First Person Data, Publicity and Self-Measurement

Much of the recent discussion of first-person data has taken place within consciousness studies. Some authors see the methodology of first-person data as a first step towards a science of consciousness (e. g., Dennett 1991, Varela 1996, D. Chalmers 2004). Some also see the use of first-person data as a way of closing the explanatory gap or solving the “hard problem” (e. g., Varela 1996, Roy 2003, D. Chalmers 2004). But we should not assume that first-person data are all and only about consciousness, or that legitimizing first-person data is enough to construct a science of consciousness. First-person data are used well beyond the study of consciousness, and the science of consciousness faces many problems besides first-person data’s legitimacy. Thus, the problem of first-person data is not the problem of how to construct a science of consciousness, although there is overlap between the two problems. Furthermore, closing the explanatory gap or solving the hard problem requires finding the appropriate explanations. Such explanations cannot be found simply by solving a methodological problem. Thus, the problem of first-person data is not the problem of how to close the explanatory gap or how to solve the hard problem.0