If the proposition is correct “Every absolutely necessary being is at the same time the most real being” [das allerrealste Wesen] (which is the nervus probandi of the cosmological proof), then, like any affirmative judgment, it must at least be convertible per accidens, thus: “Some most real beings are at the same time absolutely necessary beings.” But now one ens realissimum does not differ the least bit from another, and thus what holds of some beings contained under this concept holds also of all. Consequently, I will also be able (in this case) to convert the proposition absolutely, i. e., [infer from it] “Every most real being is a necessary being.” Now, because this proposition is determined merely from its concepts a priori, the mere concept of the most real being must also carry with it the absolute necessity of this being — which is just what the ontological proof asserted, and the cosmological proof did not want to recognize, despite the fact that it underlay its inferences, though in a covert way. (A 608–9/B 637)
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