the principal actions of warfare in those days were less concerned with the seizure of towns, cities and other places than with operations in the open field, where the infantry was no match for the cavalry. His opinion cannot fail to shed light also upon the need to keep the cavalry exercised during peacetime, for such a force cannot be of any use in warfare if it has only just been raised.

A very highly-regarded writer who was also a great commander, Maréchal de Puységur (who, having held the highest military posts for some fifty-six years, certainly knew where the strength of armies lay), suggests in his battle plans that the number of cavalry should be more than half that of the infantry. [30]

Santa-Cruz says that an army should always have a strong cavalry. He even adds that it should be twice the size of the infantry depending on circumstances: for example, if the enemy is known to have an especial fear of cavalry, or if your fellow-countrymen are more comfortable on horseback than on foot. [31] He overlooks, however, the important question of the nature of the terrain where war is being waged. “A flat country,” says Turenne, “is very favorable to cavalry. It allows it all the freedom it needs for its operations and gives it a great advantage over infantry.” [32] This great general, whose maxims have the force of law, always had, as we have said, at least as many cavalry as infantry in his armies, and was sometimes to be seen with an even greater number.

Finally Montecuccoli, the Vegetius of our time, [33] thinks that heavy cavalry must be equal in numbers to at least half the infantry, while the light cavalry should be, at most, a quarter of the heavy cavalry in size. The opinions of these great generals from different nations; those of the ancients and of the greatest cavalry commanders; reason and experience; the most important operations of war; and all the needs of an army taken together provide so much proof that cavalry is a necessity.

It is unquestionably because of the service rendered by the cavalry in the field in every historical period that on those occasions when a mixture of cavalry and foot soldiers has been deployed the cavalry officer should be in command of all of them, because cavalry operations require a special kind of experience that an infantry officer cannot be expected to have. It is fair to say that if the latter views the prospect of death with stoicism, the former rushes towards it with intrepidity.

The experience of all historical periods shows that a dispersed cavalry has no solidity, and that it is therefore necessary to keep one’s cavalrymen together – this grouping, as we have already said, is known as a squadron .

Although different nations have formed up their squadrons in triangles, wedges and squares of all kinds, it was the rhombus that was generally the form of choice. However, experience gradually revealed its defects, and this caused every nation to adopt the square as their preferred squadron formation. Only the Turks still use the rhombus and the wedge: they think, just as the ancients did, that this is the most suitable way of putting the cavalry into the field in all the different kinds of terrain, and that the various maneuvers are greatly facilitated by the fact that there is an officer at each one of the formation’s corners. They also think that, because this squadron -formation is pointed, it is easier for it to force its way through a smaller gap; that, because it occupies less space, it is swifter in its movements; and finally that, when it wishes to wheel, it is not obliged to make large circular movements like a square squadron , which in such cases is obliged to trace out the greater part of a circle. But if squadrons in the rhombus formation do have these advantages they also have certain drawbacks: they present to the enemy only a very small number of combatants; their interior parts are of no use; and the left cannot fight advantageously. A rhombus formation, when attacked by a rectangular squadron curved on both the right and left, cannot avoid being surrounded, nor does it have the opportunity to defend itself. What is more, once broken it cannot re-form: at the very most therefore it can only be of any use as a small troop serving as a guard, designed more for issuing advance warnings and then immediately withdrawing than for fighting. Here in brief are the various ways of forming triangular squadrons .

The Thessalians, to whom the art of fighting on horseback was well-known long before the Trojan War, were the first to use the rhombus formation. We know that the Thessalian cavalry enjoyed a considerable reputation among the Greeks. Indeed, it was Ileon the Thessalian who first invented this formation, which is why they called it the ilé . See Ælian’s Tactics . [34]

The commander of the rhombus squadron , called the ilarch , was placed in the front of the vanguard. Those who formed the right and left of the middle rank were called flank-guards [ gardes-flancs , or πλαγιοφυλακαι ( plagiophylakai ) in Greek], while those in the tail were known as bringers-up [ serre-file ].

There were four ways of forming a rhombus squadron : with ranks and files; without ranks and files; with files but without ranks; and with ranks but without files.

