Virtue, Encyclopedic Order, Ethics, Political Science . One more surely knows virtue by feeling, than by misleading oneself with reasoning about its nature; if there existed on this earth one so unfortunate as to have never been touched by it, to have never felt the sweet pleasure of doing well, all our discourses on this topic would be as absurd and useless as giving a detailed description of a painting or the charms of a perspective to a blind man. Feeling can be known only by feeling; do you wish to know what humanity is? Close your books and imagine those who suffer: reader, whoever you may be, if you have felt the attractions of virtue , turn to your inner self, its definition is in your heart.

We will limit ourselves here to exposing some detached reflections, in the order in which they present themselves to our mind, less to thoroughly investigate such an interesting subject, than to give a slight idea of it.

The word virtue is an abstract word, offering at first to those who hear it nothing precise and determined; it designates in general all the duties of man, all that falls under the scope of morality; such a vague meaning leads to arbitrary judgments; thus most people understand virtue less in itself, than by the assumptions and feelings that affect them; what is certain is that the ideas one has of it depend greatly on the progress one has made in this domain; it is true that in general men would agree well enough as to what merits the name vice or virtue , if the boundaries that separated them were always very distinct; but the contrary is often the case: from which arises the terms false virtues , exaggerated virtues , brilliant , or solid virtues ; one person believes that virtue requires a particular sacrifice, another that it does not; Brutus, consul and father, should he have condemned his children when they rebelled against the nation? The question has not yet been unanimously decided; the duties of man in society are at times so complicated and intertwined that they do not appear in their true light; their virtues cease, cross each other, modify themselves; one must seize the golden mean beyond and below which they cease to exist, or lose more or less of their value; it is there that your tolerance must cease, or justice will be harmed; sometimes clemency is virtue , at others it is dangerous: from which arises the necessity of simple and generous principles that guide and enlighten us; above all one must judge actions by motives, if one wishes to evaluate them justly; the purer the intention, the more real the virtue . So enlighten your mind, listen to your reason, deliver yourself over to your conscience, to that sure and faithful moral instinct, and you will soon distinguish virtue , for it is only a great idea, or rather a great feeling. Our illusions in this regard are rarely involuntary, and ignorance of our duty is the least of the pretexts we may allege. The human heart, I admit, is prey to so many passions, our mind is so inconsistent, so mobile, that the clearest notions seem at times to become obscure; but it requires only a moment of calm for them to shine with all their brightness; when the passions have ceased roaring, our conscience may speak to us in an unmistakable tone; the people are often more advanced in this regard than are the philosophers, the moral instinct is purer in them, less altered; one transforms one's duties by reflecting on them, the systematizing mind is opposed to truth; and reason is crushed under the multitude of reasonings.

We are aware that the word virtue referred originally to force and courage ; it in fact applies only to those who, weak by nature, become strong through courage; to vanquish oneself, to subjugate one's desires to reason, that is the continual exercise of virtue : we say that God is good, not virtuous, because goodness is essential to his nature, and he is necessarily and effortlessly of supreme perfection. Furthermore, it is pointless to remark that the good, decent man and the virtuous man are two very different beings; the first is easy to find, the second a bit more rare; but in the end what is virtue ? In a word, it is the constant observation of the laws imposed on us, by whatever point of view man considers himself . Thus the generic word virtue comprises several species in itself, the details of which it is not for us to describe. See in this Dictionary the various articles on these topics, especially natural law, morality, and duty. Let us simply observe that however numerous the classification of these duties, all flow from the principle we have just established; virtue is singular, simple, and inalterable in its essence, it is the same in all eras, all climates, all governments; it is the Creator's law given to all men, speaking to all in the same language: do not seek for what constitutes virtue in positive laws, nor in human conventions; these laws are born, altered, and succeed each other, like those who make them; but virtue knows nothing of such variations, it is immutable like its Author. In vain do they point to some obscure peoples, whose barbarous and senseless customs seem to testify against us; in vain does the skeptic Montaigne gather examples from all parts of the world, strange opinions, to insinuate that conscience and virtue seem to be only prejudices that vary according to country; without refuting him in detail, we will say only that the usages he alleges may have been good when they began, and became corrupted later; how many institutions seem absurd to us, because we are ignorant of their origins? It is not upon such often truthful information that philosophical observers should found their judgments. Theft authorized by law had a goal and utility in Lacedemonia, and one would be wrong to conclude that it was a crime among the Spartans or that it was not elsewhere: whatever the case, it is certain that the disinterested man of any nation wants, essentially, what is good; he may be mistaken in the path he has chosen, but his reason at least is infallible, in that he never adopts bad because it is bad, vice because it is vicious, but rather the one and the other often clothed in the appearance of good or virtue . These savages for example, who kill their sick, who cut short the days of their fathers when they are infirm and languishing, do so only out of a humane principle badly understood, they act cruelly out of feelings of pity. However corrupt a man may be, he is never so hideous as to say intrepidly to himself:

