The development of Philippine politics
Kalaw, Maximo M. (Maximo Manguiat), 1891-


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Page   NTO PHILIPPINE POLITICS (1872,1920), %,4 -,: 1,II,, je.,,, ,An, acunt of te rt pl aed by the Filipino eaders and'partiesin the political development -':: ' -,: of the -Phiippines:MAX IMO M,KAA, A.B LL.B. (A dissertatn submtted parti fufiment -fth + ~reps0eentfr the 'degree of Doctor of losophy tthe Unitversiy of:Michigan)'..L \:.' R't -'.:. ',-' ~: 'x..;' ',:, 3,'-": *i< j —; S-.S:.... -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.... —....:.-.. RINT MERCIAL C PAN, Inc. Pnr s.Booketrsll ers `:3 E s-: MzanU, P. L 2 444 4;~: V J4,;~~~ ~.~i:< *i' I,~

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Page  III THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS (1872-1920) An account of the part played by the Filipino leaders and parties in the political development of the Philippines BY MAXIMO MSkALAW, A.B., LL.B. 4w (A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan) ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL COMPANY, Inc. Printers-Booksellers-Publishers 36 Escolta, Manila, P. I.

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Page  VII PREFACE A good many books have already been written on the history and political conditions of the Philippines, but they have all been written from the standpoint of the outsider and have been mostly a record of foreign administrations, Spanish and American, which have been established in the Islands. The nearest approach to a political history of the country has been merely a narrative of the rule of foreign governor generals, their policies and activities, their successes and failure. No serious attempt has yet been made to trace the part played by the people themselves or their leaders, the political associations and parties which have been formed, and the governmental institutions established or attempted by the elected or self-appointed representatives of the people. These things the present writer endeavors to treat. The year 1872 is taken as the starting point because the events of that year aroused the native political consciousness as it had never before been aroused. The politics of the country is then followed to the end of the Spanish domination, through the two revolutions against Spain, from the beginning of the Philippine Republic to the end of the Filipino-American War, and from the establishmen-1t of American sovereignty up to 1920, the year which marks the close of a distinct period in Philippine political development. The writer realizes the perils of pioneer work in such a wide field; but he has been encouraged to undertake it for two reasons: first, because it has never been done before, and second, because he has been given opportunity to see and use manuscripts and other unprinted materials which the public has never seen. It must be obvious to those who know anything about the Philippines that the chief difficulty in the preparation of a work of this kind is the scarcity of materials available, Very little can be

Page  VIII PREFACE secured from books already published. Therefore, in this study, political pamphlets scattered here and there, newspaper files, government archives, and unpublished diaries and memoirs, have all been resorted to, so that it might be a connected story of Philippine politics from 1872. Some space has been devoted to American-Philippine relations and to the development of American policy towards the Philippines, because they all react upon the internal politics of the Islands. In fact, due to the absolute control that the American federal government has over the Philippines, the slightest change in the policy of the American government often produces a lasting effect on the Philippines. The work and the personalities of the leaders have been emphasized somewhat in the chapters covering the Spanish period, as well as in those dealing with the first years of American sovereignty up to 1907, because during all these times the Filipino people or their leaders were not given much participation in govermental affairs. From 1907 on, with the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly and the establishment of political parties favoring independence, the roles played by the leaders, and the policies they advocated, became more closely identified with governmental and other political bodies; hence in dealing with this period less emphasis is given to personalities. The collection and preparation of materials alone have been going on for several years. But the vwriter does not claim that the field has been exhausted. Other writers will undoubtedly be able to unearth new documents which will shed better light upon certain periods dealt with in this work. In fact, that is one of the objects of the writer: to encourage others, especially his fellow-countrymen, to give more attention in their investigations to the part played by their own people and their own leaders in the political, social and economic development of the Philippines.

Page  IX PREFACE iX Acknowledgments are hereby made to General Frank NMcIntyre, of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, for permission to use Taylor's Philippine Insurgent Records; to my brother, Teodoro M. Kalaw, for the use of his Mabini and other Philippine Collections; to Professors J. Ralston Hayden, Harold P. Scott, and Thomas H. Reed, of the University of Michigan, and Leandro H. Fernandez, of the University of the Philippines, for reading the manuscript and offering valuable suggestions; and to Professor C. V. Wicker, of the University of the Philippines, for his painstaking work in proof-reading. M. M. KALAW.

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Page  XI TABLE OF CONTENTS ~INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER-EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES. Three Pre-Spanish Influences —Pre-Spanish Law and Government-Early Changes made by Spain-Encomenderos and Priests -Local Government-The Provincial Government-The Governor General-Checks on the Governor's Powers —The Judiciary-The Seed of Revolt.................................. Pages 1-18 CHAPTER II —BEGINNINGS OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT. The Nineteenth Century-Representation in the Cortes-Secular vs. Regular Priests-Economic Progress a Factor for Liberalism -The Press and Education-A Liberal Governor General: Governor La Torre-The Leaders of the New Liberal MovementExecution of the Liberals....................... Pages 19-31 CHAPTER III-THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA. A. THE CAMPAIGN IN MADRID UNDER MARCELO H. DEL PILAR. Friar Sovereignty-Del Pilar in Madrid-The Spanish-Philippine Association-"La Solidaridad"-Masoy-,lnry asonic Influence on Liberal Movement-Persecution of Masonry........ Pages 32-48 CHAPTER IV-THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued). B. THE POLITICAL CAREER OF JOSE RIZAL. His First Novel-Rizal's First Visit to the Philippines-Rizal and del Pilar-Was Rizal a Revolutionists?-Persecution of His Family-Rizal in a New Role-Rizal and the Rebellion of 1896......................................... Pages 49-68 CHAPTER V-THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT UNDER BONIFACIO AND AGUINALDO. The Liga and the Katipunan-A Plebeian Association-Doctrines of the Katipunan-Initiation of a Member-Did Rizal Favor the Revolt? —Magdiwang vs. Magdalo-The Katipunan vs. A Revolutionary Goverlment-The Defeat of Bonifacio at Tejeros Assembly-Bonifacio Refuses to Recognize Results of Tejeros Convention-Trial and Death of Bonifacio-The Biak-Na-Bato Constitution-Pact of Biak-Na-Bato-Restlessness After Aguinaldo's Departure...................................... Pages 69-98 CHAPTER VI-THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. The War in Cuba-Aguinaldo and Consul Pratt-Aguinaldo Consults with Filipino Committee-Aguinaldo's Early Moves-Spain Attempts to Secure Filipino Cooperation-Declaration of Independence —Mabini on the Scene —Establishment of Local Governments-Establishment of the Revolutionary Government-The Mabini Cabinet-The Revolutionary Congress-The Malolos Constitution-Legislative Omnipotence-Proclamation of the Philip

Page  XII TABLE OF CONTENTS pine Republic-Proposed Judicial Organization of the Philippine Republic-The Educational Program of the Philippine RepublicThe Finances of the Revolution-Support Given the Revolutionary Government-Apolinario Mabini-Aguinaldo's Role —Aguinaldo's Proposed Resignation-Judgrment of the Philippine Republic....................r.......e........... Pages 99-163 CHAPTER VII-THE OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVERE EIGNTY (1898-1901). The Capture of Manila-The Parting of the Ways-What the Revolutionary Governmrent Desired-The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation-Aguinaldo's Reply-The First Peace Parley-War Inevitable-The Beginning of Hostilities-McKinley's Unfounded Statements-Filipino Determination to Resist American Sovereignty-The Schurman Commission-Attitude of Mabini's Cabinet-The Hay Offer of Autonomy-The Movemrent for Peace — Fall of Mabini Cabinet-The First Peaceful Transfer of PowerGeneral Luna-Mabini's Complaint Against Luna-New Appeal for Suspension of Hostilities-Schurman's Own Views-Death of General Luna-The Seat of Revolutionary Government Moves Farther North-Period of Guerrilla Warfare..... Pages 164-226,-CHAPTER VIII-DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERMENT. The Revolutionary Committee at Hongkong ---The Paris Conference-Agoncillo's Protest-Ratification of the Treaty in the Senate-Agoncillo's Activities in Washington-The Memorial to the Senate-The Bacon Resolution-Propaganda Work ContinuesApacible's Proposed Termsn-Imperialism as an Issue in 1900 -Bryan and the Insurgent Cause-McKinley's Position-Propaganda Work Continues-Dissolution of the Junta.. Pages 227-257 CHAPTER IX-THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM (1900-1905). Mabini as Negotiator-Paterno's Peace Proposals-Paterno's Foiled Celebration-Birth of the Federal Party-First Platform of the Federal Party-Mr. Taft and the Federalists-The Americanization of the Philippines-Mabini on the Federal PartyThe Sedition Law-El Nuevo Dia and El Renacimniento-Abor tive Nationalist Parties of 1902-The Democratic Party of 1902.......................................... Pages 258-295j, CHAPTER X —TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM (1906-1913). The Commission Government-The Executive Department —Local Government-Nationalists Allowed to Organized-The Two Nationalist Parties of 1906-Birth of the Nacionalista Party-Federal Party is Changed to Progresista Party-Convention of Local Governors-The Elections of 1907-The Philippine Assembly -Attitude Towards Independence-Growth of the Power of the

Page  XIII TABLE OF CON^ENTS Speaker-The Elections of 1909 —Joint Petition for a Philippine Constitution.................................. Pages 296-322,CHAPTER XI-THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA (1907-1916). America's Sober Second Thought on the Philippines-The Philip. pines for the Filipinos-Ultimate Independence Now the PolicyPropaganda of the Retentionists-Mr. Quezon's Campaign-Mr, Wilson and the Philippines —The Jones Bill of 1914-The Clarke Amendment —Approval of the Jones Law......... Pages 323-34S CHAPTER XII-BEGINNINGS OF FILIPINO AUTONOvIY UNDER GOVERNOR HARRISON'S ADMINISTRATION (1913 -1916). "The New Era"-Filipinization-The Democrata Party is Established (1914)-Progresista-Democrata Fusion-The Jones Law — The Main Defect of the Jones Law-Party Organization....................................... Pages 349-368 CHAPTER XIII-PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOV ERNMENT (1916-1920). Power of the Legislature-The New Legislature —Reorganiization of the Executive Departments-Cabinet Desponsibility to Legislature-The Reorganized Departments ---Departmental ControlSpeaker Osmefia's Refusal of Secretaryship of the Interior-The Cabinet-The Council of State-Functions of the Council of State-The Budget System-The Presiding Officers of our Legislature-Interpellation-The Committee System-The GovernorGeneral-Veto Fower in the Philippines and in America........................................... Pages 369-409 APPENDIX A-ACT OF THE PROCLAMATION OF INDEPEND. ENCE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE............. Pages 413-417 APPENDIX B-CONSTITUTION OF BIAC-NA-BATO. Pages 418 -422. APPENDIX C-AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION OF JUNE 23, 1898, ESTABLISHING THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT.......................................... Pages 423-429 APPENDIX D-THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC............... Pages 430-446 APPENDEX E- TREATY OF PEACE BETWVEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN.......................... Pages 446-451 APPENDIX F-PRESIDEN' MCKINLEY'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TA.FT COMMISSION...................... Pages 452-459 APPENDIX G-RESOLUTIONS REGARDING INDEPENDENCE APPROVED BY THE PHILIPPINE ASSEMBLY OR THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE FROM 1909-1918... Pages 460-468 * f i'

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Page  1 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES Political parties, as we use the term nowadays, that is, associations composed of individuals with common purposes and principles, whose main object is to secure government control by means of the ballot, did not exist in the Philippines during the three centuries of Spanish occupation. Not until the last century of that period did any native Filipino take an active and visible part in national politics. There were from the beginning, it is true, many local disturbances based on serious grievances and led by determined native leaders, but they failed to acquire national scope and significance. A study of Philippine national politics should not, therefore, strictly speaking, cover more than the last century of the Spanish period. However, a comprehensive discussion of the subject would be difficult without some knowledge of the past political life of the Filipinos. Hence it will be necessary for us to go back as far as written history will let us for a glimpse of the early political and social institutions of the Philippines. Three Pre-Spanish Influences Neither the discovery of the Islands by Magellan in 1521, nor the first conquest by Legaspi forty-five years later, found a compact, national governmental organization in the Philippines. The ancestors of the present Christian Filipinos then numbered about half a million people, scattered all over the islands under more or less independent petty kings, or chiefs. They belonged to the Malay race, and had been in contact with three cultures or civilizations, the Hindu, the Mohammedan and the Chinese. The Philippines had been parts of at least two great Malayan empires, the Shri-Visaya and the Madjapahit.(1) At the time of the Spanish conquest, however, there was hardly any trace of these political connections. The Shri(1) Beyer. H. 0.. The Philippines Before Magelan, in Asia, October, 1921.

Page  2 2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Visavan Fmrire was established with a seat in Sumatra about the 7th century, and extended to the places now known as Java, Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, and the Philippine Islands. At the end of the 13th century a new empire called Madjapahit was founded in Java, which absorded the Shri-Visayan kingdom. At about the end of the 14th century, this new empire comprised all the territories controlled by the Shri-Visayan empire as well as Siam, French Indo-China, Borneo and New Guinea. The culture which predominated in these two empires was Hindu. The greatest pre-Spanish influence on the Philippines was, therefore, the Hindu influence. Hindu culture had given the early Filipinos a system of writing, a mass of religious ideas and practices, though not a welldefined religion, and a general culture far superior to that of the aborigines, the Negritos. It had taught them some mechanical and industrial art such as metal working} but it had not greatly changed the structure of society, nor had it brought in ideas of a well-defined national political organization. "At the time of the Spanish discovery"'() according to H. Otley Beyer 1not only were the more civilized Filipinos using the Indian syllabaries for writing, but their native mythology, folk-lore and written literature all had a distinct Indian cast. The same was true of their codes of laws and their names for all sorts of political positions and procedure. The more cultured Philippine languages contain many Sanskrit words, and the native art a noticeable sprinkling of Indian design.< A strong Brahmanistic religious element was also certainly introduced, though it seems to have affected chiefly a limited class, while the mass of the people still clung to their more ancient pagan worship." Time and again scholars have affirmed that the Filipino people did not gain as great material benefits from the Spanish occupation as they did spiritual ones. Agriculture in the pre-Hispanic Philippines was in a compara<1) Beyer. H. 0., op. cit.

Page  3 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES tively flourishing condition. They had sugar cane, coconuts, indigo, sweet-potatoes, bananas, hemp and cotton. Irrigation was used. Pigs, goats, a.nd Philippine buffaloes, or carabaos, were common. Fishing was engaged in; mining and metal work were practiced; and textile industries, such as the spinning and weaving of cloth, were in evide.,ce. Their houses were constructed of wood and bamboo. Gunpowder was manufactured. H.des were prepared and exported. Some of the largest ships in the world at the time were built in the Philippines. There was trade with China, Japan, Malacca, Siam, Cambodia, Borneo and other Islands. To China from thirty-three to forty ships sailed yearly from Manila. (1) The Chinese traded with the Islanders as early as the ninth century. But strange as it may seem, the Chinese failed to have much influence on the social and political Lfe of the people. A few present customs of the non-Christian tribes, such as the use of the gong as a musical instrumeat, seem to have a Chinese origin; but the present Christian Filipinos show ve.y little trace of Chinese socIal and political ideas. Implements and other material objects, such as pottery, are apparently the chief contribution of the Chinese to Philippine culture. This fact will appear strange to those who have seen how Chinese culture and civilization spread to Korea and from Korea reached and dominated Japan. They might ask, therefore, why the Philippines failed to receive as much of Chinese civilization as their Northern neighbors. The answer would seem to be that the part of China which is nearest the Philippines and with which the Philippines had commercial intercourse in pre-Spanish days, is Southern China; and Southern China has not manifested that strong missionary spirit which characterized Northern China, nor has it developed that peculiar Chinese civilization which was eminently the child of the North. North China was the home of the early Chinese philosophers. From it emanated Chinese calture and the classics which found in (1) Craig and Benitez, Philippine Progre. Prir to 189#, p. 45.

Page  4 4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Korea and Japan, its nearest neighbors, their natural and immediate outlet. (1) The Mohammedan, or Arabic, influence upon Philippine civilization came later than the Chinese. To it may be ascribed a great deal of the political organization in existence at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards. It brought to the Philippines the idea of kingship in the sul. tan or the dato. At the time of the Spanish conquest the Mohammedans were just beginning their own work as political and religous missionaries in Luzon and the Visayas. It is fortunate that Spain came before Mohammedan religious and political ideas had become imbedded in the people; otherwise the political conquest and Christianization of the Filipinos would not have been an easy task, and the democratization of the country would be a far more difficult undertaking. Pre-Spanish Law and Government As it was, the work of Spain was relatively easy. Native political organization could offer only very weak resistance. There was no strong national government. There might have been, as Rizal suspected (2) a loose confederation covering most if not all the Islands, as a result of the political connections with the empire of Madjapahit; but there were very few traces of such relations. What actually existed, according to Spanish writers, were small independent communities under more or less independent rulers. Absolute kingship, however, did not exist. Their government, to quote Father Juan de Plasencia, "was not monarchic, for they did not have an absolute king; nor democratic, for those who governed a state or village were (1) For characteristics of North and South China, see Sih-Gung Cheng, Modem China A Political Study, (Oxford) 1919. pp. 28-46. 42) "This fundamental agreement of laws, and this general uniformity, prove that the mutual relations of the islands were wide-spread, and the bonds of friendship more frequent than were wars and quarrels. There may have existed a confederation, since we know from the first Spaniards that the chief of Manila was commander-in-chief of the Sultan of Borneo. In addition, documents of the twelfth century that exist testify the same thing." Rizal's edition of Antonio de Morga, Sueoso de lo I la Filipin, 109, XVI Blair and Robertson, p. 121.

Page  5 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES 5 not many; but an aristocratic one, for there are many magnates (who are called either maguinoos or datos), among whom the entire government was divided." (1) These magnates, or petty kings, were scattered all over the Islands. "Some were more powerful than others, and each one had his followers and subjects, by districts and families; and these obeyed and respected the chief. Some chiefs had friendship and communication with others, and at times there were wars and quarrels. "These principalities and lordships were inherited in the male line anid by succession of father and son and their descendants. If these were lacking, then their brothers and collateral relatives succeeded. Their duty was to rule and to govern their subjects and followers, and to assist them in their interests and necessities. What the chiefs received from their followers was to be held by them in great veneration and respect; and they were served in their wars and voyages and in their tilling, sowing, fishing, and the building of their houses. To these duties the natives attended very promptly, whenever summoned by their chief. They also paid the chiefs tribute (which they called buiz), in varying quantities, in the crops that they gathered. The descendants of such chiefs, and their relatives, even though they did not inherit the lordship, were held in the same respect and consideration. Such were all regarded as nobles, and as persons exempt from the services rendered by the others, or the plebeians, who were called timaguas (Timawa-Rizal). The same right of nobility and chieftainship was preserved for the women, just as for the men. When any of these chiefs was more courageous than others in war and upon other occasions, such a one enjoyed more followers and men; and the others were under his leadership, even if they were chiefs." (2) Thle Christian religion was easily introduced; for as we have stated there was not a well-defined established religion. Paganism was still practiced, although the majority of thile people recognized a common God which the Ta(1) Juan de PIasencia. Crdnioas, 1788. XL Blair and Robertson. p. 848. (2) Rizal's edition of Antonio de Morga. Sucesos de la Islaas Fiipinas, 1609, XVI Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, pp. 110-121.

Page  6 6 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Fan!rs calledl athala. The social system had not as yet built un the impassable barriers of I'-dan castes. There were three classes of peonle in the Philippines: the chiefs, the freemen, and the slaves. But there were not very many great differences in soc'al rank between the chiefs and the freemen. There was the bord of ore race, of common customs, and of mo-al and religious traditions. There were written laws. Recently a penal code called the Penal Code of Calantiao, third chief of Panay, written in 1433, was discovered. "TI-e laws." states Just;ce Malcolm, "covered many of the sub;ects which wve find in the modern codes. To indicate only a few of the most striking points in the subs'antiative law. 'One was the respect of parents and elders. carried to so great a deree that not even the name of one's father could pass the lips. in the same wav as the Hebrews [regarded] the rame of God.' Even after reaching manhood, and even after marriage the son was under a strict obligation to obey his father a-d mother. The people were accustomed to adoption. Marriage had reached the stage of mutual consent. Marriage cer-emonies approaching the religious and including use of the proverbial rice, were more or less elaborate according to rank. Husband ard wife were equal socially and in control of their property. Property was acquired principally by occupation, but also by gift, purchase, and succession * * * Contracts were strictly fulfilled. In fact, non-performance of a contract was severely punished. Partnerships were formed and the respective obligations of the partners enforced." ( ) Force was not the only instrument used in the conquest of the Philippines. Friendship and the policy of attraction were also an important factor. Upon arriving at a place, the early Spanish conquerors usually tried peaceful means at first, even making a treaty of alliance or friendship with the native rulers. In one instance, a blood compact was consummated between Legaspi and the native chief Sikatuna, in which each took blood from his arm, giv(1) Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 86, 37.

Page  7 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES 7 ing it to the other to drink. If friendship was of no a-ail and there was suffic-ent force to subdue the natives, then force was used. After friendship had been consumma+ed, demands for tribute would be resorted to as a sign of allegiance to Spain. Many misunderstandings were brought about because of the discovery on the part of the natives that the real obiect of Spain was conquest and not a treaty of alliance. This is not said to belittle the work of the early conquerors; for the first Spanish missionaries and soldiers who came to the Philippines were men of the highest type. They represented the spirit of chivalry and conquest which then pervaded all Spain. They were brave, courageous and far-sighted. They used tact and diplomacy when tact and diplomacy were necessary and force when force was the only means left. Early Changes Made by Spain By the end of the sixteenth century practically the entire Archipelago, with the exception of Palawan and the Moro country, were under the control of Spain, their inhabitants paying tribute to the Spanish government. On the whole, the early Spanish government was an improvement over the previous conditions. The country was unified under a more centralized government in place of the old decentralized organization. There was more peace and order, although now and then local uprisings occurred. In the beginning the social order was not very much changed. The powers of the chiefs were naturally curtailed. Gradually, the traditional differences between the social classes were lessened until they were practically eliminated. (1) Slavery was abolished by King Philip II when he decreed that Filipinos born of slave parents should be freed. and prohibited the Spaniards from permitting anybody to be held for slavery in the future. In actual practice, how(1) At the end of the Spanish occupation, the only difference between the classes was the difference in wealth, the ilustrado class, as the Spaniards called it, being the wealthy people, and the masses, the poor class. But there was no impassable barrier which prevented the poor from entering the ilustrado class. A family which acquired wealth and which could send its children to school and to college automatically became of the ilustrado class.

Page  8 8 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ever, complete abolishment of slavery was not effected during the Spanish regime. Undoubtedly the greatest blessing brought by Spain was the conversion of the people to Christianity. We have seen that one of the objects of conquest was to spread the Catholic religion. This was done most energetically by the early missionaries, so that thirty-five years after the arrival of Legaspi in Cebu, the spread of Christianity among those who had been in contact with the Spaniards was very general. Economically progress was very slow. Agricultural methods remained very much the same as in pre-Spanish times. Restrictions upon trade and commerce reduced the commercial importance of ports like Manila. The three hundred years of Spanish occupation, however, could not but improve somewhat the living conditions of the people..Streets and roads were constructed in some parts of the Philippines. More substantial economic progress came in the last century of Spanish occupation, of which we shall speak later. Encomenderos and Priests The most signficant change made after the conquest in the native political organization was the division of the Philippines into the encomiendas, which were based on the feudal theory that the ownership of all land reverted to Spain. At the head of the encomiendas were Spanish soldiers. By 1591, about twenty years after the system was first established, there were 267 encomiendas, of which thirty-one belonged to the King and the remainder were assigned to private persons. (1) The encomenderos, or those at the head of encomiendas, were supposed to take care of the inhabitants and to rule them. They were responsible for the keeping of order and the execution of laws. They also supported the priests for the instruction of the people and for the building of churches. Every male Filipino in an encomienda between the ages of sixteen and sixty had to pay an annual tax or tribute of eight reales (about fifty cents) in silver or their equivalent; he could also pay in (1) Barrows, History of the Philippines, pp. 167-160.

Page  9 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES 9 rice, cloth, or other products. Considered from the standpoint of modern economic conditions, taxation was not heavy. But the encomendero could increase the tribute, which was not infrequently done. The system soon became unpopular and burdensome. Abuses in the method of collection were frequent. On the other hand, the Filipinos did not get much benefit from the system. The encomendero hardly ever visited his encomienda, for he looked upon it as something with which to enrich himself. The encomienda system was abolished after more than half a century of existence. (1) The abolishment of the encomienda system transferred the control of local affairs to the hands of the local priests. The early missionaries accomplished a wonderful work in the conversion of the inhabitants, one of the prime objects of the conquest. They got in touch with the people more closely in their parishes, they learned the native languages, and became acquainted with the customs of the people. Many times they became the protectors of the Filipinos against the unjust abuses of the encomenderos. It was natural therefore, that the virtual control of local affairs should fall into their hands when the encomenderos were forced to give up their encomiendas. Local Government The unit of local administration became the town-as it is to-day-embracing often many square miles and containing numerous barrios, or villages. - At the head of each barrio was the chief, or cabeza de barangay; and at the head of the whole town was a gobernadorcillo, or little governor, often known as the Capitan. To aid him were deputies, alguaciles, or subordinate employees, and chiefs of police, of field and of cattle. The goberitadorcillo was elected annually by thirteen electors, twelve of whom were chosen by the cabezas, or chiefs of barangay, and ex-gobernadorcillos. The thirteenth was the outgoing gobernadorcillo. A typical election is described by Jagor as follows: (1) Feraandez, A Brief History of the Philippines, pp. 81, 82.

Page  10 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS It took place in the common hadl; the governor (or his deputy) sitting at the table, with the pastor on his right hand, and the clerk on his left-the latter also acting as interpreter; while Cabezas de Barangay, the gobernadorcillo, and those who had previously filled the office, took their places all together on the benches. First of all, six cabezas and as many gobernadorcillos are chosen by lot as electors; the actual gobernadorcillo is the thirteenth, and the rest quit the hall. After the reading of the statutes by the president, who exhorts the electors to the conscientious performance of their duty, the latter advance singly to the table and write three names on a piece of paper. Unless a valid protest be made either by the parish priest or by the electors, the one who has the most votes is forthwith named gobernadorcillo for the coming year, subject to the approval of the superior jurisdiction at Manila; which, however, always consents, for the influence of the priests would provide against a disagreeable election. The election of the other functionaries takes place in the same manner, after the new gobernadorcillo has been first summoned into the hall, in order that, if he has any important objections to the officers then about to be elected, he may be able to make them. The whole affair was conducted very quietly and with dignity. (1) To be a gobernadorcillo was practically the only political ambition the Filipinos could aspire to. And it was not worth working for. It carried no remuneration-with it, but expenses and trouble. For the corrupt there were good chances for enrichment; but the honest and industrious preferred to avoid it. Substantial citizens even paid voters so that they might not be elected; for the gobernadorcillo was, to quote Rizal, "only an unhappy mortal who commanded not, but obeyed, who ordered not, but was ordered; who drove not, but was driven. Nevertheless, he had to answer to the alcalde for having commanded, ordered, and driven, just as if he were the originator of everything." (2) Above the gobernadorcillo were the parish priest, the alferez, or Spanish army officer stationed in the town, and the alcalde mayor, or provincial governor. But the real power in local politics was the parish priest. We have just (1) Jagor. Travels in the Philippines, printed in Craig, The Former Philippines through Foreign Eyes, Manila. 1916. pp. 222, 223. (2) Rizal, The Social Cancer, (Trans. by Charles Derbyshire) Manila. 1912, p. 77.

Page  11 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES 11 seen his controlling influence in the local elections. From the minute the gobernadorcillo assumed office, he had to look up to the parish priest as his guide, mentor, and superior. Reports from municipal officials about any person had to be vised by the priest. His signature was also needed on the lists of natives drafted for the militia, on financial reports and on practically every other official document. HIe was also the inspector of the schools and the vigilant eye of the government in all matters, whose report about measures and persons might result in confiscation or deportation. (1) The Provincial Government Above the town government was the provincial government. One province embraced many towns. The provinces were governed by alcaldes mayores, who for many years combined both executive and judicial positions. They received only a small salary, but they had the privilege of trading, from which source they secured a great decl of money. The practice was the fountain of much corruption. Some of the early local disturbances were due to the abuses of the alcaldes mayores. "Scarcely are they seated in the place of authority," said Tomas de Comyn, "when they become the chief consumers, purchasers, and exporters of everything produced and manufactured within the districts under their command, thus converting their license to trade into a positive monopoly. In all lucrative speculations the magistrate seeks to have the largest share; in all his enterprises he calls in the forced aid of his subjects, and if he designs to remunerate their labor, at most it is only in the same terms as if they had been working on account of the king. These unhappy people bring in their produce and crude manufactures to the very person who, directly or indirectly, is to fix upon them an arbitrary value. To offer such and such a pr.ce for the articles is the same as to say no other bid shall be made. To insinuate is to command; the native is not allowed to hesitate, he must either please the magls(1) For Del Pilar's description of the friar influence, infra p. 36.

Page  12 12 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS trate or submit to his persecutions. Being besides free from all competition in the prosecution of his traffic, since he is frequently the only Spaniard resident in the province, the magistrate therein acts with unbounded sway, without dread, and almost without risk of his tyranny ever being denounced to the superior tribunals." (1) The abuses of this privilege led to its abolition in 1844, when the alcaldes were prohibited from trading. It was not until 1866 that executive and judicial functions were separate and the alcaldes were confined to judicial positions, while civil governors were appointed who were separate from the judiciary. The governors were always Spaniards. They kept order, executed laws, looked after public instruction, and supervised municipal officials. The Governor-General At the head of the 'entire government of the Philippines was the Governor General. At the outset he was given tremendous powers. He represented the all-embracing attributes of the king. He was the head of the civil administration and with few exceptions appointed the provincial chiefs, or alcaldes mayores, and other administrative officials. He sent ambassadors or delegates to other countries of the Far East, and could even make peace or war. He was the commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces. The constant wars of the time, the menace from the neighboring countries, as well as the Moro piracies gave much importance to his military power. He could deport individuals without any process of law. He conducted himself with pomp and ceremony and went around with guards called the halberdiers. Antonio Alvarez in his Extracto Historial, in 1776, wrote of the governor's power as follows: So great is this that it may be affirmed with truth that in all his kingdoms and seignories (although the vice-royalties are classed as superior to that government) the king does not appoint to an office of greater authority. If this is (1) Tomas de Comyn, State of the Philippines in 1810, in Craig, op. cit., pp. 427, 428.

Page  13 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES 1 is not evident, let it be noticed how many crowned kings render homage to that governor, and recognize him as superior; how they respect him and fear his arms; how they desire his friendship, and, if they violate it, receive punishment * * * And it ought to be considered that the governor of the Philippines sends ambassadors to all those kings, with gifts to present to them, and receives those that they send to him in return; he makes peace and declares war, and does * whatever seems to him expedient; and all this on his own responsibility, without waiting for a decision of the matter from Espaiia, because the excessive distance renders him the entire master in these acts. This is a pre-eminence of so great authority that no governor or viceroy in Europe exercises it. The grandeur which this monarchy preserves in those islands is widely known. (1) For a long time the Governor was also president of the supreme court. Nobody was entrusted with legislative powers in the Philippines, but the Governor General had the prerogative of "Cumplase" with regard to laws approved in Spain for the Philippines. By that power, he could suspend the operation of a law. Thus entire laws or parts of laws approved for the Islands were never enforced, and other laws were enforced only in certain provinces. Checks on the Governor's Powers It should not be concluded, however, that the Governor General was always the absolute master of the situation.. In time several checks on his power became firmly established in the Islands. One of the checks was the evil practice of the Spanish administration of allowing subordinate officials to write reports to Spain over the head of the governor general. This practice destroyed the necessary discipline in the service and all sorts of gossip and false accusations were sent to Spain. Again, at the end of the term of a governor, there was the institution of the residencia, whereby his acts were sifted by an investigation committee. During this time he might be held a prisoner pending the investigation. There was usually an audit of the accounts sometimes occupying months and even (1) mX Blair and Robertson. The Philippine Islande, pp. 81, 82.

Page  14 14 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS years. Again the governmnent of Spain might send visitadores. or visitors, to report on conditions in the Philippines. But the greatest check on the Governor's power was the church officials. After the enthusiasm of the first decades of conquest and religious conversion, the interest of Spain in the Philippines lagged. The church dignitaries and civil officials of the government entered into a most acrimonious rivalry. For centuries they fought each other, and many pages of our history are covered by these conflicts. Some of these conflicts degenerated into bloody contests, as was the case of Governor Bustamante. In 1770, Fernando de Bustamante became Governor of the Philippines. He found that the treasury had been robbed and that there were many people indebted to the government. He began to prosecute them, but the church, being also indebted to the government, was opposed to the governor's policy. It even provided refuge for those whom the governor was prosecuting. What the governor did was to order the arrest of the Archbishop himself. Upon hearing this, the friars organized a mass meeting, secured arms, and actually mobbed the palace, carrying crucifixes in their hands. The guards of the Governor, upon seeing the crucifixes, did not fire, so that the governor had to defend himself alone. He and his son were killed, and the archbishop took charge of the government. (1) Another instance of the conflicts between the archbishop and the civil authorities was that of Governor Salcedo in 1668. He was kidnapped and handcuffed one night and taken to a monastery. (2) To assist the governor general, there were two advisory bodies, one called the Junta de Autoridades (Board of Authorities) and the other, the Consejo de Administratcion, (Council of Administration). The Board of Authorities was akin to the cabinet, and the council of administration was an advisory body on proposed legislation. It could consider the budget and regulations or instructions from the governor general to the home government, and was consulted in matters of patronage. There were also (1) Tavera, History in The Census of the Philippines 1908, Vol. I, pp. 816-817. 42) Tavera. Ibid, VoL.1, p. 848.

Page  15 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES 15 subordinate bureaus or offices to assist the governor in administration. The Board of Authorities was composed of a president who was the Governor-General and the following members: the Archbishop of Manila, the General second in command, the Admiral of the Navy, the treasurer, the director-general of the civil administration, the President of the Audiencia (Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), and the Attorney-General. The Council of Administration was composed of some twelve members ex-officio, with the Governor-General also as president and the following as members: the Archbishop of Manila, the General second in command, the Admiral of the Navy, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the treasurer, the director-general of the civil administration, the reverend fathers superior of the religious orders, the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Manila, and the president of the Society of Friends of the Country (amigos del pais). In addition there were six delegated members, three from the provinces of Luzon and three from the Visayan provinces, and four members of royal naming. (1) The Judiciary The jud-cary was composed of a territorial Supreme Court in Manila, two supreme courts for criminal cases, provincial courts, and special courts. No Filipino could hold the position of a provincial judge, much less be a member of the supreme court. The courts offered no sure protection to life and property. Judicial procedure was tardy and susceptible to the most stupendous abuses and corruption. The following remarks made by an Englishman at the beginning of the nineteenth century on the conditions of the judiciary may appear exaggerated, but they were on the whole true: Does an unfortunate Indian scrape together a few dollars to buy a buffalo, in which consists their whole riches? Woe to him if it is known; and if his house is in a lonely situation-he is infallibly robbed. Does he complain, and is the robber caught? In three months he is let loose again (1) Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 63, 64.

Page  16 16 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS (perhaps with some trifling punishment), to take vengeance on his accuser, and renew his depredations. Hundreds of Indian families are yearly ruined in this manner. Deprived of their cattle, on which they depend for their subsistence, they grow desperate and careless of future exertion, which can but lead to the same results, and thus either drag on a miserable existence from day to day, or join with the robbers to pursue the same mode of life, and to exonerate themselves from paying tributes and taxes, in return for which no protection is granted. In many provinces this has been carried to such an extent, that whole districts are rendered impassible by the robbers, who even lay villages under contribution! The imperfect mode of trial, both in civil and criminal cases (by written declarations and the decisions of judges alone), lays them open to a thousand frauds; for if the magistrate be supposed incorruptible, his notaries or writers (escribanos and escribientes) are not so; and from their knavery, declarations are often falsified, or one paper is exchanged for another whilst in the act of or before signing them. To such a degree does this exist, that few Indians, even of those who can read Spanish tolerably, will sign a declaration made before a magistrate without threats, or without having some one on whom they can depend, to assure them they may safely do so. Nor is this to be wondered at, when it is known that declarations on which the life or fortune of an individual may depend are left, often for days, in the power of writers or notaries, any of whom may be bought for a doubloon; and some of them are even the menial servants of the magistrate! This applies to Luzon. In the other islands, this miserable system is yet worse; they have seldom but one communication a year with the capital, to which all causes of any magnitude are sent for decision or confirmation; and, as the papers are often (purposely) drawn up with some informality, the cause, after suffering all the first ordeal of chicane and knavery, experiences a year's delay before it is even allowed a chance of being exposed to that which awaits it at Manila. Or should the cause be at length carried to the Audiencia, or Supreme Court, and there, as is sometimes the case, be judged impartially, the delay of the decision renders it useless-the sentence is evaded-or treated with contempt! This may appear almost incredible, but is known to any person who has resided in Manila. () (1) Remarks on the PhiUppine Islands, 1819-2- by "An Englishman" Calcutta, 1828, in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine islands, Vol. LI, pp. 92-95.

Page  17 EARLY POLITICAL LIFE IN THE PHILIPPINES 17 There was no freedom of speech or of the press. The most harmless remarks made in public might be cause for imprisonment.. The right of petition was unknown. Religious freedom was not to be thought of, for everybody was supposed to profess the Catholic religion. Failure to perform Catholic duties would put one on bad terms with the parish priest, and that was tantamount to being an enemy of the government. Not until the latter part of the nine. teenth century did the government pay any attention to the education of the people. Spain approved some very good laws for the Philippines, but they were rarely enforced by her officials. The Seed of Revolt Whatever might have been the real desire of Spain towards the Philippines-and Spain has been by nature generous and chivalrous-the fact was that those who were responsible for the Philippine policy preferred to keep the Philippines in a state of ignorance and backwardness so as to insure their perpetual subjection. It is true that early there were established schools and colleges in Manila, one of them being older than Harvard, but they were originally intended for Spaniards, although later on Filipinos were also admitted. Spanish officials frankly confessed that if they wanted to retain the Philippines they must prevent the introduction of liberal ideas; they must prohibit the Filipinos from learning the Spanish language; they must abolish the schools and colleges already in existence. A distinguished Spanish diplomat, Sinibaldo de Mas, who visited the Philippines in the middle of the nineteenth century, said that unless these things were done, the people, sooner or later, would rise and ask for separation from Spain. There could, therefore, be no middle ground; it must either be the policy of retrogression or the policy of progress. If it were to be the policy of progress, then the country must be prepared for separation. Spain did not heed the warning. She allowed things to continue in their natural course, now and then taking some backward step,

Page  18 18 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS at other times enacting liberal measures. She took the middle ground. She did not encourage the political progress of the country; neither did she take the sweeping steps proposed by reformers like Mas. So the inevitable had to happen. How? When did the Filipino people realize that they were oppressed? When did they begin to think of rights they must fight for? Who were the leaders that initiated their movements for reforms? How and when did they conduct the campaign? What organizations and means were used? How and when did political parties in their present meaning develop? These are some of the questions we want to answer. There was one thing the oppression they bore in common had done: it had brought them closer together. Companionship in suffering makes fast friendships. There was no favored spot in the Philippines. The system pervaded all, covered every province, and every island, from Cagayan to Misamis, from Luzon to Mindanao. The minute, therefore, that one portion, one town, one province complained, a hundred towns were, sooner or later, sure to follow. The field was prepared for the propagation of restlessness and discontent. The seed of revolution was bound to grow and bear fruit.

Page  19 CHAPTER II BEGINNINGS OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT We have mentioned the fact that not until the last century of Spanish occupation did we see any Filipino leader taking an active and visible part in national politics. We must confess that before that time there were no signs of a well-defined political consciousness among the Filipino people. They had to live through more than two centuries of political stagnation before they could produce leaders who would take upon themselves the task of participating or trying to participate in the national public affairs of their country. The Nineteenth Century The nineteenth century, however, promised new things for the Philippines. The democratic movement in Europe at the beginning of the century, the revolutions in the Spanish colonies of America, and the liberal waves that now X and then swept Spain herself, did not fail to have their effect on the Philippines. Because of the tremendous distance and the inadequacy of means of communication at the time, the effect was not instantaneous. The Philippines lagged behind the American colonies. Some of the prominent Filipinos were already, however, seriously pondering on the civil and political rights denied their people. They were beginning to think of the Philippines in terms of a nation and a people. The ideals of nationality had commenced to filter into the minds of a few leaders. Thus, in 1809, when the Spaniards resisted the French invasion headed by Napoleon Bonaparte, a Filipino, Luis Varela, published a pamphlet encouraging the vassals of Ferdinand VII in the Philippines to defend their King, but maintaining that Filipinos and Spaniards should be equal before the law. Although there was no separatist desire on his part, he was among the first to work for a dignified position for his people as an integral part of Spain.(1) Al) Poze% Mariano. Sobre Fairisi, in Norton, Bus8ors of a Notion, pp. 87, 3&

Page  20 20 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS It was a period of constitutional struggles in Spain herself, and certain Filipino leaders were preparing the Filipinos for a constitutional life. They were possibly, among the first group of Filipino leaders bent upon a works of propaganda for reforms and liberty in the Philippines.: Among these were Luis Rodriguez Varela, author of the work already cited, Regino Mijares, Domingo Roxas, Jose~ Maria Jugo, and others. These and their followers were soon placed on the black list by the government as dan-, gerous persons. Many of them suffered deportation and other persecutions. The Spanish government, fearing that what was happening in America might happen in the Philippines, would not take any chances. When a new Governor General, Juan Antonio Martinez, came in 1822, he brought with him Spanish officials to take the place of Filipino and Mexican officials whom he believed to be disloyal to Spain. Some of the political persecutions led to actual uprising, as in the case of Andres Novales, who led 800 soldiers and captured a great part of the city of Manila, but who afterwards was captured and shot. In fact, revolts became numerous during this period, indicating the political restlessness. There were revolts and uprisings in 1807, 1811, 1814, 1820, 1828, 1837, 1844, 1854, 1863, 1869 and 1872. (1) Spanish visitors and writers complained of the changing behavior of the natives. They were becoming less submissive and more arrogant. A Spanish official, Sinibaldo de Mas, wrote in 1840 as follows: (2) The natives have committed many acts of violence and contempt. A Recollect cura was beheaded in Talibond, Cebu; the provincial governor of Negros was assassinated in 1833, and another Spaniard severely wounded; the alcalde-mayor, of Capiz was attacked in 1836, but saved himself by his presence of mind; the house of the alcalde-mayor of Antique was burned and he barely escaped the flames; another atcalde-mayor was taken prisoner to Manila in an iron cage; the cura and government employes were ridiculed in pantomimic dances in Capan in 1841; a comedy was to have been (1) Cralg-Benitez. Philippine Progress Prior to 1898, pp. 128. 129. (2) Sinibaldo de Mas, Internal Political Conditions in the Philippines, 1842. in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islacns, VoL LII, pp. 69, 60.

Page  21 BEGINNING OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT 21 enacted at the feast day celebrations at Santa Cruz, Laguna, in 1840, in which the alcalde-mayor and his court were to be held up to ridicule, but it was avoided by the arrest of the actors. It has happened sometimes that the gobernadorcillo remains seated in the presence of a Spaniard with whom he has contests in the ayuntamiento. The members of the village ayuntamientos are not accustomed to rise when a Spaniard enters the town hall, and even laugh at them; and should the Spaniard grow angry and strike any of them, complaint is forthwith made to the governor, who punishes the Spaniard. An artillery captain and an advocate were stoned without cause in a Laguna village. A Spaniard, angered by the insolent answer of a native, struck him, whereupon the native threatened his life. In Manila, the natives are insolent. They do not yield the sidewalk to Spaniards; coachmen and porters do not rise in the presence of Spaniards; Filipino women do not yield to Spanish women either in the stores or the church. Since the new governor, Oraa, has ordered a verbal process against a commandant for punishing a servant, they have become more insolent than ever. Other acts of insolence are noted. These things are not heard of by the governors, or they lay no stress upon them as they do not recognize their political importance. Representation in the Cortes The Philippines wvere for the first time accorded representation in the Cortes in the year 1810. This concession however, was not given as the result of native agitation in the Islands, but as a necessary corollary to the triumph of constitutionalism in Spain herself. The constitutionalists were bent upon equality of rights between the Spaniards and the peoples of the possessions, hence one of their first steps was the granting of parliamentary representation to the colonies. Ventura de los Reyes, a wealthy merchant of Manila, seventy years of age, was elected to represent the Philip-1 pines by a small electoral college. (1) Senfor de los Reyes went to Spain when the famous Constitution of 1812 was being discussed. He was one of its signers. The Constitution (1) The number of electors who chose Ventura de los Reyes is not definitely known. In the elections of 1818 the board of electors was composed of the Governor-Genei al, the Archbishop and three others. In those of 1816 there were 26 electors. (Documentos Constitucionales, Vol. I, pp. 9. 18. 19).