The Macedonians, Scythians, and Thracians found the rhombus too unwieldy. They therefore removed the tail and, through this reform, created what they called the wedge [ le coin ]. We are told that Philip of Macedon invented this battle formation. Whatever the case may be, it does not seem to have been the commonest formation among the Macedonians, since Polybius (in Book VI, Chapter XII) tells us that their cavalry was generally arranged eight-deep, “which is,” he says, “the best method.” [35] Tacitus tells us that the Germans also formed the various corps of their army in wedge formations. [36]

The Sicilians and most of the Greek peoples formed up their cavalry squadrons in squares, which seemed to them to be the easiest to form and to keep together on the march. Besides, in this formation the front would be composed of officers and the better horsemen. Also, since its more cohesive formation would cause the shock to make itself more keenly felt, it would have greater force and momentum. [37] The rhombus or the wedge, on the other hand, presents to the enemy only a single combatant, and once he has fallen the whole squadron is invariably lost.

The Persians also used the square. As their cavalries were very numerous they made these squadrons much deeper: files were twelve or sometimes sixteen deep, which made their squadrons so unwieldy that they were almost always defeated, despite their superior numbers.

The Romans formed their squadrons (or turmæ ) in a different kind of quadrilateral: the oblong square or rectangle. This gave them a front and a depth which was much smaller than that to which the Greeks were accustomed. This was the usual cavalry formation among the Romans, but they were not so strongly attached to it that they did not adapt it to suit their circumstances. At the Battle of Pharsalus [48 BCE] we see Pompey, greatly superior in cavalry, combining four turmæ and forming his squadrons of fifteen horsemen abreast by eight deep. This forced Caesar, who had only thirty-three turmæ of thirty men each, to form them up them according to the usual arrangement of ten abreast by three deep.

The custom of putting the cavalry into the field in just a single rank lasted for much of the early period of our monarchy. This arrangement was made obligatory by the type of cavalry available and by the offensive and defensive weapons they used. It lasted until the middle of the reign of Henri II [1547-1559] who, seeing that the files of gendarmes were easily defeated by the squadrons of lancers and by those of the Schwarze Reiter which Charles V had created, [38] formed up his cavalry in squares but with an exaggerated depth. This custom, despite its many shortcomings, lasted in Europe from the reign of Henri II to that of Henri IV [r. 1589-1610], under whom the squadrons were reduced from the previous ten ranks, first to eight and then to six. In those days there were as many companies as squadrons . Each squadron consisted of 400 troopers [ maîtres ]. Their captains wanted to lead their own companies and so were reluctant to share their command with others. These companies were subsequently reduced to 200 men, so that squadrons had less front and depth, but they still proved too unwieldy and were only reduced to the most convenient size when they were formed into regiments under Louis XIII in 1635. They were then arranged in three or four ranks, each of forty or fifty troopers. This is the arrangement that we still use today, and it is indeed the one that experience has shown to be the best. The most seasoned officers think that the cavalry squadron of three ranks each of forty-eight troopers is preferable to any other, being the most happily proportioned. A squadron of 120 troopers, forty per rank, can however be effective when companies are under strength, because it then comprises eight equal divisions. The other model can be divided into sixteen. [39]

Some people have however taken exception to the three-rank squadron , maintaining that it would be better to add a fourth. Although their system receives support from the authority of the Gustavuses [40] and the Turennes, who added a fourth rank to their squadrons (sometimes even going as far as a fifth rank in depth), we must conclude that if the custom of organizing squadrons in three ranks had not been the best then the whole of Europe would not have adopted it or, at least, would not have persisted with it.

Others have found even three ranks too deep, and have claimed that a two-rank cavalry model is superior. Supporters of this model point out that the ancient cavalry and gendarmerie (who were for a long time the principal force of French armies) always challenged the enemy in a single rank. But what conclusions can we draw from that? In those far-off days no one formed up their cavalry in squadrons , so the enemy had no advantage over us in that regard. In any case, this cavalry was composed of the elite of the French nobility; both men and horses were covered in an armor that rendered them almost invulnerable and would have made squadrons thus composed excessively unwieldy; and their offensive weapon was the lance, which also made it impossible for them to fight in squadron formation. Would adding another identical rank to create a two-rank model have led to anything other than the unnecessary loss of some excellent champions? Besides, we know that such a cavalry was always defeated when it was confronted with a cavalry several ranks deep.

