Mathematical philosophy, a study of fate and freedom; lectures for educated laymen, by Cassius J. Keyser.

TRUTH AND THE CRITIC'S ART 147
constant regard to the principles and the spirit of mathematics-the spirit of dispassionate thought-to estimate
the logical cogency of their thinking in accordance with
mathematical standards, to employ the postulational
method in many instances where it has never been employed nor even attempted, to hold it as a model in all
cases, and in all their work to own the authority, even
though they can not attain the perfection, of the doctrinal
function as the highest and purest of logical ideals; and
I contend that, if this were done, both the logical quality
and the truth-quality of what I have called "the more
or less reasoned literature" of the world would be thereby
rapidly, constantly and immeasurably improved.
Finally, I would direct your best attention to the fact
that everywhere in that literature,-the literature of
Thought,-there are to be found certain phenomena,
certain common characters, which invite us to the indicated type of criticism as to a great and hopeful enterprise. What I mean is this: if you will select any wellknown doctrine, no matter how amorphous, belonging to
any field, no matter how remote or seemingly remote
from mathematics-it may be in natural science or in
philosophy or in theology or in ethics or in law or in
education or in politics or in economics or in history or
in sociology or in education-if I say, you will select from
any such field a doctrine worthy of attention and examine
it, you will find that the author has more or less consciously recognized, in at least some small measure, the
necessity of working with principles which he may not
have explicitly stated as such either in whole or even in
part; you will find that he has consciously or unconsciously
made use of certain (or uncertain) primitive propositions
or propositional functions,-certain assumptions, that is,