No, vice in itself is odious to all men; the most resolute evildoer suffers in committing his offenses, and if he could achieve the same results without crime, there is no doubt that he would not hesitate to do so. I do not seek to justify the illusions and false notions that men create concerning virtue ; but I say that in spite of these missteps, and apparent contradictions, there are common principles that unite them all; that virtue is attractive and worthy of reward, that vice is odious and worthy of punishment, these are felt-truths to which all men subscribe of necessity. In vain do they cite philosophers, whole peoples, who reject almost all moral principles, what does one prove in this way, other than the abuse or neglect of reason, unless one denies these principles because they are not innate, or so imprinted on our minds, that it is impossible to ignore them, to imagine them in any other manner? Furthermore, these people who have had no conception of virtue , are as obscure as they are small in number, according to a very impartial author (Bayle), regulated mores are always preserved where people make use of their reason:

Let us borrow a moment the words of a modern author, whom it is not necessary to name:

Yet if virtue was so easy to recognize, from whence comes, one might say, these difficulties on certain moral issues? What work is required to fix the limits separating the just and the unjust, vice and virtue ! Consider the form of the justice that governs us, it is true testimony to our weakness, full as it is of contradictions and errors. 1. Self-interest, prejudices, passions, often throw a thick cloud over the clearest truths; but consider the man who is most unjust where his own interest is concerned; with what equity, what justice he decides, when the interest of another is at stake! Let us remove ourselves to the true point of view in order to discern objects; concentrate, let us not confound our point of view with the Creator's, and we will soon see the clouds dissipate, and the light burst forth from the heart of the shadows. 2. All the subtleties of the casuists, their vain distinctions, their false maxims, can do no more harm to the simplicity of virtue , than can all the excesses of idolatry to the simplicity of the eternal Being. 3. The difficulties of morality or of natural law, do not concern general principles, nor even their first consequences, but only certain distant consequences, of little interest in comparison to others; the nature of governments, the obscure points, the contradictions in positive law, often complicate questions that are clear in themselves; which demonstrates only that the weakness of men is always imprinted in their works. Finally, will the difficulty of resolving moral questions suffice to shake the certainty of the most immediate principles and consequences? One distorts evident maxims, and most of all distorts feeling, when one laboriously pours on objections and difficulties; the very impossibility of resolving them would in the end prove only the limitations of our own intelligence. So many demonstrated facts in the natural sciences, against which they form unsolvable difficulties!

