Definition, in rhetoric , is a common-place; and by definition , rhetoricians mean a short and clear explanation of something. The definitions of the orator differ greatly in their method from those of the logician and the philosopher. These thinkers strictly and tersely explain each thing by its genus and its differentia: in this way they define man as a rational animal . The orator gives himself more freedom, and he defines in a way that is more expansive and more ornate. He will say, for example: man is one of the most beautiful works of the Creator, who has formed him in his image, who has given him reason, and who has destined him for immortality . However, to speak precisely, such definition is more in the nature of description than a properly expressed definition. [1]

There are different sorts of oratorical definitions . The first sort is made by enumerating the parts of a thing as, for example, when it is said that eloquence is an art that consists of invention, disposition, elocution, and pronunciation . The second defines a thing by its effects; for example, it could be said that war is a cruel monster that drags in its path injustice, violence, and fury, feeds on the blood of the wretched, relishes tears and slaughter, and counts among its pleasures the desolation of the land, the torching of towns, the ravaging of provinces , and so forth. The third sort is like a heap of various notions, each one making the thing the orator talks about more magnificent; this is what the rhetoricians call definitiones conglobatae (a heaped together or accumulated definition). In such a way Cicero defines the Roman senate: templum sanctitatis, caput urbis, ara sociorum, portus omnium gentium (temple of virtue, leader of Rome, sanctuary of her Allies, haven of all nations) [2].

The fourth consists in negation and affirmation, that is, to designate first what a thing is not so that, in contrast, what it is may be better conceived. Cicero, for example, wanting to define the Roman consulate, says that the dignity of this office is not characterized by axes, fasces, lictors, toga praetexta, or any of the exterior appearances that accompany a consul, but by prudence, wisdom, vigilance, and love of country. Cicero concludes from this that Piso, who has none of these qualities, is not really a consul—even though he carries the rank and he occupies the station. The fifth defines a thing by what it accompanies; thus is it said of alchemy that it is a foolish art, whose beginning is deceit, whose middle is toil, and whose end is indigence . And, finally, the sixth defines by similes and by metaphors: we might say, for example, that death is falling into darkness or that, for some, she is but peaceful sleep .

One can add to that the last class of metaphorical definitions five definitions of man that are sufficiently interesting to find a place here. [3] The classical Poets of our antiquity pretend that the Sciences gather together one day by the order of Minerva to define man . Logic defines him as a short enthymeme whose birth is the antecedent and whose death the consequent ; Astronomy, as a changing moon who never rests in the same state ; Geometry, as a spherical figure who begins at the same point where it ends ; and finally, Rhetoric defines him as an oration whose exordium is birth, whose narration is confusion, whose peroration is death, and whose figures are sadness, tears, or a joy worse than sadness . Perhaps by this fiction the Poets would teach us that each art and each science establishes its own terms for defining its subjects.

Regarding definitions in philosophy, they are most critical for the very things that are most familiar to us. We disagree about these things only when they have not been defined or when they have been defined badly. The error is hardly in the terms themselves. What I claim for an object, I claim for the idea that I attach to the object, that is, I write this claim into the definition that I attach to the name of the object; what you deny of the same object, you deny of the idea that you apply to the object, that is, you write your denials into the definition that you attach to the name of the object. We are then apparently opposed in our opinions since we speak of two distinct things using the same name. However, should you read my claims in my definition objectively, and should I then read your denials in your definition without bias, you will affirm what I affirm, and I will deny what you deny. This communication of ideas works only through the means of definitions . See Idea, Truth, Evidence, Error, etc.

Notes:

1. I wish to express my appreciation for the help I have received in preparing this translation from David J. Adams, University of Manchester; A. Sebastian Anderson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; André Bandelier; Ralf Breslau, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin; Jeff Loveland, University of Cincinnati; Edward Rhodes, George Mason University; Glenn Roe, ARTFL Project, University of Chicago; Gordon Schochet; Christi Sumich, Mount Carmel Academy; Karl-Erik Tallmo; Nick Treuherz; Abbie Weinberg, Folger Shakespeare Library; Nuria Yanez-Bouza, University of Manchester; Richard Yeo, Griffith University; and participants in the WordReference.com forums on the French language.

2. Taken literally, the expression “caput urbis” is “head of the city”. I render this as “leader of Rome”.

3. The entry actually presents only four such definitions.