The Maison du Roi [the Royal Household Cavalry] fights in three ranks. Though no doubt comparable in all respects to the ancient cavalry just mentioned, it is far superior to it in discipline. If it had a genuine advantage fighting in two ranks then it is easy to imagine that this custom would have become established in a body like this, which has learned from long experience always to emerge victorious and who might be expected to have found two ranks sufficient to achieve that aim. The first of the three ranks in the squadrons of the Gardes-du-Corps [bodyguards] is usually composed entirely of officers, but if not enough officers are available then the numbers are made up with the guards known as Carabiniers . [41]

If we wanted to compare our cavalry with the Maison du Roi then we might be tempted to give the latter six ranks rather than three. But although these are the same arms, they are not the same men or the same horses. Sometimes in war it is necessary to add to good horsemen some of mediocre ability, and even some that are of low caliber, meaning callow youths or young untrained horses from which is it impossible to obtain good results. Perhaps the only way of remedying these defects is to give this cavalry the best formation of which it is capable. It must be resilient and yet at the same time maneuverable, and for that the depth of the squadron must be in proportion to its length in such a way that it takes up neither too much nor too little space. The arrangement of the squadron in three ranks is, without fear of contradiction, the most suitable for combining these advantages. We hope to demonstrate this below, always assuming however that the squadrons must consist of between 120 and 144 men, for if they numbered 100 or less then they would have to be arranged in only two ranks.

The amount of space on the battlefield taken up by a three-rank cavalry is already very considerable, and if these squadrons were arranged in only two ranks then the line would obviously have to be extended by one-third.

Who cannot see at a glance the difficulties that such a disposition would entail? Even if it were possible to find flat areas sufficiently vast to accommodate under all circumstances two lines of fifty squadrons each (the most usual number in today’s armies) in two ranks, what problems would not arise from the excessive size of a battlefield where the general would not be able to judge the whole of the terrain by himself, and who would therefore be unable to issue the appropriate orders? [42] Reinforcements [always] arrive too late and, of course, time is of the essence in warfare. Besides, how can wings composed of two-rank squadrons be expected to hold against the shock of other – stronger – squadrons with just one rank? As we know, it is the wings that almost always decide the outcome of battles. Deprived of their assistance, the infantry is soon simultaneously outflanked and attacked in the rear by the enemy cavalry and in the front by the enemy infantry. Also, a general cannot have too good a view of his cavalry, and the best way to ensure this is to form the squadrons up in three ranks. His cavalry is already too far away from his position, and its combats are intense, of short duration, and almost always decisive: only the general, through his presence, can deal with the thousand unexpected eventualities that all the human foresight in the world could not have anticipated.

An excessively wide squadron can only proceed in fits and starts, with movements that are more ponderous and uneven. There is a danger that it will break ranks or even split at some point along its width, and in that situation a squadron is defeated before it has even started fighting. Its true strength lies in being equally compact in all its parts, but without undue constriction. The union must be perfect for, as Montecuccoli remarks, “all the advantage of war consists in forming a solid body so firm and impenetrable that, no matter where it might be or might go, it will stop the enemy in its tracks like a mobile fortress, and defend itself by its own efforts.” [43]

The movements of a two-rank squadron cannot help but be very slow and awkward. All it needs to halt or, at least, considerably impede such a squadron’s progress is for its route to be obstructed by a ditch, ravine, hedge, elevation, or stream. The more extensive the terrain it has to cover the greater the likelihood that it will encounter these obstacles, which are much less of a problem for three-rank squadrons , whose narrower front makes it easier to avoid or overcome them.