Page  22 22 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS provided for a constitutional government in which the sovereignty resided in the people and the lawmaking power in a Cortes. The following year the Constitution was proclaimed in Manila, and this was the cause of much rejocing on the part of the masses. They thought that personal liberty and equality would henceforward be safeguarded They thought further that this would put Filipinos and Spaniards on the same legal level. It must be remembered that the Spaniards did not pay any tribute and the head men, or principales, of a town were exempt from compulsory labor. When, later on, the news came that the Cortes were dissolved and the constitution abolished, the people would not believe it at first, suspecting that it was a mere fabrication of the reactionary faction. This led again to disturbances. There was actual revolt in Ilocos under the? leadership of Simeon Tomas and Andres Bugarin. The most important measure passed by the Cortes at the instance of Representative Reyes was the suppression of the Acapulco Galleon. Heretofore the trade between the Philippines and the Spanish colonies had been prohibited except through the port of Acapulco, Mexico. Even then only two vessels could run annually, and later on the number was reduced to one vessel. The amount of merchandise was also limited to 250,000 pesos to Mexico, and on the return trip five hundred thousand pounds worth of silver. Only high officials in the government, like the governor general, the judges of the supreme court, and the religious corporations, could send this merchandise. The measure abolishing the monopoly was therefore a great blessing to the Islands. For the Cortes of 1822, the representatives elected were Francisco Bringas y Taranco, a former alcalde mayor 1 of Ilocos, Vicente Posada and Manuel Saenz de Vizmanos, These representatives voted in favor of the dismissal of the King in the session of June 11, 1823. In the Cortes of 1834-1837, Andres Gamboa, Brigadier of the Army, and Juan Francisco Lecaroz, a Filipino lawyer, represented the Philippines. The electoral board was composed of 27 electors, 23 of whom were Spaniards and four born in Manila. For the year 1836 a new election was

Page  23 BEGINNING OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT 23 ]~1 by a board composed of 29 members. ten of whom were F;lipinos and nineteen Europeans, in which Andres Ga'c;a Camba and Luis Pruc'encio Alvarez y Te4ero were elected. Phil;ppine representation was definitely abolished in 1837. In the Constitution of that year was inserted the following provision: "The provinces of the Ultra Mar (outlying possessio-s) shall be governed bv specsal law." The constitutional life of the Philinpines practically died with this provision, for after 1837 the Philippines were ruled by special laws to the e-d of Spanish domination. It should not be implied that the Philippine delegates to the Spanish Cortes in the three short periods of our parliamentary life were really representatives of the Filipino liberal movement or of Filipino nationalistic sentiments. Filipino nationalism was then in its infancy and the determining voice in the selection of the representatives was Spanish. Most of them were, however, men of liberal ideas and had the welfare of the Philippines at heart. While parliamentary representation did not render great material benefits to the country, it gave a great impetus to the liberal movement. With the growing political consciousness, the desire for its renewal grew. It became one of the objectives of the liberals of a later period. The constitution of 1876, the present Constitution of Spain, title XIII, article 898, reads as follows: "The provinces of the 'Ultra Mar, (outlying possessions) shall be governed by special law but the government is authorized to apply to those provinces with the modifications or changes deemed convenient by the cortes, the laws promulgated or which shall be promulgated for the Peninsula." By virtue of this provision, now and then laws or codes passed for Spain were made applicable to the Philippines. In 1869 a decree established an advisory council on reforms for the Philippines. A minority of that committee, composed of Antonio Ramos Calderon, General Jose de Orosco, Idelfonso Pulido y Espinosa, Felix Bona, Geronimo San Juan de Santa Cruz, Jose Ochoteco and Manuel Regidor y Jurado, advocated the re-establishment of parliamentary representation in the Philippines. Various prominent members of the Cortes, like Calvo Munfoz and Emilio Ju

Page  24 24 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS noy, made attempts in parliament for representation in the Cortes, but to no avail. Secular vs. Regular Priests The first real conflict which contained the germs of party life was the struggle between the so-called secular clergy and the regular clergy. The greater number of Spanish and European priests who came to the Philippines belonged to some religious organization or order, such as the order of St. Augustine, St. Dominic, St. Francis, etc. These priests were called regulars or friars. Those who did not belong to any order were called seculars. Most of the Filipino priests belonged to the second class, the seculars. The regulars were supposed to live in convents isolated from mankind, and the seculars in parishes in direct contact with the people. In the Philippines, however, because of the scarcity of secular priests, many parishes were given to the regulars, or the friars. As the number of Filipino priests increased, they felt that they should be given chances to occupy as good parishes as those given to the regulars. Nay, they even contended that the secularization of the parishes should be undertaken as fast as there were secular priests available. One advocate of secularization was Simon de Anda, who was de farcto governor of the Philippines during the British occupation of Manila in 1762. He went to Spain and submitted a memorial to the King advocating, among other things, secularization. He openly charged the friars with "commercialism, neglect of their spiritual duties, opposi tion to the teaching of the Spanish language, and scandalous interference with civil officials and affairs."(1) He induced the King to issue a decree in 1774 to the effect that curacies held by regulars should be secularized as fast as they became vacant. Anda was himself appointed governor-general, and he immediately secularized some curacies in Pampanga, Negros, and Panay. At this time, the question was taking on a racial aspect. Anda had the support of Santa Justa, the archbishop, and both were not only in (1) Barrows. History of the Philippines, p. 289.

Page  25 BEGINNING OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT 25 favor of secularization but also in favor of the rapid training of Filipinos as secular priests. The College of San Jose was converted into a seminary for this purpose. The main issue was, in effect, the Filipinization of the curacies, inasmuch as very few Spanish priests were seculars. But too much haste spoiled the cause of secularization. Quantity and not quality was the goal. In its zeal for Filipinization, the seminary turned out poorly prepared priests. Even its advocates, like Santa Justa, repented of their action and were forced to adopt reactionary measures. Another royal order came from Spain suspending the previous order of secularization, and thus the friar element was again triumphant. But the native clergy did not give up the fight. By 1860 the question of secularization again became acute. The seculars found a staunch advocate in Rev. Pedro Pablo Pelaez, who was born in Laguna on June 29, 1812. Father Pelaez wras admitted to Santo Tomas College as an orphan and studied in the College of San Jose, where he obtained the degree of Doctor of Theology. Later on he became secretary to Archbishop Aranguren, and he gained valuable experience from this connection. HIe became widely known as an intrepid defender of the rights of the secular clergy. t When in December, 1861 the Queen decreed that the parishes in Mindanao should be given to the Jesuits upon their return, strong feelings of resentment were again manifest among the native clergy. They found an able spokesman in Rev. Pelaez, who immediately sent a vigorous protest to the Vice Regal Patron against the despoliation. Upon the death of Dr. Pelaez, Father Buigos succeeded to the leadership in behalf of the Filipino clergy. In 1870, of the 792 Philippine parishes, the friars were in charge of 611, and the secular priests, nearly all natives, had 181. They were scattered all over the islands and their demands soon had the support of all liberalminded persons. By this time the demands of the secular priests had become a part of the general movement towards Filipino nationality. "Under the encouragement of the 1868 revolution in Spain," says LeRoy in his Bibliographical Notes, "these de

Page  26 26 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS mands grew apace from 1868 to 1872, and became interlaced with strictly political demands, until finally we may regard the cause of the Filipino clergy as a part of the campaign for Filipino nationalism." (1) Economic Progress a Factor for Liberalism Several other important factors had been steadily helping the cause of liberalism among the native Filipinos. First and foremost was the economic factor. The opening of the ports of Manila in 1830, followed by the opening of those of Sual, Iloilo and Zamboanga, and later on of Cebu, announced an era of economic progress. General economic improvement succeeded the financial torpor of the previous two centuries. Roads and bridges were built, agricultural X products increased in value, industry and commerce were fostered, and foreign business houses were established in Manila. In 1842 there were 39 Spanish and foreign commercial houses in Manila of which seven or eight were English, two American, one French, and one Danish. (2) Sugar was raised in Pampanga and Negros; hemp, in Ambos Camarines, Albay, and Sorsogon; coconuts, in Tayabas; tobacco, in Cagayan and the Ilocos provinces; and coffee, in Batangas. This increase in production naturally increased the political knowledge and the intelligence of the people. More contact with foreigners brought in better ideas of government. Prosperity aroused the spirit of independence and criticism. A strong well-to-do class was formed from which leaders of the new liberal movement could be recruited. (3) "The Filipino," states Dr. Barrows, "had now become embarked upon a new current of intellectual experiencey a course of enlightenment which has been so full of unexpected development, and which has already carried him so far from his ancestor of one hundred years ago, that we can not say what advance another generation or two may bring. Throughout all the towns of the Islands a. (1) LII Blair and Robertson, p. 167. (2) Benitez, Old Philippine, p. 69. (3) Ibid, p. 72-74.

Page  27 BEGINNING OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT 27 class was rapidly rrowiing up to which the new industries had brought wealth. Their rnfas e-abled them to bu;ld sracous and splendid homes of the fine hardwoods of the Philippines. and to surround temnselves with such luxures as the life of the Islands permitted. This class was rapidly gaining education. It acquired a knowledge of the Spanish language. ard easily assumed that graceful courtesy which distinguishes the Spaniards." (') The Press and Education Another important factor for l'beral;sm came in the nineteenth century in the form of the printing press and the newspapers. The first periodical was founded in 1811. According to Retana,(2) sixteen newspapers appeared between the years 1822 and 1860. It is true, however, that all newspapers before 1860 were printed in Spanish, and so they did not reach the masses. The first paper to print native articles was "El Pasig" in 1864, where besides Spanish, Tagalog was used. It was also in the nineteenth century that the first system of publ'c instruction was establshed. In 1860 a royal order was issued advising the governor to use all his power to have the local priests devote themselves to the teaching of Spanish. It may be remembe ed that the priests were in charge of the primary instruction. A committee on education was organized to frame a system of instruction for the Philippines, and the report was sent to Spain for sanction. In accordance with report of the committee in 1863, a royal decree established a normal school and system of primary instruction in the Philippines.(3) Other schools were established, like the Ateneo de Manila and San Juan de Letran. The primary school system for the Islands had the following curriculum: (4) (1) Batrows, History of the Philippines, p. 277. (2) Retana, El Periodismo Filipin;o, p. 20. (3) IMonte-o, Hii:toria Ge3eral de FilipizCa, Vol. III, p. 407. (4) Fernandez, op. cit., p. 214. '

Page  28 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS 1. The catechism, elements of morals and sacred history. 2. Reading. 3. Writing. 4. The Spanish language. 5. The elements of arithmetic. 6. The elements of general geography and of the history of Spain. 7. The elements of practical agriculture with reference to the Philippines. 8. Manners and social usages. 9. Vocal music. While the system left a great deal to be desired, still it was a tremendous factor for political education. In 1866 there were schools in 900 municipalities with an enrollment of 135,098 boys and 95,260 girls, out of a population of 4,411,261 people. In 1892 there were 2,137 schools. (1) Another important element which worked for liberalism was the group of liberal Spaniards who made the Philippines their home arnd who more or less openly worked for reforms in the government. Some of them were married to Filipino women and others were political exiles from Spain. Still others were voluntary immigrants from some of the South American countries which had declared their independence of Spain. A Liberal Governor-General: Governor La Torre All these factors contributed to the political awakening of the people. When fortune favored the liberals in Spain herself, the political progress in the Islands would gain a great impetus. This was what happened in the Philippines after the triumph of the Spanish liberals in 1868. The defeat of the Royal troops of Queen Isabela and her flight to France inaugurated a democratic monarchy and later on a republic in Spain. The new regime proclaimed liberal ideas and established reforms based on universal suffrage, liberty of conscience and liberty of the press and association. These reforms were intended not only for Spain but also for the colonies. In order that the provisional government of Spain could establish liberal reforms in the Philippines, a liberal governor was sent, Carlos Maria de la (1) Cesmu of 190s, Vol. m, pp. 69, S

Page  29 BEGINNING OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT 29 Torre. His rule in the Philippines marked a new era. He disapproved everything that savored of royalty and pomp, and dismissed the governor's body-guard composed of halberdiers. He walked about the streets of the capital in plain civilian clothes with a straw hat. He inaugurated an era of equality between Spaniards and Filipinos, and announced that attraction and assimilation would be the guiding principles of his administration. He pardoned many criminals who had become outlaws because of government persecution. The Leaders of the &ew Liberal Movement At this time the leaders of the native liberal movement were Jose Maria Burgos, a priest, Dr. Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, a wealthy lawyer, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Martin de Alpa, Mauricio de Leon and Gervasio Sanchez. Evidently these leaders had a little more organization than the previous ones. (1) They belonged to the intellectual and wealthy class. But they were not working for independence; they were simply striving for equality of rights with the Spaniards. They were also working so that the Filipinos could occupy positions in the Army and Navy. Naturally, they were also in favor of secularization, for one of the foremost leaders of the movement was the recognized leader of the seculars. They knew that they must have a voice in Madrid if they wanted their proposed reforms accepted by the Madrid Government. A fortnightly called "El Eco Filipino" was therefore established in Spain. It was edited by Mr. Llorena,, a Spaniard who was indentified with the Filipino liberal movement, with the cooperation of Manuel Regidor y Jurado. On July 12, 1869, a liberal parade was held in Manila in which prominent officials and citizens of the liberal government took part. On another occasion, on September 21, 1869, in order to celebrate the revolution of 1868, another parade headed by Father Burgos, Pardo de Tavera, and Maximo Paterno, was held. Most of them waived flags and lanterns at Malacafiang Palace. Mrs. Sanchez, a pro(1) Felipe Buencano in his unpublished memoirs calls this group the first liberal party In the Philippines.

Page  30 30 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS minent lady, wore a red ribbon upon which the following words were inscribed: "Long Live the Sovereign People, Long Live Liberty" and "Long Live Governor de la Torre." These parades caused a great sensation among the reactionary group. Political manifestations were a novelty in the Philippines. Only a man of Governor la Torre's type would ever think of permitting such a thing. Imagine, therefore, the consternation of the friars! Another measure which was received with intense opposition by the friars was the decree of 1870 establishing the University of the Philippines and secularizing the managemeat of the schools. Execution of the Liberals The man, however, who succeeded La Torre, Rafael Izquierdo, was of the opposite type. He represented the reactionary party, which had again triumphed in Spain; and he was determined, upon his assumption of office, to kill the liberal movement. The fortnightly defender of Filipino interests in Madrid, "El Eco Filipino", was put on the black list and the Archbishop prohibited all priests from patronizing the paper. Governor Izquierdo tried to undo everything that La Torre had done. He re-established the governor's bodyguard. He proclaimed that he was going "to rule with the cross in one hand and the sword in the other," and he made good his boast. Ile suspended the educational decrees of 1870 and discriminated against the Filipinos. In 1872 the workers of the arsenal at Cavite, aided by some native soldiers, revolted, but the uprising was suppressed by a superior military force. The friar faction took this opportunity to deal a dea'h blow to the secular and liberal movement. The three foremost leaders of the clerical faction, Fathers Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora, were accused of inciting the revolt. They were tried in a way which savored of the inquisition and which gave them no opportunity to defend themselves. They were condemned to death. There was such scarcity of proofs against these

Page  31 BEGINNING OF THE FILIPINO LIBERAL MOVEMENT 31 priests that the public opinion of the country believed to the very last in their innocence. The trial failed to convince even many of the friars themselves. And Jose Rizal, the national hero, dedicated his second novel, El Filibusw terismo, to their memory in the following words: The Church, by refusing to degrade you, has placed in doubt the crime that has been imputed to you; the Government, by surrounding your trials with mystery and shadows, causes the belief that there was some error, committed in fatal moments; and all the Philippines, by worshipping your memory and calling you martyrs, in no sense recognizes your culpability(l) (1) RisaL The Reign of Greed, pp. 6, 7.

Page  32 CHAPTER III THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) A. THE CAMPAIGN IN MADRID UNDER MARCELO H. DEL PILAR With the death of Fathers Burgos, Gomez and Zamora, the friars thought that they had dealt a death blow to the secular or liberal movement. Indeed, there was quiet for some ten years. But the lull was only preparatory to an even greater storm; for in fact the events of 1872 X shook the national consciousness into a gradual but sure awakening. Leaders who in a later period played a commanding part in national politics have looked back to the death of those three martyrs as the starting point of active Philippine nationalism. We have seen how Rizal dedicated his last novel, El Filibusterismo, to their memory. One of the heroes of his first novel, the plebeian leader Elias, referred to their martyrdom in the following words: "The sleep had lasted for centuries, but one day the thunderbolt struck, and in striking, infused life. Since then new tendencies are stirring our spirits, and these tendencies, today scattered, will some day be united, guided by the God who has not failed other peoples, and who will not fail us, for His cause is the cause of liberty!"(1) Apolinario Mabini, in his work on the Philippine Revolution, interpreted the event as follows: But that manifest injustice, that official crime did not cause fear, but hatred to the friars and the government which supported them and deep pity and pain for the victims. This pain wrought a miracle; it caused the Filipinos to think for the first time of themselves. Feeling pain, they felt themselves living; so they asked themselves how they lived. To wake up was painful and to work out a living was more painful still; but it was indispensable to live. How? They did not know, and the hunger of knowledge, the anxiety for learning took possession of the Philippine youth. The veil of ignorance, carefully woven for centuries, was torn off at last; the fiat-lux would not be long in coming; the dawn of the new day was approaching.(2) (1) Rizal, The Social Cancer, translated by Charles Derbyshire, p. 898. (2) Mabini. The Philippine Revolution, Chapter III. This work of Mabini is practically in manuscript form, although there was a limited edition of an

Page  33 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) The first attempts at a liberal movement after that tragedy were naturally weak. This is nearly always the case; after an apparent defeat, time is necessary to reunite all forces. Many families, for fear of persecution, fled from the Philippines, and established themselves in cities of Europe and the Far East. Young men with progressive ideas preferred to stay abroad. These Filipino colonies were in time to become the centers of liberal propaganda activities. The desire for reform was given a rebirth. Spanish sympathizers were found. A circle was established in Madrid in 1882 called the Spanish-Filipino Circle. It published a paper under the name of La Revista del Circulo Hispano-Filipino, but this paper had a weak and vascillating policy ard soon died. The campaign conducted so far by the Filipino liberals showed lack of organization. It was not effective because it was not properly organized and directed. The first Filipino who saw the neel of organizing the liberal forces was Marcelo H. del Pilar. Del Pilar was a lawyer by profession, born in Malolos, Bulacan, on Aug. 30, 1850. He studied law and had all the requisities for a successful law practice, a clear mind, a forceful logic and a memory for assimilating facts; but he preferred to defend a lawsuit which would in the end bring him poverty and misfortunes. His country needed a lawyer, many lawyers, in fact. Del Pilar's public career may be divided into two periods-his work while in the Philippines (1872-1888) and his labors in $ 1888-1896). Even as a student in Manila he showed the unmistakable signs of leadership. He held secret meetings with fellow students to discuss political matters. A house in the district of Trozo, Manila, was chosen for such a purpose. Mariano Ponce describes these meetings in the following words: English translation printed some time ago which was apparently suppressed upon the suggestion of Governor Harrison. Mabini made his own translation into English, which is found in the collection of Teodoro Kalaw, from which the foregoing and subsequent quotations are taken. The chapters are very short hence references by chapters are ea&ily located.

Page  34 84 "THE DE.ELFPMENT OF PIILIPPIN POLITICS There we passed the greater part of the hours not taken up by our studies in the mcs.n' agreeable and instructive conversation with our future apostle. He took pleasure in inoculating our virgin intellects with the germ of new ideas, and our hearts with the purest love for our unhappy country. We rapturously listened to him as he stated, with the attractiveness and magic of his winsome speech, his ideas and opinions on things or events of the day or on any other topic whatsoever. From the modest little circle of friends, whose center and soul Marcelo was, there was born the idea of organizing to protest. The apostle and enthusiastic and sincere propagandist already showed himsz:I.,.. sL.adied with eagerness, with rapture, not only in books. but men and things, using his powerful intellect and bhiF iron will. Ils voice had a: unexplainable suggestive power which persuaded and conquered the heart. His words were always i:,Aired by the same logic and the same inflexible criterion, iut he adopted different tones according to the degree of inte!.^.ence and instruction and of the psychic susceptibility cf t.e person whom he addressed, and according to what Ais impression of the person suggested. His energetic features became animated and impregnated with a prophetic light; his eyes shone with enthusiasm like those of a seer, and his broad, majestic forehead seemed surrounded with the nimbus of inspiration. Thus he broke the ice of indifference in some, fixed the wandering attention of others, elucidated dim ideas in one, solved a doubt in another, and conquered everybody; and all within the modest cricle in which our propagandist was moving at that time.(1) / His liberal ideas and love for justice made him, in the eyes of the authorities, especially the friars, a dangerous political agitator. His first conflicts were with the priests. Once when he was acting as god-father at a christening, he had a disagreement with the priest which cost him thirty days in prison. He was already a young man in his twenties when the events of 1872 took place. Indeed, that gloomy year touched his own family and home, for the Filipino priest with whom he used to live, Father Mariano Sevilla, and his own brother, Father Toribio Del Pilar, were banished to Marianas Islands, charged with the same crime of being too liberal-minded. Soon he became convinced that the priests were the worst enemy of the people 41) Arh originaly published In El e mi, Jug 8J, WX9.

Page  35 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) and even of the government. It was their aim, he reasoned, to keep the people and the government as far apart as possible so that they could continue as the ruling factor. Del Pilar was the brains of the agitation in Malolos, Bulakan, against the abuses of the friars. His activities soon extended outside his province. He was an effective writer in Tagalog. He had a wonderful knack of dealing with all sorts of men. He took advantage of fiestas, or social gatherings, in order to spread his ideas and carry on his propaganda against the abuses of the friars and the abuses of the government. In such social gatherings, a dupluhan would be indulged in, which was an attempt at improvised poetry in which one answered another. When the turn fell on del Pilar he would take advantage of the opportunity to criticize the friars in a most satirical way. He would mix with people in the cockpits and persuade them to his way of thinking. Rizal's first novel soon appeared and was attacked by the priests. He defended it most vigorously and was thus instrumental in circulating it among the people. (1) He published in 1882 a Tagalog papel called Diariong Tagalog, wherein his ideas could be given to the people. He kept in touch with prominent Spanish citizens and with people who could help him in Spain. His propaganda work while in the Philippines was partly responsible for the famous political demonstration of March 1, 1888. Taking advantage of the fact that the governor of Manila was a liberal, the leaders of the reform movement paraded in Manila and handed him a petition against the abuses of the friars. Friar Sovereignty After the execution of the three priests, which was, according to popular opinion, the machination of the friars, hatred for these orders grew. It was believed that they were becoming more and more powerful. We have seen the power the parish priests wielded in local politics. In the higher sphere of the government this power also exerted a great influence. Del Pilar called it the friar sovereignty (1) Santos, Maredo H. del Pilar, in Philippine Review, Dec., 1918.

Page  36 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS of the Philippines. It began in the local government and ended with high officials of Manila. "In carrying on their municipal duties," said del Pilar, "the local authorities are dependent upon the parish priest. For a report on the conduct of a resident, a hundred of the principal men are not enough; the vital point is having the 'O. K.' of the parish priest. In turning in the tax rolls of the neighborhood, his signature is necessary. To call to the colors the young men upon whom the lot has fallen to serve as soldiers, the parish priest's 'approved' is required; in everything and for everything, as a pre-requisite, the approval of the parish priest is demanded. "Orders from the above are complied with when it so pleases the Most Reverend Parish Priest. If the higher authority attempts to impose and require energetic compliance with his commands, the parish priest communicates it to one of the superiors of his order, and thus obtains the overthrow of the official. For it he has an argument incontrovertible and of magic effect, to wit, that it endangers the national indivisibility. If it is an effort to open a road and the parish doesn't want it, then it endangers the national indivisibility. Or if the public health requires that dead bodies should not be taken into the church, still it is no reason,-it would imperil the national indivisibility. 'And in everything, the same tendency." (1) Naturally, at that time, a man of del Pilar's type was "persona non grata" to Spanish" officials. The priests in Bulakan called him a filibustero-a dreaded name, meaning "agitator," which was a sufficient cause for deportation or the death sentence, as we shall see later. Sensing what was coming to him, he decided to leave the islands. At that time the governor-general had a most extraordinary prerogative, which apparently was an innocent way of "changing residences." It really meant banishment. Without any process of law he could issue an order for persons to "change their residences." The "new residence" was often, in effect, a Philippine St. Helena. So del Pilar left 41) Ciaig and Benitez, Philippine ProgreS Prior to 1898 pp. 119-121

Page  37 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-189G) g7 for Spain: but before he left, upon the initiative of Mariano Ponce, a Committee on Propaganda was organized with one of his relatives, Deodato Arellano, in charge. The Committee was to collect money to support del Pilar's work of propaganda in Madrid. He knew that it was necessary to have an organiz?:ion if they wanted to conduct an effective campaign, and he showed immediately that he was the man needed in Spain to direct the work. Del Pilar in Madrid When del Pilar left the Philippines in 1888, he was already a mature man, being thirty-eight years old. His work in Madrid was unique. He acted as the unoffic;al resident commissioner of the Filipinos in order to influence publ'c op;nion in Spain, and to induce the members of the Spanish Parliament to pass reform measures for the Philippines. If one should read his letters and forget that it was del Pilar who was writing them, he would suspect that they came from the Washington of today, written by the Philippine Resident Commissioners telling of their attempts to induce the members of Congress to present some measures for the Philippines. Del Pilar befriended liberal members in Spain who could help him, such as Representatives Calvo y Muiioz and Emilio Junoy. Thus, he wrote of Calvo y Munioz: "Very soon he spoke of the Philippine Congress. What he said is also what we say in order to awaken the sleeping intellect of the Spaniard to the needs of our country. Perhaps the friars will contribute towards it, because their ire will be aroused and their newspaper will begin to talk nonsense, and nothing is more necessary than to have our country frequently discussed in order to call attention to it...."(1) He was vitally interested in knowing who would be the Governor-General of the Philippines, very much in the fashion of Filipino Resident Commissioners in Washington, who throw their influence in favor of this or that candidate for the governorship. Thus on April 29, 1890, he wrote a very hopeful letter. 41) Santos, M. H. de Pila, In Phlippine Review, Aprl and May, 1920, p. 295.

Page  38 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Weyler is going to be relieved. If Burgos takes his place, Calvo y Munioz may, perhaps, be made Director General by him. I begged the latter in that case first to introduce the bill on representation in the Cortes for the Philippine Islands. He says he will do everything possible. We shall be all right if Burgos comes with Calvo; he is a favorite of the Segundo Cabo there, and Colonel Pazos is a nephew and the right-hand man of General Burgos. This Colonel Pazos is one of our collaborators in La Solidaridad and signs himself Padpyvh.(1) He would give banquets and entertain members of the Cortes when the funds permitted it. Thus, in another letter he told of a proposed dinner at which he would try to have the liberal party in Spain commit itself in favor of Filipino representation in the Cortes. We are preparing a grand pirpao (dinner) to which the party leaders will be invited (they have already given their promise), and at which we shall speak of the necessity of there being deputies for the Philippine Islands, in order that upon the accession to power of the liberals, this will be an obligation to be redeemed by the party. Two stenographers will be present at this banquet and will take down what everybody says, and we shall afterwards have it printed, for the information of all. Archbishop Nozaleda will be invited. If he is going to sit down to table with us, he will not dare talk against us; if not, it will be his duty to write to us, and in his letter he will not be able to unburden himself against us, because we shall turn it over to the newspapers. If he neither comes nor writes, we shall make it public that he does not amount to much so far as good manners are concerned.(2) Evidently, the friars feared him as much as they feared Rizal, if not more. In another letter, January 22, 1890, he cold of attempts made by the friars to declare a truce. He said: "The friars sent me a flag of truce, inviting me to parley with them. I told them I was not their enemy, but merely paried their blows; if there was no blow, there was no parry. They say they are going to organize a proPhilippine party and solicit my affiliation and that of my friends. I replied they should first issue a manifesto, fol(1) Ibid, p. 295. (2) Ibid. p. 296.

Page  39 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) 89 lowed by an invitation addressed to the Filipinos and if the program was beneficial to the Philippine Islands, many, I said, would come in. In one word, I told them neither yes nor no..." (1) On another occasion the Dominicans sent word saying that they were not enemies of the Filipinos; that they were not opposed to the desires of the people and that the ones opposed were the Augustinians, the Franciscans, and the Recolects. The funds, however, from the propaganda committee did not have a steady flow to Madrid. The persecutions suffered by the members coupled with secrecy with which contributions had to be secured, prevented the collection of a sufficient amount to cover all the necessary expenses. Yet, besides the propaganda committee, the Masons, through the Junta de Compromisarios, were also sending money to Madrid. Many times, said Mariano Ponce, Marcelo del Pilar deprived himself of prime necessities so as to continue the work of propaganda. (2) One day, del Pilar's daughter heard of the financial difficulties in which her father found himself and so she sent him the only peso which she had received as a present at Christimas. The Spanish-Philippine Association Besides being personally active in connection with the Cortes, del Pilar was recognized as the moving spirit in three other entities working for reforms. They were: (1) the Asociacidon Hispano-Filipina (Spanish-Filipino Association), (2) the fortnightly La Solidaridad, and (3) Masonry. The Spanish-Philippine Association was an association composed of Filipinos and Spaniards for the purpose of securing reforms for the Philippines. It was intended as a non-partisan association. Its chief officers were Don Miguel Morayta, Professor of History of the University of Madrid and ex-Minister of the government, as President; and General Felipe de la Corte, who had lived in the Philippines and had written works on the Islands, as Vice-Pre (1) Ibid, p. 198. <2) Ponoe, op. 0t

Page  40 40 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS sident. Several other prominent statesmen and scientists interested in the Philippines were made honorary members and all the Filipinos in Europe were active members. Three sections were created to carry out its work: (1) the Political Section, (2) the Literary Section. and (3) the Sporting Section, in the charge of Marcelo H. del Pilar, Mariano Ponce, and Tomas Arejola, respectively. () The principal objects of the association were as follows: 1. The compulsory teaching of Spanish in all schools in the Philippines. 2. Reforms in the prisons and the courts of justice. 3. The establishment of civil registry and the registry *of deeds. 4. The creation of secondary schools and of reforms in the University of the Philippines. 5. Agricultural development such as the -planting of cotton and cacao and the establishment of agricultural banks. 6. The construction of roads and railways. 7. Reforms in the tariff and public administration. La Solidaridad La Solidaridad, with del Pilar as editor, was the fortinghtly organ of the Filipinos in Madrid. The first number of the paper appeared on February 15, 1889, a month and a half after de. Pilar's arrival from the Philippines. Hle had the cooperation of Jose Rizal, Mariano Ponce, Antonio Luna, Juan Luna, Graciano Lopez-Jaena, Eduardo de Lete and others. It was first published in Barcelona, then in Madrid. The paper admirably represented the minds of the po. litical leaders of the time. It was by no means political alone, for it printed, besides political treatises, short stories, travel sketches, scientific essays, and poems. Many of Rizal's poems appeared in this magazine. Its copies were secretly introduced into the Philippines and were there eagerly devoured by the faithful followers of the propagandists abroad. It was naturally anti-friar in its attitude and endeavored to set forth to Spanish and European public opinion the social and political conditions in the Phil(1) Vcya and Ponce, Efemirides Fiipint", p.,9.

Page  41 THE UPERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) 41 ippines. It 4vocated the curtailment of the powers of the governor-general, the establishment of individual rights and liberties, legal equality between Spaniards and Filipinos, the eipulson of the friars, and the resoration of Filino representation in the Cortes. It did not work for separation; on the contrary, what del Pilar most desired was assimilation with Spain. He appealed to the chivalry of Spain, to treat her daughter, the Philippines, in the same way that she treated her more favored provinces of continental Europe or even her colonies in the Americas. To show how extensive was the campaign in Madrid by the Spanish-Philippine Association and La Solidaridad, fifty-two towns in Spain had been successfully urged to send petitions to the Spanish Parliament in favor of the restoration of parliamentary representation for the Philippines. The petition was presented by Representative Emilio Junoy on February 21, 1895. It asked for thirtyone representatives and eleven senators for all the Philippine Islands. (1) The campaign of del Pilar and his followers was not without results, for at least several important Philippine measures were put on the Spanish statute book. The little band was able to secure a reform of the municipalities and provinces by the Maura Law; they again put into law the compulsory teaching of Spanish, and won reforms in the courts of justice, and the establishment of a registry of property as well as other measures. It is true, however, that practically every one of these reforms was, later on, with the return to power of the reactionaries, almost totally disregarded or completely abolished. Masonry The other institution which interested itself in the Filipino movement for reforms was Masonry. The first Masonic lodge in the Philippines was probably established in 1856 with the name of Primera Luz Filipina. It was to be exclusively for Spanish citizens for mutual protection and closer union among them. It is possible, however, that (1) Veyra and Ponce, op. cit., p. 185.

Page  42 42 TIE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS other lodges had been established before that time, although no record of them has been preserved. (1) The lodges subsequently established did not have much influence on the political and intellectual life of the native Filipinos. They were not intended for Filipinos and few natives gained access to them. The life of Filipino Masonry began in 1890 under the leadership of Marcelo H. del Pilar and Jose Rizal. Before that time Filipinos had been admitted to lodges abroad, and those who were working for reforms and were making the Philippines better known in Europe, were the first ones to be initiated. On April 1, 1889, under the leadership of Graciano Lopez Jaena, Revolucion Lodge, the first Masonic lodge composed of Filipinos in Spain, was established in Barcelona. Another lodge was established in Madrid in 1890 called La Solidaridad. All the Filipinos in that city, including Rizal, del Pilar, Luna, and those who belonged to the Revolucion, which was afterwards dissolved, became members of the lodge La Solidaridad. At that time Masonry was tolerated in Spain. Filipinos there had the protection of a very prominent Mason, Don Miguel Morayta, who was also president of the Spanish-Filipino Association. He was head of the Gran Oriente Espafiol, which took special interest in the spread of Masonic ideas, of liberty, equality, and fraternity, in the Philippines. The preamble of the constitution of the Grand Lodge reads thus: "In the Philippines, where clericalism has made the people its victim, brutalizing the inhabitants, we must organize a council of the order which will free them from the yoke and safeguard them towards progress and civilization, defeating those who are only the specters of the past and who carry with them ignorance, fanaticism, and superstition."(2) On October 10, 1890, the Grand Lodge of Spain, in obedience to this preamble, urged every mason in Spanish domains to induce the senators and representatives of Spain to work in favor of parliamentary representation in the Philippines. In that way, the lodges also became a center (1) Kalaw. T. M.. La Msoneria ilipj.m, p. IW. (2) Kalaw, T. A. op. it.. p. M

Page  43 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) 43 of propaganda in Spain for reforms in the Philippines. Lectures on Philippine political and social problems by Rizal, del Pilar, and others were given in La Solidaridad. But it was not enough to carry on Masonic work in Spain; the campaign had to be extended to the Philippines. And for this reason del Pilar and Rizal decided that lodges should be established in the Islands. Antonio Luna and Pedro Serrano Laktaw were delegated to organize Philippine Masonry. Luna, however, could not go, so Serrano Laktaw did the work alone with powers from the Gran Oriente Espanol. The first Filipino lodge was Nilad, established in Manila on January 6, 1891. So rapid was the progress of Masonry that in one year and four months about eighty-five lodges and triangles were established all over the Philippine Islands. Masonic Influence on Liberal Movement Nilad Lodge was the so-called mother lodge, enjoying powers delegated to it by the Gran Oriente Espanol to organize other lodges. Very soon jealousies sprang up between the mother lodge and the other bodies. One of the activities of the Masonic lodges was to raise money for the support of the fortnightly La Solidaridad, the Spanish-Filipino Association, and a pension to Graciano Lopez Jaena in Spain. There seemed to be discontent with the manner in which Serrano, the delegate, carried out the agreement as to the funds. He was specially antagonistic to del Pilar, the recognized Filipino Masonic leader in Spain. On the other hand, the other lodges were acting in support of del Pilar. They wanted greater authority in the conduct of their affairs and less intervention by the mother lodge. The conflict soon became acute, for while the mother lodge was in all probability technically right, the democratic spirit on the other hand demanded greater recognition of the other lodges. A council was convoked to discuss the various Masonic matters in the Philippines and it was agreed to ask authority for the establishment of a Grand Regional Council which might wield the powers generally enjoyed by the mother lodge. The members of Nilad Lodge

Page  44 44 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS were naturally opposed to this plan; nevertheiss the council empowered Marcelo del Pilar to make the necessary arrangements with Spanish Masonic authorities to accomplish its purposes. Del Pilar had great influence in Masonic affairs. He had attained the thirty-third degree of masonry, the highest degree, and was also a Grand Councilor of the Order and Chairman of the Grand Committee of Justice. He was successful in securing from the Gran Oriente Espanol a constitutional charter by means of which a Grand Regional Council was established. Further plans were contemplated for the formation of a Grand Consultative Chamber which would be even higher than a Grand Regional Council, but the persecutions to which Masonry was subjected afterwards frustrated the attempt. The fraternal and pacific nature of the Order whose main objective is the reign of reason over force and intolerance, must have softened the form of the demands for liberty, and that was probably one of the reasons why we do not hear of very many fiery and demagogic utterances on the part of Filipino propagandists. This was how the Filipino Masons stood on the Philippine question: (1) It is a people eight million strong who have bien for three centuries under tyranic oppression. Its social life is devoid of freedom. Its inhabitants have no right of association. They have no pulpit to express their needs and have no right even to express their thoughts. As regards their individual life, the Filipinos, unlike the inhabitants of other countries, possess no security from abuses in the exercise of government authority and for tidlis reason the prisons and deportation places are becoming overcrowded upon the instigation of the friars. We want a dignified, free and prosperous people with a horizon bright and promising to justice and civilization. We want the rule of democracy, real autonomy and effective human individuality as against the ambitious pretentions of those who absorb the rights of the people and drown their happiness in tears. We want a good government and a good administration. We want the right of our country to be represented in the cortes. To-day not a single representative or senator defends its interests in the Spanish Parliament. Its government depends exclusively on the Ministro de Ultramar, Secretary of (1) Ibid, pp. 98-99.

Page  45 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) 45 the colonies at Madrid, who for itself and by itself legislates and governs the Philippines by means of the Royal orders. In Manila the government depends on the Governor-General who executes and annuls the mandates of the Ministro. We want our country declared a Spanish province with all their rights and obligations. We want, in other words, reorms, reforms, reforms. Persecution of Masonry "Masonry", states Teodoro Kalaw, "was nothing less at that time than a campaign for liberty." (1) But Masonry as an institution never advocated separation. Del Pilar, the Masonic leader, wanted Masonry to be the instrument of popular political education. In a letter to Modestia Lodge, he said that what the Filipinos needed was "habits of respect to authority," (habitos de dirigibilidad); "that is, habits of collective life and of discipline with relation to the powers which we have given to our votes." In a letter to the Grand Regional Council he recommended to Masons the study of problems of organization; political, economic, and military, and the development of the new municipalities. He believed that the Masons were called upon to lead the people in the solution of their domestic problems. He advocated the establishment of civic leagues which would teach good citizenship and individual virtues and where public questions could be discussed and studied. After three years of a very productive Masonic campaign in the Philippines, the Spanish government, especially the friars, saw the dangers of its doctrines and began to agitate for the persecution of Masons. They insisted that Masonry had, in fact, desires for separation; as a result meetings of Masons had to be held secretly. Sometimes they would give dances and receptions as a blind, and then in some secret room would hold their meetings. (2) In 1895 a veritable reign of terror for Filipino Masons took place. Even the fortnightly, La Solidaridad, had to succumb. It was impossible to secure funds. Many people were scared, and the collection of money was very diffi(1) Ibid, p. 97. (2) Ibid. p. 102.

Page  46 46 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS cult. Priests from the provinces were constantly giving secret lists of Filipino masons to the government. A cablegram was sent by the Secretary of the Colonies, the Ministro de Ultramar in Madrid, addressed to the Governor General as follows(1) April 4, 1895. There is alarm here about separatist's work by means of Masonic propaganda in the Philippines which excludes Spaniards and are exclusively maintained by the natives. I request your Excellency, 'vho surely must have exact knowledge of this, to inform me minutely if it is true, and to redouble vigilance and issue orders to ot!.er provincial governors. Houses were inspected and a great many masons were imprisoned. The Spanish authorities showed much concern. An official document exaggerated the situation, saying that almost all the inhabitants of the Philippines, from the wealthiest to the poorest, were Masons, and that in the town of Pasig alone there were over 17,000 Masons. Some prominent Masonic leaders were deported. With the outbreak of hostilities in the later part of August 1896, after the discovery of the Katipunan, the Spanish government redoubled its efforts. Even the government at Madrid took steps and disbanded the Circulo Filipino, which had taken the place of the Asociacion Hispano-Filipina. It also ordered the arrest of prominent Filipino Masons in the peninsula and even began a movement against Spanish Masonry. Arrests and more arrests were made. Tortures were resorted to in Manila under the governorship of General Blanco. But the friars were not satisfied; they cried for more blood. (2) So another man became governor-Polavieja, who no doubt satisfied the thirst for blood, with the execution of many accused persons. By this time del Pilar was convinced that further attempts at peaceful propaganda were useless. He was begin(1) Ibid. p 112. (2) Ibid. 112.

Page  47 THB PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (1888-1896) 47 ning to think of other means At the end of 1895, the publication of La Solidari d was suspended because it was seen that the peaceful mission of del Pilar and his friends was ended. Del Pilar and Mariano Ponce were already preparing to return to the Philippines. Del Pilar was beginning to be a real revolutionist. Unfortunately he was already ill with tuberculosis. Altho when he first reached Spain he was in the very vigour of life, after seven years of arduous labors he found himself too weak to return home. On July 4, 1896 on the very eve of Bonifacio's uprising, he died in Barcelona, Spain. It seems certain that if he did not wholly originate the Katipunman (the real revolutionary association) it was established with his consent and support, after he became convinced that diplomacy must give way to force. He had written his family that he was returning because the peaceful negotiations on legal fields had been useless and that it was his duty to fight as a soldier for the cause of his country. (l) The part played by del Pilar in the political development of the Philippines has not as yet been fully realized. It was General Blanco, for a time Governor General of the Philippines, who considered del Pilar the most intelligent leader, the real soul of the separatists, and very much surperior to Jose Rizal. La Politica de Espaiia en Filipinos of July 15, 1896, the organ of his political enemies, said of him:(2) Marcelo del Pilar was the greatest journalist produced by the purely Filipino race. We did not consider him as an artful filibuster; at times we saw in him the calculating conspirator, the journalist gone astray, who had no real hatred for the sovereign country, though he showed he had it for the state of affairs prevailing in the Philippines. But whatever the truth may be, we must not lose sight of the fact that it was Marcelo (as his intimate friends called him) the Tagalog, who as a publicist, inspired us with the greatest esteem when serenely, and apparently with (1) Santoe. Rpifanlo MaVows o I. d Pi Piir. in PkhippMs Rbevw, June, I02. (2) HSntoi Epifani, oe. ocit.. 78,?87.

Page  48 48 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS the greatest sincerity, he gave his views on very arduous political problems. More correct in form than any other, skillful in debate, tenacious in maintaining his conclusions, the personality of Marcelo del Pilar, as a propagandist, is doubtless the greatest produced by the Tagalog race. While he had not the culture and intensity of purpose of his countryman Rizal, he had, however, the advantage of knowing how to instill his thoughts in a subtle manner into the minds of his followers. Hle was an adversary, a rival; he insulted us at times; we never could approve of the tendency of his political activities; but he was industrious, he was intelligent, and perhaps, he was the victim of his own engagements * * S

Page  49 CHAPTER IV ThE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) THE POLITICAL CAREER OF JOSE RIZAL When Marcelo del Pilar left the Philippines to take charge of the campaign in Spain, another Filipino was already being regarded as the soul of the liberal movement. This was Jose Rizal, now the national hero of the Philippines. Some contend that the beginning of party struggles between Filipinos was the difference between Rizal and del PTlar. In the last chapter we have taken up the work of del Pilar as a propagandist, organizer and leader of mei. Rizal was a different type. From his early boyhood he showed the unmistakable signs of a genius. At three he already knew his letters. In school in Manila, he surpassed others in industry and literary ability. At fifteen, his essay on education revealed ideas of a mature man. At eighteen his poem, To the Filipino Youth, received a prize in. a literary contest in competition with Spaniards. He was beginning to paint and to show some ability as a sculptor. HIe went to Europe when he was only twenty-one years old, and remained there until 1888; this was Rizal's period of preparation, as Craig puts it. He studied medicine and specialized in eye diseases, but public questions apparently interested him more; the pitiful condition of his country was uppermost in his mind. In Madrid quite a number of Filipinos, mostly students with liberal ideas, had established themselves. Rizal attempted to organize them into some sort of association for the purposes of propaganda, but he failed. He had proposed that they publish a book telling the truth about the Philippines and illustrated by Filipino artists. At first, said one of his American biographers, "the project was severely criticised.; later a few conformed to the plan, and Rizal believed that his scheme was in a fair way of accomplishment. At the meeting to discuss the details, however, each member of the company wanted to write upon the Fil

Page  50 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ipino woman, and the rest of the subject scarcely interested any of them. Rizal was disgusted with this trifling, and dropped the affair, nor did he ever seem to take any very enthusiastic interest in such popular movements. His more mature mind put him out of sympathy with the younger men. Their admiration gave him great prestige, but his popularity did not arise from comradeship, as he had but very few intimates." (1) His First Novel His most important work during this period was the publication of his first novel, Noli Me Tangere. That novel immediately marked him out, in the eyes of the friars, as a filibustero. Yet in the book he simply attempted to portray his country's conditions; it was a faithful picture of Philippine life. The various types of Filipinos, from the Europeanized wives of Spaniards to the rustic farmer, the political institutions and their defects, the social customs, the lack of educational facilities, the abuses of government officials, the persecution of innocent people, the power and immorality of the local priests, the desire for reforms, are all faithfully reflected in the various characters of the book. There are two heroes in the novel,-one Elias, the outlawed victim of tyranny, representing the masses, their sufferings, their persecutions; and the other,-Ibarra, a Spanish half-caste, born in the Philippines, of wealthy parents, but full of love and devotion for the country and its people. Ibarra was engaged to the beautiful Maria Clara, the daugther of a wealthy property owner. He was educated abroad and returned to the Philippines with the intention of helping the country by building schools for the education of the people. He believed in siding with the government, for he was convinced that in spite of its defects it was still a most important factor in their life. Ibarra and Elias became fast friends. Both were patriots, but they differed in their procedure. With all his patriotic motives, Ibarra was looked upon as a dangerous individual and was considered by the friars (1) Craig, Lmew. Life aid Lbor of JoA Ria, P. t2L

Page  51 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) 51 as an enen', of the country and the state. A revolutionary plot was concocted to implicate him and bring his downfall. To add to his misery, he had discovered that in reality his sweetheart was the daughter of his enemy, the local priest. Amidst the shouts and jeers and stoning of a maddened crowd which had been led to believe that he was the real autho- of the foolish uprising, his elbows were bound tightly behind his back. and he was led to prison. Elias, the plebeian leader, succeeded in delivering him. Ibarra then swore that in truth he would be a real revolutionist. But the escape was discovered, and in the chase which followed, Elias lost his life to save that of his friend. The priests condemned the book most ferociously, maintaining that it was: (1) An attack against the religion of the state. (2) An attack against the administration of the Spaniards employed in the government and the courts of justice. (3) An attack against the Civil Guard. (4) An attack against the integrity of Spain. Rizal was called a vulgar half-breed, and the book was immediately prohibited by the Spanish authorities. But these attempts to suppress it became its greatest advertisement. It was imported secretly and was sought after by eager readers. People would travel miles and go to other towns just for the pleasure of reading the book. The Guardia Civil was hot after it, and whenever a house was suspected of having it, immediate searches would be made. It came as a thunderbolt in the midst of the friar ranks The priests made special efforts to tell their devotees at the confessional not to read it. How could a pure Filipino dare publish such a thing? Even in the senate of Spain the book was talked about It was considered the most daring work on filibustensmo. In Europe Rizal became interested in anthropology and ethnology. He wanted to know whether the charges of natural incapacity which have so often been made against his people were true. He himself had proven his individual superiority over many of the white race. He had been in

Page  52 652 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS contact with scientists of Europe who recognized in him a man of no mean ability. HIe became the friend of one of the foremost students of the Malay race, Professor Blumentritt, who became very intimate with him. He studied works in anthropology supplemented by first-hand investigation. of the rural communities in Europe, so as to compare them with his people. HIe became convinced that the Filipinos did not belong to an "inferior race"; that they had the same faults and virtues as other peoples of the world; that the virtues and vices of a people are not necessarily peculiarities of the race, but generally are the product of climate and history. Rizal's First Visit to the Philippines Rizal came back to the Philippines in August, 1837, but he soon received warnings from his friends, together with anonymous letters, telling him of the danger he was running into. His parents were constantly alarmed, and many people who saw him would not believe their own eyes. They could not imagine how the author of a book so hated by the friars could come to the Philippines. Yet at that time the government of Spain was under liberal hands, with Sagasta as president of the cabinet. The governor general promised Rizal that nothing would happen to him and that further to assure his safety, he would detail a lieutenant, Jose Tafiel de Andrade, to be his companion. Probably another object of the governor was to watch his movements. At the time of his visit the agrarian problem of his town Calamba, was acute. The Dominican friars raised the rents and enforced harsh methods of collection. The government, desiring to better social conditions, requested information as to the amount of rent the big Calamba hacienda was receiving and whether that rent was commensurate with the taxes which were being paid. Rizal himself gathered statistics and prepared a report in which the pitiful conditions of the tenants were exposed to the government. It was a public document read to everybody and to which everybody affixed his name. But the report was

Page  53 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) 53 pigeonholed. "The government," in the words of Rizal, "was afraid to fight for the truth and left the poor people to their fate. And the memorial dealt only with agriculture, hygiene and the building of roads and school houses." Rizal left in February, 1888, after staying in the Philippines for six months. On March 1, 1888, or immediately after he left the Philippines, a monster demonstration against the friars was organized in Manila, led by Doroteo Cortez, a lawyer. A petition was presented to the authorities at Manila to be forwarded to Spain. It was headed "Long Live Spain, Long Live The King! Hurrah for the army! Away with the friars!" It was signed by property owners, merchants, manufacturers and other prominent citizens. It recited the abuses of the friars, their opposition to civil authorities, and the obstacles they raised against a better understanding between Spain and the Philippines. It is said that Rizal must have given approval to the move while still in the Philippines. (1) Participating in that demonstration was sufficient cause for persecution. The friars became active and succeeded in having many of the leaders deported. This was one of the reasons why it was decided to carry on the propaganda in Spain and establish a paper there. We have seen how Del Pilar left immediately for Spain and undertook the editorship of La Solidaridad. When Rizal reached Spain in August, 1890, the propaganda work was in full swing, with del Pilar at the head. Rizal, however, from the beginning, was a regular contributor to the paper. Many of his political and literary productions were published in the paper. It was probably at this time that the rivalry for leadership which undoubtedly had a great influence on the future work of our national hero, sprang up between the two leaders. Some former Filipino residents in Madrid, have told the writer of a gathering of Filipinos in that Capital in which it was decided to elect a sort of president, or respontsable, of the colony who would naturally be the recognized leader. Testimonies now differ as to the results of (1) Supra p. 35.