One might make a more serious objection; it is, they say, only because virtue is profitable, that it is so universally admired: eh! would that not itself prove that we are made for it? Since the author of our being, who no doubt wants to make us happy, put such an evident and intimate bond between happiness and virtue , is that not the strongest proof that the latter is in nature, that it is an essential component of our constitution? But whatever the advantages that come with it, they are not however the only cause of the admiration we have for it; is it believable, indeed, that so many people of all ages and all places, came together to give it the homage that it merits, from entirely selfish motives, in such a way that they believed themselves in the right in doing wrong, as soon as they were able to do so without danger? Is it not closer to the truth to say that, independently of any immediate advantage, there is in virtue a certain indefinable greatness, worthy of man, that makes itself felt all the more when one meditates profoundly on this subject? Duty and utility are two very distinct ideas to anyone who reflects on them, and indeed natural feeling alone suffices to distinguish them; when Themistocles announced to his fellow citizens that the project he had conceived would make all of Greece instantly subservient to them, we know that the order was given to him to communicate it to Aristides, whose wisdom and virtue were recognized; when the latter declared to the people, that the project in question was truly useful, but also extremely unjust, in an instant the Athenians, who at the time spoke for humanity, forbid Themistocles to go further; such is the empire of virtue , an entire people together rejecting without further study an infinite advantage, for the sole reason that they could not attain it without injustice. Let them thus not say that virtue is only attractive to the extent that it satisfies our current interests, for it is only too true that it is often in this world opposed to our interest, and that while adroit vice flourishes and prospers, simple virtue succumbs and moans; and yet, does it become less attractive by this? Does it not seem to the contrary, that it is most beautiful, most touching, in its reversals and perils? Far from losing any of its glory, never does it shine with a purer brilliance than in storms and under a cloud; oh, who can resist the ascendancy of distressed virtue ? What ferocious heart is not softened by the sighs of a good man? Does crime triumphant make as much an impression on us; yes, I dare you, man of sincerity, to say, in all the integrity of your heart, if you do not see with more enthusiasm and veneration Regulus returning to Carthage, than Sylla banished from his homeland; Cato crying over his fellow citizens, than Cesar triumphant in Rome; Aristides praying to the gods for the ungrateful Athenians, than the proud Coriolanus insensible to the cries of his compatriots? What benefit other than that of virtue inspires veneration in me at the death of Socrates, what interest inspires me other than that of virtue ? What good comes to me, from Cato's heroism or the goodness of Titus? Or what do I have to fear from the attacks of Catiline, from the barbarism of Nero? and yet I detest the latter two, while I admire the former, I feel my inflamed soul reach out, grow, elevate with them. Reader, I call upon you, on what you feel when, upon opening the splendors of history, you see pass before you the good and the bad; have you ever envied the apparent happiness of the guilty, or has their triumph not rather excited your indignation? In the various personages whose place our imagination would have us take, would you not prefer to die a thousand times, like Germanicus, regretted by the entire Empire, rather than rule over the universe like his murderer? We go further still (does the human mind ever stop?)

Response. One sees that the dark system of Hobbes and his supporters goes so far as to overthrow all the moral principles on which are based, as if on an unshakable foundation, the entire edifice of society; but is it not also absurd to put forward that there are no natural laws anterior to positive laws, to claim that truth derives from the caprice of men, and not from the very essences of being, that before anyone drew a circle, all its radii were not equal? Far from positive law having given being to virtue , it is only itself the more or less direct application of reason or of natural law, to those diverse circumstances in which man finds himself in society: the duties of the good citizen thus existed before there was a city, they were latent in the heart of man, they did nothing more than develop. Gratitude was a virtue before there were generous men, before there were any laws, feeling inspired it in any man who received the help of another; let us transport ourselves to the side of those savages closest to the state of nature and of independence, whom no commerce, no society link together, imagine one of them whom another has just saved from a ferocious beast about to devour him; would you say that the first is insensible to this good deed, that he regards his liberator with indifference, that he could offend him with no remorse? Whoever could affirm such a thing would be worthy of the act. It is proven that pity is natural to man, for animals themselves seem to give signs of it; and this feeling in itself is the source of almost all social virtues , for it is nothing other than our identification with those like us, and virtue consists above all of repressing base interests and putting oneself in the place of others.

It is thus true that we have within ourselves the principle of all virtue , and that this principle was the point of departure for all legislators who wished to establish a lasting system. What force indeed would remain in their laws, if you suppose that conscience, awareness of justice and injustice, are only pious chimera, with no efficacy other than the will of the sovereign? See what absurdities must be accepted in such suppositions; it would follow that kings, who are all in the state of nature, and superior to civil laws, are incapable of committing injustices, and that notions of justice and injustice are in a continual flux like the caprices of princes, and that once the state is dissolved, these notions are buried in its ruins. Virtue did not exist before the establishment of societies; but how would they have been formed, maintained, if the saintly law of nature had not presided, like a happy genie, over their creation and their maintenance, if justice had not covered the nascent state with its shadow? By what singular accord are almost all civil laws founded on this justice, and work to enchain those passions that lead us astray, if these laws, in order to attain their goal, had not, again, followed these natural principles that, whatever they say, existed before them?

