Verisimilitude, the truth, says Father Buffier [Claude Buffier, 1661–1737], is something that is so important for mankind, that one must always search for reliable ways to arrive at it; and when s/he cannot, s/he must compensate for it by attaching importance to that which is closest to it, that which is called verisimilitude .

Besides, an opinion is not close to the true except in certain ways. For to approach the true is to look like what is true; that is to say, to be apt to form or to remember in spirit the idea of the true. Yet, if an opinion, in all ways that one can consider it, also formed ideas of truth, there would not appear to be anything but what is true. One would not judge the thing as anything but true; and so it would very well be the true or truth itself.

Otherwise, as that which is not true is false, and as that which does not look like the true looks like the false, all that is called verisimilitude contains some aspects of the false and other aspects looking like the true. One must therefore weigh these opposing aspects to recognize which ones affect each other, so as to attribute to one opinion the quality of verisimilitude , without which at the same time, the opinion would and would not be verisimilar.

Indeed, what reason would there be to call similar to the true that which looks like as much of a falsehood as a truth? If one asked us which color a banner dappled equally with white and with black looked like, would we respond that it seems white to us because it contains white? One would ask us at the same time, why not also say that it looks like black, since it has just as much of one color as of the other. With strong conviction, could we not say that the color of this banner looks white, if there is more black than white in it? On the contrary, if it is predominately white, not black, as such that it brings to mind so much the idea of white, that in comparison, the black hardly makes an impression, one would say that this color approaches white, and looks white.

So on the occasions where one does not speak with such a great meticulousness, as soon as it appears a little more true than false in places, one calls the thing verisimilar . But to be absolutely verisimilar, it must manifest itself and be detected in many more true places than false ones, without which the appearance remains indeterminate, not approaching more of one than the other. What I say of verisimilitude goes along with some probability; since the probability only falls on that which the spirit endorses, due to its similarity to the true, finding itself on the side that has the greater appearance of truth, rather than on the contrary side, assuming that it wants to be decided. I say, suppose that it does want to be decided , for the spirit is not necessarily carrying itself only to the true, as soon as it barely glimpses it in all of its day, it can suspend its decision; but assume that it does not suspend it, it would only know to lean more to the side that has the greater appearance of the true.

One could ask, if in an opinion, there could not be middle ground between the true and the [f]alse, that would be places about which the spirit would only know to think. Yet, in similar hypotheses, one must look at that which is middle ground between the truth and fallacy, as if it weren’t anything at all; since in fact it is incapable of making any impression on a reasonable spirit. On the very occasions where it would be found on one side or the other by reasons equal to being judged, the usage authorizes the word verisimilar ; but as this verisimilitude looks like as much of a lie as of what is a truth, I would better like to call it dubious rather than verisimilar .

The highest degree of verisimilitude is that which approaches physical certainty, that which could perhaps subsist by itself with some suspicion or possibility of falsehood. For example, I am certain that, physically, the sun will light tomorrow’s horizon; but this certainty assumes that things will remain in a natural order and that in this regard it would hardly be a miracle. Verisimilitude increases, so to say, and comes close to the true by so many degrees, that in the following circumstances it meets it in an even greater and more expressive manner.

1 ^st . When what we judge to be verisimilar corresponds with conspicuous truths.

2 ^nd . When having doubted an opinion, we come to conform to it, while we give it more reflection and examine it more closely.

3 ^rd . When experiences that we had not known of previously, intervene with those that had been the foundation of our opinion.

4 ^th . When we judge as a consequence of a much larger application than of the things that we are examining.

5 ^th . When the judgments that we had made on things of the same nature, were afterwards verified by each other.

That approximates the various character scenarios that, according to their reach or their considerable number, make our opinion seem more like the truth. If all these circumstances met each other in all of their reach, so that the opinion perfectly seemed to be the truth, it is of the sort that it would pass not only for verisimilitude but also for truth, or it would even, in fact, be it. Like the banner covered in white, not only would it seem like white, but again, it would be said to be absolutely white.

What we have come to observe about verisimilitude in general applies, like oneself to verisimilitude, to what is said to be taken from the authority and testimonial of mankind. Even though mankind in general can lie and we have even had the experience that they often lie, nevertheless nature having inspired in all humankind the love of the truth, the presumption is that what we are speaking of follows this inclination; when we have no reason to judge, or to suspect that it does not speak true.

