The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection

Sobel, David

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The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection

David Sobel

September 2007, Volume 7, No. 8, pp. 1-17

Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0007.008

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Abstract

Consequentialism, many philosophers have claimed, asks too much of us to be a plausible ethical theory. Indeed, the theory's severe demandingness is often claimed to be its chief flaw. My thesis is that as we come to better understand this objection, we see that, even if it signals or tracks the existence of a real problem for Consequentialism, it cannot itself be a fundamental problem with the view. The objection cannot itself provide good reason to break with Consequentialism, because it must presuppose prior and independent breaks with the view. The way the objection measures the demandingness of an ethical theory reflects rather than justifies being in the grip of key anti-Consequentialist conclusions. We should reject Consequentialism independently of the Objection or not at all. Thus, we can reduce by one the list of worrisome fundamental complaints against Consequentialism.

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Suppose we have in mind the version of the Objection that focuses on cumulative or expected demands over a lifetime. Now, of course, trivially, the average cumulative or expected benefits to an agent over a lifetime of full compliance with standard maximizing Act Consequentialism must be at least as high as any rival moral theory. If we lacked grounds to distinguish a particular agent’s expected lifetime benefits under a Consequentialist regime from the average, then this formulation of the complaint would be in trouble. One way to solve this problem is to argue that the antecedent of the previous sentence is false. Another way to get this version of the Demandingness Objection up and running would be to distinguish between cumulative or expected costs imposed on an agent by compliance with a moral theory and avoidable costs imposed in other ways. Perhaps we should count just the costs to one of compliance with the requirements of a moral theory. Let’s call this the Compliance Cost.

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