Reginald Pecock's Book of faith; a fifteenth century theological tractate, ed. from the ms. in the library of Trinity college, Cambridge, with an introductory essay by J. L. Morison, M. A. ...

CHAPTER III

FADIR, if al this be trewe which ȝe han tauȝt sithen y spake bifore last to ȝou, it seemeth therof to folowe that the mo and the strenger evydencis accordyng to gendre eny certeyn opinial [folio 22a] feith upon eny certeyn article a man have, the bettir is thilke feith, and the more perfit is thilk feith, and the strenger is thilk feith, and the more perfit is thilk feith in his kinde of feith. Forwhi, the strenger the substancial causis of eny effect ben, the strenger the same effect is, and sithen the likli evydencis, schewing that an article is affermed bi God, ben causis of the opinial feith to be had upon the same article or conclusioun, it folowith nedis, that the mo and the more likli tho evydencis ben had for an opinial feith, the more is thilk opinial feith, and the perfiter, and the strenger in his kinde of opinial feith. And bi lijk skile, sithen the cleer sure expert evydencis, schewing that an article is affermed of God, ben causis of the sciencial feith to be had upon the same article, it folowith nedis in lijk skile that the mo, and the more cleer,

sure, and expert evydencis ben had for a sciencial [folio 22b] feith, the more is thilke sciencial feith, and the perfiter and the strenger in his kinde of sciencial feith. Of whiche now spokun ii spicis of feith, that is to seie, opinial feith and sciencial feith, y have maad declaracioun, ground [MS. gorund.] and proof in the first party of The folower to the Donet, the ch., and in the first party of The book of feith in latyn. [There is an erasure in the MS. with the title substituted on the margin, but half pared away.]

Forsothe, sone, y can not seie nay, ne y trowe no man alyve, to this that thou hast now dryve and proved, and that for so opene proof which thou hast therto now maad. Nevertheles, therto in wey of confeermyng these to be rehercid evydencis. [The sentence terminates so in the MS.] Opinial feith is not but a certeyn spice of general opinioun, and sciencial feith is not but a spice of general science, as is open bi what is tauȝt in the places now alleggid. Wherfore, sithen every opinioun which is not feith, is maad the strenger and the perfiter in his kinde, bi that that the mo, and the perfiter, and the strenger evydencis perteynyng to his kinde ben had, as no wys clerk [folio 23a] wole seie nay, it folowith bi lijk skile that every opinioun which is feith, is maad the strenger and the perfiter in his kinde, bi that the mo and the

perfiter and strenger evydencis, perteynyng forto gendre an opinial feith, ben. In lijk maner, sithen sciencial feith is not but a spice of general science, it foloweth that as every science which is not feith is maad the strenger, and the perfiter in his kinde, bi that that the mo, and the perfiter, and the strenger evydencis perteynyng to his kinde ben had, as no wise clerk wole seie nay; so every science which is feith, is maad the strenger and the perfiter in his kinde, bi that that the mo, and the perfiter, and the strenger evydencis perteyning to gendre a sciencial feith ben had. And so, sone, bothe for the evydencis which thou thi silf brouȝtist forth, and for the evydencis which y have now brouȝt forth, y graunte al that thou hast now last concludid.

Fadir, if this be trewe which is of ȝou grauntid, thanne foloweth ferther this, that the geting and the havyng of the mo, and of the more evydencis bi which opinial feith is gendreable, lettith not the merit of a man to have thilk opinial feith, but encresith the merit of thilk man, and in lijk maner the geting and the having of the mo and of the more evydencis, bi which sciencial feith is gendreable, lettith not the merit of the man to have thilk sciencial feith, but encreesith it. For|whi, [folio 23b] for eny feith, in that that it is feith chosen bi the wil, a man hath merit and in this undirstonding

feith is meritorie, as at the ferthest it is able to be acceptid of God, wherfore what ever thing is helpen to cause eny maner of feith in his kinde of feith, and strengthen thilk maner of feith in kynde of feith, thei letten not the merit to be had for thilk feith, neither the merit of thilk feith; but thei encresen the merit of the man and of thilk feith, folowingli upon that that thei encreesen thilk feith. Forwhi, what ever things founden, gendren, and encresen the grounde, encreesen what thing growith out of the same ground, bi strengthe and vertu of the same ground. But so it is that evydencis, longing to gendre opinial feith, causen, gendren, and holden, and encresen opinial feith, and encresen the willing to have thilk opinial feith. And evydencis longing to gendre sciencial feith, causen, gendren, holden, and encreesen sciencial feith, and encresen the willing to have thilk [folio 24a] sciencial feith, wherfore the same evydencis causen, gendren, holden, and encresen the merit of the same willing, and of the same feith which willing and feith thei so causen, gendren, and encreesen.

Sone, y may not seie nay herto, neither y wote who may seie nay therto bi his avisid resoun, and therfore y graunte wel al that thou hast now proved and concludid.