Page  54 54 THM DEVELOPMENT OP PHILIPPINE POLITICS the election. Some maintain that Rizal was elected, but he did not want to assume office because the election was not unanimous, and this was the reason, it was alleged, why he left Madrid to continue his studies and investigations in Paris and England. Subsequently, del Pilar was elected to the post It was a repetition of the same old and new story that when two equally able or almost equally able men meet face to face, bent on doing exactly the same thing, each sincerely convinced that he is God's elect for the particular work, a rivalry is bound to arise between the two and the world will seem too small for them. lnasmu 3 each has different ideas as to the way the particular work should be done, criticism of one another is bound to be voiced, each becoming more and more convinced that right is on his side. That is the only explanation of the supposed differences and misunderstandings between Rizal and del Pilar. Personally they remained friends. Rizal and Del Pilar Retana, in his book on Rizal (1) speaks of an rssociation started by Rizal in Madrid which was nipped in the bud by del Pilar. The association had the sole obiect of distributing prizes among Filipinos for work done in school or for literary and scientific undertakings. Some of del Pilar's followers went to the extent of attacking Rizal in La Solidaridad. Rizal, all sincerity and candor, his heart and soul devoted to his country's interest, could not understand how some of his own countrymen could have the courage to attack him in public. From the beginning he showed some sensitiveness with regard to these attacks. This was probably the reason why after some time he ceased writing for La Solidaridad. In a letter to Carlos Oliver, speaking of the opposition of the Madrid committee of Filipinos to himself, Rizal said: I regret exceedingly that they war against me, attempting to discredit me in the Philippines, but I shall be content (1) O. s.. p. 82.

Page  55 THE PEIMOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) provided only that my successor keeps on with the work. I ask only of those who say that I created discord among the Filipinos: Was there any effective union before I entered political life? Was there any chief whose authority I wanted to oppose? It is a pity that in our slavery we should have rivalries over leadership. And in Rizal's letter from Hongkong, May 24, 1892, to Zulueta, commenting on an article by Lete in La Solidaridad, he said: Again I repeat, I do not understand the reason of the attack, since now I have dedicated myself to preparing for our cquntrymen a safe refuge in case of persecution and to <wr:: some books, championing our cause, which shortly will'appear. Besides, the article is impolitic in the extreme and prejudicial to the Philippines. Why say that the first thing we need is to have money? A wiser man would be silent and not wash soiled linen in public.(l) Rtizal at first suspected that del Pilar was responsible for the attacks; but he received explanations from del Pilar himself disclaiming responsibility. Rizal admitted that possibly he had been mistaken. "I do not deny," Rizal said in his letter to del Pilar, "the services that you have rendered over there or that at the present time you are only one who could render them." (2) According to Mabini, the reason why Rizal separated himself from La Solidaridad, was that he saw that del Pilar was editing the paper with ratre ability. (3) Rizal differed with del Pilar in procedure and ideas. He had a broader view of world politics. He probably lost hope for Spanish reforms earlier than del Pilar. Del Pilar was more for assimilation with Spain. On May 17, 1892, Rizal wrote to del Pilar: "Without wishing to pose as the mentor either of the review (La Solidarid) or the Association, I believe that for the present little can be ex. pected of Spanish public opinion. The Spaniards are in deep water themselves and cannot give much thought to the Philippines." We have seen that del Pilar later on was (1) Craig. Lineage, Life and Labors of Jose Rz. pp. 186167. (2) Letter of June 15th, 1892. (3) Mabini. Philippine Reolutio, Cbhpter VI.

Page  56 56 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS convinced of the same thing. Both wanted to go back to the Philippines, where they believedl they could do more; but the leaders in the Philippines were opposed to this plan. In spite of the few differences between the leaders, when great issues in the Philippines were at stake all the Filipinos in Madrid and the leaders in the Philippines united against the common foe. When the people in Calamba, for instance, suffered further persecution, even those Filipinos who were inimical to Rizal joined with him and denounced the action. When in 1892 Rizal was deported to Dapitan, all the Filipinos, with Marcelo H. del Pilar at the head, protested most vigorously. Because of these differences of opinion and procedure with the Madrid Filipinos, Rizal found it more advantageous to absent himself from Spain, and to continue his propaganda through the publication of more serious swork on the Philippines. "It is positively true," said Retana, "that while the Filipino young men were agitating in Madrid and in the principal towns of the Philippines, looking for means to effect liberal reforms which centered in the regranting of * representation in parliament, Rizal was absorbed in annotating an old and rare book which was very much appreciated by the bibliographers and which was called Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas by Dr. Antonio de Morga." (1) Rizal's idea in publishing the Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas was to let his people know their past. Spanish historians had always belittled the part taken by the Filipinos in their history and had ignored the culture which the Filipinos possessed on the arrival of the Spaniards. In his preface addressed to the Filipinos he said; "In the Noli Me Tangere I attempt a picture of the actual situation of our country. The effect of my attempt made me understand that it would be necessary, before I reveal to you further pictures, that we know first our past, survey the road that we have travelled for three centuries so that we may judge the present better. If the book should arouse in you an appreciation of our yesterday now erased from our mem(1) Retana op. cit., p. 160.

Page  57 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) ory and rectify what has been falsified and calumniated, then my work will not be in vain. We can then all address ourselves to the study of what the future may bring us." Rizal's work was indeed a notable contribution to the history of the Philippines especially as to the part played by the Filipinos which has been very much belittled or ignored by Spanish writers. Was Rizal a Revolutionist? After the publication of Morga, he proceeded to Write his second rovel, a sequel to Noli Me Tangere, which he called El Filibusterismo. These two novels have been translated into English by Charles Derbyshire under the names of The Social Cancer and The Reign of Greed, respectively. El Filibusterismo, or The Reign of Greed, is more of a political treatise than his previous novel. It was a prophecy. The peaceful and progressive Filipino leader, Ibarra, who in Noli Me Tangere wanted to educate his people by building schools, was converted into a real revolutionist. He was now known as Simoun the Jewvellc', a malignant character, who because of his wealth gae;l.o access to the offices of the Spanish officials. Secretly he was continually plotting a revolution. HI-e vanted to arouse the feelings of the people by all possible means. He incited the government to create more abuses so that the people might wake up earlier. Another of the grievances was the fact that his former sweetheart, Maria Clara, had been shut up in a convent. He would open the convent by force. His project failed, however, and again he was a fugitive, mortally wounded. He came to the place of Father Florentino, to whom he confessed all his plans, and wondered why God had been so unkind as to prevent their realization. Father Florentino, who is supposed to represenlt a maturer judgment, replied that no revolution was justified on such selfish grounds, that if there was going to be an uprising, it must come from the people. After hearing the story of Simoun,-his plans to bring about the revolution through intrigues and crimes, his own personal motive, in thus rising which was to avenge the persecution of his family and to secure the liberty of his beloved Maria Clara,

Page  58 68 THE DEVLOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Father Florentino exclaimed, "God will forgive you, Sefior Simoun. He has frustrated your plans one by one. Let us bow to His will."(1) Then Simoun asked the Father if it was the will of God that these islands should continue in the condition in which they suffered. Father Florentino answered: "I don't know, sir, I can't read the thought of the Inscrutable. I know that He has not abandoned those peoples who in their supreme moments have trusted in Him and made Him the Judge of their cause. I know that His arm has never failed when justice long trampled upon and every recourse gone, the oppressed have taken up the sword to fight for home and wife, and children, for their inalienable rights." "Why then has He denied me His aid?" asked the sick man in a voice charged with bitter complaint. "Because you chose means that He could not sanction," was the severe reply. "The glory of saving a country is not for him who has contributed to its ruin. You have believed that what crime and iniquity have defiled and deformed, another crime and another iniquity can purify and redeem. Wrong! Hate never produces anything but monsters, and crime, criminals! "You fostered the social rottenness without sewing an idea. From this fermentation of vices loathing alone could spring, and if anything were born overnight it would be at best a mushroom, for mushrooms only can spring spontaneously from filth. "We must secure it by making ourselves worthy of it, by exalting the intelligence and the dignity of the individual, or loving justice, right, and greatness, even to the extent of dying for them,-and when a people reaches that height God will provide a weapon, the idols will be shattered, the tyranny will crumble like a house of cards and liberty will shine out like the first dawn. "Our ills we ogwe to ourselves alone, so let us blame no one. If Spain should see that we were less complacent with tyranny and more disposed to struggle and suffer for our rights, Spain would be the first to grant us liberty, because when the fruit of the womb reaches maturity wee unto the mother who would stifle it! So, while the Filipino people has not sufficient energy to proclaim, with head erect and bosom bared, its rights to social life, and to guarantee (1) This and subequent quotations are taken from Rizal, The Reign of Greed, tranlated by Charles Dexbyshire, Manila, 1912, pp. 357-361.

Page  59 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) 59 it with its sacrifices, with Its own blood; while we see our countrymen in private life ashamed within themselves, hear the voice of conscience roar in rebellion and protest, yet in public life keep silence or even echo the words of him who abuses them in order to mock the abused; while we see them wrap themselves up in their egotism and with a forced smile praise the most iniquitous actions, begging with their eyes a portion of the booty-why grant them liberty? With Spain or without Spain they would always be the same, and perhaps worse! Why independence, if the slaves of today will be the tyrants of tomorrow? And that they will be such is not to be doubted, for he who submits to tyranny loves it. "Sefior Simoun; when our people is unprepared, when it enters the fight through fraud and force, without a clear understanding of what it is doing, the wisest attempts will fail, and better that they do fail, since why commit the wife to the husband if he does not sufficiently love her, if he is not ready to die for her?" Rizal's Spanish biographer, Retana, would have us bel'eve that Rizal was never at heart in favor of separation from Spain. Yet nobody can doubt that The Reign of Greed preached a revolutionary doctrine-not the doctrine of Simoun, but the ideals of Father Florentino. Father Florentino is supposed to represent more particularly the ideals of Rizal and Father Florentino was in favor of independence or separation provided it was carried on in a rightful way. The change or separation must be brought about not by corruption, crimes and bribery; it must not be impelled by the motive of freeing a captive lady love, or of avenging family wrongs; it must be a united demand of a people conscious of its rights and duties, capable of establishing and maintaining a better order of things. On the other hand, the revolutions which Elias and Simoun svould lead were not national movements but mere family or personal grudges against the government. Elias, it is true, represented in a way the grievances of the common people, but he had but a handful of followers, and the last pages of The Social Cancer saw his premature death. He is followed, in The Reign of Greed, by the vindictive and Machiavelian figure of Simoun, sowing the seeds of discord and ruin and degradation as if these, and not sacrifice, love, abnegation and consciousness of one's rights,

Page  60 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS should be the prime motives of a just revolution. No, Father Florentino could not sanction the revolution led by such men. He would seek the leaders elsewhere. And so his last words were: Where are the young who will consecrate their golden hours, their illusions, and their enthusiasm to the welfare of their native land? Where are the young who will generously pour out their blood to wash away so much shame, so much crime, so muceh abomination? Pure and spotless must the victim be that the sacrifice may be acceptable! Where are you, youth, who will embody in yourselves the vigor of life that has left our veins, the purity of ideas that has been contaminated in our brains, the fire of enthusiasm that has been quenched in our hearts? We awa. you, 0 youth! Come, for we await you! Rizal was undoubtedly at heart a revolutionist, but not of the radical type. He would appeal first to the heart of Spain, then exhaust all legal means before resorting to actual violence. He frankly stated in an article: We repeat and will ever repeat, that it is far better to anticipate the wishes of the people than to cede. The first bequeaths sympathy and love; the second despite and hatred. Inasmuch as it is necessary to give the six million Filipinos their rights so that they may become Spaniards, let the government give those rights freely and spontaneously without injurious reservations and irritating suspicions. We will ever repeat that while we have a ray of hope we would rather do this work that we are now doing than to have to tell our mother country the following: 'Spain, we have employed our youth in serving the interests of our country, which are also your interests; we have addressed ourselves to you; we have exhausted all our intellect, all the ardor and enthusiasm of our hearts in working for your welfare, so that we can in return get a glimpse of love, a liberal policy which should guarantee to us peace and insure your sovereignty over those loyal but unfortunate islands! Spain, you have remained deaf and enveloped in your pride, you have continued your evil way and you have accused us of being traitors simply because we love our country, because we tell you the truth and we hate every kind of injustice. What do you want us to tell our poor country when she asks us whether we have succeeded in our efforts? Must we tell her that because for her we have lost all, youth, future, illusion, tranquillity, family; because in her services we have exhausted all the resources of hope, all the disap

Page  61 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) 61 pointments of desire, she should also receive the rest of what remains in us-the blood in our veins and the vitality of our arms? Spain, must we tell the Philippines some day that you have no ear for her evils and that if she wants to redeem herself she must do it alone?'(1) Persecution of his Family What Rizal most regretted in his political life was that his enemies, upon failing to lay their hands on him, persecuted his parents and relatives. Evenry attempt to reach them for faults he had committed exasperated him. One of his brothers-in-law who died was refused burial in the cemetery because hle was married to Rizal's sister. Some of his brothers and sisters suffered banishment; his father was evicted from his land in Calamba, all on his account. The sufferings of his family naturally caused Rizal great pain, for he conserved the Filipino trait of family attachment. He could not bear to have his own relatives suffer on his account. He decided to join them andhelp them, so he went to Hongkong to wait for developments. The Filipino leaders in Manila, and his own relatives, warned him not to come. But a "liberal" governor general, Eulogio Despujol, was soon. appointed. Rizal, moreover, received assurances from the Spanish consul that he would not be molested if he came to the Philippines, so he sailed home. Before he left Hongkong, however, he had written two letters marked "to be opened after my death." He knew that he could not rely on Spanish promises and that in thus returning home, he was risking his own life. One letter was addressed to his brothers and sisters, to whom in part he said: With pleasure then, I risk life to save so many innocent persons-so many nieces and nephews, so many children of friends, and children, too, of others who are not even friends -who are suffering on my account. What am I? A single man, practically without family, and sufficiently undeceived as to life. I have had many disappointments and the future before me is gloomy, and will be gloomy if light does not illuminate it, the dawn of a better day for my native land. (1) La Soiridard, February 1, 1890.

Page  62 62 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS On the other hand, there are many individuals, filled with hope and ambition who perhaps all might be happy were I dead, and then I hope my enemies would be satisfied and stop persecuting so many entirely innocent people. (1) The other letter was addressed to his countrymen. It read in part:The step which I am taking, or rather am about to take, is undoubtedly risky, and it is unnecessary to say that I have considered it some time. I understand that almost every one is opposed to it; but I know also that hardly anybody else comprehends what is in my heart. I cannot live on seeing so many suffer unjust persecutions on my account; I cannot bear longer the sight of my sisters and their numerous families treated like criminals. I prefer death and cheerfully shall relinquish life to free so many innocent persons from such unjust persecution. I appreciate that at present the future of our country gravitates in some degree around me, that at my death many will feel triumphant, and, in consequence, many are wishing for my fall. But what of it? I hold duties of conscience above all else, I have obligations to the families who suffer, to my aged parents whose sighs strike me to the heart. I know that I alone, only with my death, can make them happy, returning them to their native land and to a peaceful life at home. I am all my parents have, but our country has many, many more sons who can take my place and even do my work better. Besides I wish to show those who deny us patriotism that we know how to die for duty and principles. What matters death, if one dies for what one loves, for native land and beings held dear? If I thought that I were the only resource for the policy of progress in the Philippines and were I convinced that my countrymen were going to make use of my services, perhaps I should hesitate about taking this step; but there are still others who can take my place, who, too, can take my place with advantage. Furthermore, there are perchance those who hold me unheeded and my services are not utilized, resulting that I am reduced to inactivity. Always have I loved our unhappy land, and I am sure that I shall continue loving it till my latest moment, in case men Prove unjust to me. My career, my life, my happiness, all have I sacrificed for love of it. Whatever my (1) Cralg, Lineag. Life and Labore of Jo" Rizal, up. 177-178.

Page  63 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) 63 fate, I shall die blessing it and longing for the dawn of its redemption. If Rizal was famous when he came in 1887, he was even more famous on his second return (June, 1892) after publishing his El Filibsterismo, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas and his articles in La Solidaridad, and after his valiant support of the Calamba people. There was evidently another reason why he wanted to return. Before this time he had held aloof from all organizations; he had been a mere propagandist, a scientist, a poet, a philosopher. The organizing and political part of the campaign was done by del Pilar. Now he wanted to play a new role, he wanted to direct the work of nationalism in person. Upon his arrival he was visited by prominent Filipino leaders. The first to visit him were Timoteo Paez and Pedro Serrano, and he invited them and through them the prominent leaders to the house of one Ongjungco. At this meeting, (1) he talked of patriotism, unity and nationalism. It was followed by another meeting, more interesting still. Others who went to hear him were Apolinario Mabini, Moises Salvador, and Andres Bonifacio. He spoke of the rights of the Filipinos by natural law, of the political rights which they should have. The time had come to think of the country's redemption. Organization was necessary. Hie asked them to join the Liga Filipina, which he really founded, because he was the author of the Estatutos or the constitution. The objects of the Liga were as follows: 1. To unite the whole archipelago into one compact, vigorous, and homogeneous body. 2. Mutual protection in every want and necessity. 3. Defense against all violence and injustice. 4. Encouragement of instruction, agriculture, and commerce. 5. Study and application of reforms. Motto: Unus instar omnium (i. e., one like all) Rizal was evidently entering upon a new role. He went to the provinces to preach the same doctrines: unity, (1) taa, o. pp. 245-24&

Page  64 64 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS organization, nationalism. "Up to October, 1891," said Retana.(1) "we have seen Rizal, isolated and austere, a theoretical propagandist of the cabinet, a suggestive dreamer, absolutely foreign to the founding of the HispanoFilipino Association, to the establishment of the fortnightly LA SOLIDARIDAD, to the importation of Freemasonry to his country, (2) and to all work of organization and recruitment. Rizal, until then, had been in the manner of of a lone star that shed all its redeeming lustre over the land of his love and dreams. And now, about the middle of 1892, we see Rizal modified. He is another Rizal; that which had been epic and sublime in him disappears before the eyes of those who contemplate with serene judgment; the superman is converted into a mere man; the romant'c into a realist, and Don Quixote into Saficho... Has he in his new role rendered greater service to the CAUSE? Perhaps... But his individuality disappears. Rizal symbolized Ideal, Inspiration and Soul... After the conspiracy of the night of the 26th of June, 1892 these were transformed into something real and material: ACTION. Rizal no longer preached in books, and paper as in his doleful poems, inspired by the fantastic vision of his far Country. Now he preaches verbally and in common prose, a'.d that vision no longer enlightens him; he is in his Country, where all is sunshine; but the sun's splendours offend him: he labors in the dark." His Spanish biographer evidently preferred to have seen Rizal continue in his aloofness, representing only soul and idea and no action. What many of the Filipinos regret is that he had not been given the opportunity to direct s in person the movement for nationalism. We have seen that he had not much. gift for organization, but he never had much opportunity except in his early days in Madrid. It is true that at that time he was not very successful in dealing with his fellowmen in Madrid. But with Rizal's acquired prestige which would have given him unquestioned authority, who knows how much he could have done? While (1) Retana, op. cit., pp. 251-262. (2) Kalaw, T. M., in his La Masoneria Fitpina,. 88, states that Del Pilar and Rizal jointly conceived the idea of founding masony in the Philippines.

Page  65 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) there were at the time a few followers of del Pilar who looked with jealous eyes upon the supremacy of Rizal, his popularity was unquestioned. He was really the people's idol. He continued his work of propaganda in the provinces, ever preaching unity, nationalism and organization. His footsteps were closely watched. There were bound to be immediate searches of every house that he visited. The civil guards would confiscate every suspicious object that they could find. But he had spent hardly a month in his new work when he was summoned by Governor Despujol, who accused him with bringing from abroad incendiary documents. Without any trial he was deported to Dapitan. The circulation or introduction of his books, as well as of all proclamations directly attacking the Catholic religion or the national unity," were strictly prohibited. As a further excuse for his deportation, it was claimed by the Spanish authorities that Rizal broke his word when he mixed in politics. The American biographer of Rizal, Austin Craig, maintains however, that there was no proof of Rizal's ever promising that he would not mix in politics. (1) Rizal's life in Dapitan was exemplary. He was prohibited from taking part in politics and he gave his word that he would not. He was a model citizen. He cured the people free of charge, interested himself in the improvements of the town, built a school and water works, and continued many of his scientific and literary pursuits. He bought some land and spent much of his spare time developing it. But life was perhaps too tame for him. He longed for freedom. He had many chances to escape, but to break the word he had given to his guards was unthinkable to him. Some of the Filipino leaders would have been glad to rescue him, but that would have precipitated the revolution, and he was not sure that the people were ready for it. He therefore determined to wait. He still showed loyalty to Spain. He applied for a position as doctor in the Spanish army in Cuba and after several months of waiting, his petition was granted. He immediately set sail for Manila, where he arrived late in August of 1896. It was at this time that the uprising of the Katipunan took place. He (1) Craig, op. cit., p. 182.

Page  66 66 THE D1VELOPMLNT OP PHILIPPINE POLITICS had a letter from the governor general that his conduct in Dapitan during his exile wvas exemnplary, yet in spite of this, in such tense moments, accusing fingers were pointing to him as the author of the rebellion. After some delay he set sail for Spain. Everybody, however knew that his life was in danger. When the boat touched Singapore, he had a chance to escape, but he did not take advantage of it. Some of his English friends even attempted to liberate him byr habeas corpus, but failed. HIe considered that he had done his duty to his country and yet he had no faith in the justice of Spain. What linany had feared actually happened, for a telegram overtook the steamer at Suez, making him prisoner. He was -sent back to the Philippines after reaching Barcelona. Rizal and the Rebellion of 1896 Rizal did not approve of the rebellion and he was willing to address a letter to the Filipinos. He actually wrote one, in which he said, "I have given proof that I long for the liberties of our country and I am still desirous of them but I place as a prior condition the education of the people so that they may be worthy of those liberties." In other words, Rizal believed that the time had not yet come for a rebellion. This was very much in line with the view of Father Florentino in Noli Me Tangere. At his court martial there was no trained lawyer to defend him. He was simply to choose an army officer from a list given him. He was charged with founding an illegal society, the accusation confusing the Liga Filipina with the Katipunan. He was also charged with being responsible for the existing rebellion, and the penalty of death was pronounced upon him. His trial was of great interest, and details of it were cabled to Madrid. If Rizal had made an anti-Filipino retraction, he would have been freed. He met his death calmly and on the eve of his execution even wrote his famous poem entitled, "My Last Thoughts." Professor Blumentritt has said that the death of Rizal is the greatest of the many atrocities which the colonial history of Spain registered. It also ushered in a new era in the history of the Philippines!

Page  67 THE PERIOD OF PROPAGANDA (Continued) 67 RTzal was and was not the author of the revolution which had started. His works were largely resnonsible for it, as thev more than anything else made the Filipinos feel as a people, and united the elements of discord into one harmonious voice of complaint against the wrongs suffered b, all. But he did not know that his own work had already effect'el snch a tremendous commotion. He d;d not know that the Katipunan was inspired by his own life and writings: that he was made its honorary president and that his picture hung on the session hall of this revolutionary body. He underestimated the capacity of the masses, for he alwa-s bel'eved that if there were to be a revolution, it must be led and supported by the "intelligentsia" and the wealthy people. He was honest when he sa'd that he had nothing to do with the actual movement. As a scientist, as a philosopher of the loftiest type, he abhorred bloodshed and would not resort to it until he was absolutely sure that there was ro other wav,. To a certain extent what the Spanish thinker Caid of Rizal was true: "He was a soul that feared revolution, but in his innermost recesses was longing for it... And revolution was repugrant to him because he feared it might imperil the work of culture. And though he feared it, he perhaps desired it in spite of himself." (') His greatest claim to being first in our political history is that he was the real founder of Philippine nationalism. It may be truly said that while the seed of an awakening political consciousness may have been planted by other heroes and martyrs to Spanish tyranny, it was Rizal's writings which cleared the ground of its iniquitous weeds, it was the tears from his pure heart which watered the tender plant, and it was his noble martyrdom which gave the necessary warmth for its rapid growth and development. Indeed, it was so rapid a development that he himself before his death, was astonished and could not recognize the product of his own labors. HIe became, though dead, the soul and inspiration of the revolution. Through his manifold activities, in which he showed extraordinary (1) Unamuno, in Retana, op. cit. p. 479.

Page  68 68 THE DEVELOAMILNT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ability, he became the greatest defender of the inherent capacity of his people. In the words of the Filipino scholar, Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, "The appearance of Rizal announced that the Filipino race was able to give birth to individuals endowed with the highest attributes, who could be considered an honor to the human race."(1) (1) His latest American biographer, Charles E. Russell, summarizes his life as follows: "As to few men it has been given to bring to the struggles of life so great a natuiral armament, few also have been able to wield in so short a time a power so momentous. To all the Far East he is slowly becoming a figure of inspiration and hope. To the modern Filipino world he gave an impetus and an impress it can ha,,!ly lose in generations if ever. To the movement for Philippine independerce he gave vitality, character, and energy that have grown stronger year after year. Even when wve consider the natural passion of the race for freedom and the long succession of revolts with which it shook Spanish rule, this remains substantially true. With his first, then his sarcasms and censures, then his appeals, he showed the way to unity and drove the people along it. At his death he bequeathed to them his unquenchable yearning for liberty, while he gave them the necessary background of sacrifice for it. Whatever has been gained for nationality has been gained under this inspiration; without or beyond his knowledge, Rizal was the father of Philippine independence and the lofty model towa-d which Philippines life may aspire." Russell and Rodriguez, The Hero of thw Fiiipinos, pp. 333, 834.

Page  69 CHAPTER V Tuii KATIPUNAN REVOLT UNDER BONYIFACiO AND AGUINALDO On the very day of the publication of Rizal's banishment to Dapitan, July 7, 1892, Andres Bonifacio with Ladislao Diwa and Teodoro Plata founded another association different from the Liga Filipina, which was afterwards known as the Katipunan. () Its long name in Tagalog was the Kataastaasan Kagalanggalang na Katipunan Nang Mga Anak Ng Bayan (Highest and Most Respectable Association of the Sons of the People). Retana is undoubtedly right in giving the Katipunan a plebeian character. It wras truly an association of the "sons of the people." The Liga and the Katipunan Come people, with reason, attribute the establishment of the Katipunan to the influence of del Pilar and the consequent decline of Rizal. Perhaps it is more nearly true that in the deportation of Rizal, the loyal and noble propagandist of evolutionary nationalism, the necessity for more radical action became apparent; and that this more than anything else induced Bonifacio to form his Katipunan. Del Pilar was undoubtedly a man of greater decision than Rizal, and once he was convinced that peaceful measures were unavailing, he was determined to use violent means. It is therefore strongly probable-even if no proofs can be produced-that. the establishment of the Katipunan was inspired by del Pilar rather than by Rizal. In fact, Rizal's Spanish biographer, Retana, sees in the Katipunan the triumph of del Pilar's ideas over Rizal's. He states: "The League dies, and the Katipunan rises in its place. Del Pilar's plan wins over that of Rizal. Del Pilar and Rizal had the same end, even if each took a different road to it. Rizal sought the support of the intellectual and wealthy element; Del Pilar, the plebeian. (1) Z'tawa, Vida y Eacritos, p. 267. Other writers give a slightly diferent date

Page  70 70 THE DSVEJPMENT OF PIItLIPPINE POLITICS Del Pilar had something of the demagogue in him; Rizal was eminently spiritual. Del Pilar secured inspiration from the commune; Rizal could not conceive the conquest of liberty without previous education of the people. Del Pilar infused revolutionary sentiments; Rizal infused nationalistic sentiment. The Katipunan was the emblem of war; the League was the emblem of peace. Perhaps because of these reasons, General Blanco gave much more importance to del Pilar than to Rizal. Both sought the same end, if by different methods. Del Pilar was all shrewdness. apparently in favor of the government when he writes for the public, but at heart a demagogue. Rizal on the contrary was an intellectual revolutionist outsfde, and in h's heart a dreamer obsessed with the hope of peaceful development through ideas. "The contrast has been well established, though blind and vulgar spirits have failed to understand; the League was never the Katipunan. The League asked for no blood, reither then nor since. If the Katipunan did not ask for blood immediately, because it lacked organization and men, it would ask for it at the first opportunity. In effect it d'd, even before the appointed time, because it saw that Andres Bonifacio no longer had the patience to tolerate the tyranny under which the Filipino people was submerged." (1) While the Katipunan undoubtedly meant the triumph of the radical element and the repudiation of the evolutionary methods of the more conservative leaders, it did not spell the complete downfall of Rizal in the eyes of his people. In fact, his deportation gave him the halo of a martyr and his ideas continued to exert tremendous influence even among the Katipuneros themselves. He was made honorary president without his knowledge, and his picture was hung in the hall of the Katipunan. A Plebeian Association A few Spanish writers are prone to attribute to the Katipunan and its founders the most sanguinary feats, (1) retana, op. cit. p. 257.

Page  71 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 71 simply because it was really a more radical body than the Liga.(1) If in the actual revolution some of its members committed cruel deeds, those deeds were certainly performed without the consent of the responsible leaders and in flagrant violation of the ideals and principles of the association; for the association was conceived with noble purposes. It was a secret association somewhat akin to masonry in its practices; for as there was no freedom of association at that time, every attempt at political reform had to be secret. Its distinguishing feature was that it was a plebeian association. It included in its membership very few if any of the "intelligentsia" or of the wealthy people. Its founder, Andres Bonifacio, came from the lower stratum of Philippine society. He was first a vendor of sticks and paper fans; then he became a messenger at Fleming's Commercial House, and was later transferred to Fressell and Co., where he was paid about P12.00 a month. He did not have very much schooling, but he was a voracious reader. Bonifacio had in his small library the History of the French Revolution, Rizal's two novels, all the issues of La Solidaridad, and a few French novels. He had been a member of the Liga Filipin; and had attended the meeting called by Rizal. Doctrines of the Katipunan The doctrines of the Katipunan written in Tagalog and circulated among the members were the following: 1. Life which is not consecrated to a lofty and just purpose is like a tree which casts no shadow-a poisonous weed. 2. To do good for some personal motive and not because of a true desire to do good is not virtue. 3. Real saintliness consists in being charitable, in loving one's fellowmen, and in adjusting one's every word, action and deed to right and reason. 4. All men are equal, be the color of their skin black or white. One may be superior to another in wisdom, looks, or wealth, but they are equal as men. (1) See Jose M. del Castilo y Jimenez, El Katipunta o el Flibnusterismo en Filipinas, Madrid 1897, and Manuel Sastron, La Inaurreccio en Filipinas, Madrid, 1897, Abstracts of such writings are found in Artigaa, Andres Bonifaco y el Katipunan, Manila, 1911.

Page  72 72 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS 5. He whose sentiments are noble prefers honor to personal aggrandizement; he whose sentiments are perverse prefers personal desires to honor. 6. To a man of honor, his word is his oath. 7. Do not squander time; lost riches can be recovered; but time lost cannot be regained. 8. Defend the oppressed and fight the oppressor. 9. He who is intelligent is cautious in speech and knows how to keep the secrets which must be guarded. 10. On the thorny path of life man is the guide of his wife and his children, and if he guides them toward evil, they will also go toward evil. 11. Think not of a woman as a thing with which to pass the time merely, but as a helper, as a partner in the hardships of life. Respect her in her weakness and think only of the mother who brought you into the world and took care of you in your childhood. 12. What you do not want done to your wife, daughter, or sister, do not do to the wife, daughter, or sister of another. 13. The greatness of a man does not consist in being a king or in having a high nose or a white skin, or in being the priest representing God; neither does it consist in holding high positions on earth. Great and noble is he who altho born in the woods and with no knowledge except that of his own native tongue, is possessed of good character, is true to his word and mindful of his dignity and honor; a man who does not oppress nor help those who oppress; a man who loves and looks after the welfare of his country. Preach and follow these doctrines and when the Sun of Liberty rises in the midst of these unhappy Islands and with her splendour sheds everlasting happiness upon these united children and brothers of the same race, the lives of those who are gone and the pains and tribulations we have suffered shall be well recompensed. (1) The foregoing principles of the Katipunan were prepared by Emilio Jacinto, the adviser to Bonifacio. Jacinto was possibly the only Katipunan leader who had had what might be called a university education. It is said that Bonifacio had written his own draft of the proposed principles for the Katipunan, but upon seeing Jacinto's proposals, he gave up his own and adopted his friend's, believing them better written and better adapted to the needs of the so(1) Artigas. Andre Bonifacio y l Katihna#. pp. 18-20.

Page  73 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 73 ciety. Bonifacio's draft is in the form of a decalogue and reaus as follows: Duties of the Sons of the People 1. Love God with all thy heart. 2. Always hear in mind that the true love of God is the love of thy country, and that this love is also the true love of thy fellow-man. 3. Engrave in thy heart that the height of honor and happiness is to die in order to save one's country. 4. Calmness, constancy, reason, and faith in all work and action crown every good desire with success. 5. Maintain the mandates and aims of the K. K. K. as thine honor. 6. It is of the incumbency of all to deliver and aid, at the risk of their own lives and property, any one who runs great risk in the performance of his duties. 7. Let the acts of each in good government and the performance of his duties be such as to serve as an example to his neighbor. 8. In so far as it is within thy power, share thy means with every indigent or unfortunate person. 9. Diligence in one's efforts to earn the means of subsistence is the genuine love for oneself, one's spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister, and compatriot. 10. Believe in the punishment of every scoundred and traitor and in the reward of every good act. Believe, likewise, that the aims of the K. K. K. are God-given, and that desires for thy country are therefore also desires of God. Initiation of a Member Before a member could be initiated to the Katipunan he had to be tried, and the initiation, like that of masonry, was done in secret and with an impressive ceremony. A prospective member was led into a dark room with black curtains, on the walls of which were written the following words: "If you have strength and valor, you can proceed. If what has brought you hither is only curiosity, retire. if you cannot control your passions, retire; never shall the doors of the Sovereign and Venerable Association of the Sons of the People be opened to you." The candidate then proceeded to a table where there was a bolo and a skull. lie would then read the following questions and answer them:

Page  74 THEI DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS 1. In what state did the Spaniards find the Filipino people at the time of the conquest? 2. In what state are they to-day? 3. What future do they have?(1) lie was supposed to answer the foregoing questions in more or less the following manner: Answer to question No. 1: The Philippines before the coming of the Spaniards had a civilization of its own, had commerce with other countries, and was happy and content; No. 2: A description of the injustices and abuses committed by the Spaniards must be given; No. '3: The candidate's firm belief must be expressed that the future would be brighter if all the people could band together to improve their conditions, re3orting to fighting if necessary. The oath had to be signed in his own blood. The Katipunan had three degrees: first, second a-id third, somewhat like masonry. Apparently with the establishment of the Katipunan, Bonifacio still continued as a member of the Liga, because the Liga did not actually die with the establishment of the Katipunan. In fact, Bonifacio did not push the propaganda for his new association very much until the Liga was actually dead. Bonifacio tried his best to gain adherents for the Liga; but evidently his ideas were too radical for the others, and as soon as he was convinced that Rizal's association was dead beyond resuscitation, he began his propaganda for his own Katipunan. He was an enthusiastic propagandist of the association. He appealed to the masses, of which he was one, with amazing success, travelled from place to place, and gained followers wherever he went. The rapid growth of his association was a testimony to his untiring energy. The central government of the Katipunan resided in a Supreme Council with a president, a fiscal, a secretary, and an interventor. In 1892, after its foundation, the central government of the association was the Supreme Council called Kataastaasang Sangunian and consisting of the following officials: Deodato Arellano, President, Andres (I) Artigaa, on. cit. p. 82.

Page  75 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 75 Bonifacio, Comptroller, Ladislao Diwa, Fiscal, Teodoro Plata, Secretary, Valentin Diaz, Treasurer. Shortly after, Ramon Basa succeeded Deodato Arellano as president, and Andres Bonifac'o became fiscal. Ramon Basa then had differences with Bonifacio and in 1894 the former yielded to the latter the presidency of the Katipunan. Bonifacio was more popularly known as the Supremo of the Katipunan. At the time of the outbreak of the hostilities, the following were members of the Supreme Council: President....................... Andres Borifacio Secretary of State............... Emilio Jacinto Secretary of War............... Teodoro Plata (1) Secretary of Justice............. Briccio Pantas Secretary of the Interior......... Aguedo del Rosario (2) Secretary of Finance............ Enrique Pacheco In each province there Was a provincial council called Sanguniang Bayan; and in each town a popular council called Sanguniang Barangay. The Sanguniang Bayan had a directorate somewhat akin to the Supreme Council. There was also a secret chamber sitting as a court to try those who had violated the secrets or rules of the Katipunan. This chamber was called the Sanguniang Hukuman, and also had the power to dec:de disputes between the brethren. The Katipunan issued a paper called the Kalayaan, or "Liberty", on January 1, 1896, but only two numbers appeared of which the second issue failed to be distributed, for it was confiscated by the Spaniards. By August 19, 1896, Bonifacio was already planning a revolution, but the plan was discovered through the confessional before it could go into effect. One woman who knew the secret believed it her pious duty to tell the priest, and she laid bare the whole plan. Disregarding the secrecy of confessions, the priest wrote to the government a very lengthy report of what he had heard in the confessional, (1) Kalaw, T. M., The Philippine Revolution, p. 9. (2) Isabelo de los Reyes, in h's La Religion del Katipunan, gives a somewhat different list which would make Aguedo del Rosario Secretary of War, Teodo-o Plata Secretary of the Interior, Daniel Tria Tirona Secretary General, and V. Silvino, Treasurer-General.

Page  76 73 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS and many arrests followed. When the Katipuneros found out that their plan had been discovered, Bonifacio gathered all the leaders together. They swore that they would never return to their homes; they tore to pieces their tax certificates as a testimony that they had ended their allegiance to Spain. The war cry was given. On August 29-30 occurred the first bloody encounter on the fields of Balintawak near Manila. On that spot to-day there stands a monument, a plebeian Filipino brandishing the bolo of the Revolution. The news of the uprising spread like fire, and Governor Blanco had to declare the provinces of Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlak, La Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas in a state of war. Did Rizal Favor the Revolt? Feborc he decided on the uprising, Bonifacio had sent Dr. Valenzuela to Dapitan to get the opinion and support of Rizal. According to Valenzuela's statement to the Spanish authorities, Rizal was against the revolution, so much so that Rizal and he almost quarrelled over the matter, ard instead of staying in Dapitan for a month, Valenzuela left the following day. General Alejandrino, on the other hand, declares that(1) Rizal was in favor of the revolution, but he first wanted an understanding with the wealthy people. He even desired Valenzuela to ask Antonio Luna to act as an intermediary with the people of means. When Antonio Luna was actually approached later on he ridiculed the idea and asked, "How shall we fight? With this?" Ile showed his teeth. Some wealthy people, like Francisco Ro::as, were also approached, but they naturally rejected the idea. This shows that the movement was composed of the poor people rather than of the wealthy and intellectual class. It is true that as soon as the revolt was started the Katipunan leaders tried to implicate the wealthy people of Manila by telling the authorities that the movement had the support of the well-to-do. Some of the latter were put to death on such false testimony. (2) This (1) Memories de Nuestro Glorioso Pasado, lecture given at the Liceo de Manila. July 26. 1913, published in El Ideal, July 29. 19,18. (2) Testimony of Dr. Valenzuela printed in Retana, Aroivo del Bibioflao FUipino, Madrid, 1897, Vol. III, p. 226.

Page  77 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 77 is another indication of the plebeian character of the organization. At the time of the revolution, those affiliated with the Katinunan must have been between 100,000 and 400 000 members. (1) Meanwhile Rizal, who faithful to his promise to the Spanish government had kept himself in his exile aloof from every active political movement, was now ol his way to Manila. To show further his desire to return to private life, he had requested and received permission to go to Cuba to cure the wounded, as he had heard of the great need there for medical aid. But when he reached Manila he fa;led to get the boat, and had to wait for another ore. The first encounters had already taken place. Naturally the Spaniards in Manila were in a state of nervous tension. The governor ordered arrests by the dozers and the hundreds, but Rizal was allowed to leave for Spain. Everybody feared for his life. At Singapore, RIoxas, a wealthy Filipino, urged him to escape and promised to make the attempt with him. Ro.:as actually did get away but Rizal would not even try. I-e wanted to go to Spain and Cuba, saying that he was not connected with the revolt and that inasmuch as he had applied for the position in Cuba, he wanted to show that he hoiestly wanted to be in Cuba. Events proved the fears of his friends to have been justified. At Port Said the boat was overtaken by a telegram which declared Rizal a prisoner. The cry of Balintawak, as the first revolutionary encounter was called, resounded through the nearby towns and provinces. Cavite, a town of the same province, rose two days afterwards under the leadership of a man whose popularity and military achievements were destined to eclipse those of Bonifacio.- This was Emilio Aguinaldo, a school teacher by profession, who joined the Katipunan in 1894. Though a relatively obscure member, he rose to prominence with his successes in the field. He won notable battles like that at Binacayan, and so his prestige grew to the detriment of Bonifacio's. The Spaniards considered (1) Le Roy, op. cit. vol. I. p. 85: De los Reyes. in La PRegiofl det Ka'panag, p. 45. places the number from 15,000 to 46,000 only.

Page  78 78 THE DIVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS him the real leader of the revolutionists; and in trying to effect a reconciliation, wrote letters to him rather than to Bonifacio, evidently ignoring the Supremo of the Katipunan. Bonifacio naturally did not like this. Moreover, he thought that Aguinaldo was not wholly sincere in his support of revolutionary ideals and that he would be willing to surrender if good terms in the way of political reforms could be secured. Magdivang Vs. Magdalo There is another circumstance that must not be lost sight of in this rivalry for supremacy between Aguinaldo and Banifacio. The heart of the rebellion was Cavite, and Aguinaldo was a Cavitenflo. The Cavite-ios were the first to clear the greater portion of their province of the Spanish rule. They next divided the towns of the province into two provincial councils under the Katipunan organization. One was called the Magdiwang and the other the Magdalo. In each of the provincial councils there were a president, a vice-president, a secretary, several secretaries of departments (interior, justice and finance), anid a captain-general corresponding to the secretary of war. Aguinaldo belonged to the Magdalo council, holding the post of Captain-General. HIe seemed to have the idea from the beginning that the Katipunan organization should continue only as a means of propaganda and that the conquered provinces should have a different sort of organization. On October 31, 1896, he published his first manifesto declaring that the purpose of the revolution was "Liberty and Independence." He signed it as "Emilio Aguinaldo, Magdalo." He proposed to establish a revolutionary government to be composed of a central revolutionary committee consisting of six members, municipal committees and a number of delegates representing the municipal committees. The motto of the revolution was "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." He had the support of the Magdalo people in his desire to establish a revolutionary government instead of continuing the Katipunan organization. Bonifacio was not in Cavite at this time, but in the mountains of Malabon, now the province of RizaL While

Page  79 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT he had shown tremendous ability in winning over adherents and members of the Katipunan, once war was declared, he seems to have failed in the qualities of a military leader. He was not a soldier by nature. In this respect Aguinaldo outshone him. Moreover, being the founder of the Katipunan, Bonifacio could not see why any other government should be established. Here was a conflict of ideas which eventually led to a clash. The rivalry between the two leaders was further engendered by the friction between the Magdalo and the Magdiwang councils. The Magdiwang had been in closer touch with Bonifacio and recognized him as the Supremo of the Katipunan. They invited Bonifacio to come to Cavite in order to see the situation there with his own eyes. At the third invitation of the Magdiwang people, Bonifacio went to Cavite in the latter part of December, 1896. Ile noticed the growing rivalry between the two councils and immediately sided with the Magdiwang. Thus, in a letter that he wrote to Emilio Jacinto, his close adviser, and the brains of the Katipunan, he said: (About February or March, 1897) Here the enmity between the two factions is very great, because those of Magdalo want to rule all and the entire Philippines, because they say that nothing but the Government of Imus is recognized there and throughout Europe. The government they try to establish here is as follows: President and General-in-Chief "Magdalo"; Director of Military Works, "Baldomero" and those of "Magdiwang" will simply act as sub-director or sub-minister. This plan truly disgusted the ministers of Magdiwang, who saw through their game th. if Imus is elected, they will govern here in Malabon. The selfishness of Magdalo is truly disgusting and has been the cause of their many reverses in the field. (1) The Katipunan Vs. A Revolutionary Government Bonifacio was met at Cavite by.Edilberto Evangelista, an engineer, who belonged to the Magdalo faction. He presented to Bonifacio a proposed constitution, establishing a revolutionary government. To discuss this proposed constitution, an assembly was convoked at Imus by the govern(1) Santos. P.ilippine Review, November, 1917. "The Government of Imus" stated in the first paragraph refers to the Magdalo council.

