There are several lines of response to this objection. The first is to point out that neither the Leontius case nor the remarks that follow are as clearly indicative of akrasia as they are standardly taken to be. To begin with, Leontius counts as an akratic agent only if, at the precise moment he acts on his appetite, he also rationally believes that he should not. Yet unlike in the two other cases of psychic conflict in Book IV — the thirsty individuals and Odysseus — we are told nothing about the status of Leontius’ reasoning in the story. Indeed, Leontius is supposed to illustrate conflict between appetite and spirit, and those are the only parts of his soul that are explicitly said to be involved in the struggle. Furthermore, while it is true that Socrates’ subsequent remarks indicate that appetites are sometimes engaged in psychic “civil war” against spirit and reason, they do not take a position on how that conflict between the two parties is actually resolved. Indeed, Socrates uses the conative or progressive present tense and participle (βιάζωνται, βιαζομένῳ), which can be taken to indicate a struggle that is continuing and has not yet been decided. What his statement indicates, then, is simply that sometimes appetites are in the process of using force against reasoning and spirit. All we can conclude, in other words, is that at some point prior to acting, the agent rationally judges that he should not indulge his appetite, and that both reason and spirit resist appetite at that time. That is consistent with the denial of akrasia, however. For all Socrates tells us, it could be that if the reasoning part continues to maintain its judgment, then reason and spirit will effectively overcome appetite, and that, on the other hand, if appetite overcomes the others, it will be because it has caused the individual to “abandon” — for at least a moment — his rational belief.
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