Williams therefore thinks that at least some deliberation takes the form of reasoning to a conclusion about what one has reason to do. Given his conceptual premise, this is to think that to deliberate is sometimes to reason toward an explanation of what one would do if one deliberated soundly. (This couldn’t exhaust the possible kinds of deliberation, or else this characterization of deliberation would be vacuous. Fortunately, Williams never suggests that it does). This model of deliberation differs strikingly from Humean instrumentalism; Williams writes that “the mere discovery that some course of action is the causal means to an end is not in itself a piece of practical reasoning,” whereas “a clear example of practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one has reason to φ because φ-ing would be the most convenient, economical, pleasant etc. way of satisfying some element in [one’s motivational set]”. If this is right, then Williams’ view of deliberation turns out to be surprisingly close to that of “cognitivists” about practical reason like David Velleman and Kieran Setiya, who more recently champion the idea that deliberation aims at acting in a self-comprehensible way.
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