Page  80 SO THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ment of the Magdalo. There the following issue was presented: "Should the revolutionists be governed by the Katipunan or by a new government?" Those who supported the first proposition, government by the Katipunan, maintained that the Katipunan had its own constitution, duly discussed and approved; that by virtue of that constitution provincial governments had been established around Manila; that the mission of the Katipunan was to secure the liberty of the country, and that therefore this constitution and its rules should continue until the longed-for liberty of the country was secured. Those who were in favor of establishing a new government said that the Katipunan was a secret society, and that therefore as soon as the insurrection had started it should be abolished; and that with regard to the government of the province of Cavite, because it was a small province it should have only one council. (l) However, nothing definite resulted from that assembly of Ilmus. Another assembly of leaders was called at Tejeros, San Francisco de Malabon. The Defeat of Bonifacio at the Tejeros Assembly In the assembly at Tejeros on March 22, 1897, the question of establishing a revolutionary government was submitted by Severino de las Alas, who was, by the way, a Magdiwang. Evidently not all the Magdiwang people were in favor of continuing the Katipunan. Alas raised the question whether the type of government to be established should be discussed. The President of the session, Jacinto Lumbreras, stated that the Katipunan with its supreme council, provincial councils and popular councils was the established government. He was supported in this by Bonifacio himself. Again Alas arose and inquired what kind of government t!e country had, whether monarchial or republican. Bonifacio answered that the motto of the 41) Artemio Ricarte. Apwntes Hist^ricos de la Insurreocidn por los asociados al "Kamwahlmahala't Kttaasang Katipuaan ng Mga Anak nog Bayan", contra el Gobierno Esopaol e las Islas Filipinas. This work still in Ms. form and written by a man who was supposed to be in favor of Bonifacio, gives a most interesting account of the issues between Aguinaldo and Bonifacio. He has divided his work into sections so that it is relatively easy to refer to it. A carbon copy is kept by the writer.

Page  81 TAP, KATIPUNAN REVOLT 81 constitutioni of the Katipunan was "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality." After some discussion it was decided to establish a revolutionary government. Bonifacio himself said that inasmuch as they wanted to establish a supreme government to direct the revolution, abolishing that which had already been organized by the Katipunan, he would acquiesce as President of the Supreme Council of the Katipunan, to their just petition, but that before everything else, he invited everybody to recognize a principle on which the deliberation regarding all matters and at all sessions must be based. This principle, he said, was that they must respect and acquiesce to the vote or the decision of the majority in all its parts. They unanimously agreed to be guided by that principle. (1) By this time Bonifacio himself was presiding, and as soon as the Republic of the Philippines was proclaimed with vivas, the election of officers took place. Again, before voting, Bonifacio called the attention of all the electors who represented the several provinces to the fact that whoever received the majority vote should be respected and supported, no matter what his ambitions might be and no matter what culture he might possess. Again his words met with common assent. Ballots were distributed, and by majority vote Emilio Aguinaldo was elected President of the Republic, defeating Andres Bonifacio and Mariano Trias. Aguinaldo was not present at the meeting; he was in the battlefield. His election was proclaimed with applause. The election of Vice-President followed. Severino de las Alas said that inasmuch as Bonifacio had obtained second place in the election for President, he should be proclaimed Vice-President of the Republic. No one said anything either against or in favor of Alas' proposition, so Bonifacio ordered them to proceed to the election, which resulted in favor of Mariano Trias Closas over Andres Bonifacio and some others. Then the election for Captain General was held, resulting in the triumph of Artemio Ricarte. For Director of War Emilio Diego de Dios was chosen, and for Director of the ((1) For the bmeeting at Imis and Tejerot. see icarte. Apantes, et aes. e 81, 84.

Page  82 82 THIE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS.Interior, Andres Bonifacio. But whereas the results of the several preceding elections had been met with vivas, in the case of Bonifacio, Daniel Tirona asked for the floor and said: "The position of Director of the Interior is very great and should not be occupied by one who is not a lawyer. We have in our province a lawyer, Jose del Rosario, who should be declared elected." That was too much for Bonifacio, so he shouted: "Haven't we agreed to follow the dictates of the majority of this assembly?" The meet. ing would have resulted in a fight had not some of the members intervened. Then Bonifaclo declared null and void all that had been agreed upon in that meeting and refused to recognize it as legal. Bonifacio Refuses to Recognize Results of Tejeros Convention Af'e- the assembly at Tejeros Bonifaclo's men tried to annul the action. For this purpose they held a meeting at Na;c. Auinaldo was sick at the time; but when he learned of the plot, he immediately went to the place, and seems to have succeeded in winning over most of the leaders, including 5Mariano Trias and Severino de las Alas.(') Bonifacio then proceeded to leave the province, determined not to recognize the Revolutionary government. Aguinaldo heard that Andres Bonifacio was recruiting forces and had even induced Artemio Ricarte to resign as Capitan General of the Army; he was also told that Gen. Malvar was loaning rifles to the President of the Katipunan. It was probably this news and the possible support of the Revolutionary government of Batangas for Bonifacio which induced Aguinaldo to write a letter to the provincial government which he ended as follows: Once more I wi-i to impress upon your minds, the fact that the Government in its efforts to carry out its purposes must be supported by everyone, and that if you give it your assistance you will deserve not only the thanks of the whole country but mine as well; but, on the other hand, if you should fail to give me the assistance which I request of you my regret will be great, for I shall consider your in(1) Santos op. cit., Philippine Review, Nov., 1917.

Page  83 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT difference to mratters affecting our country as a sirn of a lack of partiotism, which the Nation should punish with utmost severity and without delay.(1) Mabini in his work on the Philippine Revolution contends that what should have been done at the time, 'or even earlier after the elections, was to seek some means of reconciliation. When Mabini wrote his history he did not have the documents necessary for a comprehensive study; he was in Guam, deported and surrounded by some Bonifacio people, chief among whom was Ricarte himself. As a matter of fact, there was an attempt at reconciliation. Col. Agapito Bonzon was sent after Bonifacio to prevail upon him to stay so that a reconciliation might be effected. Even the correspondence of Bonifac'o's wife admits that the first steps taken by Col. Bonzon were friendly and that the Colonel invited Bonifacio to go back to Indang that night. According to Bonifacio's wife, Bonifacio said: "What shall I do in Indang when I am treated badly by our own brothers?" Artemio Guevara, who xwas a supporter of Bonifac'o, in his letter to Emilio Jacinto of May 3, 1897, said: Colonel Intong Bonzon of Bacoor came to the house accompanied by other officers, and upon being asked by Don Andres concerning the purpose of his visit, he replied as follows: "We have come, sir, in order to invite you to do your part to prevent a separation between us; it is for you to choose the place where you wish to stay, whether at Naik or at Indan." Don Andres replied: "Pardon me, if I decline to accept your invitation; I shall never return, because I will not tolerate what they have been doing to me. In the first place, they cut down our food, and what shall I do with the orphans and widows of those who fell in action at Malabon and Noveleta? I believe if such a thing were to happen to you and you had my mettle your patience would come to an end too. In the second place, they say (1) Taylor. Philippine Insurgent Records, Vol. 1. Exhibit 28. These records, consisting of a historical resume and English ti anslations of important revolutionary documents captured during the war, and collected by Capt. John R, Taylor, are still in galley proof, their publication having been suppressed by Mr. Taft, then Secretmay of War. For further information regarding this important collection see notes in the bibliography. Henceforward in this work. this citation will be referred to simply as Taylor followed by the volume and the galley or exhibit number.

Page  84 84 ThIT DVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS hereabouts that I should be denied recognition in the P --- ince of Cavite, because I am a worthless individual. The proper thing for me to do is, for this reason, to leave here; somebody will surely be found in the provinces of Manila, Bulacan, and Nueva Ecija who will take pity on me." The sharpers then replied: "If that is so, we shall go away again, because our men have not yet eaten."(1) This interview between Bonifacio ard Col. Agapito ronzon, Aguinaldo's envoy, ended in a fight. Who began the firing is a question that has not been settled. It may be true that Col. Bonzon, upon finding that he could not achieve his purpose by conciliation, decided to take Bonifacio back as a prisoner. That Col. Bonzon was the first to order the firing was the testimony of Donifacio in his trial. (2) In a letter dated at Maguagi, April 23, 1837, Mariano Noriel, Brigadier General, brought to the attention of the President the report by Col. Agapito Bonzon, who had been sent to Indang to investigate certain matters with reference to Bonifacio. Acco;ding to Noriel, the Colonel reported that he had tried to converse with Bonifacio in friendly terms, but that it was useless because Bonifacio ordered his forces to open fire, which was answered by Bonzon. (3) The forces of Bonifacio were defeated and Eonifac'o himself was wounded and taken, to prison. Trial and Death of Eonifacio On the same date Aguinaldo ordered that a judge be appointed to examine the facts. Noriel appointed Col. Pantaleon Garcia, who investigated the matter and got the statements of many witnesses, including Bonifacio and his brother Procopio. Bonifacio denied before Col. Garcia the. existence of a revolutionary government. When he was asked whether Emilio Aguinaldo was elected President at the meeting at Tejeros, he replied: "Almost all who attended said meeting were biased in favor of Aguinaldo, the proceeding was carried out according to previous (1) Santos. Philippine Review,, January & Februaiy, 1918, p. 49. (2) Taylor, Vol. I, Exh. 30, 99 F. Z. (3) Taylor, op. cit. Vol. I, Exh. 80. 95 F. Z.

Page  85 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 85 arranemnents made by, the Ministers of the Magdiwang government, so that although said Emilio Aguinaldo was elected President and Gen. Artemio Ricarte was chosen for the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Filipino Army, I did not consider said acts to be an expression of the sentiment of the people." (1) On May 4. 1897, Pantaleon Garcia further reported that Bonifacio had been recruiting people in Limbon and putting into prison those who were opposed to his plans; that Bonzon had been sent to investigate, and that when the fight in which Bonifacio was wounded took place, the first shot was fired by Ciriaco Bonifacio. Pedro Giron also declared that he had been given ten pesos by, Andres Ionifacio to kill President Aguinaldo. In vewv of all these statements, Pantaleo- Carc a recommended that a court martial be appointed in order to study the proofs more carefully and to determine whether law and justice could be executed. A court martial was anpointed. presided over by Mariano Noriel, and includirg Mariano Riego ce Dios. Esteban Infante, Sulpicio de la Cruz, Crsostono Riel (?), Plac'do Martinez. and probably Tomas Mascardo. Thb first session took place at Maragondong on May 4, 1897. Plac'do Martinez acted as lawyer for Andres Bonifacio, and Teodoro Gonzales for Procopio Bonifacio; and Jose Elises acted as fiscal or prosecuting attorney. The fiscal maintained that Andres Bonifacio and his brother were guilty of conspiracy and sedition, and should, therefore, be sentenced to death. Placido Martinez seemed to admit Bonifacio's guilt but he asked pardon for him. Pardon was also asked for his brother. Andres Bonifacio further requested permission to speak, which was granted him. The court martial found that Bonifacio knew of a government in the locality where he was; that he was inducing officials and soldiers from the Revolutionary Government to join him; that he was recruiting and arming men at Limbon to overthrow the Revolutionary Government; and that he had fired the first shots against Col. Bonzon's troops. He was therefore guilty of (1) Taylor, VoL I, Exhibit 80, 97 F. Z.

Page  86 c86 TTHE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS conspiracy and sedition against the Revolutionary Government, and the Court sentenced him to death. The death sentence was signed by Sulpicio de la Cruz, Crisostomo Riel, Mariano Noriel, Tomas Mascardo, Esteban Infante, and Placido Martinez. On May 7 the court martial sent the paper to the Commander-in-Chief. They were later referred to the Auditor of War and Adjutant General Baldomero Aguinaldo, who confirmed the sentence, though he also asked that the conduct of Col. Bonzon be investigated with reference to the alleged maltreatment of Bonifacio's wife.(') On May 8, Emilio Aguinaldo and Baldomero Aguinaldo commuted the death sentence of Andres Bonifacio and Procopio Bonifacio to life imprisonment. (2) The terms of the others were reduced to one year. It is alleged that Bonifacio later on tried to escape and was killed. Nobody seems to be able to prove that his death was due to the order of Aguinaldo, who as we have seen, had himself commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. (3) (1) Taylor, Vol. I, Exhibit 30, 2 L. Y. (2) Taylor, Vol. I, Exhibit 30, 2 L. Y. (8) Capt. Taylor, who compiled the Insurgent Records said in his historical resumm. (Insurvent Records Vol. I, 31 FZ): "Aguinaldo later stated that he had had him (Doniiacio) shot." Tayloi's sole authority for this statement is Jose Barroso, a Spanish reporter, who published an account of the events of 1397 in El Imparcial. The sto.y was afterwards printed in "La Politica de Espaia en Filipinas" Vol. VIII, 1S9', and t analated in English in Taylor, op. cit. Vol. I, Lxhibit 65. In the interview with the Spanish reporter, Aguinaldo is reported to have said: "It is quite true that the Katipunan us another desire-that of indepeneence-but that desire was unattainable, and imoo eover it was in opposition to our sentiments. It served as the banner of Andres Bonifacio, a ciruel man whom I ordered sliot, and with his death the Katipunan disappeared. You may be sure of this; we ask no reforms other than that the influence which the friars hold under the laws in all our towns be restrained. We do not ask for their expulsion for such radical measures should not be carried into effect under the present conditions. We desire that the parishes be secularized or that they be presided over by friars who depend, not on their piovincials, lit on the a chbishop, and, in a measure, we ask that some part of the patrimony of -'he hacienas in the provinces be diverted from the religious orders to us." The authenticity of this interview may well be doubted for Aguinaldo could not have denied that he had advocated inu. pendence. His troclamations and the Biak-na-Eato Constitution were all directed toward that end. In explaining exhibit 30, 2LY, Capt. Taylor appended the following note: "Note by J. R. M. Taylor-Bonifacio was undoubtedly killed: how or when I do not know, but undoubtedly with the consent and probably in accordance with the orders of E. Aguinaldo." Evidently when he wrote the foregoing note, Capt. Taylor forgot that he had already supported the testimony of the Spanish writer to the effect that Aguinaldo had ordered Ionifacio shot.

Page  87 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 87 Mabini, in his work already cited, mercilessly attacks Aguinaldo and brands the death of Bonifacio as a crime. He said that "the death of Bonifacio constitutes the first triumph of personal ambition over true patriotism." Nobody questions the sincerity of Mabini in his work, yet his criticism does not seem to be fully justified. The Te'eros convention was doubtless crude from the standpoint of popular government, yet considering the circumstances, it was fairly representative of the forces in arms even if a majority were Cavitelios. Moreover, Bonifacio, whatever he may have decided to do later, was prevented from questioning its representative character, inasmuch as he had agreed to abide by its decision. The fact that he was defeated in three consecutive elections for three different posts showed that he had completely lost the leadership which he had wielded as Suprenmo of the Katipunan. After the election Bonifacio complained to Emilio Jacinto that he ha.l Ciscovered underhanded work on the part of some- of the Magdalo faction; but in spite of that fact he said at the opening of the convention that he would acquiesce in the decision of the majority. Bonifacio has been called the father of democracy in the Philippines, for he was the first to show faith in the masses. A plebeian, himself, he knew that he could rely most upon the support of the common people, and that is why lie recruited his Katipuimn members from among the common people. When it was reported to him that" Rizal was against the revolution at that time because of the lack of arms and ships, he said: "Where did Dr. Rizal read that in order to start a revolution we needed arms and ships first?" It was his radical determination which started the revolt. Nobody can justly minimize his work preparatory to the great conflict. As a propagandist and organizer he had shown extraordinary capacity. Even the commanding officer of the Spanish civil guard at Manila, Olegario Diaz, had this to say of him: "It must be understood that Bonifacio is not an ordinary man; lie has an energetic, strenuous and audacious disposition, with an ease of expression in his own language which appeals to his countrymen; of a judgment clear, but badly influenced by

Page  88 88 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS reading literature of an ex'citing and dangerous character; and of an unlimited ambition." (1) But the times demanded strong measures. The revolutionists could not afford to be divided; one of two courses had to be taken, either the continuation of the Katipunan government under Bonifacio or the maintenance of the new Revolutionary Government, which had the support of the majority. Attempts at conciliation with Bonifacio having failed, the Revolutionary government was forced to eliminate him. Bonifacio ceased to be the man of the hour. Even his own leaders, who protested against the results of the election, proposed that Pio del Pilar should be made the "master of the situation" and not Bonifacio. The members of the Magdiwang council who had been elected, upon being called to a subsequent meeting, took their oath of office. Even Ricarte himself, after some persuasion, took the oath. In other words, the revolutionary government was actually established,-a government that Bonifacio, as the Supremo of the Katipunan, declared that he did not recognize. Ricarte, a Bonifacio man, confessed that Aguinaldo had won to his side the other leaders of the revolution. He said: "After Easter in 1897, having won the good will of the majority of the insurgent chiefs, Aguinaldo put into effect what was agreed to at the Tejeros Convention, and at the church of Santa Cruz de la Malabon he convoked all the members of the Magdiwang faction to a new assembly."(2) The new government of the Philippine Republ'c was finally constituted as follows: President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo Vice-President, Don Mariano Trias Closas Captain-General, Artemio Ricarte (Vivora) Director of War, Don Mariano Riego de Dios Director of the Interior, Don Pascual Alvarez Director of State, Don Jacinto Lumbreras Director of Finance, Don Baldomero Aguinaldo Director of Fomento, Don Mariano Alvarez Director of Justice, Don Severino de las Alas (1) Retana, Archivo del Bibiofitlo Filipino, VoL In, p. 856. (2) Rlc^ai't Apnetes, etc. Sec. 35 e.

Page  89 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 89 There was no time to lose, for General Primo de Rivera. the Spanish Commander, had received reinforcements and had now four brigades which gave him a decided advantage over the revolutionists. Many of the towns had been reconquered by the Spaniards. Three brave Filipino generals were killed, Edilberto Evangelista, Crispulo Aguinaldo, and Flaviano Yengko. Even Aguinaldo was obliged to go to Batangas and join Malvar, afterwards proceeding to Biak-na-Bato. But the new revolutionary leader won the sympathy of the other officials, former followers of Bonifacio. When Aguinaldo arrived at Talisay, he was recognized by the forces of Andres Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto. From Talisay, Aguinaldo went to Laguna and Rizal with hardly, forty men. At Puray the department government of Luzon was established, comprising what are now the provinces of Rizal, Bulakan, Laguna, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Tarlac, and Pangasinan. With the coming of the Spanish reinforcements, amounting to over 20,000 soldiers far better armed than the revolutionists, the greater part of Cavite was retaken by the Spaniards. Other reverses were suffered, but by this time the revolution had spread to more provinces in spite of Spanish victories; hence the Spanish governor was obliged to announce a policy of attraction. The Biakna-cBato Constitution With Cavite retaken by the enemy, and with Spanish victories in other provinces, Aguinaldo thought it wise to establish himself in the mountain fastnesses of Biak-naBato, Bulacan. From that place he continued to give his commands to the Revolutionary forces. On July 7, 1897, he issued a manifesto explaining the grievances of the Filipino people against Spain and urging his countrymen to continue the fight. This document admirably pictures the pent up feelings of the oppressed people. The document is printed in full: On the inauguration of the second epoch of our struggle, from these mountains, ever faithful to our liberty and independence, we raise our voices to all those in whose breasts

Page  90 90 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS beat noble hearts; to all those who have courage and honor, dignity and patriotism. We make no racial discrimination; we call upon all who possess honor and the sense of personal dignity; the Filipino, the Asiatic, the American and the European all alike suffer; and we invite all those who suffer to aid in lifting up a fallen and tortured people, a country destroyed and sunken in the mire of debasement. We reject no one, not even the Spaniards, for we have gallant Spaniards in our ranks; free from prejudice and solely through love of justice, they defend our demand for the recognition of ourselves and our dignity. To arms, noble hearts, to arms! Enough of suffering! The Filipino people crawl in degradation. The country weeps because of the debasement of her sons. Look at our altars, stained by the religious orders which have converted the most sacred objects into means of avaricious exploitation. Without regard for poverty, for morality or for the public health, the friar thinks only of the gold he receives for baptisms, weddings and burials. Tlo them the Tagalogs who have no tnoney are heathens, they may live together in concubinage and their corpses may be food for the crows and the dogs. Only the rich are blessed and receive the sacrament. Look at our homes, their landmarks and lands watered with the sweat of our forefathers are taken away by the insatiable friars, despots and plunderers of the fruits of our toil, while they proclaim their poverty and chastity. Alas for the family which lays by some little saving! Alas for the mother who has a daughter who is good-looking! On their account innocent parents and brothers will soon have to shed tears of disgrace and exile. Look at the law trampled under foot, converted into a weapon to be used against rather than in defense of the Filipinos; on all sides threats and bribes. The municipality degraded; the administration and treasury ruined by immorality and speculation. In the government and high offices of the State, where the native is barred from holding office, arbitrary rule prevails, individual security depending not on natural right, but on the irresponsible will of any of those in authority. Error and deception is the motto of public instruction; in the schools and the press absolute tyranny; on all side& ignorance, dishonor, vice and corruption. Appeals to the law have no effect; complaints, demands in legitimate form, have only received contempt. What has been done with our legal petitions to have the friars expelled from Philippine soil? What has been done with our

Page  91 THE KATIPUNAN rE-VOLT 91 demand and arguments for the proper representation of the Philippines in the Spanish Cortes? Oh civilization and culture! The signers who peaceably petitiored under the protection of the law are all executed or banished. Enough, enough of scandal. To arms, Filipinos, to arms. my brothers! Mindful of the common good, we aspire to the glory o- obtaining liberty, independence and honor for the country. We aspire to have a common law, created for all citizens, which will serve then as -a guarantee and assurance of respect, without exception. We aspire to have a government which will represent all the active forces of the country, in which will take part the most capable, the most worthy in virtues and talents, without regard to their birth, their wealth or the race to which they belong. We desire that no friar set his foot on any part of the Archipelago, and that no convent or monastery or center of corruption, or partisans of that theocracy which has made this land another inquisitorial Spain, shall remain. In our ranks order shall always be respected. Under our flag justice will always govern. Worthy sons of that liberty which has been so iniquitously snatched away from us, we shall show the world that we are worthy of having our own government-our own country as we have our own language. We fling back into their teeth the name which our enemies give us. We are the faithful sons, we who, scorning life and money, and comfort, we who, scorning all kinds of hardship give our blood for the good of our country, for the welfare of our fellow-citizenm and the redemption of our children. Viva the free Philippines! () The revolutionists assembled at Dlak-na-Eato organized themselves as Assembly of Representatives and proceeded to discuss a provisional constitution prepared by Isabelo Artacho with the help of Ferrer. (2) This constitution was approved in November, 1897, and was to take effect for two years only. It declared that the end sought by the revolution was "the separation of the Philippines from the Spanish monarchy and their formation into an independent state with its own government called the Phl (1) Taylor, Vol. I, Exh. 83. (2) ILearte, Apuntes, aBe. 88 (j).

Page  92 92 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ippine Republic." The government of the Republic was vested in a supreme council composed of a president, a vicepresident and four secretaries (of state and foreign relations, of war, of the interior, and of finance). This council could give orders with the force of law, impose and collect taxes, and supervise and direct military operations. The executive power was vested in the President, and the judicial power in a Supreme Council of Grace and Justice to be created. The principal provisions of the bill of rights were to be enforced; and Tagalog was to be the official language. After two years a new assembly of Representatives was to be called to modify the form of the constitution and to elect a new council and government. (1) Several other decrees and proclamations were issued from Biak-na-Bato, such as those providing for military contributions, the organization of sandatahan, and punishments for robbery, raid, and crime committed by armed persons. A central revolutionary committee was also organized in Hongkong, headed at first by Jose Ma. Basa and later by Felipe Agoncillo, with Mariano Ponce as secretary. (2) The revolutionists there gathered acting as Assembly of Representatives proceeded to enforce the constitution by electing on November 2, 1097 the Suprerle Counc:l of Govelnment as follows: President, Sr. Emilio Aguinaldo. Vice-President, Sr. Mariano Trias, Secretary of the Interior, Sr. Isabelo Artacho. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Sr. Antonio Montenegro. Secretary of the Treasury, Sr. Baldomero Aguinaldo. Secretary of War, Sr. Emiliano Riego de Dios.(s) The Pact of Biak-na-Bato Simultaneously with the discussion of the IBak-na-2ato Constitution, Pedro A. Paterno offered himself as a mediator between the insurgents and Gov. Primo de Rivera. After extended negotiations and after consulting his col(1) For a complete text of the constitution see Taylor, Vol. I, Exh. 47. It is also printed as appendix B of this volume. (2) T. M. Kalaw, The Philippino evftoution, p. 66. (3) Tayior, VoL I, Lxh. 4o.

Page  93 TII3 KATIFUNAN KEVOLT leagues, Aguinaldo gave Paterno authority to negotiate for the insurgents, and stated that the reforms which would be accepted by the revolutionists as a basis for peace were as follows: 1. Expulsion of the religious orders, or at least regulations prohibiting them from living together in cloisters. 2. Representation of the Philippines in the Spanish Cortes. 3. Application of true justice in the Philippines, the same for the native as for the Spaniard. The same laws in Spain and the Philippines. The natives to have a share in the higher offices of the civil administration. 4. Adjustment of property, of taxes and parishes, in favor of the native. 5. Proclamation of the individual rights of the native, as well as his liberty to combine with others in associations, and the liberty of the press. (1) Aguinaldo also requested that complete armistice be extended to those who had taken up arms and that the sum of P3,000,000 should be set aside for distribution among the revolutionists and their families who had suffered during the revolt. Primo de Rivera would not consider making those reforms part of a written pact. He had been, however, known to favor reforms openly, and he told Paterno "that the magnanimity of the nation and the wisdom of the government would accord the reforms judged necessary for the existence and development of the Archipelago." (2) The actual Pact was signed on November 18, 1897, between Fernando Primo de Rivera as Captain General and Pedro Alejandro Paterno as arbitrator. The document provided for the surrender of Aguinaldo and his followers and for full amnesty for them. The rebellion was to be ended for, to quote the document, "the state of war retarded rather than hastened the inauguration of advantageous reforms". Aguinaldo claims that the reforms agreed upon were "that the religious corporations in the Philippines be expelled and an autonomous system of government, political and administrative, be established, though by special re (1) Taylor. Vol. 1. p. 216. 10 LY. (2) Taylor, Vol. I. p. 206, 5 LY.

Page  94 94 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PIIILIPPINE POLITICS quest of Ceneral Primo de Rivera these conditions were not insisted on in the drawing up of the Treaty, the General contending that such concessions would subject the Spanish Government to severe criticism and even ridicule". (') The monetary consideration was contained in the program for the execution of the agreement which was dated December 14, 1897, and signed by Fernando Primo de Rivera as Captain General, and Pedro A. Paterno as arbitrator. It provided for the sum of 800,000 pesos, to be paid in three installments, one of which, a check for 400,000 pesos, would be given Emilio Aguinaldo on his departure for Hongkong. In the meanwhile two Spanish generals would act as hostages in Biak-na-Bato where 225 firearms, 2,382 cartridges and 22 pieces of machinery would be turned over by Artemio Ricarte. As soon as this was done, Ricarte would telegraph Aguinaldo in Hongkong to cash the check for P400,000. As soon as 700 arms had been surrendered, Paterno would be given two checks, one for P200,000 payable on sight and the other for the same amount payable when the Te Deum was sung and a general armistice proclaimed. Besides the 800,000 pesos promised the Revolutionists in arms, Primo de Rivera pledged 900,000 pesos more for those not in arms who had suffered during the rebellion. The total obligation promised by Spain was therefore 1,700,000 pesos. The P400,000 check was cashed in Hongkong, and on December 16, 1897, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation approving the program presented by Paterno and declaring "without jurisdiction of the Government organized by the revolution, and without the right to call themselves insurrectos or revolucionarios or to profit by any of the charities or other benefits forthcoming under the agreement with the Spanish Government, all those who disobey my orders to lay down the arms and all those who oppose themselves to the carrying into effect the terms of this programme of pacification." (2) This proclamation was signed by Emilio Aguinaldo, President, Isabelo Artacho, Secretary of the Interior, and (1) Agruinaldo. Re.Reia Ver;diea de la Revolucid6 Filipiwa, Chapter II. (2) Taylor, Vol. I, Exh. 60.

Page  95 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT Vito Vilarmino, Secretary of War. The Council of Government conferred upon Isabelo Artacho and Baldomero Aguinaldo full powers to act for the Supreme Council in the Philippines for the execution of the agreement. In another manifesto Emilio Aguinaldo stated that he laid down his arms because his expectations were one with "the lofty designs of the Governor General." (1) On their way to Lingayen, where they intended to take the boat to Hongkong, Aguinaldo and his followers were enthusiastically met by the people. In fact, it was more of a triumphal march than a capitulation to the enemy. Apparently the revolutionists had emphasized to the people the reforms promised in lieu of their expatriation and hence the pact was considered in the light of a victory. Probably the monetary consideration was not very much dwelt upon in their explanation to the people. The parting message which the revolutionists sent the Spanish Governor General reads as follows: General Primo de Rivera, Manila Lingayen, Dec. 27, (1897) On leaving their native land, the Filipino revolutionists, with profound emotion and tears in their eyes send you their adieu, leaving in the hands of your Excellency the care of their homes, the protection of the soil in which so much blood has been shed, the defense of the country which gave them their lives, confident all of us that Spain will institute the longed-for reforms, without struggles or wars, in the path of law and right, so that the Philippines may realize its ideals of humanity. In the midst of the social tempest which could be seen in the fields of Luzon, we heave organized and constituted a revolutionary government under an authority duly elected and obeyed as supreme. Attracted by the magnet of the fraternal policy of Your Excellency, this government now turns over to your hands the realization of the rights and liberties for which so many heroes and martyrs have given up their lives and the peace which we now offer loyally to Spain. May God bless and perpetuate the peace, for the sake of the future of our country and for the prosperity and greatness of Spain.(2) (1) Taylor, Vol. I, Exh. 08. (2) Doaumentos Cowstituetaies, Vol. II, p. 20. Somewhat belated this telegram is published by Barroaso in Loa Politic de Espafta en Pitipinas, Vol. VIII, 1898, translated in Taylor, Vol. I, Exh. 6&

Page  96 96 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Mabini, in his historical work, commented that both parties to the treaty acted in bad faith. This theory seems to be gaining ground. Probably the Spanish authorities never intended to establish the reforms promised; while Aguinaldo, suspecting such a maneuver, and running short of arms, ammunitions and other resources, accepted the peace as a mere truce so as to afford him opportunity to buy arms with the money given him.(l) As a matter of fact, the Revolutionary Government was not automatically abolished upon the signing of the Pact of Biak-na-Bato. The Supreme Council of the government continued functioning in Hongkong. The Council, together with the other members of the revolutionists, was termed "Representatives of the people." A modification of the composition of the Supreme Council was made with an enlargement of its membership. It was now called the Supreme Council of the Nation. On February 14, 1898 its membership included the following: Emilio Aguinaldo, Vito Balarmino, Mariano Llanera, Vicente Lucban, Lino Viola, Lazaro Macapagal, Maximo Cabigting, Escolastico Viola, Doroteo Lopez, Manuel Tinio, Benito Natividad. Anastasio Francisco and Antonio Montenegro. To these were added: Tomas Mascardo, Gregorio H. del Pilar, Miguel Malvar, Leon Novenario, Pedro Aguinaldo, Carlos Ronquillo, Teodoro Legaspi, Rosendo Banaad, Anastasio Vida, Elias Mendoza, Sebastian Castillo, and Vicente Caiton. (2) A petition was sent on December 29, 1897 by Isabelo Artacho, Isidoro Torres, Francisco M. Soliman, Artemio Ricarte Vibora, Paciano Rizal Mercado, and Pedro A. Paterno, requesting that the rest of the sum of P400,000 be distributed among those who were needy. The second installment of P200,000 was received in Manila and distributed, upon petition of Artacho, to the revolutionists in the Philippines. A list of the chief among these, together with the amounts they received, follows: (1) See Taylor. Vol. I. Exh. 87; Isabelo de los Reyes, La Rdtgion de Kapa#it(, p. 298; and Paterno, Pedro A., Pacto do Biak~-Bat po. 108, 104. (2) Taylor. Vol. I. Exah 4.

Page  97 THE KATIPUNAN REVOLT 97 Rece'pt from Emiliano Riego de Dios countersigned by B. Aguinaldn. Non 2................ P 7.0)0 Receipt from Francisco Macabulos, No. 8........ 14,000 Receipt from Isabelo Artacho, No. 11.......... 5,000 Receipt from Pedro A. Paterno for amount given him for distribution, as per meeting held in Malacafiang on the 11th and 12th of January of this year, No. 20......................... 89,500 Receipt from Mariano Trias countersigned by Pedro A. Paterno, No. 21..................... 6,000 Receipt from Artemio Ricarte countersigned by Pedro A. Paterno, No. 22.................... 6,000(1) This distribution was contrary to the desires of Aguinaldo, who wrote to Paterno accordingly. Aguinaldo wanted to keep all the money intact so as to finance the renewal of the revolution. He and his followers lived very meagerly on the interest of the money. It was said that a member could not even buy shoes without securing Aguinaldo's consent. It was agreed that only upon the unanimous vote of the Council of Representatives could a division of the money be made. A commercial body to be called "Junta de Comercio" was apparently established to engage in business; but it was probably only a camouflage to deceive the Spaniards as to their real intention with regard to the money. Artacho, who tried to have the money partitioned, was expelled from the society and had to resign as Secretary of Interior. Then he began litigation to have the 400,000 pesos divided; and after consultation with the leaders, it was determined that in order to avoid the litigation threatened by Artacho, Aguinaldo should leave Hongkong quietly. Accordingly on April 7th, 1898, he left Hongkong and went to Singapore. There important developments awaited him. Restlessness after Aguinaldo's Departure The Pact of Biak-na-Bato did not completely stop the opposition to Spanish rule. Spain showed no immed'ate signs of instituting the needed reforms. In February 1893 there was an attempt to cripple the railway at Dagupan so as to prevent the soldiers from coming to Pampanga. (1) Taylor, Vol. I, Exh. 78.

Page  98 98 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS A conspiracy instigated by Jocson was discovered in Manila; and insurgents under the leadership of Francisco Macabulos and Isidro Torres were active in Central Luzon. Cebu joined the movement headed by Francisco Llamas and a revolutionary committee was appointed. Ilocos Sur was also restless under the leadership of Isabelo Abaya. Probably the most important revolutionary official who did not adhere to the pact and refused to go to Hongkong was Gen. Francisco Macabulos. For a time he refused to lay down his arms, remaining in active operations in the province of Tarlac. On January 14, 1898, he disbanded his troops and accepted the amnesty after receiving 14,000 pesos, which were, according to his own statement, distributed among his people. Later on he decided to renew the struggle, and on April 17th an assembly of citizens representing the boards he had created in the nearby towns met and drafted a provisional constitution. The members of the assembly styled themselves representatives of Central Luzon, and their constitution provided for a General Executive Committee composed of a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary of the Interior, a Secretary of War, and a Secretary of the Treasury. This government was to exist "until the general government of the Republic in these Islands shall again be established." True to its object this government was dissolved upon the establishment of Aguinaldo's dictatorial government in May 1898. (1) (1) For copy of the provisional constitution see Taylor, Vol. I, Exhibit 81; for Macabulos' statement see Ibid, Vol. I, Exhibit 66 and Vol. III, Exhibit 130.

Page  99 CHAPTER VI THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT It was decreed that Aguinaldo should go no farther than Singapore; for events on the other side of the globe were hastening the renewal of his struggle against Spain. Unforeseen occurrences were bringing America to the Philippines, and in a manner of which the representatives of both countries had never even dreamed. In order to understand the political development of the period fully, it is necessary to consider the background which was staged ten thousand miles away from Philippine shores. The War in Cuba Cuba, another colony of Spain suffering the same fate as the Philippines, was indirectly responsible for the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States; for on account of Cuba the Spanish-American war was fought, and as a result of the war, Spanish sovereignty over the Philippines was transferred to the United States. For many years before the war broke out the American people had been in sympathy with Cuban aspirations for independence, extending both moral and material help to their struggling neighbors. Revolutionary preparations were secretly made on American soil, supplies and munitions were shipped from American cities, and expeditions were fitted out in American ports. American public opinion in favor of Cuba's freedom was constantly growing, and on April 6, 1896, the Congress of the United States, by a large majority, passed a joint resolution recognizing the belligerencv of the. Cuban insurgents. On -April 20th, 1898, the fateful Teller resolution was passed by Congress and war was practically declared. The resolution declared that conditions in Cuba "have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States" and "have been a disgrace to Christian civilization"; that Spain should relinquish its sovereignty over that Island, for "the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent;" that the United States had no intention to exer,,tA:~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~I I.r

Page  100 100 TIHE D2;MLOMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS cise control or sovereignty over the Island except for the purposes of pacification; and that once that was accomplished she would "leave the government and control of the Island to its people." Thus America entered the war with her lofty and humane purpose announced to the world. It was to be a war for a people's freedom. It was the result of righteous indignation against shocking barbarities perpetrated at the very door of America. Aguinaldo (and Cornsul Pratt By this time Aguinaldo and his companions had reached Singapore. Although they landed under assumed names, the American consul-general at Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, heard of their arrival, and immediately saw the advantage of enlisting their cooperation on the side of his country. Through the mediation of an Englishman named Bray, Consul Pratt secured several interviews with Aguinaldo. After the first interview the American consul cabled Commodore Dewey, through Consul Williams at Hongkong, as follows: Aguinaldo insurgent leader here. Will come Hongkong arrange with commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph. Pratt. The comn1dore's reply was, "Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.-Dewey." (1) Just exactly what transpired at the meeting between Aguinaldo and Pratt has been a matter of debate. The Englishman Bray acted as interpreter. A few of the principal facts, however, seem quite clear. Aguinaldo was not made to understand that, in consideration of Filipino cooperation, the United States would extend its sovereignty over the Islands, and thus in place of the old Spanish master a new one would step in. The truth was that nobody at the time ever thought that the end of the war would result in the retention of the Philippines by the United States. Was not the Spanish-American war a war () S. Do.. 6t, Pt., 66th Cong., 8d &s. p. 842.

Page  101 THE RDVOLUTIONAIY GO3V0NMUNT 101 for Cuban freedom? How could it result in mastery over another people who were also fighting for freedom?(1) These negotiations were naturally secret, yet they got into the papers-a not unnatural thing. The Singapore Free Press of May 4th, 1898, published a complete account of them, and copies of it were forwarded by Consul Pratt to Washington with the comment that the story was in the main correct. The newspaper account stated that Aguinaldo's policy embraced "the independence of the Philippines, whose internal affairs would be controlled under European and American advisers." (2) Consul Pratt also forwarded to Washington a proclamation issued by the Filipinos in Hongkong prior to the departure of Commodore Dewey for Manila. The proclamation, in the words of Pratt himself, called "upon the Filipinos not to obey the appeal of the Spaniards to oppose the Americans, but to rally in support of these, as they came as their friends and liberators." The manifesto also contains the following words: "Where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers." (3) It must be said in justice to the state department in Washington that it never officially sanctioned the negotiations made by Consul Pratt. On the contrary, Consul Pratt immediately received what was in reality a reprimand for the apparent commitment which Mr. Pratt, in the opinion of Secretary of State Day, had made on the question of the recognition of Philippine independence. In reply to the correspondence of Mr. Pratt enclosing a copy of the address of the twenty-five or thirty Filipinos who saw him after the Battle of Manila Bay, Mr. Day\ said: (1) Ibid p. 843. For Aguinaldo's version of this Interview see his Resela Veridica de la Revolucion Filipina, Chapter III. It has been claimed, probably with some truth, that Aguinaldo's Resefia Veridica, was not written ty himself, but by some of his cabinet members, most likely, Buencaino. The principal facts, however, must have been furnished ly Aguizaldo himself. It v as written, it must be confessed, at the time (about September 1899) when the question of whether Dewey and Pratt, had promised Aguinaldo independence, vas being asked in America. (2) Ibid, p. 846. 3) Ibid, p. 846.

Page  102 102 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The address presented to you by the 25 or 30 Filipinos who gathered about the consulate discloses an understanding on their part that the object of Admiral Dewey was to support the cause of General Aguinaldo, and that the ultimate object of our action is to secure the independence of the Philippines under the protection of the United States; your address does not repel this implication.(1) The American Consul in Hongkong, Rounseville Williams, like his comrade at Singapore, was also interested in securing the cooperation of Aguinaldo with Dewey. In a letter he wrote to Aguinaldo a little later (June 25th 1898) he said: "Do not forget that the United States undertook this war for the sole purpose of relieving the Cubans from the cruelties under which they were sufferiung and not for love of conquest and the love for gain. They are actuated by precisely the same feelings for the Filipinos." (2) Aguinaldo Consults with Filipino Committee In accordance with the request of Commodore Dewey. Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong. Wheli Aguinaldo arrived in IHongkong the American Commander had already left for Manila to give the Spanish armada that memorable blow of May 1st, 1898, which completely annihilated it. Aguinaldo was still doubting whether to proceed to Manila or not, despite the friendship assured him by Consul Pratt and the invitation subsequently extended by Dewey himself. The exact conditions for the desired co(1) Ibid, p. 357. The address of the Filipinos to which Pratt replied read in part as follows: "Our countrymen at home, and those of us residing here * * * hope that the United States, your nation persevering in its humane policy, will efficaciously second the piogiamme arnanged between you, Sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States." (Ibid, pp. 352. 353.) Consul-General Pratt replied in part thus: "Rest assuted * * * that your words, which have sunk deep in my neart, shall be faithfully repeated to the President, to Admi al Dewey. and to the American people from v hom I am suie, they will meet with full and generous response * * *. I can only hope that the eventual outcome will be all that can be desired for the happiness and welfare of the Filipinos." (Ibid. p. 358.) (2) Congressional Record, April 7, 1900. Quoted in Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippinea, p. 19.

Page  103 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT operation with the Americans had not been decided upon. The only thing known at that time was that the United States entered the war for the freedom of Cuba and that Consul Pratt assured him that the United States would surely not retain the Philippines as a possession; for was not the war a war of liberation? Aguinaldo must have known that as yet Pratt had not been duly authorized to act for his government. But Aguinaldo, like a good diplomat, was'careful not to divulge the real nature of the understanding, knowing that there was no legal validity to it as yet. He saw Consul Williams at Hongkong; but aside from general assurances as to the good intentions of the United States, he could not get definite conditions for the projected cooperation. Aguinaldo, cautious by nature, was in the habit of consulting other leaders on every serious step he contemplated taking. He undoubtedly knew that Pratt had no formal authority to commit his country in favor of the recognition of the government he intended to establish. But certainly, like Pratt, he knew that there was not the least indicationi at the time that the reverse would happen. Moreover, he thought that Dewey would have a more authoritative voice as to how the desired cooperation was to be effected. There was at the time in Hongkong a Filipino Committee, composed of prominent revolutionary leaders, like Felipe Agoncillo, Miguel Malvar, Teodoro Sandiko, Andres Garchitorena and others. (1) Aguinaldo submitted to this committee the question of whether he should accept the invitation of the American officials to go to the Philippines. He told the Committee that both Consul Pratt and himself had agreed that he, Aguinaldo, should confer with Commodore Dewey, who had asked him to come to Hongkong. Sandiko, Garchitorena, and Apacible were all of the opinion that the conditions in the Philippines demanded the presence of Aguinaldo. Manila, it was reported, had already been taken by the American fleet, and so it was necessary for President Aguinaldo to hasten home in order to partic(1) Supra p.....

Page  104 104 TIHE DEVELOPMNT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ipate in whatever developments might follow. In spite of the opinion thus expressed, Aguinaldo still had his doubts. According to the minute3 of the Committee, Aguinaldo suggested that another committee be sent to ascertain the real intentions of the United States, and if it was found that his intervention was still necessary, he would have no objection to going. Sandiko, Garchitorena, Gonzaga, and Apacible in reply insisted on their proposal that President Aguinaldo return to the Islands.. They were convinced that Dewey would give them arms, for they knew that the fleet could do nothing in the Philippines without the help of the revolutionists. Another fear of Aguinaldo was that they might not be able to -6t the money deposited in the banks, for it could be taker out only at certain times, and Spain might reclaim it if the revolutionists should resume the revolution. Agoncillo supported the position of the others, urging Aguinaldo to go. He said: The president, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to carry out the fundamental principles of its constitution, there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonizr the Philippines, or even to annex them. It was probable;en that it would give them independence and guarantee it, in such case the presence of the President was necessary, as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the counter who sought office, who might cause the intervention of European powers, an intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the country. He would be able to secure by his prestige the establishment in that country of an organization as perfect as possible and suited to its new social and political evolution. Presenit conditions in the Philippines urgently called for the aid of her strong sons to control her destiny remedying her present wellknown critical condition. Then to wait. What injury could come to the Philippirnes, ec en if we admitted that the Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the country, after he had taken all means to provide for her defense?

