Army, a considerable number of infantry and cavalry troops joined together to go against the enemy. This definition describes land armies . Those of the sea, called naval armies , are defined as the meeting or assembly of a great number of warships which carry troops intended to act against enemy vessels. See Fleet, Ship, etc.

Included in the composition of the army is the artillery, that is, the cannon and the other machines of war, used in attack and defence. [1]

‘All the troops of the army are divided into squadrons and battalions, these different corps of cavalry and infantry can be considered as elements of the army, just as the men are the elements of these formations. Thus, the army ’s formation depends only on the arrangement of the battalions and squadrons. As the most considerable action the army can take is going into battle, the positions which are observed for this by the battalions and squadrons of the army are called the order of battle .

‘The battalions and squadrons are placed next to one another, in the same fashion as the men are placed within their troops; however, these troops placed in the order of battle are not called troops in ranks but troops in line or in battle ; nor do we say a rank of troops but a line of troops .

‘Troops are placed one behind the other, in the same way as the men are arranged in their formations, but we do not use the term files to describe this arrangement. If those arranged one behind the other are to follow each other, and they are in great numbers, they are called troops in column , or a column of troops , not a file of troops . If the troops placed one behind the other are not to follow each other, they are not considered to be in the preceding arrangement, only in relation to the other troops with whom they are in line. This last case is much more common in the order of battle than the first one.

‘The number of lines which make up an army is not fixed any more than the rest of the order of battle: The different countries and terrains where one must fight, and the disposition of the enemy can cause considerable variations. So, it appears that one must define the order of battle as the order and arrangements of the battalions and squadrons of an army in relation to the land, the designs of the general, and to the arrangement or possible arrangement of the enemy .

‘It is not our intention to give here all the different orders of battle either executed or possible; we are content to give an idea of them, to imagine one which most conforms to the maxims in use, which was still considered during the war of 1701, as rules from which one should not deviate. Their use is founded upon the practical realities of assembling an army . We assume first an order close to that which will be described, to assign and inform each troop of their post. A statement of this order is made and distributed to the principal officers. This order is not, for that reason, considered rigid and the general thereafter makes the changes he judges opportune.

‘Following are the maxims which in the last war served as a foundation for the order of battle.

‘ Principles or maxims which serve as a foundation to the order of battle. First maxim. Forming the army into two lines of troops.

‘The line which is nearest to the enemy is called the first line; the one immediately following is called the second line ; the one after the second, the third and so on if one has a greater number of lines. This happens when the terrain does not allow the army to deploy in two lines.

‘ II Maxim . Keep some troops besides those that make up the two lines, to use if need be to provide help where it is necessary. The corps composed of these troops, or battalions and squadrons, are called the reserve in the order of battle. There have been as many as three in the great armies . The most natural reserve position is behind the second line.

‘ III Maxim. Put all the infantry in the middle of the army. The space it occupies is called the centre .

‘ IV Maxim. Place the cavalry equally on the two flanks of the infantry. The cavalry of each line are called wings of cavalry .

‘ V Maxim. Leave an interval between the battalions equal to their front and observe the same thing between the squadrons. It follows that by this arrangement the lines have as much void as full, which means that the battalions and squadrons can move easily and execute the different motions ordered by the general without causing them to become entangled with each other.

‘ VI Maxim. Place the battalions and squadrons of the second line opposite the intervals of the first line so that, if necessary, the troops of the second line can easily rescue those of the first; and so that if the troops of the first line are beaten and put into disorder, they can retire through the intervals of the second without causing disorder to this line and can rally or reform behind it.

‘ VII Maxim. ‘Place the second line about three hundred paces, or one hundred and fifty toises from the first, so that the fire of the enemy cannot reach it. [2] During combat, the second line approaches the first; but at a hundred toises it will sustain many losses, and even more at fifty or twenty-five toises .

‘ Observations on the preceding maxims.

‘Following these maxims an army must have a very large extension from right to left and a very small depth from front to back.

‘To know the width, it is necessary to know the number of battalions and squadrons that will compose the first line and the intervals which separate them. As we know the space occupied by a battalion and squadron, it is little more than a simple multiplication to know the extent of the first line, and consequently the frontage of the army.

‘It could be objected that the battalions and squadrons may be very different from one another, and that the calculation just indicated cannot be exact. It is argued that if the troops differ considerably from each other, it is particularly important for the officers to know the ground that the army will occupy, to learn these differences in order to take account of them in the calculation. If these differences are not considerable, or if they come only from the complete number of the troops, one can without a noticeable error, add half the difference between the strongest troops and the smaller ones, and then consider as equal those of the same type. Otherwise we must calculate the extent of each troop individually and add them together with the appropriate intervals. This calculation is a little longer than the preceding one, but it is not difficult.