To refute this statement, let us try in a few words to show the insufficiency of laws to render society happy, or, what is the same thing, to prove that virtue is equally essential to states and to individuals; you will pardon us this digression, if it be one; it is at least not foreign to our subject. Far from laws sufficing without mores and virtue , it is from them, to the contrary, that they take their force and all their power. A people with mores, would survive without laws, better than a people without mores but with the most admirable laws; virtue would provide for everything; but nothing may replace it: it is not the man who must be enchained, it is his will; one does well only that which one does willingly; one obeys laws only if one loves them; the forced obedience of bad citizens, far from being adequate, as it is in your principles, is the greatest vice of the state; when one is just only because of laws, one is not just even with them: if you would give to laws an empire as respectable as it is sure, make them reign over hearts, or, what is the same thing, make individuals virtuous. One may say with Plato that an individual represents the state, as the state each of its members; now, it would be absurd to say that what makes for the perfection and happiness of man, is useless to the state, for the latter is nothing other than the collection of its citizens, and it is impossible for there to be in the whole an order and harmony that is not in the parts that compose it. Do not thus imagine that laws may have a force other than from the virtue of those who are subject to them; they may well exclude certain guilty parties, prevent some crimes by terror of the punishments, remedy with violence some present evils; they may well maintain for a time the same form and the same government; an assembled machine still works, despite the disorder and the imperfection of its parts; but this precarious existence will have more shine than solidity; the interior vice will extrude everywhere; the laws will thunder in vain; all is lost. Quid vanoe proficiunt leges sine moribus? When once the public good is no longer that of individuals, when there is no longer a homeland and citizens, but only men together who seek only to hurt each other, when there is no longer love of moderation, temperance, frugality, in a word, when there is no longer any virtue , then the best laws are powerless against general corruption; there remains in them only a nullified and non-reactive force; they are violated by some, eluded by others; in vain will you multiply them; their number proves only their powerlessness: it is the masses who must be purified: it is mores that must be reestablished; they alone cause us to love and respect laws: they alone make all individual wills work together for the genuine good of the state: it is the mores of citizens that reestablish and vivify the state, more by inspiring love than by your fear of laws. It was by mores that Athens, Rome, Lacedemonia astonished the universe, these prodigies of virtue that we admire without feeling them; if is true that we admire them still, these prodigies were the work of mores; see as well, I ask you, what zeal, what patriotism inflamed individuals; each member of the homeland carried it in his heart; see what veneration the senators and simple citizens of Rome inspired in the ambassador from Epirus, with what eagerness other peoples came to render homage to Roman virtue , and submit themselves to its laws. Illustrious shades of Camillus and Fabricius, I call for your testimony; tell us by what happy art you made Rome mistress of the world and made it flourishing for centuries; was it only by terror of law, or by the virtue of your fellow citizens? Illustrious Cincinnatus, fly again triumphantly to your rustic foyers, be the example of your country and strike fear in you enemies; leave gold to the Samnites, and keep virtue for yourself. O Rome! As long as your dictators demand as the fruit of their labors only agricultural goods, you will reign over the entire universe. I stray; perhaps one's head turns in the higher regions. Let us conclude that virtue is equally essential to politics and to morality, that the most dangerous system one can establish makes all sense of justice and injustice dependent upon laws, for finally, if you remove the brake of conscience and religion to establish only the right of force, you sap the state of its foundations, you allow free entry to all disorders, you marvelously favorize all methods of eluding the law and of being unjust, without running afoul of them; for a state is close to its ruin when the individuals who compose it fear only the rigor of laws.

There remains a moral problem for us to resolve: atheists, one asks, may they posses virtue , or, what amounts to the same thing, may virtue exist when there is no principle of religion?

One has answered this question with another: may a Christian be vicious? But we must give some clarity to this subject: let us summarize.