Page  105 THE IEJVOLUT1ONARY GOVERNMENT 105 None. Such an act of the President could not be censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious because it would be one proof more of his undoubted patriotism.(l) The return of Aguinaldo to the Philippines was therefore agreed upon. The Filipino leaders in Hongkong, knowing that they were taking a risk, considered all possibilities. Spain had taught them- a lesson: to scrutinize the acts and promises of every government official, for they had had sad experience of promises broken. Mabini in his history(2) condemns Aguinaldo's readiness to accept the vague promises of American officials. Aguinaldo accepted them, he said, for ht Nwas anxious to come back to the Islands, afraid lest otEher influential Filipinos in the name of the people might come to an understanding with the Americans. As a matter of fact, as we have seen, the return of Aguinaldo was fully discussed by the committee and dec'ded on against the original desires of Aguinaldo himself, being settled only after mature deliberation, whicl.American students of Philippine history have cons:ldred a sign of a shrewdness which was highly deserving. "As a matter of fact," says LeRoy, "this is only the first of a series of events and documents which show that the Filipinos during 1898 and 1899 looked into the future more shrewdly and mapped out their course of action in a less haphazard way fithan did the Americans.(3) Charles Ei~ott in his The Philippines to the End of the Military Rrgikie. quoted also the above recognition of LeRoy an d added tit Aguinaldo and the other leaders "understood the situation and calculated very properly upon taking advantage of Dewey's necessities... They understood perfectly that they were relying on their own influence and their skill in turning the situation to their advantage."(4) (1) Taylor. Vol. I, Exhibit 91. (2) Chapter IX. (3) The American in the Philippines, Vol. I. p. 208, note. (4) pp. 412, 413. now on, it would seem necessary to indicate whether the authorities quoted a e anti-imperialists or supporters of the policy of the American administ:ation; for unfo.tunately, on account of the independence question, American writers lave been divided into those two camps. The anti-imperialiets have alm ays endeavored to paint the brighter picture of the Philippines and their people so as to Luppo.t their contention for Independence, while the supporters of retention have always cndeavoed to do ihe

Page  106 106 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Aguinaldo's Early Moves Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite on May 19th on board the American ship McCulloch. Dewey immediately told him to recruit his army and gave him some rifles, since he wanted the Filipinos to invest Manila pending the arrival of American troops. Aguinaldo interpreted this friendship shown him as a veritable alliance between his people and the American nation. On May 24th, 1898, or rive days after his arrival, acting upon the advice of Attorney Rianzares Bautista, he issued his first proclamation, establishing a dictatorial form of government, and stating that he had come back from his voluntary exile because of Spain's failure to institute the promised reforms and also because he had now the cooperation of a powerful nation. "Now that the great and powerful North American nation," he said, "has come to offer disinterested protection for the effort to secure the liberation of this country, I return to assume command of all the forces for the attainment of our lofty aspirations, establishing a dictatorial government which will set forth decrees under my sole responsibility, assisted by the advice of eminent persons, until these islands are completely conquered and able to form a constitutional convention, and to elect a president and a cabinet in whose favor I will duly resign the authority." (1) In another proclamation of the same date, May 24th, Aguinaldo said: "Filipinos: The great nation, North America, cradle of true liberty, and friendly on that account to the liberty of our people, oppressed and subjugated by the tyranny and despotism of those who have governed us, has come to manifest even here a protection which is decisive as well as disinterested toward us, considering us endowed with sufficient civilization to govern by ourselves this our unhappy reverse, or are at least inclined to be over critical. Le Roy and Elliott, fortunately, belong to the latter group, Le Roy having been secretary to Dean C. Worcester, and Elliott, a member of the Supreme Couit and of the Philippine Commission during a Republican administration. Their recognition, therefore, of the far-sightedness displayed by Filipino leaders can be taken at face value. (1) Sen. Doe. 208, p. 89.

Page  107 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 107 land. To maintain this lofty idea, which we deserve from the now very powerful nation, North America, it is our duty to detest all those acts which belie such an idea, as pillage, robbery, and every class of injury to persons as well as things." Then followed four articles instructing the people to respect the lives and property of foreigners and prisoners and hospital establishments such as ambulances. (1) The two foregoing proclamations were made publicly and, therefore, must have come to the knowledge of Admiral Dewey. These proclamations indicated that Aguinaldo believed-even if he had no authorized promise from the American government-that the United States had not come to institute her rule but to offer protection for the liberation of the country. Dewey most likely did not at the beginning pay serious attention to Aguinaldo's ulterior plans. It is a reasonable inference that in purposely ignoring them, he tacitly consented; for his main concern, according to his own statement, was to get the Filipinos started against the Spaniards. Even such a conservative writer as James A. LeRoy, generally held as the foremost American scholar on the Philippines, recognizes the tacit consent which Dewey gave to Aguinaldo's early movement to establish a separate government. He states: As we have seen, Aguinaldo had repeatedly claimed to be operating under the formally pledged protection of the United States; no protest against such pretensions on his part had come from the chief representative of the United States on the spot. Arms bought for him by Americans had been landed under the American guns at Cavite, and he had received some few guns directly from the American naval commander. Until the arrival of the American troops he was allowed to retain possession of the town of Cavite, surrendered by the Spaniards to the Americans. When the small steamers bought with his funds in China and the steam launches donated to him by Filipino adherents began to move about the bay, they flew the new Filipino flag, with the tacit consent of the Americans. Indeed, when the German Admiral sought to obtain from Admiral Dewey a definite statement as to whether or not that flag was officially Sen. Doe. 62. p. 481.

Page  108 103 TIe DVFELOPMENT 0 PHIILIPPINi POLITICS recognized by the latter's home government, the American commander evaded the question by saying that it was "only a little flag," and anybody could fly a little flag or pennant. (1) When on June 30 General Thomas M. Anderson came with the first batch of American troops, doubt as to America's real intentions in the Philippines began to creep in among the revolutionists. The relations between General Anderson and the Filipino leader showed the caution with which the Filipinos were proceeding and their desire for an early understanding with the American people. At first the horses3, ox carts, fuel and bamboo which General Anderson desired could not be readfly secured from the natives, for it appeared that General Aguinaldo had prohibited any direct aid to the Americans without his written consent. Aguinaldo's reason was simple. It was not that he did not want to aid the United States. He wanted them to recognize his authority so that the Americans might know that without such authority no effective aid from the natives could be secured. He gave notice to General Anderson not to disembark American troops in places conquered by Filipinos without previous notice to the Revolutionary Government, "because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights."(2) Although General Anderson was not willing to recognize Aguinaldo's civil authority, yet in view of the necessities, he was forced to remain on friendly terms with him. Oa the fourth of July General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo that the United States had "entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine Islands" and he therefore desired to have "the most amicable relations" with the Filipino leaders and full cooperation of the Filipino people in military operations against the Spanigh forces. On July 22nd Dewey transmitted the following cable from General Anderson to the Secretary of War through the Secretary of the Navy: (1) LeRcy, The Americans in the PhiLippines, Vol. I. p. 214. (2) Letter of Aguinaldo to Anderson, Sen. Doc. 208.

Page  109 THE rIVOLUTION A Y GOVIENMMNT 109 "The following for the Secretary of War: Aguinaldo declares dictator (ship) and martial law over all the islands. The people expect independence..... ANDERSON, Commanding, Dewey." (1) On July 24. 1893, A.,ainaldo wrote to General Thomas M. Anderson that while his government had not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, the Filipinos "expected that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation." (2) Spain Attempts to Secure Filipino Cooperation Aguinaldo had brought with him a project drafted by Mariano Ponce for the establishment of a revolutionary government. This project was modeled upon the Spanish constitution and provide] for an assembly of representatives and for executive departments. It also contained a declaration of rights. When Aguinaldo arrived in the Philippines, however, Ambrosio Bautista, his first adviser, counselled him to drop Mariano Ponce's project and to establish a dictatorial government instead. In the meanwhile, Spain, seeing the danger coming upon her, -her squadron destroyed, and the revolt not quenched altogether in spite of the pact of Biak-na-Bato — began her overtures to the Filipinos by promising many things if they would only side with her. The Spanish Governor-General organized a Philippine Militia and in a decree established a consultative assembly. The Militia attracted influential insurgent leaders like Trias, Pio del Pilar, Riego de Dios, and Ricarte, who were willing to offer their services to Spain. It was the general feeling that if 2~guinaldo had not returned, the majority of the people would have been loyal to Spain. / (1) Report of Admiral Dewey for 1898, p. 117. (2) Senat~ Document, No. 62, pat 2, p. 395.

Page  110 110 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The consultative assembly was to have powers to deliberate and to inform the governor-general on matters either governmental or administrative which affected the interests of the people, and on which the governor-general might desire the advice of the assembly. The body could also voluntarily take the initiative of advising on public measures, provided such measures did not invade the functions of other organizations or infringe on the laws. On June 9, 1898, members of the council were appointed, among whom were Pedro Paterno, Cayetano Arellano, Maximo Paterno, Ambrosio Bautista, and Dr. Pardo de Tavera. Not content with a mere advisory body, Pedro Paterno proposed an autonomous government under Spain. There were to be a governor-general, a Philippine legislature, and a council of government with ministerial responsibility. While Governor-General Agustin was apparently not ready to approve Paterno's plan of government openly, he must have given consent to the publication of the scheme now that General Aguinaldo had arrived and he was desirous of securing the cooperation of the Filipino leader. Paterno's proposal was published in his manifesto of May 31, 1898, urging the people to help "our old friend Spain and realize with her more quickly our aspirations." When a Tagalog translation of this manifesto found its way to Aguinaldo's office, he wrote on the margin: "You are pretty late." Some of the members of the assembly, like Rianzares Bautista, had already gone to Aguinaldo. Felipe Buencamino was sent by the Spanish authorities to negotiate with Aguinaldo, but instead of bringing back Aguinaldo's reply, he decided to remain with him. Upon the arrival of the Filipino chief from Hongkong any hope that Spain may have had of gaining the good wishes and cooperation of the Filipinos vanished. On June 10th when Aguinaldo read in a leading newspaper that at the end of the war the United States mighit sell the Islands to a European power, he wrote a letter to President McKinley expressing the great sorrow of the Filipino people upon hearing such news and earnestly requesting that the American government leave the Philip

Page  111 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT Ill pines "free and independent," after the conclusion of peace with Spain.(1) Declaration of Independence On June 12, 1898, the independence of the Philippines was declared at Kawit, Cavite. In part the declaration states: "Summoning as a witness of the rectitude of our intentions the Supreme Judge of the Universe, and under the protection of the Mighty and Humane North American Nation, we proclaim and solemnly declare, in the name and by the authority of the inhabitants of all these Philippine Islands, that they are and have the right to be free and independent; that they are released from all obedience to the crown of Spain; that every political tie between the two is and must be completely severed and annulled; and that, like all free and independent states, they have complete authority to make war, conclude peace, establish treaties of commerce, enter into alliances, regulate commerce, and execute all other acts and things that Independent States have the right to do. Reposing firm confidence in the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge for the support of this declaration, our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred possession, which is our honor." The document was signed by the first leaders who joined Aguinaldo, ninqty-eight in all. Among them were Ambrosio Rianzares, Ladislao Diwa, Artemio Ricarte, and Baldomero Aguinaldo. (2) Mabini on the Scene On the same day that the independence declaration was made, a sickly little man had come to Aguinaldo upon the latter's request to act as his adviser. This was Apolinario Mabini. Aguinaldo had not known Mabini personally, and before 1898 Mabini had not taken any active part in the revolution. He was a member of the Liga Filipina and had once been imprisoned by the Spaniards, but he had soon (1) See Sen. Doc. 62 pt. I, 56th Cong. 3d Session, p. 360. (2) Tayior, Vol. III, Exhibit 28.

Page  112 112 THE DEVELOPMENT OP PHILIPPINE POLITICS been discharged because of his physical condition. Early in 1898 he went to Los Banios for his health, and from this time he followed political movements with interest. He wrote what he called Las Ordenanzas de la Revolucion, which was a plan for the organization of a general movement which he believed imminent. He had also addressed a manifesto to the revolutionists, advising them on the conduct that they should follow when the American fleet invaded the Philippines. These plans reached the hands of Aguinaldo, who sent for Mabini. Establishment of Local Goverumentzs Mabini's first move wvas the establisment of local governments in a decree signed by Aguinaldo on June 18, 1898. That was the immediate need, he thought, because the towns liberated by the insurgents from Spanish rule required some form of government. The decree stated that it was "the first duty of the government to interpret faithfully the popular will," and therefore it was the wish of General Aguinaldo to be surrounded by representatives from the provinces so that he could know the true needs of the people to the end that the most speedy measures could be taken. In accordance with these provisions, the organization of local governments was started in the provinces freed from Spain. The inhabitants of a town who were "most distinguished for high character, social position, and honorable conduct" were considered electors. They elected a chief for the entire town and a headman for each of the barrios, or villages, composing the town, as well as three delegates, one of police and internal order, another of justice and civil registry, and a third of taxes and property. The chief, the three delegates, and the headmen of the different barrios constituted the popular assembly, the duty of which was to supervise the fulfillment of the laws and the interests of the town. The chiefs of the towns, after consulting the popular assemblies, elected the chief, or governor of the provinces, and three delegates corresponding to the three delegates of the town government.

Page  113 TilE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 113 They also elected representatives to the Revolutionary Congress. (1) The revolutionary government was centralized with reference to its relations with the local units. It was the desire of Mabini to have local chiefs during those troublous times at the beck and call of the central government. On August 1, 1898, the chiefs of the towns of the provinces (1) The scheme of local government was not carried out in all the towns. It was generally followed in the picvirccs a:ound Mlanila and prolab'y to a less extent in the Vieayas. An example of a town election is given in Tcylor, Vol. III, Exh. 157, which is as follows: "Ealayan, Datangas, July 3, 1C93. Province of Batangas, town of Balayan Act of Popular Elections. In the town of Pralsy&n, prcvince of Eatangas, leaving been previously summoned, there assembled on July 3, 1c93, all the citizens mort conspicuous for their education, social position and hono:able conduct, from the "cent o" of the town as well as from the barrios; hlaving been called to conStltute the mass meeting provided by Article 2 of the Dec:ee of the Dictatorial Government of the Philippines, dated June 18, 1898, said Decree having been bcought to this province ly Sr. Santiago Rillo de Leon, with inst.uctions to proc.ed to the election by majority vote cf the President of the town, ard of a headman (Cabeza) for each Larrio, as well as of a Commissioner of Police and Internal Order, a Commissioner of Justice and Civil Regist ation, and a Commissioner of Revenue and Propel;ty, as set forth in Article 8 of:amne Dccr-ee. Sr. Lortnzo Fency p le iCed, celepatcd ly Dcn Miguel blalvar, commissioned to establish civil organization in the town already free from Spanish control. After having read aloud, both in Spanish and Tagalog, that clause of the ordering the ekcticn, as well as rarag.aph 2 of Rule 38 of Instructions of June 20, 1898, they picceedcd with the balloting an d; retcd, the following pasties being elected: * * * * (The names of men elected as headmen of "cent-o" and barrios and as Commissioners of the town, follow here and are ommitted in translation.) With the foregoing the proceedings terminated, and having drawn up the present act in duplicate, it was signed ly the president with all those who had taken part in the mass meeting, the former retaining one coly of the same, the other remaining in possession of the present municipal mayor of the town for safekeeping and delivery to the President (Jefe) on the day which may be indicated by the Dictatorial Government. IBalayan, July, 1C93. (Omission is here made of the signatures of the members present at the mass meeting.) Bacoor, August 8, 1C93. DECREE.-In view of the act of the constitution of the Local Board of the town of Balayan (Batangas), and considering that no comment or protect has been presented against the' same, I hereby decree the following: Said act is approved and confirmed in all its parts, and provisions of the Decree of June 18, and Instructions of June 20, 1898. Publish and announce this Decree. (Sgned) EMILIO AGUINALDO, President of the Revolutionary Government." (Signed) LEANDRO IBARRA Secretory of the Interior.

Page  114 114 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS of Cavite, Pampanga, Manila, Bulacan, Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Laguna, Morong, Tarlak, Batangas, Mindoro, Tayabas, Zambales, Pangasinan, Union and Infanta went to Bacoor and took their oath of office in accordance with the decree of June 18th and met in an assembly to express their loyal support to the Revolutionary Government. "They proclaim solemnly to the face of the entire world the independence of the Philippines; they recognize and follow Don Emilio Aguinaldo Famy as President of the Revolutionary Government constituted in the form prescribed in the decree of June 23rd and the instructions of June 27th last, and request the said President to secure from foreign countries our belligerence and independence not only because such an act would be in accordance with justice but because nobody has the right to contravene the laws of nature or to drown the legitimate aspiration of a people for its uplift and dignification." (1) By a further decree the organization of the municipal government was completed. Many important reforms were announced. The meetings of the municipal and provincial councils were declared public; the slow and complicated criminal procedure was changed; a civil registry of births, deaths, and marriages was provided for; and cockpits and gambling were entirely forbidden. When there were disturbances and abuses of local prerogatives on the part of the provincial or town chiefs, the central government would appoint investigators and take drastic action. Thus when news was received that in the provinces of Tarlak, Pangasinan, and Nueva Ecija disorders reigned, the President of the Revolutionary Government, through the Secretary of the Interior, appointed Arcadio del Rosario and Marcelino Santos as commissioners to those provinces, charged with the important and principal mission, "to administer justice in the name and on behalf of this government, endeavoring in so far as possible to provide that the provinces entrusted to them return to a pacific and tranquil life; they are also granted for this (1) From the minutes of the meeting signed by Leandro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior, and Emilio Aguinaldo, President of the Revohlutionary Government, and dated at Bacoor, Cavite, Aug. 6, 1898.

Page  115 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 116 purpose full powers to institute all kinds of proceedings and prosecute all violators of the laws, whether civilians or military, at the instance of a party or on their own motion; to apprehend and decree the arrest of criminals and other alleged offenders being empowered for this purpose to call upon the assistance of the civil or military authorities who must assist them promptly when called upon to do so, under the penalty of being declared liable for the loss and damage which their refusal or delay wvithout just cause might occasion; to suspend and provisionally remove offenders from the offices they fill and to appoint persons to their places either by suffrage or of their own will on the recommendation of a private individual, provided they consider such recommendation impartial and proper; and, finally, to examine all books kept in the public offices of said provinces, afterwards making a report to this government of their respective commissions..."(1) In one instance the Secretary of the Interior ordered the people "by reason of the scarcity of food, to plant vacant ground with corn, camotes, tuguibi, gabe, peanuts, mangoes, red pumpkins, and other crops within the period of twenty days which is allowed to the owners thereof." (2) It was the purpose of the revolutionary government to put civil officials in charge of the civil administration of the provinces, and in some cases as soon as peace was restored, the provincial military chiefs turned over the civil affairs to the provincial civil officials; but in the face of imminent danger the military chief practically assumed control. Legally, however, the only duty that military commanders had was to secure help and provisions for the army which the provincial and town chiefs were in duty bound to give. The Establishment of the Revolutionary Government On June 23, 1898, the dictatorial government was changed into the Revolutionary Government. The proclamation was signed by Aguinaldo, but it was known that Mabmini had drafted it. The preamble of the decree stated (1) Taylor, Vol. 3. Exhibit 473, 37 KU. (2) Taylor, VoL 3. Exhibit 477. 88 KU.

Page  116 11G TIHE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS that in establishing the Revolutionary Government it was the desire of the dictatorial government to show to the Filipino people "that one of its objects is to combat with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish administration, abolishing that personal luxury and the voluminous ostentation which make it routinary, weighty, and sluggish in its movement and establishing in its stead a simple and efficient though'modest machinery for the execution of public affairs." The government was henceforward to be called the Revolutionary Government, "whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until she is recognized by the free nations of the earth." Four departments of the government were created, that of foreign relations, marine and commerce; war and public works; police, justice, instruction, and hygiene; and finance, agriculture, and industry. The secretaries could be present in congress and could answer interpellations. The congress was to be composed of members elected by the town chiefs in accordance with the decree of June 18th, although it was provided that the government could designate for the time being other persons to represent those provinces which had freed themselves from Spanish dominion, but which were yet unable to hold elections. The congress was empowered to look after the general interests of the people and the fulfillment of the revolutionary laws; to discuss and pass these laws; to discuss and approve treaties and appropriations; to approve and examine expenditures and revenues of the country, and to advise the pres dent on all important national affairs. The president could not prevent the congress from holding session, but his approval by signature was required on all bills, and his veto was final. The president was responsible to the congress. The revolutionary congress, by means of a committee on justice, could act as a court of appeals for those matters coming from the provincial councils and could also impeach the secretaries of departments and the provincial chiefs and councils. This was, in brief, the organization of the Revolutionary Government as conceived by Mabini and decreed by Aguinaldo. To quote a Filipino scholar, Rafael Palma, it

Page  117 THIE RISOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT was a completely original structure, "no one system has been faithfully followed, modern theories have been adapted to the circumstances amd the ideas of the moment to the essential conditions then existing. There is no doubt that it was Mabini's intention to establish a democratic government, but because of war conditions he did not want to weaken the power of the chief of the government." () On July 15 Aguinaldo appointed his first Cabinet, consisting of Baldomero Aguinaldo as Secretary of War and Public Works; Leandro Ibarra, Secretary of the Interior; and Mariano Trias, Secretary of Finance. The Secretaryship of Foreign Relations, Marine, and Commerce, was provisionally in the charge of the Presidency. Later Cayetano Arellano was appointed Secretary of Foreign Relations, and Dr. Pardo de Tavera, Director of Diplomacy. Arellano, however, Cecided not to accept the position, and Mabini was later called to fill it. teretofore Mabini's position had been simply that of adviser to Aguinaldo. He himself remarked that he was called President Aguinaldo's "dark chamber." On Septemcber 23, 1898 the four e:cecutive departments were increased to six as follows: war, interior, foreign affairs, treasury, justice, and fomento. At about this date the personnel composing the Revolutionary Covernment was as follows: National President: Don rEmilio Aguinaldo y Fainy Military Section: Secretary of War: Don Baldomero Aauinaldo Baloy Director: Don'Antonio Luna Generals of Division: Don Artemio Ricarte Don Vito Belarmino Don Emiliano Riego de Dios Brigadier Generals:Don Tomas Mascardo Don Pantaleon Garcia Don Mariano Llanera Don Mariano Noriel Don Isidoro Torres Don Miguel Malvar Don Paciano Rizal (1) Rafael Palma, MaCbini, Politico y lCstadista, PhilippinL Revew, April, 1919.

Page  118 118 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Don Pascual Alvarez Don Jose Ignacio Paua Don Pio del Pilar Don Gregorio del Pilar Don Francisco Macabulos Interior Department: Secretary: Don Leandro Ibarra Director: Don Severino de las Alas Department of Foreign Affairs: Secretary: Don Cayetano Arellano Director: Don Trinidad Pardo de Tavera Treasury Department: Secretary: Don Mariano Trias y Closes Director: Don Benito Legarda Treasurer General: Don Silvestre Legaspi Navy: Director: Don Pascual Ledesma Commerce: Director: Don Esteban de la Rama Department of Justice: Secretary: Don Gregorio Araneta Director: Don Jose M. Basa Enriquez Director of Register: Don Juan Tongco Department of Fomento: Secretary: Don Felipe Buencamino Director of Public Instruction: Don Arsenio Cruz Herrera Public Works: Director: Don Fernando Canon Faustino Agriculture and Industry: Director: Don Jose Alejandrino The Mabini Cabinet On January 2, 1899 when it was definitely known that Arellano would not accept the position of Secretary of 'Foreign Relations, Mabini was given the place and thus became head of the Cabinet, or Council of Government. The Mabini cabinet consisted of the following: President and Secretary of Foreign Relations, Apolinario Mabini. Secretary of the Interior, Teodoro Sandiko. Secretary of War, Baldomero Aguinaldo. Secretary of Finance, Mariano Trias. Secretary of Fomento, including Public Instruction, Public Works, Communications, Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, Gracio Gonzaga.

Page  119 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 119 "The Council," announced Mabini, "belongs to no party, nor does it desire to form one; it stands for nothing save the interests of the fatherland. It is bound to nothing save to make itself beloved of its own people and respected by strangers, independent of what the obstacles may be. It is convinced that the health of a country depends on the balance of its live forces. It shall see to the interests of all, neglecting none; it shall harmonize and adjust them to the level of perfect equality, to the national aspiration of independence. The Council shall never depart from this principle. If in a society of men naturally equal any one leads, it is because all desire to obey him as the guardian appointed to watch over the interests of the community. With this principle ever in sight, and using it as a rule of conduct at all times and in all places, it shall endeavor to bring every Philippine official, both civil and military, to realize that they have received from the people a mission to guard the interests of both Filipinos and foreigners; to afford to the latter the hospitable protection of this country; to respect and cause to be respected the rights proclaimed by the constitution, and to obey the lawv and cause it to be obeyed. It knows that it is only in this way that a people grows to love liberty and becomes worthy of independence." (1) The Mabini Cabinet met at Malolos and was presided over by Mabini himself. General Aguinaldo not being present, the result of the meetings was forwarded to him for his decision. One sample of the minutes of the cabinet meetings follows Council of Government, Philippine Islands. Council meeting of January 24, 1899. The council presided over by Senior Mabini, with Sefiores Sandiko, Trias, B. Aguinaldo and Gonzaga also present. It unanimously decided as follows... Second. The advisability of sending an ultimatum to the General commanding the American forces was discussed in view of his refusal to return the launches and the ship Abbey and to stop the reenforcements coming from America but it was unanimously agreed not to use this energetic (1) Taylor. Vol. III. Exhibit 344.

Page  120 120 THE D:VELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS measure at present since the treaty of peace has not been ratified, and also on account of the friendly attitude of the Government in Washington in sending here a special commission and also on account of the consequences of an outbreak of hostilities, consequences which might be fatal to the country. It was unanimously agreed to inform the American General that the outrages committed by the force under his command are steadily increasing the excitement among the people who indeed may themselves rise and attack in spite of the warnings of the government. Fifth. It was agreed that the President of the Council should issue a letter of advice to the newspaper editors, recommending them to adopt a sensible and moderate attitude, and not an insulting or provoking one; any question of race is to be avoided. LIalolos, 24, January 1399. (Signed) APO. LIA31 I. (1) About this time there were possibly thrc elements, groups, or tendencies within the revolutionary camps. The peace element, which wanted peace at any cost under America; Mabini and his followers who would insist upon lhe recognition of Philippine independence; and somewhat like him, those of the war faction. The third group naturally were againist peace and in sympathy with Mabini; although Mabini was not completely of their own way of thinking, for he was essentially a believer in government respecting the laws, whereas certain of the war people-of the officials, especially-were rather for despotic government. Both of the latter were one in opposing the idea of unconditional peace with the United States. The Revolutionary Congress The Revolutionary Congress met in the church of Barasoain near Malolos, Bulacan, on September 15, 1898. It was a historic gathering of Filipinos. As we have seen, the second revolt was supported by the best elements of the country, and in this congress were found the most prominent figures of the time. Even such a critical writer as Taylor could not but admit that "the men who composed J this body were among the ablest natives of the archi(1) Taylor, Vol. III Exhibit 626.

Page  121 T:I3 RE"VOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 121 pelago." (1) It should be remembered that the government was allowed to appoint members to represent provinces which were not in a position to elect their own representatives as yet. The government also saw it fit to increase the number of members from time to time, hence it is very difficult to trace the exact composition of the Congress throughout its history. At the opening, according to a manuscript quoted by Taylor, the provinces represented were as follows: Elected members: Manila, 4; Batangas, 4; Bulacan, 4; Cavite, 4; Camarires, 4; Ilocos Sur, 3; Ilocos Norte, 6; La Laguna, 4; Pampanga, 4; Pangasinan, 2; Albay, 4; Cagayan, 1; Bataan, 3; Isabela, 2; Union, 1; Nueva Ecija, 3; Tarlac, 3; Zambales, 2; Morong, 2; Lepanto, 3; Mindoro, 1; Batanes Islands, 1; Nueva Vizcaya, 1; Abra, 1; Padre Burgos (Benguet), 1. Appointed members: Ilocos Sur, 1; Pangasinan, 2; Iloilo, 4; Cebu, 4; Leyte, 4; Albay, 1; Cagayan, 2; Isabela, 1; Union, 2; Tayabas, 3; Zambales, 1; Sorsogon, 3; Negros Occidental, 3; Negros Oriental, 3; Samar, 3; Capiz, 3; Antigua, 3; Bohol, 3; Zamboanga, 3; Misamis, 3; Calamianes, 3; Masbate, 3; Mindoro, 2; Batanes Islands, 1; Catanduanes, 2; Nueva Vizcaya, 1; Padre Burgos (Benguet), 2; Paragua, 2.(1) This gives a total of sixty-eight elected members and sixty-eight appointed members. The election, in accordance with the decree forming the Revolutionary Government, was made by the chiefs of the towns. Probably only about eighty-five members answered the roll call at the inauguration. When the Malolos Constitution was approved, there were on the official list over one hundred members. Of this number there were about forty lawyers, sixteen physicians, five pharmacists, two engineers, and one priest.(2) In another undated list cited by Taylor, eighty-one member's appear, of whom only nineteen were elected. (3) However, in another list of July 7, 1899, there were one hundred -,nd ninety-three members divided into three (1) Taylor, Volume II, 2 AJ. (2) bocobo, Felipe G. Calderon and the Malolos Constitution in The Filipino People, Sept. 1914, p. 7. (3) T;ay.r, Xolui.*e II, 5 AJ.

Page  122 122 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS classes, in conformity with the classification of the provinces. Of these forty-two were elected.(1) How many of these actually attended the sessions cannot be determined. The proportion of elected representatives probably oscillated from one-half to one-third or one-fourth of the members present. The inaugural session was held with impressive ceremonies. The following description was written the day after, September 16, 1898, by Mr. F. D. Millet, one of the two foreign correspondents present: At the large basilica of Barasoain (Malolos) we found a large number of the delegates already assembled, and the guards drawn up to receive the expected cortege of the President and his suites. The bald interior of the church was sparsely relieved by crossed palm-leaves and wreaths fastened to the columns which divide the nave from the aisles, and on the great bare spaces between the windows. In the middle of the nave were two bentwood chairs; on either side and behind these, in the aisles, were seats and benches for spectators. To the left of the chancel a long table, draped with blue and red, was arranged for the secretaries, and opposite it were special seats for invited guests, and in the front one next to the chancel rail we were assigned our places. The chancel was hung with a great white drapery, rudely painted to represent ermine, and a broad border of red cloth with palm leaves and wreaths framed in this curtain. Crossed insurgent flags ornamented the pilasters on each side, and in the middle of the chancel, under the imitation ermine, was a long table draped with light blue and crimson, and behind this three large carved chairs. While we were waiting for the functionaries to arrive, we had an excellent opportunity of studying those who had come from all over the islands to assist in the foundation of a republic-for this was their professed purpose. Every man was dressed in a full black costume of more or less fashionable cut, according to his means or his tastes... At last, to the sound of the national march, the delegates moved in a body to the door and then back again, divided, and then Aguinaldo, looking very undersized and very insignificent, came marching down, bearing an ivory stick with gold head and gold cord and tassels. A group of tall, fine-looking generals and one or tvo dignitaries in black accompanied him, and half surrounded him as they (1) Taylor, Volume IV, Exhibit 674, 31 GR.

Page  123 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 123 walked along. Mounting the chancel steps, Aguinaldo took the middle seat behind the table, the Acting Secretary of the Interior took the place on his right, and a general occupied the carved chair on his left. Without any formal calling to order, the secretary rose and read the list of delegates, and sat down again. Then Aguinaldo stood up, and after the feeble vivas had ceased, took a paper from his pocket, and in a low voice, without gestures and without emphasis, and in the hesitating manner of a schoolboy, read his message in the Tagalog language. Only once was he interrupted by vivas, and that was when he alluded to the three great free nations-England, France and Americaas worthy models for imitation. He next read a purported translation in Spanish with even more difficulty, and when he had finished there was quite a round of cheers, proposed and led by the veteran general Buenca-mino, for the President, the republic, the victorious army, and for the town of Malolos. Then Aguinaldo arose and declared the meeting adjourned until it should re-assemble prepared to elect officers and to organize in the regular manner. The long-talked-of and ever-memorable function was over. The English translation of President Aguinaldo's message reads as follows: Representatives:-The work of the revolution being happily terminated and the conquest of our territory completed, the moment has arrived to declare that the mission of arms has been brilliantly accomplished by our heroic army and now a truce is declared in order to give place to councils which the country offers to the service of the government in order to assist in the unfolding of its programme of liberty and justice, the divine message written on the standards of the revolutionary party. A great and glorious task, an undertaking within the capacity of every class of patriots, is it for undisciplined troops to fight and to break lances in opposition to the injustice done to those whom they defend and protect. But this is not all. It remains for us, further, to solve the grave and supereminent problems of peace for those of whom our fatherland demanded from us the sacrifice of our blood and of our fortunes and now at the present time calls for a solemn document, expressive of the high aspirations of the country, accompanied by all the prestige and all the grandeur of the Filipino race, in order to salute with this the majesty of those nations which are united in accomplishing the high results of civilization and progress.

Page  124 124 TI E DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITIC3 To these great friendly nations, whose glorious liberty is sung by the muse of history was addressed the sacred invocation which accompanied our undertaking in its incredible acts of valor, to these nations the Filipino people now sends its cordial salutations of lasting alliance. At this opening of the temple of the laws, I know how the Filipino people, a people endowed with remarkable good sense, will assemble. Purged of its old faults, forgetting three centuries of oppression, it will open its heart to the noblest aspirations and its soul to the joys of freedom; proud of its own virtues without pity for its own weaknesses, here in the church of Barasoain, once the sanctuary of mystic rites, now the august and stately temple of the dogmas of our independence, here it is assembled in the name of peace, perhaps close at hand, to unite the suffrages of our thinkers and of our politicians, of our warlike defenders of our native soil and of our learned Tagalog psychologists, of our inspired artists and of the eminent personages of the bench, to write with their votes the immortal book of the Filipino constitution as the supreme expression of the national will. Illustrious spirits of Rizal, of Lopez Jaena, of Hilario del Pilar! August shades of Burgos, Pelaez and Panganiban! Warlike geniuses of Aguinaldo and Tirona, of Natividad and Evangelista! Arise a moment from your unknown graves! See how history has passed by right of heredity from your hands to ours, see how it has been multiplied and increased to an immense size to infinity by the gigantic strength of our arms, and more than by arms, by the eternal, divine suggestion of liberty which burns like a holy flame in the Filipino soul. Neither God nor the fatherland grants us a triumph except on the condition that we share with you the laurels of our hazardous struggle. And you, representatives of popular sovereignty, turn your eyes to the lofty example of the illustrious patriots! Let this example and their revered memory, as well as the generous blood spilled on the battlefields, be a potent incentive to arouse in you a noble spirit of emulation to dictate with the great wisdom your high mandate demands, the laws which in this fortunate era of peace are destined to govern the political destinies of our country." (1) Congress was organized with Pedro A. Paterno as President, Benito Legarda as Vice-President, and Gregorio Araneta and Pablo Ocampo as Secretaries. Different com (1) MlAet, The Expemtio to the Philippinets, pp. 261-267.

Page  125 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNME:NT 1_4W mittees were selected and the rules of the Spanish Cortes, with slight modifications, were adopted. Several days afterwards, on Sept. 17th, Pedro Paterno, President of the Congress, made an inspiring address, in which he said: Filipinos, today begins a new era; we are beholding the political resurrection of our people. Amidst the glooms of yesterday; amidst the graves of our heroes and martyrs; amidst the ruins of the past, there arises and stands the refulgent genius of liberty, embracing all the islands and uniting the Filipinos with bonds of holy brotherhood. Liberty is the real purpose of our existence on earth, the foundation of life and progress. Our past, the era of cruelty, of deceit, of slavery, has ended. We shall renew the history of the Philippines... Filipinos, proceed! Let our steps be unflinching and ever forward; let them be steps of justice, of love, of harmony, and of charity; let us win the sympathy of the whole world with generous and humanitarian deeds; and let us write, in the presence of the Lord, of the Supreme Being, the oath of our independence. One of the first acts of the Malolos Congress was the ratification on September 29, 1898, of the Declaration of Independence which had been made at Kawit on June 12. The Malolos Constitution The primary object of the congress as Mabini had planned it was to act only as: an advisory, body to the President. Soon, however, it decided to draft a constitution for the Philippines. Mabini maintained that the revolutionary congress was not called for the purpose of drafting a constitution, but to give popular support to Aguinaldo, to advise him, and to help in the prosecution of the war. Mabini contended, moreover, that to draft a constitution was not the proper task at a time which was troubled by war; that they must wait until the people were through with war and were in a sufficiently calm mood to deliberate on their fundamental law. His opponents, on the other hand, claimed that in order to secure the recognition of Philippine independence by other powers they must produce a fairly modern and up-to-date constitution. This element, headed by Calderon, was triumphant, and finally decided to

Page  126 126 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS frame a constitution. Even after this was determined upon, Mabini still insisted that during war time the President of the Republic must be given great power; accordingly he urged the adoption of a constitutional program of his own. Again he was defeated, for the others decided to draft their constitution. A committee was appointed for this work. Among its members was Felipe A. Calderon, who became the author of the Malolos constitution. There were two plans presented, the so-called Paterno plan, which was a restatement of his peace proposal for an autonomous government, and the Calderon plan. From the standpoint of political culture, Calderon was the best prepared to draft the constitution, for he had made a comprehensive study of the constitutions of other countries. Local conditions and the various constitutional projects, such as the constitution of Biak-na-bato, Mabini's ideas as enunciated in his constitutional programs, as well as Paterno's plan, had undoubtedly some effect upon the final drafting of the constitution. The committee which prepared it was frank, however, to admit that the constitutions of European countries such as France and Belgium had been closely studied. The committee reported that "the work of which the commission has the honor to present the results for the consideration of Congress has been largely a matter of selection; in executing it not only has the French 'Constitution been used, but also those of Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Guatemala, because we have considered that those nations most resemble the Filipino people." (1) The American Constitution did not have direct influence except in so far as the ideas contained in it are found in South American Constitutions. The preamble, however, shows marked similarity to that of the American Federal Constitution. It reads: "We, the Representatives of the Filipino people, legally assembled to establish justice, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty, imploring the aid of the Supreme Legislator of (1) Calderon, Mis Memoriaos Sobre la Revoluion FiLipina, Appendix pp. 16-18.

Page  127 THE REVOLUTION AR GOVERNMENT 127 the Universe in order to attain these ends, have voted upon, decreed and sanctioned the following Political constitution." The project was discussed article by article for over a month-from October 25th to November 29th, 1898. Besides its author, other members who took part in the debate were Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Joaquin Gonzales, Tomas G. del Rosario, Arcadio del Rosario, Ignacio Villamor, Alberto Barretto, Aguedo Velarde and Pablo Tecson. The Calderon project was approved by the Congress with some changes and has since been known as the Malolos Constitution. It created the Filipino State called the Philippine Republic, sovereignty residing exclusively in the people. It established a government which was popular, representative, and responsible, with three distinct powers, the legislative, executive, and judicial. The national and individual rights of Filipinos and aliens were specified. The legislative power was exercised by the Assembly of Representatives, whose members were to be elected according to law. When the Assembly was not in session, there was to be a Permanent Cominiission. The executive power was vested in the President of the Republic, through the Secretaries of the Government. The Cabinet was responsible to the Assembly. The President was elected by the Assembly of Representatives and special Representatives convened as a Constituent Assembly. The Judicial Power was vested in the Supireme Court of Justice and in the courts organized by the laws. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was chosen by the National Assembly with the concurrence of the President of the Republic and the Secretaries of the Government. Legislative Omnipotence Rather unusual were the provisions for the omnipotence of the legislature, the unicameral system, and the permanent commission. Calderon fought for legislative omnipotence because he thought that it was the only way to check the possible abuses of the executive power and of the army. He said:

Page  128 128 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS In fact the legislative power, although I proclaimed at the beginning the separation of the three powers. had been vested with such amirple powers in the proposed constitution that it controlled the executive and judicial powers in all their acts, and in order to make this control a constant one, the same as in the constitution of Costa Rica, I had established a so-called permanent committee, that is, a conmmitee composed of members of the congress, which, during the recess of the congress, assumed all the powers of the same, with full authority to adopt emergency measures. In one word, it may be affirmed that the congress of the republic was the omnipotent power of the entire nation. In proceeding in this manner, I remembered that the insurrection had been organized by the most ignorant element of the people and that for a long time we were going to have a very great predominance of the military element, whose ignorance was indisputable, to such an extent that General Luna himself, as soon as he took charge of the direction of the war, organized academies in order that the officers might acquire some knowledge of military tactics of a scientific nature. The fact that the insurgent army was completely ignorant is not at all strange, because any person who knows how the insurrection was organized is well aware of the fact that Andres Bonifacio recruited his men from among the most ignorant classes. Being fully convinced, therefore, that in case of obtaining our independence, we were for a long time going to have a really oligarchic republic in which the military element, which was ignorant in almost its entirety, would predominate, I preferred to see that oligarchy neutralized by the oligarchy of intelligence, seeing that the congress would be composed of the most intelligent elements of the nation. This is the principal reason why I vested the congress with such ample powers, not only within the legislative sphere, but also in its control of the executive and judicial branches. In one word, where oligarchies were concerned, I preferred the oligarchy of the intelligence of many to an ignorant oligarchy. (1) In thus giving extreme importance to the legislature, the Philippines passed through the same period of great reliance upon legislative bodies which other peoples just emerging from executive tyranny have experienced. The objection of Mabini to Calderon's project was not based on his (1) Memoirs of Felipe G. Calderon, The Philippine Review, June-July, 1919. The Memoiis were also printed in book form.

Page  129 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 129 rF desire to have a strong executive permanently. He wanted a strong executive for war purposes only. In times of peace his theory demanded the predominance of the legislature also, although he probably would not have made it as pronounced as Calderon did. His view of the relation of the three powers is found in his article on what he called Political Trinity, in which he said: Society is a group of men pledged to render mutual help to one another for the attainment of that common welfare, which they cannot by themselves and without the help of others secure. When a group of men are called upon to carry on an enterprise, for instance, to build a house, there must be some one among them to lead the others in the proper distribution of the work; otherwise they will not understand each other and nothing will be accomplished. A corpse still retains all the organs of the body, but it cannot move, cannot function, because it lacks a soul which nerves its component parts to a simultaneous and uniform action. Its hands do not move, for the body to which they are attached cannot move. The sadine thing happens with a society; if it is nothing but a gathering otf men, without aims or guidance, order or harmony, it is a veritable cadaver, for what one man may do others will undo. They will soon fight each other and dissolve, just as nothing awaits the cadaver but its decomposition. Society, then, should have a soul,-sovereignty. This sovereignty should have a brain to guide and direct it,the legislative power; a will that works and makes it work,the executive; a conscience to try and punish the bad,-the judicial power. These powers should be independent in the sense that one should not encroach upon the attributes of the other. But the last two should be made subservient to the first, just as will and conscience are subordinated to reason. The executive and the judiciary cannot separate themselves from the laws dictated by the legislature, any more than a citizen can violate them. The power of legislation is the highest manifestation of sovereignty, just as reason is the highest attribute of our soul. But this subordination of the executive and the judiciary to the legislature is one of order and harmony, not of hierarchy. As out of a perfect harmony of the three attributes of our soul is born the attribute of virtue, so out of the harmony of the three governmental powers springs forth a good government. (1) (1) Article of Sept. 20, 1899, published in El Ideario Politico de Mabini, pp. 12, 18.

Page  130 130 TilE DEVELO'PMEilT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Calderon assigned three reasons for the unicameral system. In thie first place, there were no conflicting interests in the Philippines to justify the existence of itwo chambers; in the second place, in a formative country like the Philippines, two chambers might delay an efficient administration; and in the third place, there might not be at first enough good men to fill all the places of a two-chambered legislature.(1) ThIe provis on for a permanent commission was intended to furnish the legislature with a further check upon the executi-ve when the formre: was not in session. Provisions for permnanent le-rislative commissions are found in the constitutions of some South American countries, from which Calderon m ust have borrowed the idea. The permanent commission of the National Assembly in April, 1899 was composed of the following: Sr. Pedro A. Paterno, Sr. Felix Ferrer, Sr. Juan Nopomuceno, Sr. Arsenio Cruz H-errera, Sr. Joaquin Gonzales, Sr. Hugo Ilagan, and Sr. Alberto Barretto. Another subject on which the memubers of congress were divided in their opinions was the subject of religion. Calderon, who was a good Catholic, for very important reasons provided in his proposed constitution that the Catholic religion be recognized as the state religion, altho other people would be allowed to worship God in their own way. That was put to a vote, and the result was a tie. Upon another poll his proposition was defeated by one vote, that of Pablo Tecson, the Vice-President. Calderon in his Memoirs explains his reasons for advocating a state religion as follows: I took into account that all the Filipinos, even those who boasted they were Masons and sectarians, were Catholics, and that it was extremely dangerous at that time to do sudden violence to the consciences and establish liberty of worship, with its sequel the separation of Church and State, not oniy because it outraged the consciences of nearly all, but aiso, because it created great dissension among the Filipinos, who were divided enough as it was in those moments, while what we really needed the most was to find (1) Memoirs of Felipe Calderon, The Philippine Review, June-July, 1919.

Page  131 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 131 all possible rmeans of cohesion between the different elements here. Moreover, everybody is fully aware of the power of the native priests, and to proclaim the separation of Church and State at that time meant to remove that valuable element of our people. In addition to these reasons, I was influenced in my choice of the establishment of an official church, which was of course, the Catholic, by the consideration that in case of separation between Church and State, Rome could very well appoint foreign bishops and ecclesiastic authorities and absolutely disregard the native clergy which since the beginning of the revolution and a long time before, had been the principal authors of the reform movement in the Philippines. On the other hand, the question of the ecclesiastic property was a problem of the most vital importance which could not, in my opinion, be solved but in one of these two manners: either by entering into a concordat with Rome, for which purpose it was indispensable for us to have an official religion, or by indemnifying the religious corporations for the value of their property which, though admitting that their acquisition may have been vicious in its origin, had, in the course of the years, been redeemed by the acceptance of the tenants occupying the same. If the religious corporations were paid the value of their property holdings, all that wealth would leave the Philippines instead of remaining here and being used for the Catholic worship. Even Mabini, who was a good Mason, saw the strength of Calderon's argument although the proposal was defeated. Mabini was as much opposed to the Constitution as ever.(1) He even tried to delay its promulgation, on the ground that if it was enforced, the President would have very little power, for the signature of the Secretary was always necessary, and the President could not do what he wanted. The cabinet would be responsible to congress and not to him, and congress had tremendous powers other than this. In time of war, Mabini went on, when unity of command and effective leadership were necessary, this plan of government would not work well. (1) It is surprising how such a well posted scholar as James A. Leroy could have made the mistake of giving the exclusive paternity of the Malolos Constitution to Apolinario Mabini. (See, Leroy, Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 289).

Page  132 132 THE DEVELOPMENT OP PHILIPPINE POLITICS Probably because of Mabini's opposition a few temporary provisions wer' inserted in the last part of the constitution. The para aph of Article 4 which provided that, "two or more of these powers shall never be vested in one person or corporation; neither shall the legislature be vested in one individual alone", has been modified with the insertion of Article 99 which reads as follows: "Notwithstanding the general rule established in the 2nd palagraph of the 4th article, during the time the country may y.a7e to stru-gle for its independence the government is hereby authorized to determine, at the close of Congress, whatever questions and difficulties, not provided for by law, may a ise from unforseen events, by means of decrees which ma:' be communicated to the permanent commission and to the assembly on its first meeting." Similarly Article 5, which recognizes the equality of religions and the separation of the church and state was suspended until the meeting of the constitutional assembly. Articles 62 and 63, referring to the power of the legislature to over-ride the veto of the president was modified, allowing the president to suspend the operation of the law until the new session of Congress the following year. As amended, the Malolos Constitution was promulgated on January 21, 1899. i Proclamation of the Philippine Republic The Philippine Republic constituted with the adoption of the Malolos Constitution was inaugurated on January 23, 1899 with pompous ceremonies in the Revolutionary capital (Malolos) in accordance with the following program: The Congress to hold a session at eight o'clock in the morning. Promulgation of the Constitution. Oath of the Constitution by the Assembly. Proclamation of the Republic, as the form of Government of the Nation. Proclamation of Sefnor Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, as President of the Philippine Republic. Committee appointed in order to inform Sefior Emilio Aguinaldo that he has been proclaimed President of the Republic.