Fadir, thanne ferther thus. If the mo and the more evydencis a man hath, making for an

opinial feith, the more is his mede, and a man schulde rather desire and seche aftir to have the more mede than the lasse mede, so that he lese not therbi so myche or more in an other party of his conversacioun, it folowith herof that a man schulde labore aftir to have manye evydencis to eche article of the feith, rather than to stoond to oon or tweyne evydencis oonli: so that he therbi be not lettid fro an other more good, to be gete and doon in the meene while, and so that he holde himsilf redi to bileeve the same [folio 24b] article, as soone as he hath eny oon evydence, sufficient to putte him into feith, thouȝ he schulde have no mo. For ellis y can not wite but that he laborid in obstinacie, and also in presumpcioun, as dide Thomas the apostle in the day of Cristis resurrecioun, unto tyme that Crist had weel re|dressid his obstynacie and his presumpcioun, into sobirnes and sadnes.

Sone, al this now bi thee rehercid and concludid y graunte, and y allowe and confeerme, as thouȝ y hadde seid it to thee bi myn owne mouth. But ȝitt withal, this, what is seid of thee and of me, thou schalt undirstonde accordingli to it what thou maist fynde in The folower to the Donet, that no dede of feith, or of opinioun, or of kunnyng, or eny other dede dyvers fro dede of the fre wil, is morali vertuose or viciose,

meritori or demeritori, but for as moche as the dede of the wil, which commandeth the other seid dede to be had, is morali vertuose or viciose, meritorie or demeritorie, so that the moral goodnes [folio 25a] or baddenes, merite or demerite in the dede of the wil, makith the othere dede to be morali good or bad, meritorie or demeritorie, and the goodnes and the merite of the dede in the wil, descendith into the other dede, and ȝitt the dede of the wil is not meritorie of blisse in hevene, withoute a grace which is callid accepting grace.

Wel, fadir, sithen ȝe conforten me so wel bothe bi ȝoure so cleer teching, and bi ȝoure so gentil commending, forto cacche witt unto me upon the maters which han betwixe us be mynystrid, y wole argue aȝens what in this present chapiter ȝe han allowid, approvyd, confeermed and seid. And for as myche as al that ȝe han seid, and al that ȝe han allowid and confeermed, of the vertu of feith, bothe in this booke, and in the othere bokis bifore alleggid, is so kunnyngli and so openli led forth and tretid, that y wote not hou eny man myȝte be mouyd to speke theraȝens, by eny resoun and cleernes of witt, therfore y schal move and argue aȝens ȝoure so sad seiyng [folio 25b] bi a holi mannis writing, and in this wise. Gregorie seith, in his iii^e Omelie, in the beginnyng: Feith hath no merit, to which mannys resoun ȝeueth

other sure proof or experience, and if othere ex|perience puttith awey al merit fro feith, bi cause open experience is grettist evydence, it seemeth that alle other lasse evydence than is experience, schulde bi so moche the more diminisse, and the more lasse the merite of feith, bi hou myche thilke evydence the more neiȝeth to the grettist evydence, which is experience; and bi so myche al evydence schulde the more and the better suffre the merite of feith to be, bi hou myche the ferther it is fro the hiȝest and grettist evydence, which is experience.

Sone, if al were trewe that is of holy men writen, thin argument were the more to be drad. But certis, as thou maist wite in tyme to come, bi that that thou schal wexe into gretter and into depper [So in MS.] certeynte of feeling, namelich bi reding in the eend of the first parti of Iust [folio 26a] apprising of Holi Scripture, and in the book clepid The iust apprising of doctouris, holi men, and ful kunnyng men, at sumtyme fillen upon the treuthe and founden it, and at sum|tyme thei faileden from it, whanne thei wene|den that thei hadden founde it. And therfore, if her writingis kunne be evydentli unproved, her writingis ben to be left. And tho writingis of hem whiche kunne not be inproved, and unto

tyme thei mowe or kunne be inproved, mowe wel, and ouȝte to be holde and be folowid. But, forto come doun in special to examine the now seid alleggid wordis of Gregorie, se thou, sone, how in the same wordis mowe be founde dyverse defautis, forwhi, the said wordis of Gregorie implien and supposen, in her owne vewe, that sum feith ther is, that is had and gendrid bi open experience, and that is aȝens the same doctouris feeling and writing expresseli, in his iii^e Omelie, upon these wordis of the gospel: For that thou hast seen me, O Thomas, thou hast bileeved, et cetera; [folio 26b] where pleynli this doctour wole, feelith, and techith, that a man hath not feith of thilk thing which is of him openli and sureli knowun to be trewe. Wherfore, hise wordis bifore first rehercid, and hise wordis now last rehercid, mowen not stonde togider, and this may not be withoute a defaute. If eny man wole so expowne, glose, and interprete the first bifore alleggid wordis of Gregorie, that the meenyng which Gregorie had in hem was this, that thilk knowing which is gendrid, and had bi sure ex|perience, is neither feith, neither of it is merit, ȝitt ther aȝens is the open pretencioun of the same wordis, whiche callith a knowing, to whom mannys resoun ȝeveth experience, to be a feith, and that therfore thilk knowing, to whom mannes