I first observe that the number of true atheists is not as large as is believed; all the universe, all that exists, testifies so strongly in this regard, that it is unbelievable that someone could adopt a considered and sustained atheistic system, and regard his principles as evident and demonstrated; but if one accepts this sad supposition, one asks whether an Epicurus, a Lucretius, a Vaninus, a Spinoza is able to be virtuous; I respond that to speak with metaphysical rigor, such men can only be unjust; for, I ask you, what somewhat solid foundation would there be to the virtue of a man who misjudges and violates the first of his duties, his dependence on his creator, his gratitude toward him? How will he be docile to the voice of conscience, which he regards as a false instinct, as the work of works, of education; if some criminal passion took hold of his soul, what counterargument could we offer, if he believes that he may satisfy this passion with no punishment and in secret? Purely human considerations will hold him to order and good behavior in a very exterior manner; but if this motivation is lacking, and a pressing interest should push him toward evil; in truth, if he is logical, I do not see what could stop him.

An atheist might well possess certain virtues relative to his well-being; he will be temperate, for example, will avoid excesses that might harm him; he will not offend others out of fear of reprisals; he will possess outwardly those feelings and virtues that make one liked and considered in society; all that is required is a well understood love of self. Epicurus and Spinoza were, so they say, irreproachable in their outward conduct; but, once again, as soon as virtue requires sacrifices, and secret sacrifices, do we not know that there are few atheists who will not succumb? Alas! If the most religious man, the man most penetrated with the important idea of the supreme Being, the most convinced of having his creator as a witness to his actions, as his judge; if, I say, such a man still resists such incentives so often, if he gives in so easily to the passions that draw him, could one hope to persuade us that an atheist would be yet more scrupulous? I know that men, too accustomed to think in one way, and to act in another, must not be judged so rigorously according to the maxims they profess; it may be that there are some whose belief in God is highly suspect, and who however are not without virtue ; I even agree that their hearts might be sensible to humanity, to doing good, that they love the public good, and would like to see men happy; what are we to conclude from that? That their hearts are more worthy than their minds; for natural principles, stronger than their lying principles, dominate them without their knowledge; conscience, the feeling that presses them, makes them act in spite of themselves, and stops them from going where their dark system leads them.

This question, rather simple in itself, has become so delicate, has been so complicated by the sophistry and false reasonings of Bayle, that to discuss it fully would require going beyond the limits prescribed to us. See in this Dictionary the word Atheists, and Warburton's work on the union of morality, religion, and politics, of which we here give a short summary.

Bayle affirms that atheists may know the difference between moral good and evil, and act consequently. There are three principles of virtue , 1. the conscience; 2. the specific difference between human actions that reason makes known to us; and 3. God's will. It is this last principle that gives to moral principles the character of duty, of strict and positive obligation, from which it results that an atheist is incapable of having a complete knowledge of moral good and evil, for this knowledge is posterior to a legislating God, and from which it results that conscience and reason, two principles of which the atheist is incapable, do not work in Bayle's favor, because they do not suffice to make an atheist virtuous, as is of essential interest to society. One can in fact know the difference between moral good and evil, without this knowledge having a determining influence on one's decisions; for the idea of obligation necessarily supposes a being who obliges, and what would this being be for an atheist?

Reason; but reason is an attribute of the obligated person, and one cannot enter into a contract with oneself. Reason in general; but this general reason is only an abstract and arbitrary idea, how do you consult it, where does one find the depository of its oracles, it has no real existence, and how can that which does not exist obligate that which exists? The idea of morality, to be complete, thus necessarily contains the ideas of obligation, of legislator and of judge. It is evident that the knowledge and the feeling of the morality of actions does not suffice, as it needs to, especially to bring the multitude to virtue ; moral feeling is often too weak, too delicate; so many passions, prejudices conspire to enervate it, to intercept its impressions, that it is easy to fool oneself in this respect; reason itself does not yet suffice; for one can recognize that virtue is the sovereign good, without being moved to practice it; one must make a personal application, imagine it as an essential part of one's happiness; and above all if some active and present interest solicits us against it, one sees then how important the belief in a legislating and judging God becomes, to strengthen us against obstacles. The desire for glory, for the approbation of men holds back, you say, an atheist; but is it not as easy, to say nothing else, to acquire this glory and this approbation by a well-managed and sustained hypocrisy, as by a solid and constant virtue ? Would not ingenious and prudent vice have the advantage over a virtue that must walk a narrow path, that it could not leave without ceasing to be; an atheist convinced that he could be admired at less cost, content to manage his exterior actions, will give way in secret to his favorite penchants, will reward himself in the shadows for the constraint that he imposes on himself in public, and his theatrical virtues will die in solitude.

