In §1.1, I present evidence that suggests Kant is indeed committed to a knowability principle and I show that a Fitch-Church style proof can be constructed on this basis. Kant does not think that all truths whatsoever are knowable, but it can seem as though he is committed to the claim that all empirical truths are knowable, and on moderate background assumptions this entails that no empirical truth is unknown. In §1.2, I show that with a few additional assumptions we can also prove that all a priori truths are knowable and that no a priori truth is unknown. This is an interesting result with more general philosophical lessons concerning how certain classes of truth relate within a framework of knowability. But it is a little unfair to Kant. Arguably, we ought to further restrict our candidate Kantian knowability principle to what I call purely empirical truths, and doing so blocks the seepage into the a priori realm. However, this move would still leave Kant forced to concede that there are no unknown purely empirical truths, which is hardly more palatable.
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