The Shapelessness Hypothesis

Kirchin, Simon

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The Shapelessness Hypothesis

Simon Kirchin

May 2010, Volume 10, No. 04, pp. 1-28

Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0010.004

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Abstract

In this paper I discuss the shapelessnesss hypothesis, which is often referred to and relied on by certain sorts of ethical and evaluative cognitivist, and which they use primarily in arguing against a certain, influential form of noncognitivism. I aim to (i) set out exactly what the hypothesis is; (ii) show that its original and traditional use is left wanting; and (iii) show that there is some rehabilitation on offer that might have a chance of convincing neutrals.

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I think there are too many question marks hanging over the envisaged retreat. If one accepts that the thin is shapeless, it seems justifiable to accept that the thick is too. Of course, one could deny that the thin is shapeless. Or, as a reminder, one could deny that we will ever be certain that the thin was not shapeless. But the chocolate case and others like it, married with the argument earlier in this section, seem to favor our holding out against this, at least as a safety-first option. The onus is on those that oppose the cognitivism and the non-separationism of evaluative and descriptive content to provide clear and unambiguous arguments that: either show that ethical concepts, thin and thick, are shapely with respect to the non-ethical, and that we can know when we have a correct analysis; or show that the thin is shapeless, whilst the thick is not.

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