Let them not say to us that principles are meaningless, provided that one conducts oneself well, for it is manifest that bad principles lead sooner or later to evil; we have already remarked that false maxims are more dangerous than bad actions, because they corrupt reason itself, and leave no hope of return.

The most odious systems are not always the most harmful, one lets oneself be all the more easily seduced when evil is colored with the appearance of good; if it appears as it is, it revolts us, it makes us indignant, and its remedy is in its very atrocity; the evildoers would be more dangerous, if they threw a veil of hypocrisy on their deformity; bad principles would be less widespread, if they did not present themselves under the false attraction of particular excellence, of apparent sublimity. We must hope that decided atheism will not have many converts; it is all the more to be feared in that we let ourselves be impressed by the brilliant, but false ideas that certain philosophers give us of virtue , and that result in the end in a more refined, more specious atheism:

Projicit ampullas & sesquipedalia verba [he throws aside the paint-pots and words a foot and a half long [2]]. All of that is and is not. We have already said, like thousands before us, that virtue in itself is worthy of the admiration and love of all thinking beings, but we must explain ourselves; we have not wanted to keep from it the rewards that it merits, nor to remove from men other motives for attaching themselves to it; let us fear falling into the trap of a lying philosophy, of adhering too closely to our own system, of being more wise than necessary. These maxims that are spread in front of us with pomp are all the more dangerous the more subtly they take self-love by surprise, one in fact applauds oneself for loving virtue only for itself; one would blush to have hope or fear among the motives for one's actions, to do good for these reasons, to have a rewarding God present in one's mind, when one practices goodness and humanity, one finds in them something of a rather indelicate self-interest; it is thus that one embraces the abstract phantom that one has forged, it is thus that one denatures oneself by making oneself divine.

I suppose first of all, gratuitously perhaps, that some distinguished philosophers, a Socrates, a Plato, for example, might by profound meditation elevate themselves to these great principles, and above all conform their lives to them, that they are not animated by anything other than the pure desire to order themselves as well as possible, relative to all other beings, and to conspire for their part to that moral harmony that enchants them; I will applaud, if you wish, those noble mistakes, those generous deliriums, and I will not disavow Socrates' disciple, when he cries out that virtue visible and personified would excite all men to transports of love and admiration; but all men are not Socrates and Plato, and nevertheless, it is important to make them all virtuous; now, it is not by abstract and metaphysical ideas that they govern themselves, all these beautiful systems are unknown and inaccessible to most men, and if the only good men were those produced by them, there would assuredly be less virtue on earth. It is not necessary to have made a profound study of the human heart to know that hope and fear are the most powerful of motives, the most active, the most universal of sentiments, they absorb all others; even self-love, or the desire for happiness. The fear of pain is thus as essential to all reasonable beings as is extension to matter; for, I ask you, what other motive would make them act? By what motor would it move? How could someone be moved by another, who is not moved by himself?

But if it is true that interest, understood positively, must be the principle behind our choices, the idea of a rewarding God is then absolutely necessary in order to give a base to virtue , and to engage men in practicing it. To remove this notion is to throw oneself, as we have said, into a sort of atheism, that is no less dangerous for being less direct. To affirm that God, the most just and holiest of all beings, is indifferent about the conduct and the fate of his creatures; that he views equally the just and the unjust, is that any less than to destroy him, at least with regard to ourselves; to break off all relations with him? It is to accept the god of Epicurus, it is to accept none at all.

