Dispositional Abilities

Recently, however, another important development has emerged. Some compatibilists, such as Fara (2008), Smith (1997 & 2003), and Vihvelin (2004), who I shall refer to jointly as “dispositional compatibilists,” have revived the traditional compatibilist’s project. In light of counterexamples to the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, they have replaced the simple conditional analysis of abilities with updated dispositional analyses. The error of the traditional compatibilist’s view, dispositional compatibilists argue, lies not in their central insight that the abilities pertinent to freedom and moral responsibility are dispositional in nature, but rather with its execution. The counterexamples offered by Lehrer and others just serve to demonstrate that the simple conditional analysis does not provide an adequate account of dispositions. But once this has been replaced by a satisfactory dispositional analysis of abilities, the principal claims of traditional compatibilism are vindicated. The first of these is the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which states that the ability to do otherwise is required for freedom and moral responsibility. The second is the claim that freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism.