Mathematical philosophy, a study of fate and freedom; lectures for educated laymen, by Cassius J. Keyser.

TRUTH AND THE CRITIC'S ART 145
are, instead, though we do not confess and may not even
know our real motive, trying to make an instrument that
will "work," that will be an effective means to some practical end; we are not,-however much we pretend to
be,-endeavoring to enlighten our fellow men-we are
endeavoring to influence them: our aim is not the advancement of wisdom; it is, in current slang, to put something over or across. And, as already intimated, the
dominance of this motive is entirely consistent with sincerity. The builder or the advocate of a doctrine ostensibly aiming at truth but really aiming at some practical achievement, may be entirely sincere-he may indeed
be, like Mahomet, for example, like Deacon Paris or
Lenin, a fanatic, incapable of doubt, incapable (that is)
of doubting the validity or justice of his central thesis,
and hence incapable of scientific devotion to truth.
Now, it is evident that one making or advocating a
doctrine, if he be animated, not by the genuine philosopher's love of truth, but by the spirit of the partisan and
propagandist, if he have not the disinterestedness of the
genuinely scientific worker but have instead the interest
of one bent on driving through to the goal of some practical purpose by any and every available means thereto
-it is evident, I say, that such a one will not desire to
bring his doctrine to the perfection of logical form but
will often indeed desire the very opposite; and the reasons are plain: to make a doctrine autonomous requires
much patience and time, but the practician, the partisan,
the propagandist, is by nature impatient-he is eager for
results; in trying to make a doctrine autonomous, we
usually discover that the doctrine is false (for most doctrines are false), but such a discovery, which tends to
dampen ardor, is just what your partisan or your fanatic