Reasoning, Defeasibility, and the Taking ConditionSkip other details (including permanent urls, DOI, citation information)
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Reasoning is a way of forming or revising attitudes such as beliefs and intentions. But what sets reasoning apart from other ways of forming or revising attitudes? According to the Taking Condition, an agent’s response does not count as an instance of reasoning unless the agent takes it that her circumstances warrant that response. While initially attractive to many, the Taking Condition has also faced a lot of criticism in the literature. This paper suggests a novel way of motivating the Taking Condition. More specifically, it argues that recognizing the pervasive defeasibility of human reasoning provides strong reasons to accept the Taking Condition.