In a three-rank squadron the first rank is composed of the elite members of the whole troop: these are exclusively officers, brigadiers [cavalry corporals], carabiniers , or, at least, veteran cavalrymen whose good conduct is ensured by their training, valor, and experience. This elite sets an example to the two ranks behind it, and stirs up emulation among them. In a two-rank squadron each rank is one-third larger, and it is impossible for the first rank to be as well composed as it is in the case of a three-rank squadron . One would be forced to admit to it untrained recruits and new or unbroken horses which, not being used to the noise of war, would inevitably cause the squadron to disintegrate. What is more, the officers in a two-rank squadron would be too far apart from one another, thus sacrificing one of the greatest advantages that the French squadrons have over those of their enemies, for although the latter have fewer officers these are placed on a narrower and more manageable front and would therefore become proportionately stronger than those of the French, who would be stretched out over a front that is too long.

If the first rank of a two-rank squadron were to be successfully attacked by the enemy then could we really assume that the second rank, composed as it is of lesser men and horses, would be able to put up much resistance? That is not the case with three-rank squadrons , in which any gaps in the first rank are filled by horsemen of the second rank, while gaps in the second rank are filled from the third.

Further great advantages can be derived from the use of a third rank by ensuring that it does not take part in the shock by dropping it some way back from the two ranks in front of it. In this case it acts a rallying point: this is a function that merits close attention, as we know that once a squadron has been broken it subsequently rallies only with great difficulty. In such cases this third rank can still break to right and left from the center and then move towards the flanks and rear of the enemy squadron , or alternatively challenge the smaller troops similar to it in character who would be detached for the same purpose.

The only advantages of the two-rank squadron are that more horsemen are fighting simultaneously and that it can therefore expect to outflank the enemy squadrons thanks to the greater extent of its front without itself having to worry about being outflanked. But if we take a closer look at these advantages we find they are not as genuine as we thought: our ultimate aim is to surround or even outflank the opposing squadron , but what would become of our squadron’s center if it were attacked by an enemy whose lighter squadron , directing all its energies towards this part, would invariably have opened it up before it had had time to curve its flanks? In that case, what use would it have been to have outflanked the enemy, and what would become of our outflanking wings after our center had been routed? The only people who find these supposed advantages attractive are those who are used to judging things superficially while sitting comfortably at their desks. Professionals, whom experience has rendered the sole competent judges in this matter by virtue of their incessant training, will in no way be deceived: they all think that, of all the forms that a cavalry squadron can take, that of three ranks with forty-eight horsemen each is incontrovertibly the best. That is no reason, however, not to drill cavalry squadrons in two ranks since, as they are more difficult to handle, this will facilitate movements of the three-rank squadron . The intention of the King, as made clear by the Instruction of 14 May 1754, [44] is that all cavalry be exercised sometimes in two ranks and sometimes in three, and that cavalrymen know how to fight in both these formations.

Everything we have said about the need to form squadrons in three ranks must however be understood to refer only to those with a sufficiently extended front, that is to say one consisting of forty or forty-eight troopers, for those squadrons that are restricted to a front of thirty-two horsemen must form them up in two ranks of forty-eight each if they are to ensure a just proportion.

Nowadays, following the Instruction of 14 May 1754, cavalry squadrons are formed up in two or three ranks, depending on the strength of the companies and the commander’s discretion. Each squadron consists of four companies: the first company of a regiment which is composed of twelve companies forming three squadrons forms the right wing of the first squadron ; the second the right wing of the second; the third the right wing of the third; the fourth the left wing of the first squadron ; the fifth the left wing of the second; the sixth the left wing of the third; the seventh starts on the left wing of the first company in the first squadron ; the eighth starts on the left wing of the second company in the second squadron ; the ninth on the left of the third company in the third squadron ; the tenth is placed between the seventh and the fourth; the eleventh between the eighth and the fifteenth; and, finally, the twelfth between the ninth and the sixth.

If a regiment is over- or under-strength then the same arrangement is used, placing the companies alternately in each squadron according to their seniority. [45] The commander of each squadron takes up his position alone in front of the first rank opposite the center between the third and fourth companies of the squadron . In accordance with the above arrangement the commander of the first squadron is placed in front of the gap between the seventh and tenth company of the regiment, and so on with the others.

