However, it should be noted that if it is held that dispositional essences “contain” natural modalities, subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals are not the only candidates. In causal versions of dispositional essentialism the natural modality in question is of a causal kind instead, and in nomic versions of dispositional essentialism the natural modality is nomological modality. Correspondingly, and again ignoring interfering factors such as finks and masks, that a non-probabilistic potency P has a dispositional or modal essence might be stated semi-formally as ‘ƐP (Px → (Sx causes/causally necessitates Mx))’ or ‘ƐP (Px → (Sx nomologically necessitates Mx))’, respectively. Alternatively, there are also primitivist versions of dispositionality or dispositional modality. According to the powers view of Mumford and Anjum, “the modality of dispositionality is sui generis, of its own kind, and certainly not reducible to pure necessity or pure contingency” (Mumford and Anjum 2011: 175). If we let ◇disp be the operator expressing dispositional possibility, ‘ƐP (Px → ◇disp Mx)’ seems to be a reasonable candidate to express this version dispositional essentialism. Alternatively, the dispositionalist may keep to the stimulus-response model of dispositionality but, pace Bird, refrain from equating D(S,M)x with a subjunctive conditional or a causal/nomological connection. Instead she might view D(S,M)x as a sui generis dispositional modal connection between stimulus and manifestation and regard ƐP (Px → D(S,M)x) as the appropriate expression of the essentialist core.
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