If virtue and goodness were always inseparable on this earth, we would have a more specious pretext for denying the necessity of another economy, of an ulterior compensation, and the system that we are combating would offer fewer absurdities; but the contrary is all too well demonstrated. How many times has virtue groaned in opprobrium and suffering! So many battles to fight! So many sacrifices to make! So many tests to undergo, while adroit vice obtains the prizes due it, while widening its domain, while seeking out all its present and particular advantage! Conscience, you say, one's belief in one's own goodness. Let us not exaggerate things, in similar circumstances the just is less happy, or more to be pitied, than the unjust; conscience tilts the scales in his favor; if he suffers affliction, it soon tempers his bitterness. But in the end it does not make him insensible, it does not stop him from being in fact unhappy; it does not thus suffice to repay him, he has the right to claim something more, virtue has not done all it should for him; one would fight in vain against feeling, pain is always an evil, the cup of ignominy is always bitter, and the pompous dogmas of the skeptics, renewed in part by some moderns, are at heart only striking absurdities. This man is tyrannized by a violent passion, his present happiness depends upon it; in vain does reason fight, its feeble voice is stifled by the explosions of passion. According to your principles, by what yet more powerful brake could you repress it? The unhappy individual, tempted to quit his misery by some guilty, yet sure method; seduced, led astray by delicate temptations, will he really be held back by the fear of troubling some sort of general harmony, of which he has really no idea? So many opportunities in society to make oneself happy at the expense of others, to sacrifice one's duties to one's tastes, without exposing oneself to any danger, without losing even the esteem and goodwill of one's fellow men, whose own profit from such indulgence is easy to perceive! Tell us, then, philosophers, how will you maintain man on such a slippery path? Alas! Do we have so many motives for being virtuous, that you would take from us the most powerful and the sweetest? See furthermore how illogical you are, you claim to make us insensible to our own gain, you require that we follow virtue with no return for ourselves, no hope of reward, and after having taken from us in this way all personal feeling, you wish us to base our actions on the maintenance of a certain moral order, a universal harmony that is assuredly more removed from us than ourselves? For finally, great words do not always communicate just and precise ideas to us. If virtue is lovable, it is no doubt because it works for our happiness, because our perfection is inseparable from it; without that, I do not see how we could be moved to love it, to cultivate it. Of what importance to me is this sterile order? Of what importance to me is virtue itself, if neither contributes to my happiness? Love of order, in the end, is only an expression devoid of meaning, if it is not comprehensible according to our principles; virtue is merely a meaningless word, if sooner or later it does not complete our happiness: such is the sanction of moral laws, they are nothing without that. Why do you say that the unjust, the Neros and Caligulas, are destroyers of order? They follow it in their way. If this life is the limit of our hopes, all the difference between the just and the unjust is that the latter, as they say, orders everything with regard to himself; while the other orders himself relative to the whole. But what merit is there in loving virtue only for the good one hopes to gain from it? The rare merit of recognizing one's true interests, of sacrificing without regret all desires that are contrary to them, of fulfilling the career that the creator prescribed for us, of immolating, if necessary, one's life to one's duties. Does it then mean nothing to realize the imaginary justice that Plato offers us as a model, and whose virtue he shows crowned in another life? Is it thus necessary, in order to be virtuous, to require such a contradictory sacrifice as you require, that would be that of everyone; our present advantages, our life even, if we were not inflamed by any desire for reward? Thus men of all places and all times, have agreed on this subject; even in the shadows of idol worship, we see this truth shine, that reason more than politics caused to be accepted. Be just and you will be happy: do not hurry to accuse virtue , to calumniate its author; your efforts that you thought lost, will receive their reward, and you will be reborn: virtue has not lied to you.

Distinguish carefully, then, between two types of interest, one low and misperceived, which reason reproves and condemns; the other noble and prudent, which reason acknowledges and commands. The first, always too active, is the source of all our errors; the other could not be too lively, it is the source of all that is beautiful, honest, and glorious. Do not fear to dishonor yourself by desiring your happiness with too much enthusiasm; but know how to recognize it: that is a summary of virtue . No, God of my heart, I will not believe that I lower myself by putting my confidence in you; in my efforts to please you, I will not blush to seek that prize of immortal glory that you deign to propose to us; far from degrading me, such a noble interest inflames me and increases me in my own eyes; my feelings, my affections seem to me to respond to the sublimity of my hopes; my enthusiasm for virtue become all the more vehement; I honor myself, I applaud the sacrifices that I make for it, although certain that one day it will repay me. O virtue , you are no longer only a vain word, you produce the essential happiness of those who love you; all there is of felicity, of perfection and of glory is included in your nature, in you is found the fullness of being. What does it matter that your triumph is delayed on earth, this age is not worthy of you; eternity belongs to you as it does to its creator. That is the reason I embrace the most consoling, the truest system, the most worthy of its creator and his work; that is the reason that I dare to call myself Christian even in this century, and the folly of the gospel will be more precious to me, than all human wisdom.

