The error of false causality is an error because we wrongly infer that we know what causation is from our experience of the will being causal; but the will is not, in fact, causal, which follows from the Doctrine of Types. But, on any account of free will and moral responsibility, the will must be causal (even if not causa sui), in order for agents to have free will and be morally responsible for their actions. Therefore, if the error of false causality is a genuine error, then it follows that there is no free will. Only this second error implicates the phenomenology of willing, since it claims that we are in error in thinking we know what causation is based on our experience of the will. And the argument says we are in error here because our experience of the will misleads us as to the causal powers of the will: “there are no mental causes at all”, Nietzsche tells us.
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