‘The Marshal de Puysegur proposes, in his excellent book on the art of war,  [3] to regulate the number of ranks that the battalions and squadrons have at the beginning of a campaign in order to determine the exact ground necessary for an army. For this it is necessary to examine the strength or number of men in each troop, and fix the number in each rank by the greatest number of battalions and squadrons. If there are some that have a much greater frontage than the others, the illustrious general claims that they should have one extra rank, and those that have too little frontage should have one less. In this way it is possible to look at the battalions and squadrons as always occupying the same frontage, and make the calculation of the ground the army will occupy with great facility.

‘To give an idea of the calculation just indicated, that is to say, the one useful for finding the necessary frontage for an army, suppose an army of 48 battalions and 80 squadrons, and suppose also, according to ordinary custom, intervals equal to the frontage of each troop, and that we wish to distribute the army in two lines. We will have 24 battalions and 40 squadrons for each line. Assume that the battalions are of 650 men at 4 deep, and the squadrons of 150 men, 3 deep. Counting 2 feet [ pieds ] for each soldier in the rank, and 3 feet for each cavalryman, there are 54 toises for the front of each battalion, and 25 for each squadron. [4] Therefore, multiplying 24 by 54, we will have 1,296 toises for the front of 24 battalions. Total . . . 1,296.

‘There will be the same measurement for the intervals. Total. . . 1,296.

‘For the frontage of the squadrons, multiply 40 by 25. This gives 1,000 toises for the frontage. Total. . . 1,000.

‘The same space is observed for the intervals. Total. . . 1,000.

'’ Total frontage of each line, 4,592.

‘With regard to the depth of the ground occupied by the army , it contains only two battalions or two squadrons, with the distance of two lines, regulated to 150 toises ; thus, this depth would be not quite 160 toises . Reserves have not been mentioned in this calculation, because they have no fixed position.

‘It is difficult to disagree that a width of 4,592 toises , or two standard leagues in France, as the frontage for the army just assumed, is exorbitant in relation to its depth. [5] Skillful generals therefore deem it appropriate to diminish the frontage by subtracting something from the intervals.

‘Marshal de Puysegur not only is of the opinion that great intervals are prejudicial and must be diminished: he also holds that it is appropriate for the troops fight with full lines, without intervals.

‘To demonstrate the advantage of this he gives an example of 20 battalions of 120 men frontage, six deep, arranged next to each other without any interval, each battalion occupying a space of 40 toises frontage. He also supposes 10 battalions of the same strength opposing them, arranged with the ordinary equal intervals in their frontage. This being so, it seems evident that the 20 battalions will easily beat the 10 opposite, or even 15 who occupy such a frontage; for when two troops fight against each other, the advantage must be on the side of the one who has the most combatants acting together in the same place. On occasion full lines have been beaten by lines with intervals, but these events must be attributed to the troops of the full line failing to enter the intervals of the other line and attack the battalion’s flanks.

‘M. de Puysegur goes on to examine whether an army in a single full line is placed more advantageously than an equal army ranged over two lines with intervals. It is clear that the two armies will occupy the same frontage, but it is no less clear that the former will not be the weakest when the two troops enter combat, the one joins all his forces and the other separates them, the one which attacks with all has an incontestable advantage over the location and should beat those of troops which are separated from the rest in detail.

‘Those who find it difficult to agree with the illustrious Marshal’s observation may object that if the first line is broken, the second will come to its aid, and the former can then rally behind the second; if the army is fighting a full line and its efforts do not succeed, the army is obliged to bend without being able to reform behind any other corps that covers and protects it. To this Marshal de Puysegur, in agreement with the learned Marquis of Sancta-Crux, claims that the success of a battle depends on the attack of the first line, and that if it is broken, the second can hardly recover the fight with advantage. Additionally, the second line advances with the same weakness in its order of battle as the first and will be beaten with the same ease by the full line, which has almost the same advantage as on the first. We say almost, because it is not possible for the full line to beat the opposition without disturbing its order, and because when the second line arrives, it is in a position to attack the full line with more advantage than the first one had. We must examine the work of Marshal de Puysegur more closely for all the reasonings by which he demonstrates the advantage of solid lines. Due to the nature of this treatise this detail cannot be covered here, and we have only mentioned it to encourage military men not to neglect the study of a book so useful for knowledge of their profession, and from which they can derive the greatest advantages, to grasp perfectly its principles.