After insisting on this last observation, which seemed very important to us, let us return a moment again to a general treatment of our subject. 1. The most solid virtues often shine in obscurity, and innocence lives less commonly in high places than under thatched roofs; it is in these small huts that you view with disdain that common souls exercise the most painful duties with as much simplicity as grandeur; that is where you will find with astonishment the most beautiful models for the recognition of virtue ; you must descend rather than ascend, but for the most part we are possessed of such imbecilic vision that we see heroism only when it is gilded.

2. We have said it already, virtue is only a great feeling that must fill all our soul, dominate our affections, our movements, our being. One is not worthy of the name virtuous when one possesses only this or that easy virtue that has its source in nature rather than reason, and that furthermore does not restrain our secret penchants. The virtues are sisters; to reject one voluntarily is essentially to reject them all, is to prove that our love for them is conditional and subordinate, that we are too weak to make sacrifices to them; one might say that it is precisely the virtue that we neglect that would give us all our glory, that would honor us the most in our own eyes, that would merit us the title of virtuous , of which we are unworthy in spite of exercising all the other virtues .

3. Aspire, then, without reserve, to all that is honest; let your progress, if possible, extend to all areas; do not resign yourself to virtue ; follow nature in its works, they are all well-proportioned in their latent state, nature only develops them; you yourself should neglect nothing that might put in you the happy seed of virtue , so that your existence may be nothing other than a continual development.

4. Instead of charging your children with a multitude of arbitrary and picayune duties, instead of tiring them with trivial maxims, form them for virtue ; they will always be polite enough, if they are humane; noble enough, if they are virtuous; rich enough, if they have learned to moderate their desires.

5. Show-off virtue , which only throws off passing sparks, which seeks the light, acclamation, which burns for only an instant, blindingly, and then goes out, is not the virtue one should admire. True virtue sustains itself with dignity in the most retired life, in the simplest of details, as in the most eminent posts; it disdains no duty, no obligation, however slight it might appear; it fulfills everything with exactitude, nothing is small in its eyes. They say that heroes are not heroic to those who live with them, if they were truly heroic, they would be safe from this reproach.

6. Virtue is only a happy habit that one must contract, as any other, by repeated acts. The pleasure of having done well increases and fortifies in us the desire to do well; the sight of our good actions inflames our courage, they are so many engagements contracted with ourselves, with our fellows, and one sees here more than ever the truth of the maxim that one must advance unceasingly or one goes backward .

7. Virtue has its hypocrites, as does religion, learn to mistrust them; above all, be sincere with yourself, indulgent with others, and severe with yourself. The most beautiful of qualities is the knowledge of those we lack; people will often admire you for that which is shameful to you, in private, while they may reproach you for the source of your glory. Without disdaining the approval of others, do not measure yourself by it; your conscience is the only competent judge, it is before its interior tribunal that you must be absolved or condemned.

8. Do not trouble the moral order that must reign over your virtues .

The general good is a fixed point that one appreciates fully only by quitting it: one can be a good soldier, a good priest, and a bad citizen. Some particular virtues when concentrated in a body become crimes against the country: thieves, for being just to one another, are they any the less thieves? Consult, thus, before all things, the general will, the greatest good of humanity; the closer you approach it, the more sublime will be your virtue , and vice versa, etc.

Finally, O you, who aspire to do well, who dare to pretend to virtue , cultivate avidly those respectable men who walk before you in this brilliant career; young painters thrill and tremble with admiration before the masterpieces of the Raphaels and the Michelangelos; before the models that history or society present to you, you will similarly feel your heart soften and burn with the desire to imitate them.

Let us end this article, too long for what it is, but too short judged by what it should be. See Vice.

Notes

1. The author Romilly finds it unnecessary to name is Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The passage comes from Emile, ou de l’Education (1762), book 4. An English translation is available online: Rousseau, Emile (1911 translation).

2. [Translation from the Latin courtesy of Ruth Scodel.]