Mathematical philosophy, a study of fate and freedom; lectures for educated laymen, by Cassius J. Keyser.

226 MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY
bination, then your final question would be: is the result
of every such combination a mental phenomenon? That
is not quite the question; for under the rule two phenomena might be combinable in two or more ways, and
some of the results might (conceivably) be mental and the
others not; so your question would be: can every two
mental phenomena be combined under your rule so as to
yield a mental phenomenon? If so, then mind, as you had
defined it, would have the group property under some
rule of combination. If you found mind to have the
group property under some rule or rules but not under
others, you would be at once confronted with a further
problem, which I will not tarry to state.
We have been speaking of mind-of mind in general.
Similar questions,-perhaps easier if not more fruitful
questions,-can be put respecting particular mindsyour mind, mine, John Smith's. Has every individual
mind the group property? Has no such mind the property? Have some of them the property and others
not?
It seems very probable that the answer to the first of
the questions must be negative. There are at all events
some minds having (presenting, containing) mental
phenomena that are definitely combinable in a way to
yield mental phenomena that nevertheless do not belong
to those minds. What is meant is this: a given mind
may possess certain ideas which are combinable so as to
form another idea; it may happen that the mind in question is incapable of grasping the new idea. Such minds
have no doubt come under the observation of every
experienced teacher. I myself have seen many such cases
and remember one of them very vividly: that of a young
woman who had made a brilliant record in undergraduate