Non-Consequentialism Demystified

Nye, Howard; Plunkett, David; Ku, John

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Non-Consequentialism Demystified

Howard Nye; David Plunkett; John Ku

January 2015, Volume 15, No. 4, pp. 1-28

Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0015.004

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Abstract

Morality seems important, in the sense that there are practical reasons — at least for most of us, most of the time — to be moral. A central theoretical motivation for consequentialism is that it appears clear that there are practical reasons to promote good outcomes, but mysterious why we should care about non-consequentialist moral considerations or how they could be genuine reasons to act. In this paper we argue that this theoretical motivation is mistaken, and that because many arguments for consequentialism rely upon it, the mistake substantially weakens the overall case for consequentialism. We argue that there is indeed a theoretical connection between good states and reasons to act, because good states are those it is fitting to desire and there is a conceptual connection between the fittingness of a motive and reasons to perform the acts it motivates. But while some of our motives are directed at states, others are directed at acts themselves. We contend that just as the fittingness of desires for states generates reasons to promote the good, the fittingness of these act-directed motives generates reasons to do other things. Moreover, we argue that an act’s moral status consists in the fittingness of act-directed feelings of obligation to perform or avoid performing it, so the connection between fitting motives and reasons to act explains reasons to be moral whether or not morality directs us to promote the good. This, we contend, de-mystifies how there could be non-consequentialist reasons that are both moral and practical.

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It seems quite clear that bringing about good outcomes is one thing that there is moral reason to do. But why think that promoting the good is the only thing that morality prescribes? One way of defending this thesis is to employ substantive normative arguments, which seek to show that the plausibility of moral reasons to do other things does not withstand reflective scrutiny. Many such arguments begin by observing that it is overwhelmingly plausible that there are moral reasons to do what is good for others and to avoid doing what is bad for them. These arguments concede that it is initially plausible that there are moral reasons to do other things, like keep our promises and respect the autonomy of others, even when this does not bring about the best overall consequences. Further, it is initially plausible that reasons not to harm others are stronger than reasons to benefit them, and that reasons to benefit our loved ones are stronger than reasons to benefit strangers. Such considerations do initially count against consequentialism. But, proponents of these consequentialist arguments contend, there are good reasons to doubt that the plausibility of these distinct reasons and weighting principles can withstand our getting clearer about what exactly they could amount to. If this is correct, our plausible moral reasons of beneficence and non-malfeasance are best seen as instances of moral reasons to bring about the overall best outcomes, which exhaust the content of morality. We will call this the “bottom-up” strategy of arguing in favor of consequentialism.

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