Page  133 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT Sefior Emilio Aguinaldo will appear before the Congress in order to take the oath. A secretary of the Congress '.I read the articles of the Constitution relating to the oal-j.6 Taking of the oath by the President of the Republic. Speech by Sefior Emilio Aguinaldo. The President of the Republic will receive the oath of the army, before flags, in the streets and plazas. In the balconies of the Presidential House the Republic will be proclaimed before the pueblo in the following heraldic form: The Philippines for the Republic! Review of troops and procession. (1) Proposed Judicial Organization of the Philippine Republic Even after the beginning of hostilities between Americans and Filipinos the Philippine Congress continued to meet. They discussed and passed several laws which were not really enforced because of the defeat of the Filipino army. These laws are interesting in that they showed the framework of government which the revolutionists endeavored to establish. They are indicative also of the principles which animated the Filipino law-makers in their legislative program. On March 6, 1899, President Aguinaldo decreed that the National Assembly had passed a pension law for the disabled, and for the widows and children of dead'soldiers. But the most important of the laws approved was the provisional law for the organization of the judiciary, promulgated by President Aguinaldo on March 7, 1'899. It had many commendable points, recognizing among others, two fundamental principles: the independence of the judiciary and the appointment to judicial posts by means of competetive examination and promotion from lower ranks. The principle of the independence of the judiciary was secured in the following articles: Art. 2. The power to apply the laws in civil and criminal proceedings, pronouncing judgment and enforcing the execution of such judgments, devolves exclusively upon the Supreme Court and other inferior Tribunals and Judges. Art. 4. As a consequence of the provisions of the preceding article, neither judges nor tribunals can, either di (1) Taylor, Vol. 3, Exhibit 406, 18 KU.

Page  134 134 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS rectly or indirectly, take part in matters peculiar to the administration of the State, nor lay down rules or provisions of a general character regarding the application or interpretation of the laws.(1) There is no nrovision for declaring laws unconstituti onal and void, the European system being thus followed rather than the Amrercan system. Four kinds of courts were provided for: Municipal courts in municipal districts, courts of first instance in judicial districts, superior courts or audienc as in regions composed of several provinces, and a supreme court. There were to be six superior courts, or audienceas, to be located in the capital of the renublic, and in Vigan, Nueva Caceres, Iloilo, Cebu, and Zamboanga. The sunerior court in the capital was to be composed of a pres;dingr judge, two presiding judges of the chamber, four associate justices, two secretaries of the chanmber, and one secretary of the administration. There were to be, besides, a public prosecutor and two deputy public prosecutors. The other superior courts outside of the capital were to be composed each of one presiding judge, two assoc ate justices, and two secretaries; and in addition, one public prosecutor and one deputy public prosecutor. The supreme court was composed of a chamber of administration, a civil chamber, a criminal chamber, and a war and navy chamber. The chamber of administration was to be composed of the presiding judge of the tribunal, the presiding judges of the chambers, and the attorney general. The civil chamber and the criminal chamber which were to take charge of appeals in civil and criminal cases, respectively, were each1 to be composed of one presiding judge and four justices. The Supreme Court en bane constituted as a chamber of justice to take cognizance of certain cases against the president of the republic, the chief justice, the attorney general, the members of the council of the government, the president of the assembly, the presidents of the chambers of the supreme court, the justices of the audiencias and the supreme court, and the generals of the army. There was to be created a corps of aspirants to the judiciary who, besides finishing the law course in a university (1) Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 621, 9 GR.

Page  135 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT supported by the state, must pass an examination given by a board composed of the chief justice as president, the attorney general, two justices of the supreme court, three attorneys-at-lavw appointed by the government on the recommendation of the Board of Administration of the bar association, two professors of law, and the secretary of the administration of the supreme court. (Section 43.) Judges of the courts of first instance should be supplied only from aspirants to the judic'ary, and preference would be given to those who had the highest ranks in the list. Appointments to higher courts were to be made from the lower ones. Thus when there were three vacancies in the position of associate justices of the supreme court and of chief justice of the AudiencKa, they would be filled by the presiding judges of the chambers of the same who would be promoted, by an attorney-at-law who had practicel his profession for twelve years in the seat of an audiencia who might be selected by the National Assembly, and by another attorney-at-law who had filled an important position in the Council of Government or as Director General of the Administration. There was to be a department of public prosecution, to see to the observance of the judiciary law and other laws and to represent the government in its relations with the judicial power. The hierarchical order of officials of the department of public prosecution was: the attorney general, the public prosecutor, deputy public prosecutor of the supreme court, the public prosecutors, and deputy public prosecutor of the audiencia. (Article 76.) The laws of civil and criminal procedures, regulations for attorneys, the notarial law and the mortgage law of Spain were declared to be provisionally enforced unless opposed to the judiciary law. Similarly the law wvith regard to appeals and administrative proceedings enforced by Spain was to be followed with minor modifications. () The Educational Program of the Philippine Republic The eagerness of the Filipinos for instruction has been abundantly manifested during the recent years of American (1) For the text of the judiciary law see Taylor, Vol. IV, Exh. 621, 9 GR.

Page  136 136 THE DEVELOPMENT OF' PHILIPPINE POLITICS administration. One of the prime motives behind the movement of the Filipinos against the Spaniards was to secure greater opportunities for instruction. It would be, therefore, interesting to make brief mention of the educational program of the Philippine Revolutionary Government. Aguedo Velarde, as Secretary of Public Instruction, expressed the revolutionists' desire for instruction in the following words: "In all civilized countries primary instruction has always been the object of the greatest solicitude on the part of the governing powers: this it is that makes men religious, honorable, laborious (sic) and refined; it opens to them an understanding of a life of thought and civilization and it teaches them the sacred duties they have contracted with their country." (1) In a decree dated October 19, 1898, signed by President Aguinaldo and countersigned by Felipe Buencamino, as Secretary of Fomento, the Literary University of the Philippines was established for the purpose of teaching civil and criminal law, administrative law, medicine, surgery, and pharmacy, as well as studies pertaining to the notarial profession. The interior government of the university weas to be under a rector selected by the Board of Professors themselves, and a commission consisting of four members, also selected by the professors, to be presided over by the rector. The commission was to formulate the interior regulations and decide upon the plan of instruction. The appointment of professors and of a Secretary General of the University was made by the President of the Government on the recommendation of the Secretary of Fomento. (2) In another order of the same date professors were named as follows: Civil and criminal law, and administrative law: Cayetano S. Arellano, Pedro A. Paterno, Arsenio Cruz Herrera, Pablo Ocampo, Hipolito Magsalin, Tomas G. del Rosario and Felipe Calderon; Medicine and Surgery: Dr. Joaquin Gonzalez, Dr. Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, Dr. Jose Albert, Dr. Salvador V. del Rosario, Dr. Ariston Bautista, Dr. Isidoro Santos, Licentiate Justo Lucban, Licentiate Jose Luna, and Dr. Francisco Liongson; (1) Taylor, Vol. IV. Exhibit 953, 79 MM. (2) Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 602, 43 KU.

Page  137 TI-E REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 137 Pharmacy: Dr. Mariano V. del Rosario, Dr. Antonio Luna, Licentiate Leon Maria Guerrero, Alejandro Albert, Enrioue Perez, Manuel Zamora and Mariano Ocampo; Notariat: Licentiate Aguedo Velarde, Arcadio del RoE sario, and Juan Gabriel y IManday; Secretary-General: Mariano Crisostomo y Lugo.(lV? In another decree dated October 4, 1898 the Burgos Institute was given official character and authorized to give what were called studies of secondary instruction and studies of aplication. The s ies of condary instruction correspond to our present high school and had the following curricula: A. Latin grammar, which shall be studied in two courses. In the first the analogy and syntax and exercises in Latin orthography; and in the second, higher syntax, prosody metric art, translation and orthographic exercises. B. Universal geography and especially that of the Philippines, which shall be divided into two courses, the first constituting astronomical geography and physical geography, and the second, ancient, mediaeval and modern political geography. C. Universal history, and especially that of the Philippines in two terms, in the first being studied that of the ancient and mediaeval periods, and in the second that of modern and contemporaneous times. D. Spanish literature in two terms, the first course comprising rhetoric and poetry, and the second the study of the classic authors. E. Arithmetic and algebra. F. Geometry, and trigonometry. G. French in two courses, the first comprising reading, grammar, writing from dictation and conversation. H. English in two courses, as French. I. Natural History, with elements of physiology and hygiene, which shall be divided into two courses, the first comprising zoology and botany, and the second mineralogy, geology, and elements of physiology and hygiene. J. Elements of physics. K. Elements of general chemistry. L. Philosophy, two terms, the first being devoted to psychology, logics and ideology, and the second to Antology, cosmology and theodicy. M. Natural laws.(2) (1) Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 503, 44 KU. (2) Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 505, 44 KU.

Page  138 138 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The studies of application correspond to our collegiate work, with the following courses: A. Elements of economic, industrial and statistical geography. B. Accounting and book-keeping applied to all kinds of enterprises. C. Political economy as applied to commnerce, commercial and co-operative associations. D. Comparative commercial legislation and customs systems. E. Practice of commercial and accounting operations, and correspondence. F. The English, French, German, and Italian languages. G. Theoretical and practical elementary topography, with the measuring of surfaces, surveying and the making of plans. H. Elements of industrial mechanics. I. Elements of chen istry as applied to the arts.(1) As regards primary instruction, in a decree dated November 4, 1898, the male and female teachers who had charge of public instruction during the last days of Spanish administration were to continue in a provisional capacity. Separate boys' and girls' schools were, therefore, to be maintained. The classes wvere to be held from 8 to 10:30 and from 2:30 to 5 every day of the year except holidays. The salaries of school teachers were to be paid from local funds. Even when the Filipinos wvere at war with America, the Burgos Institute and the Literary University continued their courses and followed the exodus of the government from Malolos to Tarlac. In the latter capital, on September 29, 1899, the anniversary of the ratification of independence by the Malolos Congress, degrees were conferred in law and medicine. At the commencement exercises, De2an Leon Ma. Guerrero addressed the graduates, in part, as follows: Members of the graduating class, do not be deaf to the call of the country; on the contrary, help create a free country, an endeavor in which all your brothers and country (1) Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 505, 44 KU.

Page  139 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNM ENT men are engaged. The soldier faces a shower of bullets and shots and repulses the enemy; the doctor and the pharmacist stren;gthen the body t.hat it may the better fig'ht for life, and they cure the wounds of the wounded heroes; the engineer will build fortifications; the priest will console the dying, and you, men of the law:, will uphold the empire of justice and defend from every attack the glorious liberty of our people.(1) The Finances of the Revolution In the chapter on the Katipunan revolt, we have statel that Emilio Aguinaldo was given a c heck for four hundred thousand pesos by the Spanish government which he kept practically untouched in order to 1inance another revolution should Spain fail to redeem her promises. Wlhen Aguinaldo arrrived in the Philippines, out of that four hundred thousand, tlere was left about tw-o hundred and fifty thousand pesos, after various expenlditurLes for arms, anImmunition and other military necessities had been deducted. In the Decree of June 23, 1898, creti revolutio1ary goverinelnt, the Department of Trias ury, Agriculture, and ]ia.nuifactures wss C reatel, nd in NovCember of the same year, tihe depairtzmentS, was recon..ize.: uncer the name of the )Departmeit&nt of Finance with the following divisions: A. Division of the Public Treasury: 1. Receipt and distribution of all the money of the government. 2. Entering into negotkiationes and contracts on account of the treasury. 3. General assignment of collections from the different sources of income. 4. Supervision of Financial Obligations. 5. Loans. 6. Management of real estate owned by the State. 1. Division of Accounting: 1. General Accounting. 2. Preparation of the budget. C. Division of Customs: 1. Income from Customs. 2. Schedule. 3. Life saving. 4. Charges for navigation, ports, and light-house services. (1) Kalaw, T. M., The Philippine Revolution, p. 150, footnote.

Page  140 140 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS D. Division of General Taxation: 1. Direct Taxes. 2. Indirect Taxes. 3. Loans. 4. All other services not fallingr under the first three divisions of the department.(1) In addition to these divisions of the Department, there was created a financial board to act as an advisory body in matters pertaining to the negotiations of national loans and other transactions. Its chief functions were: (a) to undertake the negotiation of national loans; (b) to advise the government on the nature of securities to be offered by;the government; (c) to aid the Department of Finance in drafting the budget; (d) and to perform other duties inposed upon it by law. It was composed of twenty-five rnenibers with the Secretary of Finance as the chairman. To qualwify for membership in the board, one had to subscribe to at least fifty bond certificates of the government. On HTay 8, 1899, further reorganization of a minor character was made in the ofice of the Department of Finance. In justice to the revolutionary government, it must be vaid that its exuenditures never exceeled its income. The total receipts of the central treasury from May 20 to Septeimzabr 30, 1898, were P385,382.24 while the expendiitures for the same period were P173,804.82. The money with v-h1ich the government endeavored to support itself caeme from three sources: taxation, direct and indirect, boiods, and seizures and donations. The revenues from direct taxation consisted of the persorna! cedula tax, the city or urban tax, the industrial and cormmercial tax, and the Chinese capitation or poll tax, the vwar tax, and special and eventual revenues. The last class covers such items as post office box rent, the sale of state property, stamps, fees for the registration of deeds, income from opium, etc. The direct taxes were, on the whole, a continuation of the old Spanish system of taxation. The Spanish cedula tax was continued up to April, 1899, when it was superceded by the war tax. The city or urban tax levied 5 per cent upon the net rental value of all buildings. (1) El Heratdo de la Rsvolucion, Dec. 1, 1898.

Page  141 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 141 The commercial and industrial tax was very complicated, for the schedule covered over four hundred different classes of taxable industries and occupations. There was at first decreed an extraordinary contribution from foreigners, but in view of the unpopularity of the decree, it was abolished in January, 1899. The Chinese were also requested to continue paying the old tax which the Spanish government required of them to pay in proportion to their income. The greatest source of revenue was the extraordinary war tax which gave more than 60 per cent to the total estimated receipts for 1899. It wass called the war tax or certificate of citizenship tax. Under this, all citizens of the Philippine were divided into eight classes with their respective fees as follows: Class 1 (persons who owned property to the value of P25,000 or more)............................... P100 Class 2 (persons who owned property to the value of P15,001 to P25,000)............................ 50 Class 3 (persons who owned property to the value of P10,001 to P15,000)............................. 25 Class 4 (persons who owned property to the value of P5,001 to P10,000).............................. 10 Class 5 (persons who owned property to the value of 1,001 to P5,000)............................... 5 Class 6 (all males over eiglhteen not included in the first five classes).............................. 2 Class 7 (all women over eighteen)................. 1 Class 8 (Sexagenarians,, insane persons, soldiers and military employees in active service)........... Free(1) The much condemned farming out system of collecting revenues in vogue during the Spanish regime was continued. The import and export duties had fixed schedules. At first an advalorem duty of 25 per cent was levied on all merchandise leaving revolutionary ports. This was subsequently changed in October, 1899 when 5 per cent duty was declared on merchandise sent to ports within the jurisdiction of the revolutionary government or that of Manila; 15 o/o on the invoiced value or on the market price at the place of origin of all merchandise shipped from points with(1) Taylor, Vol. IV, Exh. 751, 77 GR.

Page  142 142 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS in the jurisdiction of the revolutionary government to points not within its jurisdiction; and 5 o/o advalorem upon all direct imports from abroad. The other source of revenue of the revolultionary government was the bonds. A law wvas passed in October, 1898 authorizing the government to issue bonds not to exceed twenty million pesos to be floated in the Philippines and to issue paper money of forced circulation to the value of three million pesos. In November, 1898, the revolutionary government decided to float the first two issues amounting to five million pesos and classified into A series (consisting of 25,000 bonds of P100 each) and B series (consisting of 100,000 bonds of P25 each). The five million pesos was to be amortized in forty years, beginning December 1, 1893. In lieu of a sinking fund, there w-as a provision iwhich in effect meant direct installment payment. The revolutionary government pledged that the receipts from rentals of all state property should be applied to the payment of amortized portions as well as interest due. Out of the A series there were on October 19, 1899, 3,372, and of the B series 1,507 certificates subscribed for and only'partially paid. Previous to this date, on September 2, 1899, P388,650 was turned in as proceeds from the subscription. Further sale of the bonds w as interrupted by the war. There wals an attempt to issue the Ithree million pesos of paper money, but this did not materialize. Ten years after the recognition of independence, these notes were to have been redeemed or repurchased. There was also an attempt to negotiate a foreign loan and Agoncllo was authorized to conduct the negotiations, but nothing came of it. The amount of this loan was to be twenty million pesos and was to be redeemed after twenty years from the date of the recognition of Philippine independence by the United States. The revenue of the Manila customs house was to be given as a guarantee to the subscribers of this loan. During the early days of the fighting, war contributions were received with some regularity. The abuses caused by this practice induced the government to establish the "juntas de socorro," originally designated to take care of the sick and wounded of the insurgent army and of

Page  143 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 143 the militia and to give quarters and food to soldiers that might be temporarily stationed in the municipalities. The property of the crown and of religious corporations in the Philippines was confiscated by the State. The personal property of the friars was also confiscated. The friars were placed on the status of combatants and prisoners of war, all property belonging to them being made subject to seizure and confiscation. (1) All this meant further income for the government. By instructions sent out on June 20. the administration of the property of individual Spaniards was left in the hands of the municipal presidents aided by the delegate of taxes and revenues. Property belonging to Spaniards who had been taken prisoners of war or killed in action against the insurgents, was classed as the property of the crown and reverted to the revolutionary government. On February 28, 1899, the total collection from seizures and donations amounted to P536,608.82(2) The following table shows a summary of the transaction of the central treasury from lMay 20, 1898 to February 28, 1899: - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ '.... Deposits in the Treasury May 20 to 31, 1898.. P 7,175.00 June, 1898......... 83,379.08 July, 1898......... 107,706.96 August, 1898....... 88,167.39 September, 1893.... 98,953.81 October, 1898...... 145,909.49 November, 1898.... 207,763.30 December, 1893..... 126,683.84 January, 1899...... 242,083.24 February, 1899..... 320,608.06 Disbursements by the Treasury May 20 to 31, 1898 P 1,177.48 June, 1893...... 11,664.50 July, 1893...... 69,088.44 August, 1898.... 52,659.86 September, 1898. 39,214.54 October, 1898... 28,505.24 November, 1898. 196,726.02 December, 1898.. 433,487.65 January, 1899... 231,757.53 February, 1899.. 96,709.36 Total outlay.....1l,160,990.62 rI,160,990.62 (3) Total receipts.......'1,428,430.17 Balance............ 267,439.55 P1,160,990.62 I - _ _ I-,- - _.. iZ_ ~ I~am- ~rm ~rrrla~oaer~n Icz~ra E S~i~L;L~CPCIPLPX~;IYUhl B~tSIP ICI~e~E~9P~~.UP'" - — I (1) Taylor, Vol. IV, Exh. 761. (2) Ped;osa, The Financing Plans and Practices of the Philippinel Itcurgent Governtnent during the Second Revolution, Master's Thesis, Manila, 1926. (3) Taylor, Exh. 755.

Page  144 144 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The budget of estimated receipts and expenditures for 1899 was as follows: Chap. 1. Chap. 2. Chap. 3. Regular Direct taxes................. L........ P1,016,757.00 Indirect taxes......................... 432,050.00 Special or eventual receipts............. 843,600.00 Emergency Chap. 3. Direct taxes.......................... 4,050,000.00 P6,342,407.00(1) Section 1. Section 2. Section 3. Section 4. Section 5. Section 6. Section 7. Section 8. General Summary of State Expenditures Malolos, February 19, 1899 General obligations.................. P 281,385.00 Foreign Affairs..................... 89,040.00 Interior Affairs..................... 203,550.00 War and Navy...................... 4,977,654.38 Treasury............................ 354,380.00 Public instruction.................... 35,468.00 Communication and Public Works..... 361,366.00 Agi'dalture, Industry & Commerce..... 21,688.00 P6,324,729.38 (2) The budget as drafted in the Finance Department was passed without much discussion by the Malolos Congress. It is to be noted that P4,977,654.38, or 78 o/o of the estimated receipts, were destined for the military department. The President was to receive P12,000 a year. The lieutenant general and the secretaries of the departments received P720 each and the brigadier general and chiefs of bureaus, P600. Officials could occupy two positions, but could not receive more than one salary. The general estimate of local expenditures and receipts for the year 1899 was as follows: (1) Taylor, op. cit. Vol. 4, 81 GR. (2) Ibid. Vol. III, 80 GR.

Page  145 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 145 Philippine Republic-General Estimates of Local Expenditures and Receipts for the Year 1899. General summary of local expenditures: Chap. 1. Public Instruction......................... P302,156.00 Chap. 2. Eleemosynary Institutions and Health....... 55,160.00 Chap. 3. Public W orks.............................. 50,000.00 Chap. 4. Prisons.................................... 40,352.00 Chap. 5. Leases.................................... 52,000.00 Chap. 6. Local Service.............................. 173,254.00 Chap. 7. Cemeteries................................ 12,680.00 Chap. 8. Sundry Expenses.......................... 9,000.00 Ad. Unforseen Expenses....................... 10,000.00 P704,602.00 Summary of local receipts: General summary of the estimate of receipts for the year 1899 Estimated receipts Chap. Art. Statement of receipts By article By chapter Local Revenues Regular 1 Chap. 1-Direct Taxes 1 Bridges, ferries and fords... P 5,500.00 2 Weights and measures..... 31,000.00 3 Fisheries.................. 3,500.00 4 Carriages, carts, tramways, and horses except such as are employed in agricultural work................. 50,000.00 5 From Credentials and transfers of Large Cattle 7,000.00 6 Pounds................... 1,000.00 7 Slaughter and dressing of cattle................... 40,000.00 8 Streets-lights and streetcleaning................ 9 50 o/o of the fees for formal interments.............. 150,000.00 P288,000.00

Page  146 146 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Support Given the Revolutionary Government Aguinaldo's military venture was a success almost from the very start. His entry and his assurance to the people that he had returned as a friend of the Americans, who came not to enslave the people but to free them from the Spanish yoke, proved a magic which drew the support of the entire people. Perhaps the fact might be added that the spirit of nationality was a decisive factor at this time. Certainly, as we shall see, the men who joined Aguinaldo no longrer came from tie middle or lower classes alone, as was largely true during the first revolt; men who were indiferent and passive in 1896 now became active supporters of the revolutionary cause. Recruits swarmed in. Heart and soul they joined Aguinaldo's army. There were not enough arms to go around. Astonished at such a spirit, Dewey himself said tha it w as only a question of arming the insurgents, and that they could have had the whole population. Town after town, province after province, island after island, fell into Aguinaldo's hands; his forces marched to the very walls of Manila, so that when the American soldiers came from San Francisco they found the besieged city an easy prey, and all the rest of Luzon under the control of the insurgents. The Visayan leaders soon followed suit and as early as July, 1898 there was a conspiracy against the Spaniards discovered in Panay. In Iloilo steps were soon taken to organize committees throughout the province. The movement wvas organized by Pablo Araneta, who had been chosen general in chief of the revolutionary forces, Roque Lopez, as "secretary of war of the committee of conspirators", and Quintin Salas. On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo sent an expedition to Capiz under General Ananias Diokno, with power to establish military and civil organizations. Another expedition was sent to Antique province under Leonardo Fullon. On November 17, 1898 a provisional revolutionary government of the District of Visayas was organized as a political subdivision of the Malolos government. Steps were then taken to organize the towns in accordance with the regulations issued by Aguinaldo. Ro

Page  147 THE RIEVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 147 que Lopez was designated president of the revolutionary government o the District of Visayas. Upon the constitution of the govoernment a manifesto was issued which reads in part as follows: "The revolutionary govero.nmcent and the office of general of the liberating army having been thus constituted, it affectionately g~reets the sovereign people of the Visayas who have just succeeded in obtaining th}eir liberty under the protection o God ad of the MIost Ioly Virgin under the shadow of the t1rJollored flag and u1pon the basss of t Che conlstitution of the Philippine republic." () Subsequently an assembly was called and thle revolutionrary government of the Visayas was changed to t;e Federal State of Visayas. cf, cial records show that this chlnge was nmade y seve-bnty-on.e representatives of the government of the ar-my and; of the pejople. Agui;ldo was notified of the change of administration. The government was entrusted to a council of state withl the following officials: President of the Council of State, Seiior RToque Lopez; V'ice Presidrent, Scilor VicOnte Franco; Councilors for Iloilo: Sr. Jovito Yusay, Sr. amotn Avancefia, Sr. Julio RIcrnandez, Sr. Magdaleno Javellana. Members ex-officio from the armyy: Sr. Mlartin Delgado, Sr. Pablo Araneta. Councilor for Cebu:Sr. Fernando Salas. Councilors for Occidental Negros: Sr. Agustin Montilla, for the south; Sr. Juan de Leon, for the north. Councilor for Oriental Neg-ros: Sr. Juan Carballa. Councilor for Antique: Sr. Vicente Gclla. Councilor for Capiz: Sr. Venancio Concepcion. Councilor for the District of La Concepcion: Sr. Numieriano Villalobos. General Secretary of the Council of State: Sr. Francisco Villanueva. Vice Secretary: Sr. Florencio Tarrosa.(2) When General Miller in December, 1898, tried to take Iloilo by persuasion, President Roque Lopez said: "In conjunction with the people, the army and committee, we insist upon our pretension not to consent, in our present situa(1) Taylor, Vol. II, sEh. 1192, 60 I1S. (2) Taylor, Vol. V, 7 IIK, Exh. 1200.

Page  148 148 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS tion, to any foreign interference without express orders from the central government of Luzon."(1) When further negotiations for the peaceful surrender of Iloilo was made by General Miller who insisted that by the benevolent proclamation of January 5, Iloilo should be turned over to the United States, President Lopez said: Let the Amierican commander sincerely tell us which authority we should prefer: That of the United States, arising under the treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, with which we are not acquainted because we have not been legally notified thereof, or the legitimate authority of the revolutlonary government of Malolos, based upon acts of conquest, prior to the said treaty of peace, and on natural bonds created by the policy and constitution established since the first moment of the revolution, on August 11, 1896? In view of all the foregoing, we insist upon not consenti Lg t the landing of your forces withiout express orders from our central governm;ent in Malolos.(2) By Febr'uay 1, the principal offcials of the government, Lopez and MIelleza, lhad abalndoneld the government and stayed in the city of Iloilo. Jovito Yusay was appointed president of Ithe council1 on TMay 27, 1899. On April 28, inajsmluc as 1 -Li ta lsny off- iscals el_ the council hamd already sur re:dered or aT ':beeti: capturein A gtin.aldo abolished the Federal Colun&cl of the Visavyas and instead appointed politico-m iiti3yI i. ''. a governors of most of the Visayan provinces. Onl Novemn-e,-: 5, 1 898 the Sp1 3aish officials surrendered themselves in Nekrros to the native lecders and a provisional goverinment Ywas established with Aniceto Lacsoa as preside-nt. 'here wcere also secretares of war, of the treasury, of justice, of comminerce, and of agricuiture a'n a military commander. On January 1, the federal republic of Negros as a state or canton with two provinces vwas proclaimed and notice of this was sent to Aguinaldo. Subsequently Negros surrendered to the United States without much of a fight. After the acceptance of American sovereignty a con^ stitution was approved, framed according to that of an American state, and it was to be submitted to the Pres (1) Taylor, Vol. II, 64 HS. (2) Taylor, Vol. II, 63 HS.

Page  149 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 149 ident of the United States. The plan was abandoned as being too complicated. In Cebu there was a provincial council with Luis Flores as president. He was aided in his work by General Verdeflor. On January 24, 1899 Aguinaldo approved the constitution of the council with Flores as President. But Flores' authority was afterwards contested by another Revolutionary chief, Arcadio Maxilom, who in a meeting held on April 10, 1899, with other military chiefs, decided that a gove-rnment under Maxilom's control as Aguinado's representative should be established in portions not governed by the Americans. Luis Flores was apparently to be ignored. The Island of Samar remaiined throughout under the control of Ge:nral V7icnte Ltucban, who was, to quote Taylor, "a formi dable ger ila leader who prides himself upon beinugf a desc t dant of Limahog." (') Leyte was led by General nloxica and opon his s rTrenider, General Lucban assurmed ecomman-d of the provmi ce. The Revo!utionary Government, and, later on, the Philippine LRe' lic.C, v-TaS reognC. 1 by pLractically every Christian prtortaion of the airch1ipelago, and evidcntly the people were beateo' satisfied with 1ithat governm-ient.than with the Spanish government. "Between the downfall of Spanish authoiority afte- the Battle of anila Bay and the American riitaryv ochatiro in the sp iigr of 1899," says Justice Malcolm," (2) ithere was an interim of about a year. During this period, wi'th the e:xce-ption of Manila and Cavite and the few to'lwvns actually held by the Spanisl forces, the Filipino gbvernlment was in control of almost the entire archipelago. This authority which first extended only over the Island of Luzon, finally reached to the other Islands, even to Mindanao." (") (1) Taylor, Vol. II, 80 HS. (2) The Government of the Philippine Islands, p. 157. (3) "By January, 1599, certainly before the outbreak of hostilities with the United States in February, the territory occupied by it stretched, roughly speaking, from northern Luzon to northern Mindanao. It included the entire island of Luzon, except the city of Manila and the town of Cavite, which were occupied by the American troops; the church of the town of Baler, which was defended by a small detachment of Spanish soldiers; and the mountain fastness of the

Page  150 150 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Apolinario Mabini It will be in order at this juncture to describe the personality and ideas of the two most salient figures of the Revolutionary government, Aguinaldo and a abini. The man largely responsible for the framework of governmient established and for the decrees issued above Aguinaldo's signature was Apolinarlio Mablini. I-e was, in the vwords of Mr. Schurman, a shlaper of policies rather than a leader of men. I-e did not have the culture of Paterno or thVe Inowledge of constitution1l law and political science possessed by Calderon, or the juristic mind of Arellano; but he had a clear intellect. IHe probably possessed what Wilson called a single —track mind, coupler. with a teacious will and animated by great intensity of feeling. He was an oaigizal thinkce and a politic.l philosopher. labini was btter against the irregularities and cabuses of the Spanish administration and, as we have seen in the decree of June 23, 18991, estal lishing the revolutionary governmrent, he wanted to abolish them. Ultimately hle wanted the highest type of denmocracy compatible with Philippine conditions. In times of war, however, he would have liked to have a president who could act promptly without hindrance from Congress or the other departments of the governtment. That is why he did not v want the Malolos constitution antd why he succeeded in postponing the establishment of the government by three independent departments. lce also modified the po1wer of veto. Malbini was strongly in favor of liberty, but he desired a liberty which respected the constituted authorities. Thus in explaining his decalogue he says: interior, which was inhabittd by the pagans. It included also all the islands between Luzon and Mindanao, except the greater part of Palawtan, which wvas settled largely by non-Christians, and West Negros, the loyalty of which was open to serious doubts. In Mindanao, the province of Misamnis may he considered a part of it, but Surigao and Cottabato d:ifted into chaos after the Spanish evacuation. The rest of the island and the Sulu group, except the towns of Zamboanga and Jolc, which were held by the Spaniards, were in the hands of their Mohammedan and pagan possessors, who enjoyed, as formerly, a semi-independent status."-Fernandez, Leandro H., The Philippine Republic, published in Columbia Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Vol. CXXII, No. 1, pp. 139, 140.

Page  151 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 151 Many speak of liberty, without understandinr it; many believe that, when one has liberty, one may act without restraint, either for good or evil, which is the greatest error. Liberty is only for good and never for evil; it is always in accord with right and the righteous and honorable conscience of an individual. When the thief steals, he is not free, as he allows himself to be led captive by evil, he makes himself the slave of his own passions; and when we lock him up, we punish him precisely because he does not want to mrake use of real liberty. Liberty does not mean that we shall obey nobody, for it specifically demands of us that we should submit our conduct to the government of reason and the restraints of justice. Liberty tells us not to obey everyone; but it does order us to obey always the one whom we have placed and recognized as the most capable of directing us; in doin, this we would be obeying our own reason. An army which mutinies disobeying its commanders breaks away from true liberty, because it disturbs the order and destroys the discipline, wrl!ich reason_ itself has inposed; in saying that I,;7any men together would do nothing without unity of movement or purpose, it is as if each man were to fire on his own account. (1) Mlabini conceived of the Philippine revolution not as an end but as a nleans. It heralded, according to him, the emancipation of the Malay race. It was to be a social as well as a political revolution. The abuses in government perpetr;-ated by the Spniards were of course to be corrected, but a acial reform was also imperative. He wanted to develop a people disciplined socially and mentally, and restingr on the firm foundations of representative democracy. That was the main reason why he published his decalogue, which he wanted to be the foundation of the social and political fabric of the people. "I have offered you the True Decalogue," he said in his address to the people by way of introduction, "so that you may understand that reason, your own conscience, constitutes the only true and solid basis for your moral education, and that honest work is the most firm foundation for your material education. In this way you will know that true honor, true nobility, does not reside in blood but (1) Taylor, Vol. IlS, Exhibit 45, 34 MG.

Page  152 152 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS in a man's character, formed in the atmosphere of reason and trained by honest work." A translation of the "True Decalogue" follows: First. Thou shalt love God and thy honor above all things; God as the fountain of all truth, of all justice and of all activity; and thine honor, the only power which will oblige thee to be truthful, just and industrious. Second. Thou shalt worship God in the form which thy conscience may deemn most righteous and worthy; for in thy conscience, which condemns thine evil deeds and praises thy good ones, speaks thy God. Third. Thou shalt cultivate the special gifts which God has granted thee, working and studying according to thine ability, never leaving the path of righteousness and justice, in order to attain thine own perfection, by means whereof thou shalt contribute to the progress of humanity; thus, thpu shalt fulfill the mission to which God has appointed thee in this life and by so doing, thou shalt be honored, and being honored, thou shalt glorify thy God. Fourth. Thou shalt love thy country after God and thine honor and more than thyself; for she is the only Paradise which God has given thee in this life, the only patrimony of thy race, the only inheritance of thine ancestors and the only hope of thy posterity; because of her, thou hast life, love and interests, happiness, honor and God. Fifth. Thou shalt strive for the happiness of thy country before thine own, making of her the kingdom of reason, of justice and of labor; for if she be happy, thou, together with thy family, shalt likewise be happy. Sixth. Thou shalt strive for the independence of thy country; for only thou canst have any real interest in her advancement and exaltation, because her independence constitutes thine own liberty; her advancement, thy perfection; and her exaltation, thine own glory and immortailty. Seventh. Thou shalt not recognize in thy country the authority of any person who has not been elected by thee and by thy countrymen; for authority emanates from God, and as God speaks in the conscience of every man, the person designated and proclaimed by the conscience of a whole people is the only one who can use true authority. Eighth. Thou shalt strive for a Republic and never for a Monarchy in thy country; for the latter exalts one or several families and founds a dynasty; the former makes a people noble and worthy through reason, great through liberty, and prosperous and brilliant through labor.

Page  153 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 153 Ninth. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; for God has imposed upon. him, as well as upon thee, the obligation to help thee and not to do unto thee what he would not have thee do unto him; but if thy neighbor, failing in this sacred duty, attempt against thy life, thy liberty and thine interests, then thou shalt destroy and annihilate him for the supreme law of self-preservation prevails. Tenth. Thou shalt consider thy countryman more than thy neighbor; thou shalt see in him thy friend, thy brother or at least thy comrade, with whom thou art bound by one fate, by the same joys and sorrows and by common aspirations, and interests. Therefore, as long as national frontiers subsist, raised and maintained by the selfishness of race and of family, with thy countryman alone shalt thou unite in a perfect solidarity of purpose and interest, in order to have force, not only to resist the common enemy but also to attain all the aims of human life. The tenacity and determination of Mabini as head of the cabinet were to a large measure, as we shall see, (1) responsible for the vigorous opposition the extension of American sovereignty met in the Philippines. Once independence was proclaimed and the constitution promulgated, he felt in duty bound to support both. Aguinaldo's Role While Mabini furnished the ideas of the Revolution, Emilio Aguinaldo became their unquestioned executor-but more than a mere executor. He remained the central figure throughout. He represented cohesion and unity. His name symbolized in the eyes of the masses military leadership and unselfish devotion to the country. While he was not elected by popular vote, he was the undisputed leader of the people. He managed to conduct himself with dignity worthy of the representative of the personality of the Republic, and stood above partisan politics, not unlike the President of the French Republic. Some have contended that he was merely a figurehead with whose name and reputation the politicians were wont to play upon the imagination of the masses. Yet it cannot be denied that (1) Infra Chap. VII.

Page  154 154 TIHE DEVELOPMENT OF PIILIPPINE POLITICS he was possessed of a great amount of sgacity and personal attraction. His greatest quality would seem to have been his ability to weld together apparentlv coflicting eement.s and to surround himself with able advisers. IIe sourtef i adyice before taking any step. If, as he confessed, he was ignorant of things governmental, he must have chosen by instinct anmong the several avenues suggected to him by his advisers. And yet, viewed from the present vant:age of nearly a quarter of a century, he seemrs to have erred very seldom in his course of action. Wh ile he showed a certain predilection for Mabini lie disregarded Mabini's desires on at least two very important occasions ---on the question of the drafting of the constitution andd in the dismissal of the Mlabini Cabinet. (1) The writer feels that the following appreciation of one of the keenest of the American correspondents, John F. Bass, is a fair and just estinlate of the real merit of Aguinaldo's work: It was by large measure on account of the genius of Aguinaldo, unassisted by outside power,-in gathering about him the best men of the country, in commanding the enthusiastic admiration of the people, and in preventing ambitious individuals from interfering' with his chief aim, the independence of the Filipino people,-that his government succeeded in holding its unity. I mean, that such a government as existed in the fall of 1898, while the United States influence was on the wane, existed as the result of Aguinaldo's effort and not because Americans were in any sense controlling the course of events. (2) What special contribution did Aguinaldo make to the political edifice of the Philippines aside from his military exploits? Of course, it is often difficult to determine which were Aguinaldo's ideas and which were Mabini's, for as we have seen, Aguinaldo often appended his name to proclamations written by Mabini. Aguinaldo often declared his lack of knowledge of things governmental and these statements may lead the laymen to conclude that he allowed his adviser to do everything whenever a question of govern(1) Infra p...... (2) John F. Basa in article written for Philippine Information Society, Vol. I, No. 3, June 1, 1901, p. 81..

Page  155 THE REiT/OLUTIONARY GOVIERNMENT 155 mental principle or procedure came up. But this was not always true. His chief contribution to the political philosophy, if we may use the term, of the Philippine revolution was gojyalty to public wi, ce tll,ll, and the avoidance of factions in local matters. Union and attraction were his guiding star. He made a distinct appeal to the feelings and patriotism of the people. And not all the manifestos and state papers signed by Aguinaldo were written by Mabini or his other advisers. Those originally written in Tagalog were mostly his. It is unfortunate that we have not been able to see the original Tagalog copies, but simply the English translations; however it is easy to distinguish Aguinaldo's style. For instance, it is believed that the Tagalog speech of President Aguinaldo when he administered the oath of office to the local presidentes on August 3, 1899 was his ovwn. IP,ontained that distinctive appeal to the feelings and patriotism of his people. In this respect his role was not very diffferent from that of George Washington who, in the early years of his administration, represented not the erudite wisdom of Jefferson or the financ;al genius of Hamilton but the good sense of the father of his people, ever preaching the gospel of harmony, patriotism, and freedom from factions and internal wrangling. We shall quote portions of that speech which we believe to be genuinely Aguinaldo's: Let all of us Filipinos reflect that we are all sons of a single mother, the Mother of the Philippines: for from the time of our birth and coming forth from the womb of our mother, she has sheltered us under her protection, presenting us with all the fragrance of her surroundings; she has enlightened and anirmated us with the light of her sun; and has nourished us with all the fruits of her soil. For this reason, all the natives, all the Spanish mestizos, as well as all the Chinese mestizos of the Philippines, are sons of God in this land; and in each one of them, I see an image of the Divinity and a brother of mine. And what better work can we do, my brothers, what greater enjoyment and contentment can we bring to our loving Native Land, than to all unite in bringing about her happiness? By a union of views and convictions all these provinces of the Philippines, even the most remote, will seem to be close and united in

Page  156 156 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS one and the same aspiration, namely the independence of this land and freedom from every foreign yoke. Union must be our fortress and the foundation of our tranquilty; wherefore we must jealously guard against and blot out anything that may tend to prejudice or engender our union. Let despotism disappear from among us, for a superior is a superior only so far as he promotes the welfare of his subordinates; let us destroy the parties and factions in the towns, for these only serve to fritter away the money, talents and energy which should be devoted to the advancement of our common aspirations. Let us not allow ourselves to fall victims of a covetous ambition to go in pursuit of undeserved honors or to serve the riches of the Governrment instead of the Government. Let us manage to keep ourselves from being stained and disgraced through gambling and cock-fighting, all of which have been taught us by the Spaniards. They well know that these things were great sowers of discord, and that with them we would be constantly engaged in disagreements, and would thus be kept from becoming identified and united, and from driving them out, as is happening today. An iniquitous end which they have failed to attain! For God, who had engraved upon our hearts the idea of national and racial unity, has now determined that there shall appear the sun which is to dissipate and put to an end all this iniquity, and thus unite with a single aspiration the intelligence and will of the whole Philippine Archipelago. If perchance, after having achieved our liberty which has cost us so many lives, we are compelled to lose it again through lack of union and through internecine struggles among our own people, let those who think so not oblige me on this very day to shed tears of grief, but let me unsheath and break in pieces the same sword I have used to defend our cause; and let me retire to an island lost in the sea, carrying upon my shoulders our consecrated standard, to use in drying the tears that must come coursing down my cheeks, as I weep inconsolable in a corner of the shore, over the misfortunes of our Native Land. But I know that you will never consent to this, for by the white color of the banner which we defend, born amidst the tumult of war, we have pledged ourselves to lose life and fortune rather than to permit the loss of our liberty.(l) (1) Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 86, 42 MG.

Page  157 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 157 While Aguinaldo might have been ignorant of many things governmental, in many cases of emergency where a prompt decision was necessary he appeared to rise to the occasion, retaining the final decision. Thus when a disturbance occurred in Tarlac, he had to be summoned immediately by Mabini who telegraphed him while he was in Cavite Viejo, as follows: To the President of the Rev. Govt., Cavite Viejo. Dec. 29, 1898, 10:55 a. m.: Most urgent. You must come here immediately. Trias is sick. We can come to no decision in regard to the Tarlac matter. Can not constitute a government without you. Mabini. (1) Aguinaldo had also a certain way of appealing to the feelings of his soldiers and subordinates, when he wanted to urge them to courageous action. Thus when Cailles on December 9, 1898 telegraphed: "Mlost urgent and confidential report to the effect that there are three thousand Americans in front of our position in Singalong. I do not know what they wish," Aguinaldo immediately wired the following: "Nevertheless the three thousand American soldiers are few against my colonel and his three hundred soldiers, and I believe you have more than that number." (2) (1) Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 346, 98 MG-1 KU. (2) One of the charges of Taylor against Aguinaldo was as follows: "that particular instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for the murder of General Otis is shown by a note on the back of a document presented to him." (Quoted by Worcester, The Philippines, Past and Present, Vol. I, p. 139). The document referred to by Taylor is as follows: (P. I. R. 1199-1). Our Honorable President: We, the signers, who subscribe the declaration appended, by these presents, protest against the American proclamation; we recognize no authority but that of God and the Revolutionary Government, and we offer our lives and property for the independence of our country. Manila, San Miguel, Jan. 12, 1899. FELICIANO CRUZ, SEVERINO QUITIONGCO. (25 signatures follow) (On the back is written in the handwriting of E. Aguinaldo): Leberino Kitionko: Feliciano de la Cruz: Commissioned to kill General Otis. With the foregoing document as proof, the charge is made that Aguinaldo had ordered the murder of Otis. Worcester apparently supports the charge, and explains the difference in the spelling of the name as follows: "The difference in the spelling of the name Severino Quitiongco is doubtless due to the fact that Aguinaldo wrote it down as it sounded to him." (Worcester, op. cit. vol. II, p. 734). Evidently Aguinaldo was not well acquainted with the men to whom he has entrusted the delicate mission of murdering the American commander, for he did not even know how to spell their names! The

Page  158 158 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Aguinaldo's Proposed Resignation In December 1898, without the knowledge of even his closest advisers, Aguinaldo wrote a letter addressed to the Filipino people. which he entitled "Requesting a Christmas Gift from My Filipino brethren". (1) In this letter he proposed to resign from the presidency. He assigned two main reasons for his desire to leave the presidency: first, his acknowled1ged ignorance of matters of state, and secohd, the favoritism, selfishness and bribery shown by other officials. "It pains me to know", he said, "that there are some military chiefs who besides practicing favoritism, have clearly the desire to enrich themselves, by accepting bribes and even making of the prisoners a means of enriching themselves." In indicating what kind of man should succeed him, he said that it was not enough that he should. be learned; "for there are learned men who do not want to share the fate of their country when she is in peril... Nor is it enough that he should be wealthy, for there are rich men, and this is the more frequent, who will not help with their wealth although they see the country menaced by a new slavery." The letter revealed very patriotic'feelings, and showed the inclination of Aguinaldo for men who had helped the country in its crisis. He remembered that in his two revolutions he had to rely on the poor people to support him: fact was, granting that the original of the above document, which is simply a translation, is authentic, that Aguinaldo could not have meant murder or assassination. The translator used the word kill, for probably the original Spanish was matar; hence Aguinaldo must have meant, if at all, for these brave men to kill the American general in battle, or in actual combat. Of course even that would have been a physical impossibility, for General Otis never saw acttal warfare, and Aguinaldo probably knew this fact also, but he wanted to compliment the signers of the petition, and to be commissioned, as in the tournaments of old, to sirgle cut in a comlat the leader of the opposing army vwas a great honor. But to interpret the document as an order from Aguinaldo addressed to men who were not even in his confidence for the secret assassination of the American commander, seems preposterous. (1) Aguinaldo must have written it originally in Tagalog. It was published in pamphlet form at Malolos, in 1898. When it was discovered, its circulation was suspended and many of the copies burned. The copies now in existence are therefore very rare. It is published in the Report of the Philippine Commission, 1900, Vol. I. p. 427.

Page  159 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT the rich would follow him only when there was a measure of success in sight. From the general tenor of Aguinaldo's letter it can be gathered that he favored for the presidency, in case his resignation was accepted, somebody who besides showing learning or ability, had proved his loyalty to the cause of the country. At about this time, it must be noted, the ablest and most prominent men of the Philippines had already come to his service. Wealthy men who originally paid no attention to his movernents had become members of the Cabinet or Con(gress or had been called by him for cooperation. Yet he evidently did not have full confidence in them. Moreover, these men were naturally conservative, and would accept perhaps the best possible terms under American sovereignty. And at this time, although few people suspected it, he was more completely under the influence of Mabini than of other advisers. Mabini would be the man who would answer Aguinaldo's desire for his successor. It was rumored at the time that Aguinaldo had in mind Arellano. (1) Judgmnzet on the Philippine Republic All conclusions as to what the Philippine Republic could have been must be purely hypothetical. Its government was allowed to function unmolested by the American Government for less than nine months only; that is, from May, 1898 to February 4th, 1899. A large portion of this time was spent in wresting territory from the Spanish government. From beginning to end it was purely a formative period. After the outbreak of the Filipino-American war the chief function of the Revolutionary Government was to resist the extension of American sovereignty. With the declaration of the guerilla warfare in November, 1899, in view of the successes of the American troops, it practically ceased to function as a national machine, although the revolutionists continued to recognize Emilio Aguinaldo as their head. (1) In October, 19.3, Aguinaldo told the writer that he really had Mablni in mind when he presented the resignation.