The majors and adjutants do not have a fixed position: they are separated and positioned within reach of the commanders so they can receive their orders.

The captains and lieutenants are in the first rank; the two captains of the right-hand companies on the right of their company; the two of the left on the left; the two lieutenants of the right-hand companies on the left of their company; and those of the left on the right. Both are flanked on their right by two corporals and on their left by two carabiniers (whose purpose is to close off the left flank of the first ranks of each company).

The quartermaster-sergeants bring up the rear behind the center of the last rank.

The two standard-bearers are placed in the first rank in the fifth file when the squadron is formed up in three ranks, but if there are only two ranks they are put in the seventh file.

The four trumpeters are placed in one rank to the right of the squadron , and the kettle-drummers behind the trumpeters of the first squadron .

1, 4, 7, 10, ranks of the companies of the first squadron of a three-rank regiment.

Regarding the squadrons of dragoons, hussars, and other light troops, since their way of fighting is different to that of the cavalry, with each of their ranks being composed of as many detached troops as are needed to sustain the combat and attack from all quarters, it would be preferable for them be formed up in four ranks rather than three.

In addition, the ranks should consist of an equal mixture of veterans and new recruits, in contrast to the cavalry custom whereby the first rank is always composed of the best and most experienced horsemen.

Authors who have written specifically about cavalry:

Georges Basta, Le gouvernement de la cavalerie légère . Rouen, 1616, folio. [46]

Jean-Jacques de Wallhauzen, Art militaire à cheval . Zutphen, 1620, folio.  [47]

Hermanus Hugo, De militiâ equestri antiquâ et novâ . Antwerp, 1630. [48]

Lecoq-Madeleine, Service de la cavalerie . Paris, 1730, duodecimo. [49]

De Langais, Devoir des officiers de cavalerie . Paris, 1725, duodecimo. [50]

This article was written by Monsieur D’AUTHVILLE, battalion-commander, who will shortly be publishing some memoirs entitled Essai sur la cavalerie . [51] See Horsemanship.

1. “We saw his valor among the enemy squadrons as he filled the graves.” From Épitaphe ( Celuy de qui la cendre est dessous cette pierre ) by Honorat de Bueil, seigneur de Racan (1589-1670). This sonnet was written as an epitaph to the poet’s father. See Œuvres complètes, ed. Tenant de Latour (1857), volume I.

2. Charles Du Fresne, Sieur du Cange (1610-1688), in his Glossarium mediæ et infimæ latinitatis.

3. “An array of warriors which in common parlance we call scaras .” Hincmar, Epist. ad Diœcesis Remensis Episcopos [Epistle to the Bishops of the Diocese of Rheims], chapter 3.

4. “The scara , which we have become accustomed to calling the turma [a troop of 30 or, later, 32 men] or the cuneus [a wedge].” Aimoin of Fleury (c. 960-c. 1010), Aimoini Monachi, qui antea Annonij nomine editus est, Historiae Francorum lib. V [ History of the Franks ] Book IV, Chapter xxvi.

5. “By virtue of being square.” I think “por avar” is more correct here.

6. For Moses, see, for example, Exodus 14.9 and 14.23. On Homer, see Beamish’s translation of Bismarck’s Lectures on the Tactics of Cavalry (1827), footnote on page 269: “No person of Agamemnon’s time is mentioned by Homer as riding on horseback, except Diomed, when with Ulysses, he captured the horses of Rhesus” (Iliad X.513).

7. See Polybius, Histories. The battle on the banks of the Ticino is referred to as the Battle of Ticinus and took place in 218 BCE.

8. A force of mostly Greek mercenaries hired by Cyrus the Younger to recover the throne of the Persian Empire from his brother, Artaxerxes II. Xenophon was one of their commanders and wrote of their adventures in his Anabasis .

9. I have not been able to find the source of this passage. It does not seem to be taken from the Anabasis.

10. “The source of Alexander’s strength.” I cannot find this phrase anywhere in Livy, but it does appear in the epitome of Trogus by the 2 ^nd century historian Marcus Junianus Justinus Frontinus, known as Justin ( In Trogum Pompejum libri quadraginta quatuor ).