resoun ȝeveth experience to be a feith and that therfore thilk knowing is a feith, [The sentence is very involved and is certainly mistaken. The scribe seems to have been confused here (he repeats himself in the MS.), and to have confused the sense. I suggest 'and that therfore thilk knowing, to whom mannes resoun ȝeveth experience, is a feith,' omitting 'to be a feith and that therfore thilk knowing.'] and ellis [folio 27a] it wolde folowe that he spake hem unkun|nyngli, or unavisidli, and unwarli, which is another defaute. Also that sum knowing, whanne it is gendrid bi sure certeyn experience, is feith and credence, is proved openli in The book of feith in latyn, and y doute not that to ech diligent considerer what is seid therof in the first parti of The folower to the Donet, it schal be riȝt esili to prove wel the same. Also, forto seie that a knowing, had and gendrid upon a treuthe bi sure experience, hath no merit, is the iii^e defaute. Forwhi, forto not consent, and therfore forto not knowe and knowleche a treuthe, whanne it is knowe bi sure experience, and for that it is so knowun bi sure experience, is un|resonable, and therfore viciose, and so thanne demeritori and synful. Wherfore aȝenward, forto consent, and to knowe, and knowleche the same treuthe, whanne it is knowen bi sure experience, and for that it is so knowen bi sure

experience, is resonable, and if resonable, thanne vertuose, and so thanne meritorie, and rewardable; for as myche as to every vice the contrarie is a vertu, and to ech vertu the contrarie is a [folio 27b] vice. And so nedis in the first seid wordis of Gregorie is founden the seid iii^e defaute. ȝhe, sone, in other placis where God wole that it be tauȝt in latyn, thou schalt openli se, and so thou maist sumwhat now se, if thou wolt, that a man ouȝte not have merit for his bileeve, but if he have therto sum evydence forto so bileeve. For ellis, he wote not whi he schulde bileeve it more than the contrarie of it, or more than ech other spekeable thing. And also, forto so bileeve withoute evydence is unreson|able, and therfore unvertuose, and so demeritorie; ȝhe, and it is unpossible, [So in MS.] as is bifore proved in The book of feith in latyn, and in The folower to the Donet, and if this be trewe, certis bi lijk skile, so forto bileeve a thing for therto is sufficient evydence that it is so to be bileevyd, is resonable, and therfore vertuose and so meri|torie; and if this be trewe, certis therof folowith sureli, that riȝt as grettist vice and grettist demerit in such case, and for such case, is forto bileeve [folio 28a] where noon evydence is forto so bileeve, so grettist vertu and merit, as in suche case,

and for suche case, is forto bileeve where grettist evydence is forto so bileeve. And thanne of this folowith ferther, that proporcion|abili as the evydencis ben lasse and more neiȝyng to nonne evydence, bi so myche the bileve bi hem taken is the lasse of merit. And as the evidencis ben gretter, and more neiȝing to the grettist and hiȝest evydence of alle, bi so myche the bileeve takun bi hem is the more of merit. And so nedis, upon the first alleggid wordis of Gregorie fallith the iii^e rehercid defaute. If eny man wole seie that Gregori, in thilke first wordis, menede thus, that thilk knowing, which is gendrid and had bi experience, is feith not meritori, anoon is founde this iiii^e defaute, that the first parti of this meenyng now govun is contrarie to the ii^e wordis of Gregori, bifore alleggid in his iii^e Omelie; and upon the ii^e parti of this now govun meenyng, fallith lijk defaute to it, which now bifore is namyde; for the iii^e defaute, and the resounis now bifore maad forto prove the iii^e defaute, prove also this now last defaute, rising upon the ii^e parti of this last govun meenyng. And so y wote not how y [folio 28b] myȝt save the first seid wordis of Gregorie from inconvenient and defaute; but if, for affeccioun to the persoone hem seiyng, y schulde close and sequestre the iust doom of resoun, which were

a vice and a synne. And therfore y wote not, sone, hou eny man myȝte worthili ground eny argument forto therbi obiecte aȝens eny, of me or of eny other man, ȝovun and tauȝt doctrine. And herbi, sone, take thou a marke til thou heere more in othere tymes, that it is not al trewe that bi holi men is in parchimyn ynkid, neither al is profecie that is of good men in pulpit prechid. Nevertheles, al what is writen or seid of hem, it is wel doon forto take, receyve, and bileeve, unto tyme a man can sureli, with|oute eny doute, inprove it, and fynde defaute in it, for which it ouȝte not forto be bileeved.