The reasons that we could have, taken either from one’s person or from things that one says to us; from one’s person, with relation either to one’s spirit or to one’s will.

1 ^st . Regarding one’s spirit, if one is hardly capable of judging well what it brings back; 2 ^nd . if at other times it is scorned ; 3 ^rd . if it is of a shady or stimulated imagination: characteristic very common, even among spirited people, who take easily the shadow or the appearance of things for the things themselves; and the phantom that they create from the truth that they believe to discern.

Regarding the will; 1 ^st . if it is a man who makes a habit of speaking differently than how he thinks; 2 ^nd . if one felt that what eludes the man is not to speak the exact truth; 3 ^rd . if one perceives in the man some interest to conceal: one must then be more reserved in believing him.

Regarding the things that he says; 1 ^st . if they are not connected to each other and do not agree logically with each other; 2 ^nd . if they poorly match that which had been said by other persons just as deserving of faith; 3 ^rd . if they are by themselves difficult to believe, or are upon subjects about which he could have easily deceived himself.

These contrary circumstances make what is told to us verisimilar: to know, 1 ^st . when we know the one who speaks to us to be a just and upright spirit, of a disciplined imagination, and not at all of shady character, of a sincerity that is exact and consistent; 2 ^nd . When, moreover, the circumstances of things that he says hardly refute each other, but correspond with facts or principles that we cannot but doubt. As these same things are told by a greater number of persons, the verisimilitude will also increase; it could even, in the end, reach such a high degree that it will be impossible to suspend our judgment, seeing all the circumstances that look true. The last degree of verisimilitude is certainty, as its first degree is doubt; that is to say, where doubt ends, there begins verisimilitude , and where it ends, there begins certainty. Thus the two extremities of verisimilitude are doubt and certainty; verisimilitude occupies every interval that separates them, and this interval increases even more when it is gone over by spirits that are more perceptive and more penetrating. For mediocre or vulgar spirits, this space is always very narrow; they hardly know how to discern the nuances between the true and the verisimilar.

The most natural and most general usage of verisimilitude is to compensate for the true: such that there where our spirit knows not how to attain the true, it attains at least the verisimilar, to remain there as in the position closest to the true.

First, with regard to things of pure speculation, it is good to be reserved and not pass judgment about verisimilar things, except with the greatest care and attention: why? Because the appearance of the true so exists with a false appearance that can suspend our judgment to the point where will determines it. I say suspend it, for the false appearance does not have the power to determine the spirit of that which appears the least true. So in things of pure speculation, it is very well done not to judge except when the degrees of verisimilitude are considerable, and almost erase appearances of the false, as well as the danger of erring.

Indeed, in things of pure speculation, one does not encounter any inconvenience in not passing judgment when one runs some chance of erring. Why judge when on one hand, one can dispense of it, and on the other, judging involves the risk of giving oneself to the false? Then must one abstain from judging most things? Is it not the character of an idiot? Much the contrary, it is the character of a sensible spirit, of a true philosopher, only to judge objects with evidence, when no reason exists to have use of them otherwise. Yet there is no one to be found to judge in the things of pure speculation, when they are anything but verisimilar.

While so judicious in things of pure speculation, this rule is no longer the same for practical things and for conduct, where one must by necessity act or not act. Even though one should not take the true for the verisimilar, one nevertheless should determine it with relation to practical things, to be contented with it as true, not stopping the eyes of the spirit except upon the appearances of truth, that in the verisimilar surpasses the appearances of the false.

The reason for this is evident. With relation to the practical, one must act, and by consequence, to take a side: if one remained undecided about it, one would never act; it would be the most pernicious and most impertinent of all sides. So in order not to remain undecided, one must almost close one’s eyes to whatever could appear true in the contrary part to what one currently embraces. In truth, while deliberating, one can look too closely at the diverse sides or appearances of the true that meet each other from one side or the other, to be certain which side is verisimilar. But once assured, one must with relation to the practical, regard it as true and no longer lose this view: without which one would necessarily fall into inaction or into fickleness; smallness of character or feebleness of spirit.

In necessity, where one has to determine to act or not to act, indecisiveness is always a fault of spirit, who in the middle of diverse sides of the same object, does not discern which ones should take precedence over the others. Outside of this need, one could very well and often with greater wisdom, remain unspecified between two opinions that are nothing but verisimilar.