11. The reference is to Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, surnamed Cunctator (c. 280 BCE-203 BCE).

12. Numidia was an ancient Berber kingdom located mostly in present-day Algeria.

13. Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence , chapter IV. For a nineteenth-century translation, see Montesquieu’s Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans.

14. Ibid., chapter XV.

15. Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, often called simply Turenne (1611-1675) ; Louis de Bourbon or Louis II, Prince of Condé (1621-1686), known until his father’s death in 1646 as the Duke of Enghien.

16. This term was still used in English at the time: “EVOLUTION, from the Latin evolvo , I roll out; I unravel. In the art of war, the motion made by a body of troops, when they are obliged to change their form and disposition, in order to preserve a post, occupy another, to attack an enemy with more advantage, or to be in a condition of defending themselves the better,” Charles James, A New and Enlarged Military Dictionary (1805).

17. Apparently paraphrased from Le Siècle de Louis XIV , Vol. I Chapter II. The Spanish foot soldiers were the famous Tercios ; see http://forum.milua.org/archive/TactiqueUk.htm.

18. Andrew Michael Ramsay, Histoire du Vicomte de Turenne, Maréchal Général des Armées du Roy, Book I, p. 70.

19. Antoine de Pas de Feuquières (1648-1711) served under Luxembourg, Turenne and Catinat. Voltaire used his memoirs of the Nine Years’ War as a basis for his Le Siècle de Louis XIV.

20. Iphicrates (418-353 BCE). See the Life of Iphicrates by Cornelius Nepos as well as Plutarch’s collection of his sayings and his Sixty-Three Stratagems.

21. Raimondo, Count of Montecuccoli or Montecucculi (1609-1680) was an Italian military commander who also served as general for the Habsburg Monarchy, and was also a prince of the Holy Roman Empire and Neapolitan Duke of Melfi. His Memorie della guerr a were published in Venice in 1703 and in Cologne in 1704. A French edition was issued in Paris in 1712 and a Latin edition in 1718 in Vienna, while the German-language Kriegsnachrichten des Fürsten Raymundi Montecuccoli was published in Leipzig in 1736. Of this work there are manuscripts in various libraries, and many memoirs on military history, tactics and fortification written in Italian, Latin and German still remain unedited in the archives of Vienna. The collected Opere di Raimondo Montecuccoli were published at Milan (1807), Turin (1821) and Venice (1840), and include political essays and poetry.

22. I. e., warfare on flatlands, as opposed to mountain warfare.

23. In 1747, during the War of the Austrian Succession, when a French army under Lowendal and the overall direction of Marshal Maurice de Saxe besieged and captured the strategic Dutch border fortress of Bergen op Zoom on the border of Brabant and Zeeland. See An Authentick and Accurate Journal of the Siege of Bergen-op-Zoom (1747) by “An English Officer of Distinction”: “Sept. 12. The French are, we are informed, to be reinforced by some choice Cavalry, and they seem now so determined, and egged on so urgently by their General, that our Fate must soon be determined, for if the Town is to be carried either by fair Play or Treachery, it must go,” (p. 62).

24. “Sept. 5. Count Lowendahl [sic] has dismounted his Cavalry, and they do Duty in the Trenches, by which one would think his Army is thin’d,” Ibid., p. 58.

25. In 1656-7, when Condé was leading the Fronde against Louis XIV.

26. Counterscarp: the outer wall of a ditch in a fortification.

27. By “contributions,” he means a tax: an extraordinary levée made by a public authority to pay for the military effort in time of war.

28. The war to which he refers is the Third Punic War (149-146 BCE).

29. Discours politiques et militaires du Seigneur de la Noue. Nouvellement recueillis et mis en lumière (1587), p. 314. James defines the gendarmerie as « a select body of cavalry that took precedence of every regiment of horse in the French service, and ranked immediately after the king’s household.” A New and Enlarged Military Dictionary (1810), vol. 1, s.v., “Gendarmerie.”