Page  160 160 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The period was, therefore, too short for us to judge of the merits of its work. The subjects we have discussed were mostly its plans and programs. We then took up briefly its two most salient figures, AguinalJo and Mabini. It was fortunate for the country that Aguinaldo, the leader, had for his chief adviser a man of the type of Mabini, whose clear intellect and knowledge of local conditions produced notable decrees which were able to organize the country into a national entity. The establishment of local governments and of the revolutionary government will always be an imperishable monument to his statesmanship. His notable decalogue, pointing out to his people their rights and duties, will remain an important tenet in the political philosophy of the people. The drafting of the Malolos Constitution, contrary to Mabini's ideas, showed that there were other minds in the Republic besides Mabini who were also busily at work endeavoring to solve the country's problems. Indeed, in the Malolos Congress could be found the country's best minds of the time. Mabini, Paterno, Calderon, Barretto, del Rosario, Ocampo, and others would have honored any Parliament in the world. The Malolos Constitution itself is a landmark in the history of Asiatic constitutionalism. It endeavored to establish the first Christian republic in the Far East. It was the first Oriental constitution which set forth the principle that sovereignty resided in the people. We believe, however, that it was a mistake to give an undue degree of power to a unicameral legislature. The proposed judicial reorganization had many good points to its credit; although the republic would probably have found a difficult task in trying to reform the corruption and abuses of the previous judicial system. The financial statements were clear, but again we must confess that in following certain financial practices of the Spanish government, such as the farming out of revenues, the revolutionary leaders left much room for improving their financial systemi. But the time was probably too short to devise and carry out a new one.

Page  161 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 161 The right of suffrage would probably have remained for many years in the hands of the so-called ilustrado, or educated, class. Yet it is the common experience that a taste of democracy begets more democracy; hence, it is very likely that the masses would have soon advocated active participation in governmental affairs. Now that we hear so much of the evils of universal suffrage in countries where the masses are mostly illiterate, we cannot but respect the conservatism shown by the founders of our Republic. It may be contended that under such a state of affairs, the ilustrado class would have exploited the ignorant masses. Yet, the masses were not so apathetic as we mfght suppose, for were they not the real backbone of the revolution? Was not the Katipunan recruited from among their ranks? Also it should be remembered that the ilustrados did not form a caste with impassable barriers. Any family from the mnasses could rise to the ilustrado class if it had sufficient income to send its children to school. It is probable that the Philippine Republic would have retained usages which are not entirely democratic, at least when viewed in the light of American practices and ideas. It is not easy to do away entirely with practices hundreds of years old. Thus the order requiring the people to use the title of Senor or Maguinoo when addressing officials, and telling officials to use vos when addressing superiors, may sound too aristocratic. Further, to clothe officials with the regalia of authority, different insignia were authorized. The chiefs of the towns and of provinces might use different staffs with handles and tassels of gold or silver. Probably these distinctions were meant to inspire the people with greater respect for constituted authorities, which, in the opinion of Mabini, was absolutely necessary for the success of a democracy. It is doubtful, however, if Aguinaldo himself was serious when he spoke of the titles of "marquis" and "duke" being the rewards for bravery and distinction in battles. And even granting that he was serious, the other leaders, like Mabini and Calderon, would iot have tolerated

Page  162 162 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS so brazen an imitation of monarchical institutions. The Malolos Constitution expressly prohibits them. Mabini's Decalogue and other writings, and every other state paper dealing with the form of government proposed for the Islands all point to the perpetuation of the. idea of republicanism. The military people, because of their service in winning the independence of the country, would probably have predominated for several years. It may be remembered that this was the reason why Calderon tried in his Malolos Constitution to give much greater power to the Legislature. This fact has induced many other writers to believe that the government of the Philippine Republic would have continued to be a military autocracy not unlike many of the governmnlents of South American countries and Mexico. It must be ri'omembered, however', that the nature of the Filipino population was different from that of Mexico or the South American countries. In the Philippines then existed, as there exists now, a class of millions of small property holders whose interest must naturally be in the keeping of order. We do not have here the millions of day laborers who present such a tremendous problem in Mexico. (1) The centralized system of government established had its logical drawbacks. During the first years of the Republic, military chiefs and other agents of the central government would probably have had temptations to abuse their powers, especially if they were far from the vigilant eyes of the President and his cabinet. The slow means of communication would have retarded the correction of those abuses by the central government. But the evils attendant upon such a system would have been more than (1) The Philippine Census of 1918, Volume 3, page 12, gives the number of independent farms owned by the Christian Filipinos as 1,955,276. Conceding that each farm supports four persons, there must at least be 7,821,104 people who live on independent farms and who may be said to belong to the middle class, or property owners. These figures were taken in 1918, but it is believed that relatively there has not been much change since 1898, twenty years earlier, in so far as the number of people living on independent farms is concerned. This number, out of the total Christian population of 9,381,357, (Census of 1918) means that 83.37 per cent of the Christian Filipinos may be classified as belonging to the class of small property owners.

Page  163 THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT 163 compensated by the advantage of having a strong central organization capable of preserving the national solidarity so necessary to a new-born nation. The foregoing are, we admit, serious handicaps. But what republic was ever born on a bed of roses and with food and shelter served on a silver platter? Yet with these handicaps and shortcomings, and barring all possible aggression by a stronger foreign power, the Philippine Republic had, in our opinion, more than a fighting chance to be a, success. To begin with, it had the full support of practically the entire Christian population. There was one unquestioned leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, who was at the zenith of his power at the time of the outbreak of the Filipino-American war. The hero of the two revolutions against Spain, he would for several years in all probability have con1tinued as president of the Republic and the unquestioned leader of his people especially if he had been able to secure the recognition of Philippine independence by the United States. Ile was surrounded, as we have seen, by the best minds of the country. Surely, from the standpoint of the moral right of a people who had already wrested their country's freedom from their ancient master and who had already established a government of their own, the Philippine Republic had the right to live. Even from the standpoint of international peace and progress the experiment was well worth trying. How much would the maintenance of a Christian Republic at the doors of Asia, inspired by the best traditions of America and Europe, have meant to the submerged nationalities of that continent still groping in the darkness for a fuller life and for greater freedom!

Page  164 CHAPTER VII THE OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY (1898-1901) After discussing the general framework of the Revolutionary Government, we shall proceed with the FilipinoAmerican War laying special stress on the opposition sho aved by the Filipinos to the exttension of American sovereignty as well as on tL.e in.eral politics of the period. In the monlths of June and July, 1898, American soldiers had been arriving in the Philippines preparatory to the taking of Manila. By August there were already 8500 troops, and preparations were rushed for the attack on the city. The Capture of Manila The capture of Manila represented a three-sided drama. On the one hand, even before the arrival of General Merritt as commander-in-chief of the expeditionary forces, the capitulation of Manila was already being negotiated by the Belgian Consul Andre. But this fact was known only to the highest commanders. The lower officers and soldiers of the American and Spanish armies were totally ignorant of these negotiations. They were led to believe that the assault upon Manila would be a real battle. The Filipino insurgents were also kept in the dark as regards these negotiations. Although at the beginning Dewey had apparently led Aguinaldo to believe that the taking of Manila would be a dual enterprise, as soon as the expected American army came, it was decided to exclude the Filipinos from participation. In the meanwhile an understanding seems to have been reached in the negotiations for the capitulation of the city. The Spanish military code demanded that there be some sort of a battle to permit Spain "to save face"; but it was understood that if the fleet did not fire upon the city, the Spanish artillery would not fire on the fleet. Yet some combat there must be. Also it was insisted upon that

Page  165 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY if the Spaniards did surrender, they would surrender only to the American troops, so that there might not be a dual occupation with the Filipino insurgents. If the American commanders had wished, they might have forced the capitulation by firing a few shells into the city by way of threat. In that case, however, the Spanish commanders, in accordance with their military law, would have been courtmartialed for giving up the city without a fight. (1) As it was, an arranged bcrttle had to be fought, in which a number of American soldiers lost their lives. It.was the intention to keep the Filipinos out of the fight; but that could not be done for they claimed that they were as mluch responsible for the siege of Manila as the Americans. They had been besieging the city by land all the time that Dewiey was awaiting reenforcements. They had succeeded in preventing provisions from being sent to the city, and they had also cut the water lines, so that the Spa-niards had to depend upon rain water to drink. By the time the white flag, in accordance with the previous understanding, was seen on the walls of Manila, fully 4,000 Filipino troops were within the city limits. On the day of the surrender, August 13, General Anderson telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows: "Serious trouble threatening between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your forces should not force themselves into the city until we have received the full surrender. Then wse will negotiate with you." The answer of Aguinaldo was charg-ed with bitter disappointment. "My troops", he said, "have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason and on account of the many sacrifices made in money and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority." Aguinaldo intimated, however, that if General Anderson insisted, he would send a commissioner, Buencamino, to arrange the matter. "It was feared," said General Ander (1) Elliott, Thte Philippines to the End of the Military Regime, p. 808.

Page  166 166 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS son, (1) "that they (the insurgents) would break loose and loot the city. It must be said, however, that they maintained good discipline." - The Parting of the Ways The dala after the capture of Manila General Merritt issued a proclamation in which he assured the Filipino people that following instructions from his government he had come not "to wage war upon them, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights." But he denm.nded that the revolutionary forces evacuate the suburbs they had taken from Spain. This was naturally objected to; and herein began the parting of the ways between the two peoples. Seeing that the American troops insisted in their demands,.Aguinaldo replied that at least there should be an understanding that in case the United States gave up the Islands, after the ratification of the treaty of peace, these suburbs should be restored to the insurgents. The American commander, now General Otis after the departure of General Merritt for Paris, denied the request in a very long communication of September 8, which ended in the following words: "I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the limit of the city's defenses before Thursday, the 15th inst., I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may ensue." Seeing that it was an ultimatum, the Revolutionary Government agreed to withdraw, but requested that in place of the letter a mere request to withdraw be made.(2) (1) Letter to the Adjutant General dated December 24, 1898, Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, p. 673. (2) "They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I wruld express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated —something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters-he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following, etc." Report of Major General Otis for 1899, p. 9.

Page  167 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREGNTY This was done by General Otis, and General Aguinaldo, who hlad kept from his officers and soldiers the gravity of tie occasion, succeeded in having his troops withdrawn in apparently good spirits, cheering the American soldiers. The relations between the Americans and the Filipinos were really becoming strained, and it was the calmness of Aguinaldo which prevented more serious and immediate consequences. Aguinaldo acquiesced in the demand, for he was still hoping that the issue between the two peoples might be settled amicably. He received news that the United States would send a commission to the Philippines ostensibly for the purpose of negotiating with the insulrgents. Also, by that time, Agoncillo had already left for the United States, and he wanted to know the result of the negotiations there. (1) What the Revolutionary Government Desired What the Revolutionary Government most desired at this time was a definite understanding between the two governments for the future of the Islands. On October 22, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote to General Otis: "Today, more than ever, the Filipinos desire to live in peace and perfect harmony with the Americans, because they will take care that the Philippines do not return under the odious Spanish dominion. VWhen it is possible for a formal convention to pacify and harmonize the interests of the two peoples, then tihe suspicions of my people, —which I cannot completely quiet with my prestige and authority, no matter what good desires move me, ---will disappear." (2) The Revolutionary Government expected that the proposed "Convention" between the two peoples would result in the recognition of Philippine independence. In November of the same year, 1898, Agoncillo reported that the question of independence would not be taken up in Paris, and this made the revolutionists pessimistic. The treaty, as we shall see,(1) was signed without even (1) Inf'ra Chap. VIII. (2) From Aguinaldo's letter to General Otis, October 22, 1898. Gen. Otis Report for 1,s99, p. 20. (1) Infra Chap. VIII.

Page  168 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS giving Agoncillo an opportunity to be heard, hence he immediately protested that the Philippines would not be bound by its terms. The only hope now was in Washington, where the treaty must go through the process of ratification; so the Revolutionary Government decided to await developments. But the hopes of the Revolutionary Government were destined to vanish. Official WVashington was determined to hold on to the Philippines and to deny every plea for the recognition of the Philippine Republic. It was, moreover, led to believe by General Otis that the majority of the Filipino people would peacefully submit to American sovereignty. In confirming a telegram sent to Washington on December 7, 1898, General Otis stated "that conditions were improving and that there were signs of revolutionary disintegration" and that he "had conferred with a number of the members of the Revolutionary Government and thought that the most of them (sic) would favor peaceful submission to United States authority." On December 22 he again telegraphed that he still "had confidence in the peaceful solution of affairs although it was apparent that the radical element in the insurgent councils... might precipitate hostilities without giving us much warning." (1) That this optimism of General Otis had no foundation in fact, —for the Revolutionary Government was determined not to give up their independence without a struggle-was shown by subsequent events. The Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation The first authoritative indication of the policy of Washington to retain the Philippines and not to recognize its independence came on December 21, 1898, in the famous Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation. It was wired from Washington to the Philippines. It plainly indicated that the United States intended to stay in the Philippines and would exercise the rights of sovereignty over the Islands and that the claim for independence would not be considered. "With the signature of the treaty of peace," the (1) Gen Otis Report for 1899, pp. 43, 44.

Page  169 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVERPIGNTY proclamation read, "the future control, disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are ended to the United States." In the same proclamation the President instructed the military authorities to extend by force American sovereignty over the Philippines, although the Senate had not yet ratified the treaty. The President said: In performing this duty, the military commander of the United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of Spain, in severing the former political relations, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of the United States is to be exerted for the securing of the persons and property of the people of the Islands and for the confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the Government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity, so far as possible... Finally, it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of indih ial rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. From this document the Filipino people learned in an unmistakeable manner that they were to be deprived of the boon for which they were fighting-independence. They realized what they had never for a moment dreamed in the beginning, that their bloody struggle bad brought them only a change of masters. True it is that in the manifesto they were promised individual rights and protection of their property, but these promises implied not inherent rights, but mere grants from an absolute sovereign.

Page  170 170 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS When General Otis received this manifesto, he was at a loss what to do, as he knew that its publication would only enrage the Filipino people and widen the gap between them and the Americans. So serious was the situation in the Philippines that General Otis, whose very optimism had misled the Washington administration, deemed it wise not to publish the whole proclamation but simply portions of it with his own explantions. "After fully considering the President's proclamation," he explained, "and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the friendly intentions of the United States Government towards them, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions therein such as 'sovereignty,' 'right of cession,' and those which directed immediate occupation, etc., though most admirably employed, and tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be advantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among the natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain words as 'sovereignty', 'protection', etc., had a peculiar meaning disastrous to their welfare and significant of future political domination, like that from which they had recently been freed." (1) In view of these considerations, he felt justified in amending the manifesto so that the ideas of "sovereignty" and "right of cession" might be as little suggested as possible. The authentic text of the manifesto, however, was published in Iloilo. Aguinaldo's Reply In spite of the changes made by General Otis, the Revolutionary Government received the document with anger. It was answered with two counter-proclamations by Aguinaldo, dated January 5, 1899. "The General Otis," said Aguinaldo, "called himself in the said proclamation military governor of the Philippine Islands. I protest one and a thousand times, with all the energy of my soul, such authority. (1) Gen. Otis Report for I$Si,:,p. ';t;, pp 7.

Page  171 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 171 "I solemnly declare that neither at Singapore, Hongkong, nor here in the Philippines did I ever agree, by word or in writing, to recognize the sovereignty of America in this our lovely country."'(1) Nobody can deny the truth of the foregoing statement of Aguinaldo. Scholars and students of American-Philippine relations may differ as to whether Pratt and Dewey actually promised independence and in what way that promise was made; but nobody has so far dared to insinuate that Aguinaldo ever promised to recognize the sovereignty of the United States. (2) In another manifesto issued by Aguinaldo on the same date(3) he said that he had relied on the good faith of the American people. He narrated how he had come back to the Philippines and told of his early relations with Dewey, who had encouraged him to start the revolt. "Then," he added "all the Filipinos without distinction of classes took arms, and every province hastened to expel from its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanation of the fact that after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of Luzon, the Visayan Islands, and a part of Mindanao. "Although the North Americans took no part in these military operations, which cost no little blood and gold, my government does not disavow the fact that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the gift of some rifles from the arsenal to my people influenced the progress of our arms to some extent. It was also taken for granted that the American forces would necessarily sympathize with the (1) From the manifesto of Ag-uinaldo, published in El Heraldo de la Revoluoi6n, January 5, 1I9'9, in Otis Report for 1899, p. 78. (2) The only Filipino of any significance who at that time ever proposed annexation with the United States was J. M. Basa, who in one manifesto sent to Aguinaldo, said that he hoped that the Philippines might "be counted as another star in the Great Republic of the United States", (P. 1. R. 1204-10 Exhibit 95, quoted in Worcester, The Philippines, Past and Present, p. 38). "It is reasonable to suppose," said Worcester, "especially as Basa who was a man of importance and means, was a member of the group who desired annexation to the United States, that Aguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with him and then quietly suppressed theam." (Worcester. op. cit. vol. I, p. 38). (3) January 5, 1899.

Page  172 172 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS revolution which they had managed to encourage, and which had saved them much blood and great hardships; and, above all, we entertained absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a people which fought for its independence and for the abolition of slavery, which posed as the champion liberator of oppressed peoples; we felt ourselves under the safe-guard of a free people." (1) What Aguinaldo and his government also resented was -the attempted seizure of Iloilo. General Miller was sent there to effect, if possible, a peaceful control of the city. Aguinaldo referred to the act in the following words: "My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and agressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, champion of oppressed nations. Thus it is that my government is disposed to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. I denounce these acts before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind. (2) The Fiirst Peace Parley Otis knew the seriousness of the situation and he agreed to the formation of a mi"ed commission. representing the American army and the Revolutionary Government, to see if there could be some solution to the conflict. Another reason why the Americans called for the conference was to effect a delay so that before any trouble came, enforcements from America could arrive. The Filipino leaders, on the other hand, were hoping for some amicable settlement of the question of their relationship with America, knowing full well that they were dealing with a much stronger nation. From January 11 to 31, 1899, conferences were held by the mixed commission. On the side of Aguinaldo were Florentino Torres, Ambrosio Flores and Manuel Arguelles, (1) Aguinaldo's proclamation. January 5. 1899. General Otis' Report, 1S99, p. 77. (2) Ibid p. 78.

Page  173 OPPOSITION TO AMER:CAN SOVEREIGNTY and on the side of General Otis were General R. P. Hughes, Colonel James F. Smith, and Colonel E. H. Crowder. Aguinaldo's commissioners insisted that the recognition of the Philippine Government as an entity must be the basis for all negotiations. The commissioners appointed by General Otis said that they had no power to recognize any government or jurisdiction over the Philippines other than that claimed by the United States, yet for the purpose of information they expressed desires to know of the constitution approved and of the aspirations of the people. The commissioners of General Aguinaldo frankly stated that the declaration of sovereignty by means of the so-called Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation created suspicion among the people, who believed that they were being placed on the same basis that they had been under the Spaniards. What guarantee could be offered by the United States that their situation would be otherwise? The commissioners of General Otis declared that the government of the United States could offer no greater guaranty of its future conduct towards the oppressed people than offered by her liberal constitution, her history, her traditions, and her past conduct; that with regard to the declaration of her sovereignty, it was not a matter which could be discussed; that the sovereignty was vested in Spain, and that, having terminated as a result of the war with the United States, it was now in the hands of the conquering power." (1) The commissioners of General Aguinaldo replied that "sovereignty is inalienable, and is vested directly in the people; and as at the historic moment of the cession of the archipelago the Philippine people, satiated already with injustice, had definitely expressed as their will their desire to exercise and were exercising their own sovereignty, destroying with their arms the dominating power, and establishing a government through which it has manifested said sovereignty to the world with the exercise of full jurisdiction, the right of the Philippine people to be respected is indubitable, even though the government established by them to preserve social order were not officially recognized; and (1) Tayior, Vol. III, Exhibit 594, 72 KU.

Page  174 174 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS their nonrecognition as a belligerent is not an obstacle thereto. All countries born of a colony, and later established as a nation by their own will, with or without the assistance of foreign peoples, have found themselves in a like situation."(1) They further stated that "for the sake of peace, and with the object of appeasing the excitement of the Philippine people, who are decidedly opposed to admitting any colonial government and are disposed to repel with force any attempt at coercion, the American Government could well recognize the independence of the country and admit the protectorate in principle which in some way limits independence, and communicate the recognition and admission by wire in order that the conditions of the protectorate be at once presented, for without said previous recognition the Philippine people may obtain only the right of autonomy and not the right of sovereignty." (2) The Filipinos would perhaps have accepted some sort of autonomy coupled with a formal promise of future independence. The commissioners from the Revolutionary Government, states General Otis, "begged for some tangible concessions from the United States Government-one which they could present to the people and which might serve to allay the excitement. Nothing could be accomplished without the sacrifice of some of the attributes of sovereignty, and certainly that could not be done by any existing authority." (3) On January 16, General Otis was persuaded to send to Washington the formal petition for independence of the F1ilipino commissioners, but he couched it in the following words: Conditions improving; confidence of citizens returning; business active. Conference held Saturday; insurgents presented following statement, asking that it be cabled: "Undersigned commissioners commander-in-chief of revolutionary armry of these islands state to commissioners of General Otis that aspiration of Filipino people is independence, with restrictions resulting from conditions which its government agree with American when latter agree to officially recognize (1) Taylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 594, 73 KU. (2) Teylor, Vol. III, Exhibit 504, 74 KITU. (8) General Otis Report for 1899, p. 82.

Page  175 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 175 the former". No conclusion reached; another conference tomorrow evening. I understnd insurgents wish qualified independence under United States protection. (1) The Filipino commissioners were hoping against hope for a favorable answer from Washington to the foregoing telegram sent by General Otis. But General Otis was not interested in receiving an answer to the message. He sent it only a matter of course. He was not particularly anxious for peace. In forwarding the request, he expressed his firm conviction that conditions were improving and business was active. He was clearly misinformed. Even when commenting on the proclamation of Aguinaldo, in answer to President McKinley, Otis had said that he believed it was more the result of fear for personal safety than determined hostility to the American government! In short, the military diplomacy was bound to fail because military officials were not very much interested in peace. To quote James LeRoy, "being military men by profession, they prepared for war much more intelligently, effectively, and even zealously than they labored for peace." (2) Official Washington, partly because of the optimism of the American general and partly because it had no desire to give any "tangible concessions" to the Filipinos, completely ignored the Filipino petition. War Inevitable The minute the United States decided to retain the Philippines unconditionally, without any promise, express or implied, that. the Filipino people would in time be an independent nation and that in pursuance of that decision she was determined to extend her sovereignty at all cost over the country-from that time on war was inevitable. "We have ignored Aguinaldo and his followers," said John F. Bass, the American correspondent, (3) "in so far as it is possible to ignore an army which for months have been (1) Ibid, p. 83. (2) LeRoy, The American.s in. the PhIlippines, Vol. I, p. 424. (3) Harper's Weekly, April 22, 1899, p. 429, quoted in Philippine Information Society pamphlet, March 25. 1901, p. 68, 69.

Page  176 176 THEI DVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS encircling Manila in a peaceful siege. Aguinaldo had stuck out through thick and thin for the independence of his people. Instead of getting what he wanted he received the hard and fast declaration of our president that the Islands were American property, that the army would proceed to take possession of them, and that any one resisting our authority would be suppressed by force of arms. Since this manifesto was issued there has been no hope of a peaceful settlement." (1) While the Americans were preparing the forcible extension of sovereignty over the Philippines, the Revolutionary Government was also preparing the completion of its political organization through the promulgation of the Malolos Constitution. On January 23, 1899, President Aguinaldo notified General Otis of the promulgation of the constitution. "My government," he said, "has promulgated the political constitution of the Philippine Republic, which is today enthusiastically proclaimed by the people, because of its conviction that its duty is to interpret faithfully the aspirations of that people,-a people making superhuman efforts to revindicate their sovereignty and their nationality before the civilized powers. "To this end, of the governments today recognized and observed among cultured nations, they have adopted the form of government most compatible with their aspirations, endeavoring to adjust their actions to the dictates of rea(1) On page 70 of his official report of August 31, 1899, General Otis stated that after the issuing of his proclamation of Janua y 4. 1899, a general protest arose against President McKinley's benevolent assimilation programmne, and added: "Even the women of Cavite province, in a document numerously signed by them, gave me to understand that after all the men were killed off they a.e prepared to shed their patriotic blood for the liberty anr' independence of their country." Upon page 134 of the same report, referring to the spirit of opposition to Ameiican occupation, in May, 1899, he showed that even the children were planning to oppose American occupation. I-e said: "Among them a battalion of boys of tender age appeared, whose mission was to throw stones at the enemy under the guidance of Providence; but one or two of the little fellows were wounded, and the desire for self-preservatioa being stronger than their religious enthusiasm, they were seen no more."

Page  177 OPPOSITION TO AMER:CAN SOVEREIGNTY 177 son and of right, in order to demonstrate their aptitude for civil life." (1) The Beginning of Hostilities Not long after the receipt of the copy of the Malolos constitution hostilities began on February 4, 1899, between the Filipino and American forces. The immediate impression in the United States was that the Filipinos started the hostilities. That belief was enhanced by an unfortunate incident. At that time Agoncillo was in Washington, having come from Paris either to try to influence the United States government to reject the treaty or to secure measures for the recognition of Philippine independence. Inasmuch as the relations of the Revolutionary government and the United States were becoming strained, he was constantly in fear of being arrested; so on the eve of the opening of hostilities, on February 3rd, he hurriedly fled to Canada. When news of the first shots was received in the United States, it was thought that Agoncillo knew all about the proposed hostilities, hence he had fled from Washington. On the other hand, it now seems to be a well settled fact that the Filipinos did not begin the hostilities, although they were not unexpected because of the foiled desire of the Filipinos for independence and because the two hostile armies were within a stone's throw of each other. Manila was in the hands of the Americans by the protocol; and the Filipinos were just in its outskirts. Only a spark was needed to ignite the repressed feelings of both parties. The most reliable statement seems to be that two Filipinos, unarmed, approached the American post and failed to answer the request to halt and that immediately a shot was fired. This was followed by general firing on both sides. General Otis himself admitted that the Filipinos were un(1) Aguinaldo's letter to General Otis, dated Janua y 23, 1899, Otis' Report of 1899, p. 84. It was forwarded to Washington on January 27, 1899. The decree establishing the Revolutionary Government proclaimed by AglInaldo, June 23, 1898, is printed in Senate Document 62, 55th Congress, 3d Session, pp. 433-437. The Malolos constitution of the Philippine Republie in printed in Senate Document 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session, p. 107. Both documents awre to be found as Appendices C and D, respectively, of this volume.

Page  178 178 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS prepared on this particular night, and that many of the Filipino officials were on leave. This happened two days before the ratification of the Treaty of Peace. Three senators on their own confession voted for ratification on account of this happening, so that if war had not started the treaty would not have been ratified, as in the final poll there was only one vote to spare. (1) McKinley's Unfounded Statements For the first time in their history, the American people were waging a war of subjugation and were forcing their sovereignty upon a people who had publicly declared their determination to fight for their independence. At that particular moment they were probably unconscious of this fact. We have seen how General Otis as late as December and January still thought that the majority of the Filipino people would submit peacefully to American sovereignty. Few if any of the American officers fully realized the amount of resistance that the Filipino people were determined to put up. LeRoy, in his book The Americans in the Philippines, emphasized what he called the remarkable optimism of General Otis which lasted throughout his term as military governor. He quoted General Otis as saying "Until... possibly the middle of November (1898), I had more influence in Aguinaldo's cabinet than he had himself." The reason for this, says Mr. LeRoy, was the fact that the conservatives came regularly to tell him what was going on. Even after the beginning of hostilities, he continued his optimism, always advising officials at Washington and the American press that everything went well and that the rebellion would soon collapse. A strict censureship of the press was established and American press representatives in the Philippines became so disgusted with the misrepresentations of facts that they decided, in June, 1899, to send a cablegram of protest to the American press. This cablegram was mailed to Hongkong and from Hongkong it was (1) See Chap. VIII.

Page  179 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 179 cabled to the United States. The cablegram, signed by staff representatives of the Chicago Record, the New York Sun, the New York Herald, the Scripps-McRae Association, the Chicago Tribune, and the Associated Press, read as follows: The undersigned, being all staff correspondents of American newspapers stationed in Manila, unite in the following staterment: We believe that, owing to official despatches from Manila made public in Washington, the people of the United States have not received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines, but that those despatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view that is not shared by the general officers in the field. We believe the despatches incorrectly represent the existing conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissension and demoralization resulting fromn the American campaign and to the brigand character of their army. We believe the despatches err in the declaration that "tihe situation is well in hand," and in the assun.mption that the insurrection can be speedily ended withlout a greatly increased force. We think ththe tenacity of 'the Filipino purpose has been under-estimated, and that the statements are unfounded that volunteers are willing to engage in further service. The censorship has compelled us to participate in this misrepresentation by excising or altering uncontroverted statements of facts on the plea that "they would alarm the people at home," or "have the people of the United States by the ears".(i) American officials in Washington, especially President McKinley, took the view of General Otis in explaining the Philippine situation to the American people. In his public statements and addresses President McKinley always emphasized the alleged fact that American sovereignty rwas acceptable to the Filipinos and that the opposition toe it was only found in Aguinaldo and a handful of his followers. He probably realized how loyal were the American people to their cherished principle of the consent of the governed. In his speech at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on October 14, 1899, President McKinley said: "A portion of one (1) Quoted in Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, p. 220.

Page  180 180 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS tribe, representing the smallest fraction of the entire population of the island, resisted American authority." (1) In his message to Congress in December, 1899, after nearly a year of constant fighting when he had sent to the Islands about 80.000 soldiers, he said: "I had reason to believe, and I still believe, that this transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and the aspirations of the great masses of the Filipino people." He added that "the most the insurgent leader hopdd for when he came back to Manila was the liberation of the islands from Spanish control, which they had been laboring for years without success to throw off:" Twenty-five years have elapsed since those fateful days, and we can now view the events with a certain degree of Impartiality. That the foregoing statement of President McKinley-which was undoubtedly during those es citing times taken at face value by the American people-was completely without foundation, is now conceded even by writers with imperialistic tendencies. The opposition of the Filipino people to American sovereignty was almost unanimous. Aguinaldo did not represent "a portion of one tribe representing the smallest fraction of the entire population": back of him stood practically the entire people. Filipino Determination to Resist American Sovereignty It is perhaps, in a way, fortunate that we have to resort to the testimony of American writers in order to support our statements; for surely if American writers and observers themselves have admitted that the Revolutionary Government had the unanimous support of the people, such satements cannot very well be deemed biased. One of the correspondents who had wide opportunity of knowing Philippine conditions was John F. Bass, who came to the Philippines in July 1898 representing Harper's Weekly and the New York Herald. He was perhaps the only one of the correspondents who managed to acquire a working knowledge of the Tagalog tongue. He wrote for the Facts about (1) Quoted in Van Meter, The Truth about the Philippines. p. 171.

Page  181 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 181 the Filipinos, a publication issued by the Philippine Information Society (1) as follows: The few Americans who followed Aguinaldo's triumphant march up the valley of the railroad of Dagunan, who saw crowds gather in every town to receive him with cheers of Viva ]a Republica Filipina, will hardly be persuaded that the desire for independence had not reached the hearts of the people. Several Americans who took trips to the north of Luzon testify to the loyalty of all the people to Aguinaldo... Aguinaldo was not an elected president in the true sense of the word, and yet there is not the least doubt that had there been an election he would have received the overwhelmIng vote of the great bulk of the population in the archipelago, with the exception of course of the savage tribes and the Moros. I myself saw in Malolos a delegation of men from the Island of Cebu who came to pay their respects to the new president, and I understand that numerous delegations from all over the archipelago visited Malolos and made arrangements for organizing the Filipino Government in their respective islands. They were given a scheme of organization and were furnished with arms, ammunition, and uniforms for their soldiers. From north to south, naturally with the exception of the Moros, the Filipinos acknowledged their allegiance to the central government in Luzon. In spite of the fact, therefore, that the government had the hearty support of the people, and that the congress and executive represented the brains of the islands, it was not democratic within the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word. It was self-appointed and could, from a democratic point of view, be considered only a temporary one. That Aguinaldo looked at it in that light is evident from the fact that in the fall when trouble was brewing he offered to resign and put Arellano, the leading lawyer of Manila, in his place. (1) Charles B. Elliott, who served under a Republican administration in the Islands first as associate justice of the supreme court and later as Secretary of Commerce and Police, in his comprehensive and scholarly book on the Philippines described the popular support of the Revolu(1) Vol. I, No. 3, June 1, 1901, p. 73. (1) John F. Bass, in letter to Philippine Inforrmation Society, Facts about the Fiiipios, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 70, 73.

Page  182 182 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS tionary Government at the time of the opening of hostilities in the following words: Aguinaldo was at the zenith of his power. Attempts at rebellion against his authority had been ruthlessly suppressed. The Congress of Malolos was ready to make him dictator. Manila, although governed by the Americans, was so completely under his influence that on the days named by him for celebrations and fiestas, all doors were closed and business was suspended. His governors ruled in most of the provinces. Even to the south the Visayans, after some hesitation, had very generally accepted his authority. From enthusiastic individuals in Europe there came to Aguinaldo greetings and assurances of the sympathy of all liberal and noble nations. It is idle to assert that the mass of the people of Luzon and the central islands were not at that time in sympathy with the attempt to drive the Americans from the country and establish an independent government. How and by what methods they had been brought to that way of thinking is not at present very important. During such social upheavals majorities are often less important than minorities. In fact, revolutions are generally the work of able, active and energetic minorities, and in the beginning the revolt against American power in the Philippines was no exception to this general rule.(1) In January of 1899, when the American army tried to take possession of the city of Iloilo, they were met with the statement that the people of the city owed their allegiance to the "Central Revolutionary Government at Malolos" and hence would not surrender the city without the permission of the central government. Some of the insurrectos of Mindanao with whom General Bates conferred in September 1899, stated that their cause was identical with that of Luzon. (2) In November of 1899, just before the Revolutionary Government was disrupted by the military campaign of the American troops, two American prisoners, Lieutenant Gillmore and Albert Sonnichsen, reported that the Revolutionary Government had paramount authority in (1) Elliott, The Philippines, To the End of the Military Regime, p. 457. (2) Report of Lient. General C(om),nading the Armwy for 1900, pt. 4, p. 422.

Page  183 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 183 the northwestern provinces of Luzon. (1) The Wilcox and Sargent Report, which covered six hundred miles of travel in the inteorior of Luzon, and wras made in October and November of 1898, said: "Of the large number of officers, civil and military, and of the leading townspeople we have met, nearly every man has expressed in our presence his sentiment on this question. It is universally the same. They all declare that they will accept nothing short of independence. They desire tire protection of the United States at sea, but fear any interference on land... "There is nmuch variety of feeling among the Philippines with regard to the debt of gratitude they owe the United States. In every town we found men who said that our nation had saved them from slavery, and others who claimed that without our interference their independence would have been recognized before this time. On one point they are united, however, viz., that whatever our government may have done for them, it has not gained the right to annex them." (2) "The people," said General MacArthur," seem to be actuated by the idea that, in all doubtful matters of politics or war, men are never nearer right than when going with their own kith and kin, regardless of the nature of the action or of its remote consequences." (3) Captain Taylor, whose Philippine Insurgent Records has often been cited in this work, because of the documents it contains but whose historical resume is so brazenly antiFilipino that Secretary of War 'raft refused to sanction its publication, could not but agree to the statement that the Filipinos were a unit against American rule. Speaking of the government of the revolutionists, he said: It is true that their rule was, and would have probably continued to be, both despotic and cruel; but it must be remembered that it was favored, or at least accepted, by the great majority of the people of the archipelago, and not because it answered in any way the fundamental require(1) Facts about the Filipinos by the Philippine Information Society, No. 3, Junt 1, 1901, p. 7. (2) Wilcox-Sargcnt Report, p p. 42, 43. (3) Report of the lieuteynant Genera Comnmanding the Ar-ny 1900, Pt. 3, p. 61.

Page  184 1S4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ments of good government, but because it was the rule of men whose vices and whose virtues were the vices and virtues of the people whom they controlled.(1) In the battle around Manila on February 4th, the Insurgents attempted to break through the American lines to enter Manila, but they were repulsed with heavy losses. The Americans then began their own offensive, and the superiority of their arms was soon demonstrated. They advanced northward towards Malolos, Aguinaldo's capital. Aguinaldo defended it with vigor, but it was soon taken by the Americans, in March, 1899. Aguinaldo's government was then moved to San Fernando, Pampanga. On being again pressed by the Americans, he had to move it further north to San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, then to Tarlac. The Schurman Commission In the meanwhile the Schurman Commission, composed of Jacob Gould Schurman, President, Rear-Admiral George Dewey, Charles Denby, Major General Elwell S. Otis and Dean C. Worcester, members, had arrived in the Philippines. The recognition of the claims of the Revolutionists as regards independence was completely outside the functions of the commission. The commission's work was to facilitate the most "hunmane, pacific and effective extension of authority," and "to secure with the least possible delay the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property." In the furtherance of their work the commissioners were enjoined to exercise due respect for all the ideals, customs, and institutions of the inhabitants. (2) In the language of one of its members, "We were sent to deliver a message of good will, to investigate, and to recommend and there our powers ended." (3) The recognition of American sovereignty-the one thing that the Revolutionary Government would not do-was the primary requirement. (1) Taylor, Vol. II, 58 HS. (2) Instructions to the Schurman Commission, p. 185 Report of the Phliivv'n Commission, 1900. Exhibit II, p. 186. (3) Worcester, The Philippine Past and Present, Vol. I pp. 301, 302.

Page  185 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY On April 4th the commission published the "regulative principles" by which the United States would be guided in its relations with the Filipinos, as follows: 1. The supremacy of the United States must an'd will be enforced throughout every part of the Archipelago, and and those who resist it can accomplish no end other than their own ruin. 2. The rnost ample liberty of self-government will be granted to the Philippine people which is reconciliable with the maintenance of a wise, just, stable, effective, and econornical administration of public affairs, and compatible with the sovereign and international rights and obligations of the United Strtes. 3. The civil rights of the Philippine people will be guaranteed and protected to the fullest extent; religious freedom assured, and all persons shall have an equal standing before the law. 4. Honor, justice, and friendship forbid the use of the Philippine people or islands as an object or means of exploitation. The purpose of the American Government is the welfare and advancenment of the Philippine people. 5. There shall be guaranteed to the Philippine people an honest and effective civil service, in which, to the fullest extent practicable, natives shall be employed. 6. The collection and application of taxes and revenues will be put upon a sound, honest, and economical basis. Public funds, raised justly and collected honestly, will }he applied only in defraying the regular and proper expenses incurred by and for the establishment and maintenance of the Philippine government, and for such general improvements as public interests may demand. Local funds, collected for local purposes, shall not be diverted to other ends. With such a prudent and honest fiscal administration, it is believed that the needs of the government will in' a short time become compatible with a considerable reduction in taxation. 7. A pure, speedy, and effective administration of justice will be established, whereby the evils of delay, corruption, and exploitation will be effectually eradicated.. 8. The construction of roads, railroads, and other means of communication and transportation, as well as other public works of manifest advantage to the Philippine people, will be promoted. 9. Domestic and foreign trade and commerce, agriculture, and other industrial pursuits, and the general develop

Page  186 186 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ment of the country in the interest of its inhabitants will be constant objects of solicitude and fostering care. 10. Effective provision will be made for the establishment of elementary schools in which the children of the people shall be educated. Appropriate facilities will also be provided for higher education. 11. Reforms in all departments of the government, in all branches of the public service, and in all corporations closely touching the common life of the people must be undertaken without delay and effected, conformably to right and justice, in a way that will satisfy the well-founded demands and the highest sentiments and aspirations of the Philippine people. Such is the spirit in which the United States comes to the people of the Philippine Islands. His Excellency, the President, has instructed the Commission to make it publicly known. And in obeying this behest the Commission's desire to join with his Excellency, the President, in expressing their own good will toward the Philippine people, and to extend to their leading and representative men a cordial invitation to meet them for personal acquaintance and for the exchange of views and opinions. Attitude of Mabini's Cabinet Mabini's cabinet, it may be remembered, was in power; and Mabini tenaciously held on to the ideal of independence. In fact he was the very personification of that ideal. His clear mind and indomitable spirit housed in a weak and paralytic body, was the mirror of his own people —a people weak beside the great American Republic but determined to fight to the last for its ideal of independence. The manifesto of the Schurman Commission was answered by Mabini, as President of the Council of Government, to the effect that the title of the United States to the Philippines was null and void because the people had not been consulted in it. He therefore urged the continuation of the struggle. In his manifesto, dated at San Isidro, April 15, 1899, he said: What a spectacle it is to see at the end of the century called the century of enlightenment and civilization, a people jealous and proud of its own sovereignty employing all its great powers, the result of its own continued free existence, to wrest from another people, weak but worthy of a better

Page  187 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 187 fate, the very rights which in its own case it believes to be inherent by law, natural and divine! And since war is the last resource that is left to us for the salvation of our country and our own national honor, let us fight while a grain of strength is left us; let us acquit ourselves like men, even though the lot of the present generation is conflict and sacrifice. It matters not whether we die in the midst or at the end of our most painful day's work; the generations to come, praying over our tombs, will shed for us tears of love and gratitude, and not of bitter reproach. (1) The Hay Offer of Autonomy In the latter part of April, the Revolutionary Government soug ht,another peace parley. It sent a commission to Manila headed by Colonel Manuel Arguelles charged with the following instruction: First. The Philippi-ne government finds itself compelled to negotiate an armistice and a suspension of hostilities as an indispensable means of arriving at peace: In the first place, in order to justify itself before its people as having employed all the means in its power to avoid the ruin of the country, and, in the second place, to offer to the Commission a means of putting an end to the war in a manner most honorable to the American Army and most glorious to the government of the United States. Second. It does not solicit the armistice to gain a space of time in which to reinforce itself, nor does it expect aid from Japan nor from any other nation, as no government up to the present time has recognized its belligerency, nor is it disposed to injure' its relations with powerful America, especially as there is nothing to. be gained thereby. The Philippine government earnestly desiring the felicity of its people, while it is still in pursuit of independence, would not insist upon fighting for its ideal if the Philippine people through its accredited representatives should ask for peace and accept autonomy. Third. The interests of humanity are at present in harmony with those of the North American government, and both ask for a brief space of time, however short, in which the Philippine people may reflect upon their sad situation and may understand the' bases of the autonomy which is offered to them. (1) Mabini's manifesto dated at San Isidro; April 15. 1899, quoted by Senator Hoar in the Senate, April 15, 1900.

Page  188 188 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Fourth. If, however, this last recourse is denied it, no one can blame the Philippine government for the tenacity which it may show. The honor of the army and the happiness of the country will then determine the only line of conduct for it to pursue, namely, to prolong the struggle until it reaches the end of its resources. This prolongation of the struggle would be fatal to both peoples.(1) The most the American government could offer was the so-called autonomy proposal which Secretary Hay cabled the Schurman Commission on May 5, 1899. The cable is as follows: You are authorized to propose that under the military power of the President, pending action of Congress, government of the Philippines shall consist of a Governor-General appointed by the President; Cabinet appointed by the Governor-General; a general advisory council elected by the people; the qualifications of electors to be carefully considered and determined; and the Governor-General to have absolutes veto; Juidiciary strong and independent; principal judges appointed by the President. The Cabinet and judges to be chosen fro'm natives or Americans, or both, having regard to fitness. The President earnestly desires the cessation of bloodshed, and that the people of the Philippines at an early date shall have the largest measure of self-government consistent with peace and good order. This gave not exactly an autonomous government, considering the absolute veto power of the governor. But it was certainly more nearly autonomous than the government later on established. Arguelles seemed favorably inclined to accept this proposal, but Mabini and General Luna were very much opposed to it, so much so that Luna even ordered Arguelles' arrest, contending that to advocate autonomy and not independence was well-nigh treason be(1) It is erroneous to state, as some writers have done, that Mabini wvas opposed to anything but absolute and complete independence. It is true that in the instruction given by him to the commnission no mention of protectorateship was made; but that was a matter of procedul.e. In his letter addressed to Galicano Apacibie in HIongkong, he said: "There a;e also many here who awe in favor of a protecto.ate; but the gove.rnment has no desire to announce it formal.y, So that we can take advantage of favorable ccliumsta:nces which unforeseen events may bring; it is for this reason that it has lirit(dl itself to signify that we want independence under conditions which shall fo:raulate as soon as the American government has ageced to recognize it." (F'om letter of Janual y 16th, 1899, copies of which ame in the possession of the author and of his brother Tcodo1o Kalaw).

Page  189 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 189 cause the Philippines was ruled by a constitution and was an independent nation. In fact, according to one version of the episode, not content with arresting Arguelles, Luna went to see him in his cell one evening and told him that the only thing left for him to do for having advocated the so-called autonomy, was to blow his brains out. We do not know how far this would have gone had it not been for the death of Luna; but the forces in favor of peace, even among the revolutionists and especially among the members of Congress, were growing. The policy of Mabini of not accepting any terms with the United States e:cept upon the basis of the recognition of independence, was being disapproved, and it must be remembered that at this time the Malolos constitution, or as much of it as the war permitted, was in operation. It provided for a cabinet responsible to Congress, and Congress was being won over in favor of peace under the Hay plan. The Movement for Peace Mabini wanted a cessation of hostilities in order to find out whether the offer was acceptable to the people or not. But this plan of cessation was opposed by General Otis. The trouble was that in all of the proposals of the Schurman Commission, there was no mention of independence. McKinley's administration never mentioned independence at all as a possibility for the Filipinos. The more conservative elements led by Paterno and Buencamino however, began to waver. In one of the documents captured by the Americans, part of a letter written by Mabini, and apparently intended for the Hongkong Junta, (1) signs of party struggles between the radical and conservative elements were manifest. "Paterno and Buencamino," said Mabini, "are working very hard and endeavoring to make a success of their plans and expect to be the idols of the people... If they are going to do campaign work outside, I am also ready to do the same here. I dare not say that I am going to be successful, but I earnestly promise that I will fight and use all my efforts in (1) Taylor, Vol. IV Exh. 661.

