Nobility. One might consider nobility , as does Chancellor Bacon, in two different ways, either as constituting part of a state, or as constituting the condition of individuals.

As part of a state, all monarchy that does not possess nobility is pure tyranny: nobility enters in some manner into the essence of monarchy, the fundamental maxim of which is, no nobility , no monarch ; but one has a despot, as in Turkey.

Nobility tempers sovereignty, and by its own splendor accustoms the people to fix their eyes on and withstand the brilliance of royalty without being afraid. A great and powerful nobility adds to a prince's splendor, although it diminishes his power when it is itself too powerful. It is good for the prince and for justice that nobility not be too strong, and that it conserve at the same time enough estimable grandeur to repress popular insolence and to prevent it from attacking the majesty of the throne. In a monarchical state, the most natural subordinate intermediary power, is that of the nobility ; abolish its prerogatives, and you will soon have a popular state, or a despotic state.

Honor governs nobility , by prescribing to it obedience to the will of the prince; but this honor dictates at the same time that the prince never command it to commit a dishonorable act. Nothing is prescribed more strongly to the nobility than serving the prince during wartime: that is the distinguished profession fitting to the nobility , for its hazards, its successes and even its misfortunes lead to greatness.

It is thus necessary that in a monarchy laws work to support the nobility and to make it hereditary, not in order to be the line between the prince and the people, but to be the link between the two. The prerogatives accorded to nobility will belong to it alone under a monarchy, and will not pass to the people, if one does not wish to violate the principle of government, if one does not wish to diminish the power of the nobility and that of the people. However a too-numerous nobility ordinarily weakens a monarchical state; for in addition to being overly costly, it happens that most of the nobles will become poor over time, creating a kind of disproportion between honors and means.

The nobles in an aristocracy tend to enjoy limitless authority; that is why if nobles exist in great number, one needs a senate to regulate those affairs that the body of nobles is unable to decide, and to prepare those that it will decide. It is as easy for a body of nobles to control other aristocrats as it is difficult for this body to curb its own self: such is the nature of this constitution, that it seems to place the same people under the governance of laws and then to remove them. Now such a body can restrict itself only in two ways, either by great virtue, which makes the nobles in a sense equal to their people, and may result in a sort of republic; or by a lesser virtue, that is a certain moderation that renders nobles at least equal to themselves, that preserves them.

Both the extreme poverty of nobles and their exorbitant wealth are pernicious to aristocracy. To prevent their poverty, one must above all require them early on to pay their debts. To moderate their wealth requires wise and painless regulations, not confiscations, nor agrarian laws, nor abolition of debt, which create infinite evils.

In an aristocracy, the law must remove primogeniture from among nobles , as established in Venice, so that by the continual division of inheritances, fortunes may always remain equal. There must be consequently no substitutions, no replacements, no transmissions, no adoptions: in a word, all the methods invented to support the nobility in monarchical states, tend to establish tyranny within the aristocracy.

When laws have equalized families, they will still need to maintain union among them. Disputes among nobles must be promptly settled, or altercations between individuals become altercations between families. Arbiters could put an end to trials or prevent them from developing.

Finally laws must not favor the distinctions that vanity places between families, on the vain pretext that they are more noble and older; that should left to the pettiness of individuals.

Democracies have no need for nobility , they are even more peaceful when there are no noble families; for then one considers the thing proposed and not the individual proposing it; or when it happens that the individual is taken into account, it is only to the extent that he might be useful to the business at hand, and not because of his coat of arms and genealogy. The Swiss republic, for example, maintains itself very well despite the diversity of its religions and cantons, because utility and not respect hold it together. The government of the United Provinces possesses the advantage that equality among persons produces equality in the counsels, and thus taxes and contributions are paid with a better will.

With regard to the nobility of individuals, one has a sort of respect for an old castle or for a building that has stood the test of time, or even for a tall and beautiful tree that is fresh and whole in spite of its age. How much more respect should one have for a noble and ancient family that has sustained itself despite the ravages of time? New nobility is the work of princely power, but ancient nobility is the work of time alone: the first inspires more talent, the second more transcendent grandeur.

Those who are first raised to nobility ordinarily have more genius but less innocence than their descendants. The route to honor is crossed by torturous paths that one often follows rather than taking the straight road.

Noble birth commonly stifles industry and emulation. Nobles do not have as far to go as do others in order to reach the highest levels; and he who is stopped while others rise ordinarily experiences feelings of envy. But since the nobility alone possesses the right to receive honors, this possession stifles the envy that would be felt if these honors were newly bestowed. Kings able to choose prudent and capable individuals from among their nobility find that doing so advantageously facilitates the task: the people obey them naturally, as men who are born to command. See Birth.