Dispositional essentialism and the grounding of natural modality

Since, obviously, ADE incorporates dispositional essentialism, ADE is susceptible to attacks on its essentialist core claim. For instance, it has been argued that pandispositionalism plus property structuralism, i. e., the view that the nature of every fundamental property is exhausted by its dispositionality, is incoherent, since the attempt to individuate properties exclusively via (dispositional) relations to other properties leads into vicious regresses or circles. A second line of criticism contests the grounding claim. For instance, it has been argued that various laws (e. g., functional laws, the principle of least action, symmetry laws and conservation laws) seem not to be grounded in the (natures of) potencies. Moreover, Eagle (2009) has argued that certain counterfactuals cannot be grounded in a disposition and Schrenk (2010) has called into question that a potency is appropriate to yield (monotonic) necessity in nature.