‘ Of divisions of the army, called brigades . If there were no divisions in the army except battalions and squadrons, or in the different sections of the center and wings, it might be said that the first of these divisions would be too small, and the second too large. But, as we have seen by the formation of the troops in particular, it is not convenient to compose them of too small a number of men, nor too great a number. It follows that the divisions of the army must be proportionally similar to a number of battalions or squadrons large enough to produce great effect in combat, but small enough not to be too cumbersome to the movement of the army . What is called division in the army is simply the union or liaison of several corps of troops destined to act together; the union of several battalions or squadrons can therefore be considered as a division of the army .

‘Each regiment may also be considered as a division; but as the regiments in France have very different numbers of men, the division of the battle order by regiments would not be suitable; that is why several are joined together, placed under the orders of the same chief, called the brigadier ; and this union of regiments, or rather the battalions or squadrons they compose, is called an army brigade or simply a brigade . See Brigadier. It follows from this that the brigade must be defined as a certain number of battalions or squadrons destined to fight and to perform military service together under the orders of a chief called the brigadier.

‘The troops of the same brigade are on the same line in the battle order and placed immediately beside each other; they are not of different types, but simply either infantry or cavalry.

‘The whole army is divided into brigades ; but the number of battalions or squadrons of each brigade is not fixed. However, six battalions or eight squadrons is considered the most suitable for forming brigades; but there are stronger and weaker ones.

‘There are some other rules used in the formation of the order of battle, in relation to the relative ranks of the regiments, but we refer for this detail to the Military Orders, which fix the rank of each regiment, and we restrict ourselves to what is most essential and more general in the order of battle.

‘The brigades follow the rank of the most senior regiment they contain; the other regiments are regarded as joined with this first, being part of the same corps. In accordance with the rank of this regiment, the brigades are given the posts of honor which suit them.’ See Post of Honor. Essai sur la Castramétation by M. Le Blond. [6]

In Europe experience has shown that a prince who has a million subjects, cannot raise an army of more than ten thousand men without breaking the bank. In the old republics it was different, the soldiers were raised in proportion to the rest of the people, which was about an eighth, and at present they raise only a hundredth. The reason why, seems to come from the equal division of lands which the founders of the republics had made to their subjects, which meant that every man had considerable property to defend and the means to do so. Presently the lands and property of a nation are in the hands of a small number of persons, and the others, only able to subsist by commerce or the arts, etc., have no property to defend, nor the means to go to war without crushing their families. The vast majority of the people are artisans or servants, who are but ministers of slackness and luxury. As long as land equality subsisted, Rome, though limited to a small state, and deprived of the assistance that they Latins would furnish once their towns had been captured, under the consulship of Camillus, could raise ten legions just from their enclosed city. This, says Livy, was more than they could do at present, though they were masters of a great part of the world; the reason for this, adds this historian, is that luxury and softness have increased proportionally as we have become more powerful. See Livy, book i, chapter vii ; [Montesquieu], Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence . Chapter iii, p. 24. [7]

Formerly our armies were a sort of militia composed of vassals and tenants of the lords. See Vassal, Tenant, Seigneur, Service, Militia. When a company had served the number of times enjoined upon it by its tenancy or by the custom of the fief that it held, it was dismissed. See Tenement, Fief, etc.

The armies of the Empire consist of different corps of troops supplied by the different circles of Germany. See Empire, Circle. The main part of the French army , under the first race [the Franks], consisted of infantry. Under Pepin and Charlemagne they were composed of infantry and cavalry; but since the decline of the Carolingian line, the fiefs became hereditary and the national armies , says le Gendre, were ordinarily composed of cavalry. [8]

The armies of the Grand-Seigneur [Ottoman Sultan] are composed of janissaries, sipahis, and timariots.

1. See the article Artillery.

2. A toise is was equal to six feet and is the equivalent today of 1.949 meters.

3. The reference is to Maréchal de Puysegur, Art de la guerre (Paris, 1749).

4. A pied is equivalent to a foot and is the equivalent today of 32.48cm.

5. Translator’s note - A league was exactly 2,000 toises or 2.42 miles today.

6. That is, almost all of the article to this point is drawn from Guillaume Le Blond, Essai sur la castramétation ou sur la mesure et le tracé des camps (Paris, 1749). Le Blond (1704-81) was also a contributor to the Encyclopédie . For his biography see Guillaume Le Blond.

7. The references are to the Roman historian Livy, The History of Rome, book 7, chap. 1 ; and Montesquieu, Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence. Chapter iii, p. 24. For a translation, Montesquieu’s Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans (New York, 1894).

8. The reference is to Le Gendre, Gilbert Charles, Marquis de S. Aubin-sur-Loire, Des antiquités de la nation et de la monarchie françoise (Paris, 1741).