30. Jacques-François de Chastenet, marquis de Puységur (1656 – 1743), was created Maréchal de France by Louis XV in 1734. See his Art de la Guerre (1748).

31. Don Alvaro Navia‐Oroso y Vigil, third Marquis Santa Cruz de Marcenado y Vizconde de Puerto (1684-1732), was a Spanish aristocrat who followed both a military and diplomatic career. See his Reflexions militaires et politiques / traduites de l’espagnol de M. le marquis de Santa Cruz de Marzenado par M. de Vergy in 11 volumes.

32. Mémoires sur la guerre, tirés des originaux de M. de Turenne (1738), p.15.

33. Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, commonly referred to as Vegetius, was a military author of the Later Roman Empire (late 4 ^th century). His two surviving works are the Epitoma rei militaris (also referred to as De re militari ), which G.R. Watson calls, “the only ancient manual of Roman military institutions to have survived intact;” and the lesser-known Digesta Artis Mulomedicinæ , a guide to veterinary medicine. Lt. John Clarke’s 1767 translation of De re militari (which omits Books IV and V as ‘too technical’) will be found here and the original Latin text here.

34. See John Bingham’s 17 ^th -century translation, The Tacticks of Aelian, or the Art of Embattailling an Army or this early 19 ^th -century translation: The Tactics of Aelian: Comprising the Military System of the Grecians.

35. I think he means Book XII, Chapter 18 of Polybius, Histories.

36. Tacitus, Germania, Chapter VI: Acies per cuneos componitur (‘The line is made of wedge formations’).

37. Charles James defines “shock” as “the percussion which takes place in an engagement between adverse armies, or bodies of armed men, who dispute a position in the field, endeavor to force a passage, or to get possession of an open town.” A New and Enlarged Military Dictionary (1810), vol. 1, s.v., “Choc.”

38. German cavalrymen riding smaller horses than usual and armed with guns as well as swords.

39. That is, the 3 x 48 formation, with sixteen divisions of nine troopers each.

40. Gustavus Adolphus (1594-1632), King of Sweden from 1611 to 1632, known as the “Father of Modern Warfare,” partly for his successful tactical integration of cavalry, infantry, and artillery.

41. The Carabiniers were horsemen armed with carbines (fire-arms smaller than the infantry fire-lock, with a three-foot barrel) who occasionally fought dismounted and were specifically responsible for attacking the enemy’s advanced positions and outposts. James defines the Gardes du corps as “a certain number of gentlemen or cavaliers whose immediate duty was to attend the King’s person.” Their rank was above that of the gendarmes and the king’s light-cavalry. A New and Enlarged Military Dictionary (1810), vol. 1, s.v. “Gardes du corps .”

42. Author’s footnote: Melius est post aciem plura servare præsidia quam latius militem spargere . Vegetius, Book III, Chapter XXVI. [It is better to have several Bodies of Reserve, than to extend your Front too much.]

43. Memoirs , Book I, Chapter II. Jacques Adam’s 18 ^th -century French translation is available here.

44. See the text of this Instruction ; pp. 30 ff. deal specifically with forming-up in ranks.

45. Author’s footnote: Since the peace [of 1748, ending the War of the Austrian Succession] the

the regiment of the Colonel-Général , [the supreme commander (in this case, of the cavalry, which enjoyed the first rank in that branch of the army)] has twelve companies, that of the Royal des Carabiniers has forty, and each of the others has eight. This number is increased in wartime.

46. The reference is to a French translation of Giorgio Basta, Il Gouerno della caualleria leggiera (Venice, 1612).

47. The reference is to the 1620 edition of Jean-Jacques de Wallhausen, Art militaire à cheval (Frankfort, 1616).

48. The reference is to Herman Hugo, De militia equestri antiqua et nova ad regem Philippum IV.

49. The reference is to Lecoqmadeleine, Le service ordinaire et journalier de la Cavalerie, en abregé.

50. The reference is to De Langeais, Des Fonctions et du principal devoir d’un officier de cavalerie .

51. The reference is to Charles Louis d’Authville des Amourettes, Essai sur la cavalerie tant ancienne que moderne (Paris, 1756).