Donald Davidson's Theory of Mind is Non-Normative

Schroeder, Timothy

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Donald Davidson's Theory of Mind is Non-Normative

Timothy Schroeder

May 2003, Volume 3, No. 1, pp. 1-14

Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0003.001

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Abstract

Donald Davidson's theory of mind is widely regarded as a normative theory. This is a something of a confusion. Once a distinction has been made between the categorisation scheme of a norm and the norm's force-maker, it becomes clear that a Davidsonian theory of mind is not a normative theory after all. Making clear the distinction, applying it to Davidson's theory of mind, and showing its significance are the main purposes of this paper. In the concluding paragraphs, a sketch is given of how a truly normative Davidsonian theory of mind might be formulated.

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[Radical interpretation] is intended to solve the problem of the interdependence of belief and meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible while solving for meaning. This is accomplished by assigning truth conditions to alien sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly possible. ... What justifies this procedure is the fact that disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a background of massive agreement. ... If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything. (1984, 137)

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