Page  190 190 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS that direction." Mabini, however, evidently thought that the conservatives would not win. Perhaps he still relied on the confidence that Aguinaldo had in him. In the same letter he added: "It is not improbable, though, that they may abandon the field to me, in which case I cannot give my assurance that I will be able to carry the weight of the work on my shoulders to the satisfaction of everybody." Fall of Mabini Cabinet Great must have been Mabini's surprise when he found out that Aguinaldo was rather inclining towards the Paterno-Buencamino plan arid that the majority of the members of the Congress were also against him. In the letter dated May 3rd, (1) the members of the Mabini cabinet told the President that whenever he was convinced "that other persons are better qualified to secure the realization of the happiness of the country," Aguinaldo could form a new cabinet. On May 6th the few remaining members of the Malolos Congress met, decided upon a policy of conciliation with the United States and passed a resolution setting the President at liberty to appoint a new cabinet. In the words of one of the members, "it was unanimously resolved to enter into an understanding with General Otis, upon the basis of the proclamation of autonomy offered by the Schurman Commission. A copy of this resolution was delivered to President Aguinaldo by the Secretary of the Interior and the writer; in the said resolution there was contained, moreover, a request for the substitution of the Mabini cabinet by one which should inspire in the American Government absolute confidence in the securing of a peaceful arrangement. Aguinaldo, having expressed his agreement, immediately set out on the same day for Kabanatuan, where Mabini was, to inform him of the resolution of Congress." (2) Thereupon, on May 7th, Aguinaldo notified the Mabini Cabinet as follows: (1) Taylor V'ol. IV, Exh. 650. See also Documentos Constitucionales sobre Filipinas, Vol. 2. Doc. No. 44. (2) Letter of Dr. Jose Albert printed in LeRoy op cit., Vol. II, pp. 89, 90. According to LeRoy only 15 or 16 members- were present at San Isidro at that time. Ibid, p. 89, footnote.

Page  191 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 191 THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF SECRETARIES: Please state to the Cabinet of which you are the President, that availing myself of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, I have deemed proper to entrust to Sefior Pedro A. Paterno the formation of a new Cabinet. I have been prompted to take this step, in the first place, by virtue of the resolution of Congress and that of that council dated the 3rd instant, which leaves me at liberty to select a new cabinet when I should consider it advisable for the general welfare; and on the other hand, by my desire to seek a remedy for the evils which afflict our unfortunate country. Please express also to the Secretaries forming the present Cabinet my acknowledgmnent of the services they have rendered to the country, being satisfied with the zeal, loyalty and intelligence with which both they and yourself have discharged their offices. God preserve you many years. Given at San Isidro, May 7, 1899. EMILIO AGUINALDO, President. The Mabini Cabinet made the following reply: To the Honorable President of the Republic, Cabanatuan, May 8, 1899: My colleagues and myself have read your communication dated yesterday, informing us that you have entrusted the formation of a new Cabinet to Sr. Pedro A. Paterno. In profoundly thanking you for the kindexpressions which you devote to us, as also for the confidence undeservedly placed in us, we cannot but recognize the political wisdom of your decision, fervently wishing that it may serve as a means to attain that general welfare we all desire. In cordially felicitating you on the wise political measure, we hope that you will transmit to the new Cabinet which may be formed and to its worthy president, our sincerest congratulations on their accession to power together with the earnest wish that they may be successful in the direction of public affairs. We beg of you to ever count on. our unconditional adherence and on our modest powers, when the welfare of the country is involved. Yours, etc. APOLINARIO MABINI. On the same 'date Mabini sent out the following telegram: To the President of the Republic, Secretaries of Government and Civil and Military authorities of the Archipelago: I have this date transferred my powers to the President of the new Cabinet, Sr. Paterno; Buencamino, Sec

Page  192 192 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS cretary of Foreign Affairs; Alas, interior: Trias, War; Treasury, Chuidian and acting, Ilagan; Public Instruction, Velarde; Communications, Ocampo; and Industry, Guerrero. AP. MABINI. (1) The First Peaceful Transfer of Power This was an interesting and highly important episode in Philippine politics. It was the first peaceful transfer of power from one faction to another. It should therefore mark a distinct epoch in the political history of the Philippines. Real democracy is tested in the way in which political power can be shifted, without violence or bloodshed, whenever the recognized legal organs of expression so demand, from one party to another. (2) Here is how Mabini narrates what had happened, in his letter to Sr. Lino (3): "Inasmuch as when, to my request for a suspension of hostilities, the Americans replied that they would not agree without submission to their order of the Filipino Army and its general, including Don Emilio, I decided to continue the struggle, which did not seem to be agreeable to those who desire independence without any struggle. "It seems that the present cabinet is now negotiating with the Americans on the basis of autonomy, and I laugh at all this because those who get tired after months of struggle will be of no service except to carry the yoke of slavery." In a letter dated May 8th, 1899, (4) Mabini said: "I have just received a telegram from Sr. Paterno advising me that he is ready to accept an autonomy like that of Canada and asking for my opinion; and I answered him that I do not want any kind of autonomy for my country under the sovereignty of another nation, for otherwise we (1) Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 563. Original in Spanish. Printed in the Indice Offi/al for May 13, 1899. (2) Aguinaldo, however, has told the writer that this was the beginning of his differences with Mabini, for Mabini wanted to continue in his office. Aguinaldo seemed to imply that the attacks made upon him by Mabini in the la'tter's Philippine Revolution were due to this incident. (3) Copies of which are in the writer's pOBSCssion. (4) In the collection of Tcodoio Kalaw.

Page  193 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY would be openly violating the constitution which they themselves have approved and which is still in force." Coincident with the change of the cabinet a new reorganization of the executive departments was effected whereby seven secretaryships were created as follows: foreign affairs, interior, treasury, war and navy, public instruction, communication and public works, agriculture, industry, and commerce. The Department of Foreign affairs had the divisions of public international law and of private international law. The Department of the Interior had the political, the administrative, and the auxilliary divisions. The Treasury Department had four divisions: the division of customs, that of treasury and taxes, that of the budget, and that of public credit. The War and Navy Department had the war division and the navy division. The Department of Public Instruction had: the division of superior instruction in arts, that of popular instruction, and that of statistics and accounting. The Department of Communications and Public Works had the division of posts and telegraphs, that of buildings, public ornamentation, highways, viaducts, and aqueducts, and that of accounting. The Department of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce had the division of statistics and immigration, and the division of territorial wealth. The new cabinet appointed in accordance with the foregoing reorganization, was composed of: President of the Cabinet....... Don Pedro A. Paterno Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Don Felipe Buencamino Secretary of the Interior....... D. Severino de las Alas y Moxica Secretary of War and Navy... D. Mariano Trias Secretary of the Treasury..... D. Hugo Ilagan y Lopez Secretary of Education....... D. Aguedo Velarde Secretary of Communications D. Maximo Molo y Devera and of Public Works......... Ygnacio Secretary of Industry, Agriculture and Commerce......... D. Leon Guerrero

Page  194 194 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS General Luna But the attempt of the new cabinet to enter into negotiations with the Schurman Commission based on the so-called autonomy plan was foiled by General Antonio Luria.(1) At this point, it will be necessary to digress a little and to describe the element which Luna represented, as well as the personal characteristics of the man. General Luna was, in the opinion of many observers, the ablest general of the revolution. He represented the well-to-do Filipinos who were indifferent to the revolutionary cause ir' 1896, but who in 1898 joined Aguinaldo with enthusiasm. Aguinaldo had at this time, as we have noticed, the almost unanimous support of the people. Yet complaints were sometimes heard among military officials as to the partiality shown by Aguinaldo for people who came from his province of Cavite and also for those who had been with him during the first revolution. These people were not necessarily the most intelligent of the revolutionary officials. In fact it may be said without fear of contradiction that, as a general rule, the later additions, like Generals Luna and Concepcion, showed greater military ability than the "deans and fathers" of the Philippine Revolution, as they were often called. It was rather mortifying for the new and more intelligent officers to be under the orders of officers less versed in military matters than they were. At the same time it was but human on the part of Aguinaldo to recognize the worth of men who had shown greater loyalty to the cause by joining it at the time when there were fewer chances of success. That Aguinaldo, however, was not entirely blind to great merit when real merit was in evidence, was shown by the rapid advance of General Luna. As soon - as hostilities began between Americans and Filipinos, Luna (1) The new cabinet members, to quote a letter from Mabini, dated at Nueva EciJa, May 31, 1899, and addressed to Messrs. Apacible and Santos. Hongkong, "had to desist In their purpose in view of the opposition of the army and the people. General Luna went as far as to call them traitors with some reason, because inasmuch as the constitution was in force It Is Illegal for the government to adopt a program of autonomy." This attitude of Mabini, however, Is far too legalistic. The negotiations of the cabinet could still be ratified by the Congress which could undo what they had done in the formation of the constitution.

Page  195 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 195 was appointed commander-in-chief of the Filipino forces in Central Luzon, where most of the fighting was done. The poor preparation of Aguinaldo's forces was manifest during the first weeks of the campaign and some military observers believe that if General Luna had been put in charge of the preparation of the army before the opening of hostilities, the Filipino army might have been able to offer better resisting qualities. After the taking of Malolos by the Americans, Luna rallied his forces in Calumpit and established severe disciplinary measures. He dismissed officers who disregarded his authority and disarmed men who disobeyed his orders. He knew how to infuse the proper morale into the army, and the American forces were surprised at the discipline displayed by his soldiers. But he was of a very despotic temperament and some of his acts were so arbitrary that they angered even such men as Mabini who, in the beginning, was a firm supporter of his disciplinary acts. The impression also gained currency that he wanted to supplant the President of the republic himself. Thus Aguinaldo's staff officer, in a postscript to a letter said: "Although it will give you pain, nevertheless I advise you as I wish to be faithful that there is a report to the effect that our chief of operations is forming a party, the aim and purpose of which are none other than to make him president. Be very cautious as the disgrace would be great. Two or three persons have confirmed this report and the whole of Calumpit is aware of the same".(1) One of the incidents which showed the sanguinary temper of Luna concerned him and General Mascardo. General Mascardo was the politico-military chief of Pampanga and Bataan and hence under the jurisdiction of General Luna. General Luna gave an order to General Mascardo which the latter did not at once obey because he had not been officially notified of the appointment of Luna. General Luna then asked for the dismissal of Mascardo from the government. Aguinaldo appointed Felipe Buencamino (1) Taylor, Vol. II, 41 AJ.

Page  196 196 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS to settle the disp:te, and the latter decided that Mascardo was at fault and should be placed under arrest for one day. This solution was agreeable to Aguinaldo and apparently also to Luna. But the following day, Luna was planning to challenge Mascardo to a duel, and later on intended to arrest him with 800 men. A civil war thus almost started. (1) Mabini's Complaint Against Luna Mabini himself often complained to President Aguinaldo about the arbitrary acts committed by General Luna. One of these charges was to the effect that General Luna published a decree warning people that those who should disobey his ore,'s should be shot to death without even summary trial. In this connection Mabini in his letter dated March G, 1899, said that to be shot to death without summary trial is a punishment which can be inflicted on soldiers; but a chief cannot enforce it in a civilized community, except among savages. Besides, he has only jurisdiction over Polo, where the General Headquarters is, and overt the towns of the zones of Manila. "I am very surprised that these things are not well understood by General Luna," proceeded Mabini. "He has no executive power over Bulacan and Pampanga; he must have issued his orders through the military chiefs thereof." Again in another letter, April 18th he told President Aguinaldo that Baldomero Aguinaldo should be allowed to resign from the office of the Secretary of War in order to avoid trouble with General Luna, which was likely to. occur on account of the number of complaints he was receiving. (1) Memoirs of Buencamino under heading "Incidente Luna-I.ascardo". Another act of General Luna which has been severely criticised was his secret order of February 7, 1899, for the massacre of Americans and foreigners in Manila. "Brethren," he said, "The Americans have insulted us and we must revenge ourselves upon them by annihilating them... The servant;, of the houses occupied by Americans and Spaniards shall burn the buildings in which their masters live in such a manner that the conflagration shall be simultaneous il all parts of the city... The lives of the Filipinos only shall be respected, and they shall not be molested with the exception of thcoe who have been pointed out as traitors". Fortunately his order was not carried out. For the complete order see Senate Document 381, pt. 2, 57 Cong. 1st sess. p. 1912. See also Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 816., 96 FZ.

Page  197 OPPOSITION TO AMERICASI SOVEREIGNTY 197 "This state of affairs is very serious," said Mabini. "If an incident turns out well, the credit goes to him alone; while we wish him all that is due him, the blame falls upon us because we permit the same. If our government were dictatorial in form instead of constitutional, it might be all right, but I believe it is not advisable to change the form of government because this would furnish ground for the other powers to believe what the Americans say to the effect that when they'took Malolos our government was already dissolved." (1) (1) The complete letters taken from Taylor, Vol. IV, Exh. 618 from which the foregoing quotations are made read as follows: MABINI TO AGUINALDO (Original in Tagalog, A. L.-S. P. I. R. 612a-2) March 6, 1899. SEROR PRESIDENTE: Many complaints have been received here on account of the abuses committed by General Luna. It is said that he has lately published a decree in which he warned the people that those who disobey his orders shall be shot to death without summary trial. He ordered in Bocaue a Chinaman shot to death without summary trial, and he made his decree cover the whole province of Pampanga. To be shot to death without summary trial is a punishment which can be inflicted on soldiers; but a chief cannot enforce it in a civilized community, except among savages. Besides, he has only jurisdiction over Polo, where the General Headquarters is, and over the towns of the zones of Manila. I am very much surprised that these things are not well understood by General Luna. He has no executive power over Bulacan and Pampanga; he must have issued his orders through the military chiefs thereof. During such time as he is the commander-in-chief of Manila he is not the director of war, and even if he is, he has no power other than to conduct his office and to take the place of the Secretary in his absence. * If an educated man can hardly understand his duties, how will the uneducated one understand his? Please make him acquainted with all of this in order to prevent any encroalchment. I am at your orders, (Signed) AP. MABINI. P.S.- It would be better, I think, to remove him from his post. A. M. MABINI TO AGUINALDO Exhibit 630. (Original in Tagalog, A. L. S. P. I. R. 62-2) April 8, 1899. SEROR PRESIDENTE: I inform you that Sr. Baldomero persists in his determination to resign from the office of Secretary of War in order to avoid trouble with General Luna, which is likely to occur on account of the number of complaints he is receiving. In view of the preceding statement I am of the opinion that his request to be transferred with Sr. Mariano Trias should be granted by you, for although they (he and General Luna) may not come to an open break, it will start friction through the acts of one or the other that will be prejudicial to our aspirations.

Page  198 198 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS New Appeal for Suspension of Hostilities On one thing, however, were Mabini and Luna in accord, and that was in their opposition to the acceptance of the Hay offered or the so-called autonomy plan. Meetings of members of the Congress and generals were held, and in one such meeting Luna protested against any understanding with the United States unless it be the basis of the recognition of independence. The attitude of Aguinaldo at this time indicates that he occupies the middle ground in this matter. He was not in favor of accepting the autonomy proposition unconditionally. He wanted to consult the people and the army first; so he decided to send another commission for the purpose of requesting the suspension of hostilities so as to have time to accomplish this. (1) The new peace commission was composed of G. Gonzaga, Alberto Barretto, Gregorio del Pilar and Captain Zialcita. It obtained no result, SchurAs for me and the other secretaries, although we note that General Luna neither consults nor infoi ms the gover nment about any act of his, we let it pass; Cod grant that he may maintain our honor as you had hoped when you appointed him. Under other circumstances, the secretaries would have resigned on account of such procedure; however, we restrain ourselves, so as not to increase the adversities through which our country is now passing. This state of affairs is very serious. If an incident turns out well, the credit belongs to him alone, and while I wish him all that is due him, still if the result is bad, if his plans end in a disaster, the blame falls upon us, because we permitted the same. If our government were dictatorial in form instead of constitutional, it might be all right, because the entire responsibility would rest with you; but I believe that it is not advisable to change the form of government, because this would furnish ground for the other powers to believe what the Amer icans say to the effect that when they took Malolos our Government was dissolved. We do not demand that he advises and consults with the Government concerning the plans and dispositions that he is to carry out in battle, but that he should inform us of any instructions that he may think best to issue concerning the inhabitants, foreigners and other matters, as well as in recruiting men and organizing same, he should consult with the government which has to provide arms and subsistence. In the policy of war it is not the commander of operations who has the responsibility, but the government, for which reason he should be obliged to obey the instructions he nmay receive. (1) In Mabini's letter dated May 31, 1899, quoted above, we find the following paragraph: "However, the President in his capacity as general has sent comnissioners instructed to request a suspension of hostilities for a sufficient time in which to consult the people and the army, maintaining that in his desire to come to an agreement he is now advised by a new cabinet which is more moderate and conciliatory. I do not know the result of the commission for It has not yet arrived from Manila.*"

Page  199 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 199 man wanting to deal with, Aguinaldo directly, and CGeneral Otis being opposed to any suspension of hostilities. On May 22, 1899, General Otis cabled Washington that he had "denied request of Aguinaldo's commissioners for armistice." When this became known in the revolutionary camps, the leaders incited the soldiers to fight with all their might since that was the only resort left to them. On June 2, 1899 Pedro Paterno on behalf of the Council of Government issued the following proclamation urging the people to continue the war: TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE: No one is ignorant of the fact that since we took the direction of the ship of state we have sacrificed ourselves to the service of the government of our republic, offering ourselves as victims for the sake of peace, without abandoning the sacred ideal of liberty and independence which fires our country, but the North Americans refuse to suspend hostilities asked for by us to consult the national assembly, seat of the free popular will. Well, since they wish it, may the responsibility for the war and its consequences fall on the great nation of the United States of America. We have behaved as patriots and human beings, showing the great powers of the world that the present cabinet acts with a diplomacy which protects our cause as do the arms which defend our rights. The council of government, deciding to preserve our republican institutions, national independence and the presidency of Don Emilio Aguinaldo, in spite of the Americans, who intend to construct upon our ruins the edifice of tyranny, has concluded to continue the war, preserving unhurt in their spirit and letter our constitution and laws, which we have conquered with so much blood such sacrifices. To war, then, beloved brothers, to war. In order that the people be free it is necessary for them all to be brave. Rich or poor, learned or ignorant, beloved Filipinos, hasten to unite to save our native land from insult and ignominy punishments and scaffolds, and from the sad and fatal inheritance of enslaved generations. The God of war, in whom we have put our faith and hope, is helping us. Confusion, interior and international di;ssensions and conflicts rend the invading army. Its volunteers, being aware that we are in the right, fight without

Page  200 200 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS enthusiasm and only in compliance with their forced military duty. Within the American nation itself a great political party asks for the recognition of our rights, and Divine Providence watches over the justice of our cause. Forward, Filipinos, and the sun of victory will shine on us. Viva the Filipino sovereign people! Viva national independence! Viva the liberating army! Viva Don Emilio Aguinaldo, President of the Republic! P. A. PATERNO.(1) Schurman's Own Views The only proposal from the American side that we know from the public records and reports was the cablegram from Secretary Hay sent to the Schurman Commission on May 5, 1899. But the Chairman of the Commission, President Schurman, was willing in reality, to go much farther than the plan cabled from Washington. Unfortunately he was alone in his views, for he was opposed by the rest of the members of the Commission, including the two civil members, Commissioners Denby and Worcester. There were two ways open, according to President Schurman in a long confidential cablegram to Secretary Hay: unconstitutional submission, which would mean years of relentless war, and the policy of conciliation on the part of America, especially now that the insurgents had already realized the strength of the American army. He was in favor of the latter. He believed that the invitation for peace should come from President McKinley himself. "His emissaries get at us, but we nriot at him," he said, speaking of Aguinaldo, with whom he would make direct negotiations "to adjust the United States sovereignty and responsibility with reasonable aspirations of the Filipinos, governing and garrisoning mainly for themselves." He would be willing to extend an autonomy similar to that of Canada, for, to quote him, "their terrible oppression by Spain makes them determined to keep everything possible in their own hands." He would give employment to insurgent soldiers in public works. (X) Taylor. Vol. IV.t Ex. 667.

Page  201 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 201 ` Mr. Schurman's confidential cable now published for the first time follows in full: UNITED STATES COMMISSION to the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS June 3, 1899. Hay, Washington.... secret and confidential. Following my opinion present situation, Army has convinced Insurgents American and courage must finally win if war continues with sufficient American troops. Insurgents of means or intelligence favor peace, also poor unarmed class if left alone. But leaders of armed Insurgents plan guetilla warfare hoping with active and passive resistance to tire U. S. and win by dividing American opinion, of which they keep "well informed. Insurgents are animated by idea of independence, personal ambition and interests, distrust of white race from which they have suffered so much,, resent- ment of what they believe American deception, and fear of exploit and extermination for which they cite our 'Tndians. Exceedingly skeptical of our intentions, for Spain made promises and broke them. Masses ignorant, amazingly credulous, with childish grasp actual facts, great cunning, unbounded suspicion, or primitive passions, uncontrolable once aroused, and unreasonable sense of honor. Excellent material for able and unscrupulous leaders, small minority educated, capable men. To all the Commission has proclaimed American good will and urged reconciliation. Results observable in Manila public opinion which now advocates peace. Also in ranks active Insurgents, who have not only sent emissaries but' whose congress, fifteen members present, recently voted unanimously for settlement with U. S. on basis proclamation whereon Aguinaldo dismissed cabinet headed by irreconciliable Mabini and appointed cabinet headed by Paterno, lawyer educated Europe whose books on government of Philippine. Islands show spirit moderation. Continuation war tends to increase power of military leaders. Commander in chief Luna now very influential: man of passionate nature, dictatorial, stern disciplinarian and tho well educated Europe hates white race perhaps be- cause condemned to death by Spaniards. Still he could not. stand without Aguinaldo who is the spirit and symbol of the insurrection among people. Present demand moderate Filipinos is autonomy like Canada, and Insurgents want to hold arms until it is secured. In recent message congress, Aguinaldo says: 'I am

Page  202 202 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS fully convinced our arms constitute at present the only guarantee of our aspirations because for the security for the fulfillment of the promises of the American government it is necessary that they be declared in a formal agreement with the Filipino government approved by the congress of U. S." Says also, unconditional submission dishonorable to the army, cruel to defenseless people, disloyal for him. Adds, however, there is nothing hope from foreign countries, an illusion hitherto cherished. With much consideration on all sides, see only two possibilities. First, the U. S. may demand unconditional submission. But doubtful if the Insurgents will surrender arms, and to break their forces will require either considerable increase of the army to do it speedily, or protracted war wpresent forces according to best information. Thus forcibi. subdued Filipinos will probably require considerable American army for garrisons. Second course is by negotiations with Aguinaldo to adjust U. S. sovereignty and responsibility with reasonable aspirations of Filipinos, governing and garrisoning mainly through themselves. I believe they will want autonomy like Canadian, admitting American GovernorGeneral and other American chiefs, but demanding popular representative body to whom government shall be responsible. Their terrible oppression by Spain makes them determined to keep everything possible in their own hands. So whatever they find better promoting that end in the U. S. or state constitutions they will prefer to Canadian. Indications are they will refuse to surrender arms and demand that their soldiers be taken by the U. S. whole or in part for Philippines militia or army. Trust for the interest of best future government their demands could be lowered by negotiation. It would seem necessary to make some provision for Insurgent soldiers to prevent them becoming robber bands. Might accept employment public works which would be safer than militia. If these probable initial demands are not considered bar negotiations, and in my judgment they are not, recommend that the President authorize the Commission, Captain Barker representing the Admiral, to hold conference with Aguinaldo with a view to terminating the -war. Think that the invitation should come from President who might say that altho American arms had been everywhere victorious he desired to prevent further effusion blood, and being informed and believing that the U. S. benevolent purposes were not understood by Insurgents he ordered his Commission to meet Aguinaldo in order to explain them and learn how, if at all, they differed from the aims of the Filipino in arms. It is necessary to reach Aguinaldo himself, 71

Page  203 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 203 who is animating and also moderating spirit of the insurrection. His emissaries get at us, but we not at him. The U. S. is in a false position here. Continuation fighting tends to make Filipino consider us conquerors rather than to liberate. Campaign closing has secured us all moral effect possible by force. Beginning wet season should be used for grand effort at reconciliation. Race, present circumstances, past history all peculiar and demand special treatment. Conciliation as necessary as force whether we consider present situation or future government, Americans and Filipinos will have to trust each other. One fact greatly in favor of plan I recommend, namely that while the Filipino stops at nothing nor thinks death when influenced by hatred, resentment or revenge, he is much moved by sympathy powerful superior whose power he has felt. Believe magnanimity our safest, cheapest and best policy with Filipinos. It would seem negotiations can do no harm, for conciliation failing force remains. In my judgment it would have good moral effect on negotiations if Filipinos knew that President stands ready to send additional troops if necessary. SCHURMAN. Apparently the administration was not in favor of the proposed policy of Mr. Schurman. Secretary Hay asked if it was supported by the other members of the Commission. The telegram had been sent without the knowledge of the other members of the Commission, for Mr. Schurman knew that they were not in favor of any policy but to require unconditional submission. Mr. Hay replied in the following words: Schurman, Manila: The President suggests that you submit views expressed in your dispatch, if you have not already done so, to thefull commission and cable their opinion. He is extremely anxious to stop any further effusion of blood and will welcome any honorable means to that end. There is no excuse for further resistance by the Filipinos, and if it is continued the President will send all the forces necessary to suppress insurrection and establish the authority of the United States in the islands. Remainder of thirty thousand troops requested by General Otis will be forwarded to him with all possible dispatch and as many additional as may be - required to establish peace and American sovereignty.

Page  204 204 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The President desires that every effort be made to remove any misunderstanding which exists as to the generous purpose of this government and the fullest explanation made of our just and benevolent proposals. For this work he relied upon the commission. We should not rest in false position if any effort can prevent it. After all our liberal assurances, confirmed by the most generous acts, there would seem to be no justification for any misunderstanding on the part of those who are disposed to accept the truth. It is to be feared that those of the leaders who have skillfully and for their own purposes placed us in a false position before their deluded followers cannot be relied upon to set us right. The President wants peace and means to have it, preferably by kindness and consideration, but through force if need be. Please communicate this to commission. HAY. The other civil members of the Commission, Mr. Denby and Mr. Worcester, upon learning of this special telegram of Mr. Schurman, sent their own opinion which was in favor of unconditional submission and nothing else. Their telegram was as follows: Manila. Undersigned recommend prosecution of war until Insurgents submit; after submission or some great military success, establishment of civil government as outlined in President's instructions; establishment of municipal government in Manila with public schools teaching English, as contemplated by General; continuation of efforts of the commission to ascertain views of Insurgents and to conciliate the natives; assurrances that when arms are laid down, if done soon, as free a government as people can safely administer will be inaugurated in a reasonable time; leave to commanding general the treatment of insurgent soldiers, by no means agreeing to take them in mass into our service; the commission in no wise to interfere with conduct of war, leaving to general the dictation of terms of surrender; not to send envoys to Insurgents but commission will patiently hear them should they present themselves. Indecision now would be fatal. As war continues, and congress must determine permanent form of government, no promise covering more than telegram of May & should. be made. The government therein outlined is generally ap

Page  205 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 206 proved by natives and foreigners. The Insurgents should be made to understand that as a temporary government it will be insisted upon, subject to such modifications as may be approved by the President, and in accordance with his orders to the commanding general.(1) It was very unfortunate that Mr. Schurman's policy was not followed, for judging from the temper of the Filipino government, now that Mabini's cabinet itself was defeated, there was every reason to believe that had Mr. Schurman's own views prevailed the war would have ended then and there. The measure of autonomy and the procedure proposed by Mr. Schurman would have represented the "tangible concessions", which the revolutionists were requesting. When we take into consideration that even the conservative plan of Mr. Hay almost ended the war, we can fully realize the feasibility of Mr. Schurman's plan. Dealth of General Luna(2) It became apparent that the new venture of the Paterno cabinet in favor of peace was to be fruitless, because of the opposition of General Otis to a suspension of hostilities and the hostile attitude of the army and people. At the same time a most interesting drama was being enacted in the internal politics of the revolutionary government. It culminated in the death of General Luna, not at the hands of the American soldier but at the hands of General Aguinaldo's own bodyguard. Here was another issue between two Filipino leaders which was decided at the point of (1) The three cablegrams concerning the plan of Mr. Schurman, now published for the first time, are in the Worcester Collection, University of Michigan Library, in the volume entitled Miscellaneous Documents, Aug. 1898-April 1899. For Mr. Worcester's views and criticism of Mr. Schurman's "variable opinions", see his The Philippines-Past and Present, Vol. I, pp. 817, 318, 326. (2) The writer realizes that this is a most delicate subject in view of the fact that some of the actors of the drama are still alive. The materials used are Taylor's Insurgent Records and the diaries entitled Apuntes v Diario de, Operaciones sobre la guerra Hispano-Filipino-Americana, by General Venancio Concepeion (more briefly referred to in this work as Concepcion, Apuntes). These Apuntes are still in MS. form but copies of them have been made and the writer is keeping one of them. The writer does not claim that the following is the complete story of Luna's death. There will probably be found other documents which will give new light on the subject. But with the documents we have on hand, the following Is our finding of facts and our conclusions.

Page  206 206 THE DEVELO0MENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS the bayonet and which necessarily affected the internal politics of the country. Inasmuch as many rumors and accusations have been current about Aguinaldo's part in the death of Luna, it will be necessary for us to treat the matter at some length, using all the available documents. On May 9th, the Revolutionary Government changed its seat to Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and on the same day Luna was appointed assistant secretary of war. A few days afterwards Luna knew that, after all, the peace commission had left for Manila. This angered him. He went to Cabanatuan and insulted one of the cabinet members calling him autonomist and traitor. Later on he arrested the president and members of the cabinet and handed them over to Aguinaldo advising their deportation. Some of them immediately endeavored to convince Aguinaldo that Luna was going to the extent of plotting against the President of the Republic himself. At first Aguinaldo would not believe that Luna would have such high designs. Later on he must have been convinced that Luna really had evil plans in mind. An evidence of Aguinaldo's conviction is that he wrote confidential letters, in Tagalog, and in his own handwriting, addressed to his faithful companions of the insurrection of 1896, telling them that he was in imminent peril and that he relied in the faithfulness of his old comrade who would surely not abandon him.(1) That General Luna, bn the other hand, was endeavoring to secure popular support for the arrests he had made of Paterno and Buencamino, was shown from the cablegrams he received, one from the Provincial Presidente of Cagayan dated May 18, 1899, and the other from the Provincial Councilor and Representative of Abra dated May 19, 1899, both expressing congratulations upon his action.(2) (1) One of these letters, said Concepcion, was received in his presense, on May 81, by General Makabulos who showed it to him. (Concepcion, Apintes etc. Entries for June 24 to 80th). (2) The telegrams referred to are taken from Taylor's Vol. IV, Exhibit 879-881 as follows: Exhibit 879 (Original in Spanish. Record of telegrams P. I. B. 917-9) Tuguegarao. Provincial Presidente Cagayan to Secretary of War: I recelved your telegram with cries of. "Death to Paterno and Buencamino"; and

Page  207 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 207 In La Independencia of May 20, 1899, an interview with Luna was published in which he said that the autonomy plan was opposed by all the people that he had met. His statement reads in part: "All of the Generals with whom I have had communication, viz: Tinio, Macubulos, Concepcion, Mascardo, Pilar and Torres are all of the same opinion, Those of the south are still more decided. The military, together with the civil party, will not deliver their arms or accept autonomy. I have profound convictions of what I say, since in a kind of plebiscite I have asked the people whether they wanted autonomy. Do you know what they answered me? 'Long live Independence.' 'May autonomy die!' Those were the answers I received in eight of the central provinces I addressed. On repeated occasions I asked the entire population of towns who were fleeing from the enemy, 'Are you discouraged? Do you want peace? Do you wish to return to your pueblos?' And they, women, old men and children, would answer me: 'We have started to fight for our independence, we will continue, we will lose all before we will live under the domination of those who humble and destroy us."(1) On June 5, 1899, at 2:30 P. M. General Concepcion whose headquarters was at Angeles, Pampanga, received in reply I take pleasure in stating that the entire province refuses to accept autonomy, which is nothing more than a trick to disarm us and then do what they will with us. I trust in the sound wisdom and patriotism of the Filipino people and its government. To accept autonomy now and lower our flag after having spilled blood,-ourselves and others-would be to occupy a false position before all the nations of the world. Tuguegarao, May 18, 1899. Exhibit 881 (Original in Spanish. Telegram P. I. R. 917-8) Vigan, May 19, 1899. Provincial Councilor and Representative of Abra to General Luna: Have learned traitors Paterno, Buencamino, Velarde and Arguelles imprisoned warmly congratulate you while at the same time we unconditionally adhere to policy and decisions of Government and its Honorable President. Whole province united, sentiments identical to those of that province brave army and pueblo we all repeat cries of Viva Independencia, death to the traitors. Viva the Philippine Republic and its president, _17. Benguet, May 18, 1899. (1) Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 882.

Page  208 208 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS a telegram from. President Aguinaldo advising him that the President had taken charge of the direction of the operations in Central Luzon, that he was provisionally establishing his offices and headquarters at Bamban and that he was coming at 4:00 P. M. that same day. This meant that Luna had been relieved of the command. Aguinaldo arrived at the appointed hour and immediately began investigations as to whether there were any plots against him, for General Concepcion and his troops were supposed to be pro-Luna. He asked General Concepcion why he did not send his reports about his brigade to the President, to which General Concepcion replied that he had sent all reports to the Secretary of War, who in turn was supposed to transmit them to the government. Aguinaldo-Do you recognize me as general-in-chief of all the operations? Concepcion-Undoubtedly, My General. Aguinaldo-Do you know if any conspiracy is being prepared here? Concepcion-No, General. Aguinaldo-Do you have confidence in the chiefs and officials of your brigade? Concepcion-Absolutely, general. Aguinaldo-Vrey well; give orders for the presentation to the office of the Captain General which I shall establish this same night in this town of all the chiefs of your brigades, at the most urgent possible time, this same evening. This was done and the officers who presented themselves to Aguinaldo were placed under arrest and not allowed to communicate with outsiders pending investigations as to the alleged plot. The following morning, June 6th, General Concepcion received a telegram from the President of the Council of Government advising him of the death of General Luna at Cabanatuan the day before, on June 5th. "Immediately," said Concepcion, "I went to see General Aguinaldo arid told him of the lamentable happening showing the telegram I received and he showed great sur

Page  209 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 209 prise not being able to say a word for five minutes, and then said at last: 'Please return to your headquarters; in the meanwhile reserve to yourself such a grave incident and order the presentation to the captain-generalship of all the forces armed with mausers!"' Two companies armed with mausers were discharged in spite of their good records for they were suspected of being friendly to General Luna. Some of the officers continued under arrest, and investigations continued to determine whether there was a plot to oust the President and place Luna in his stead. Most important of all, General Concepcion was himself relieved of the command of his brigade, and General L. San Miguel was put in his place. General Concepcion was detailed to work in the office of the Captain General. (1) In his observation for June 24 to 30 General Concepcion said: "In view of the famous intrigues which resulted in the sensible death of our lamented General Antonio Luna and Colonel Roman, General Aguinaldo who lived- under that false impression decided to have me always within his eyesight, and it is this fact which determined my present appointment and also the appointments of General Hizon and Colonel Leyva as first and second chiefs, respectively, of his military room; so that those who were cognizant of the great diplomacy of Aguinaldo called us the three punished ones." General Concepcion's version of the death of Luna after gathering information from other officials is as follows: On the 2nd or 3rd of June Luna received a telegram from Aguinaldo asking him to form a new cabinet and asking him to see the President at Cabanatuan. Luna found out upon reaching Cabanatuan that the officer whom he had disarmed was in charge of the bodyguard of the president. Upon going up to the presidency he also found out that Aguinaldo had left for San Isidro. He was naturally disappointed at the apparent failure of the President to keep his appointment. Suddenly a revolver shot was heard from below. Luna walked downstairs to see (I) Concepcion Apuntes etc. Entries for June 5, 6, 7. 8, 1899.

Page  210 210 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS what was the matter, but before he left the last steps he was stabbed in the back, then he and his aide Colonel Roman were fired upon and boloed, till they died.(') The official notification of the death of Luna made by the Revolutionary Government to the provincial chiefs was as follows: CIRCULAR TO THE PROVINCIAL CHIEFS OF THIS ARCHIPELAGO REGARDING THE CAUSE OF THE DEATH OF GENERAL ANTONIO LUNA AND HIS AIDE, COLONEL FRANCISCO ROMAN. 1899 SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO PROVINCIAL CHIEFS, Cabanatuan, June 8, 1899. I regret to communicate to you that in consequence of a military collision in this town on the 5th instant, General Luna and Colonel Roman died, which event the Military court is investigating. (Signed) SEVERINO DE LAS ALAS Secretary. Letter head; DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC Supplementary to my telegram of the 8th instant, making known the death of General Antonio Luna and of his aide, Colonel Francisco Roman, I must add that the causes of the deaths of these gentlemen were the insulting and assaulting of the sentinel and guard of the house of the Honorable President of the Republic, and slurs directed against the person of the latter, who was at the time absent in the field. Therefore, the sentinel and the guards being insulted by the said General and also kicked and cuffed by him and even having revolvers discharged against them, not only by the General but also by his aide Colonel Francisco Roman, and being still much more wrought up over the gross insults and threats of death which both made against the Honorable President, who, thank God, was absent in the field, the sentinel and other guards made use of their arms to repel the unjust aggression of General Luna and his aid, both of whom were instantly killed. (1) Version heard by General Coneepcion at the time and noted in his Apunt. for June 24 to 80, 1899.

Page  211 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 211 Immediately thereupon the Military Court took the proper steps and is now conducting the preliminary proceedings, and the Government decided to have the burial take place with all military honors. Such is the history of the lamnentable event of the death of General Luna and of his aid, an occurrence which God has apparently permitted, in order to prevent greater evils. God has so disposed surely for the good of the present and the future of the Philippines. Such is the public opinion on the subject, because said General showed by his acts that he desired the Supreme Power of the nation, because being only the Assistant Secretary of War, without the authority of the President of the Republic or of the Government, he issued orders in person in such delicate matters as the decree of expulsion of foreigners residing outside the radius of operations, and the law upon conscription which, without having any legal value, it is true, caused and still cause serious inconvenience to the families of all the inhabitants of the Archipelago, and many other things which it is unnecessary to mention. Such acts show the deliberate purpose of usurping the power of our honorable President, a purpose lately confirmed by the arbitrary orders to arrest the President of the Council and some Secretaries of Government; said General did this by himself without consulting the will of anyone else and without orders from anybody. I communicate this to you in detail, in order that you and those under your government may have an exact statemen of this unexpected and providential event, and that absolute secrecy may be maintained as to foreign countries in this connection. It is desirable that you take care that in the territory under your jurisdiction there be no parties which may prejudice our enviable unity which is the cause and origin of our strong resistance against the invading enemy. You will acknowledge due receipt hereof. God preserve you many years. CABANATUAN, June 13, 1899. The Secretary. () (1) Taylor, Vol. IV. Exhibit 893, 60-8. Taylor also appends the following: (Original in Spanish. Rough draft in handwriting of F. Buencamino, P. L R. 60-4).

Page  212 212 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Mabini, who had resigned and who was against the policy of Paterno and Buencamino which was for peace, I. Supplementary to my telegram of this date announcing the death of General Antonio Luna and that of his adjutant Colonel Francisco Roman, I must add that the cause for the deaths of said gentlemen are (1) Insult to and assault upon the sentinel and guard at the house of the Honorable President of the Republic and (2) Insult to and threat of death also against our said Honorable President. 2. General Luna and his Adjutant, Francisco Roman had, for a long time, been committing abuses of power of so grave a nature that it is evident to the intelligent that they had a deliberate intention of forming a party to oppose our Honorable President. 3. He several times issued proclamation of a general character to the entire Archipelago, in his own name only and without the knowledge or authority of our Honorable President or of the Government, which constitutes a real usurpation of power and functions, as you will see. 4. He has many times ordered the shooting of countrymen and soldiers, without making any report to the Captain General of the Army, who is our Honorable President, more than a hundred persons being his victims, by which acts of cruelty he has sown terror in all towns. 5. He has also taken troops from Calumpit in order to make civil war against General Mascardo, presenting an opportunity to our North American enemy to take that line of defense of the first order. 6. Lately he has given himself out as the Secretary of War, when he was only the Assistant Secretary, and then established the Department in Bayamban and organized the office without in any manner asking leave of our government or Honorable president and enacting measures by himself in matte3rs pertaining to the Department of the Treasury and of the Interior, as the last law on conscriptions, which has been causing so much inconvenience in the homes of the families in all the towns of this Archipelago. 7. These acts show in an evident manner a deliberate intention to usurp power, as against our Honorable President, an intention which has lately been confirmed by the arbitrary orders to arrest the president of the Council and some Secretaries of Government, for the purpose of putting others in their places, as is shown by his act of writing to. various persons offering them cabinet portfolios, and by publishing in the newspaper called "La Independencia", of which he is a part owner and editor, that he was called to power to take the place of the present Government. 8. The Honorable President has left nothing undone to reward the merits and services of General Luna. At the beginning he gave him the rank of Brigadier General when he appointed him Director of War; a month and a half later he promoted him to General of Division, and recently after the battle of Santo Tomas on the 26th of April last, he promoted him to Lieutenant General, in addition to always having granted his wishes and slightest suggestions that did not cause any prejudice to third persons as, for example, the appointment of his brother Don Joaquin as Lieutenant Colonel of Military Administration. 9. What more could any one desire who was not General Luna? Less than one year from the time he was a simple citizen, he was promoted by our Honorable President to Lieutenant General in the national army.

Page  213 OPPOSITION TO) AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 213 was apparently at the time the incident happened, relieved by the death of Luna, because hle was convinced that Luna not only aspired to be the head of the cabinet but to sup10. But without doubt ambition was stronger in,aid General than gratitude; hence, when he saw himself brought-to such a height, he attempted to climb higher until he should be above the one selected by God to redeem us from slavery under foreigners, even though to attain his ambitious purpose it was necessary for him to employ terrorization and the usurpation of powers, as he was doing the day of his death. 11. Hence, when the sentinel and the guards were insulted by said General and also kicked and cuffed by him and even having had revolvers discharged against them, not only by the General but also by his Adjutant Colonel Francisco Roman, being still more wrought upon by the gross insults and threats of death, which both directed against the honorable President, who, thank God, was absent in the field, the sentinel and other guards made use of their arms to repel the unjust aggression of General Luna and his adjutant, both of them being instantly killed. 12. Immediately thereupon the Military Court took the proper steps and is now conducting the preliminary investigation, the Government ordering that the bodies of the victims should be buried with all military honors. 13. Colonel Francisco Roman disabled by blows with a stick and otherwise, a policeman of this town of Cabanatuan, and in the same manner one of the town of Aliaga, in addition to having committed many other abuses elsewhere. 14. Such is the history of the lamentable event of the death of General Luna and of his adjutant, an occurrence which God has evidently permitted, in order to prevent greater evils, which would have occured if said two persons had still been living. God has so disposed surely for the present and future good of the Philippines. This is the opinion of the Government and these details are communicated to you in order that you and those you govern may have an exact idea of this unexpected and providential event, and that absolute secrecy may be observed as to foreign countries in this matter. It is desirable that you take care that in the territory under your jurisdiction there be no parties which may prejudice our enviable unity, which is the basis and origin of our strong resistance to the invading enemy. (No signature) (NOTE BY COMPILER:-This is translated from the original draft of a circular which was to be sent out in explanation of the death of Luna. In the circular as issued much of this matter was omitted.) In a letter written by F. Buencamino to Felipe Agoncillo dated at Tarlac, July 25, 1899 F. Buencamino said: "In our camp there is great harmony and enthusiasm in the defense of our cause; respect, obedience and unity with Don Emilio Aguinaldo are the notable characteristics of the conduct of all; there has been one exception — Don Antonio Luna, but God ordained that in the clash with the body guard at Cabanatuan at a time when the President was absent from that point, this dissenter who wanted to do away with Don Emilio and raise himself to his place as dictator, lost his life. "The proofs of this unmeasured anti-political ambition are clear and are preserved in possession of Don Emilio and although we all lament the circumstances, because we should have been better pleased had it not happened, we are reconciled to what has occurred because we have returned to that tranquility and unity so much needed to maintain our cause against the common enemy." Taylor, Vol. IV, Exhibit 731.

Page  214 214 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS plant Aguinaldo himself. This attitude of Mabini on the death of Luna is very significant, because in his Philippine Revolution written two or three years afterwards, he severely critizes Aguinaldo for the death of Luna. Yet a few weeks after Luna's death, Mabini wrote to Galicano Apacible who was then in Hongkong, as follows: "Between us, while I regret and disapprove the violent death of Luna, his disappearance banished a danger which was menacing. Luna aspired a great deal, convinced perhaps that he was better educated than Puno (Aguinaldo); and if he had not done anything, it was because he had not yet acquired the necessary prestige to put himself face to face with Puno. It was for this reason that he aspired to the presidency of the Council as Secretary of War. The confidence that Puno had in him has contributed a great deal to feed his ambition; for inasmuch as Puno (Aguinaldo) gave him a free hand, he thought that he could manage the president as an automaton. But as I know Puno (Aguinaldo) it would not be a risky thing to suppose that if Luna had secured what he wanted there would have occurred a division which would have annihilated us."(1) (1) Letter to Kanoy and Ikkis, Hongkong, dated at Rosales, July 25, 1899, copy of which is in the collection of Teodoro Kalaw. In his Philippine Revolution, Chap. X, Mabini said: "I cannot believe until now that Luna had been plotting' to occupy Mr. Aguinaldo's high place; but it is true that he aspired to the premiership, Instead of Mr. Paterno, with whose autonomic platform he did not agree, for it was a transgression of the fundamental law and thus constituted a punishable crime. This is shown by a report from Luna's newspaper La Independencia published a few days before his death, announcing that the PaternoBuencamino Cabinet was to be replaced by another, of which Luna was to be the Premier amnd Secretary of War. When a few days after he received Mr. Aguinaldo's telegram summoning him to Kabanatuan, Luna would have thought that the subject of the conference was to be the new cabinet; he could not expect anybody to murder him at the precise moment in which the revolution was in crying need of his strong and intelligent arm. He could not believe that a legal and correct aspiration should cause fears to Mr. Aguinaldo, who had appointed him Commander in Chief of the Philippine Army. It is true that from time to time Luna was heard saying that Aguinaldo was a weak man and incapable chief; but these words were the mere explosions of a vehement and impetuous temper seeing his plan frustrated by want of the necessa'y support; all his actions revealed honesty and patriotism, coupled with a zeal and an activity heightened to the level of the circumstances. If he was sometimes hasty and even cruel in his resolutions, it was because the army had been brought to a desperate situation by the demoralization of the soldiers and the

Page  215 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 215 In recapitulation, we may say that Luna's death was the result of a series of circumstances which began with his high-handedness as commander of operations in Central Luzon. His violent temper and despotic policy had brought him into conflict with many officials, both civil and military. His clash with General Mascardo almost brought about a civil war. His relations with his immediate chief, Baldomero Aguinaldo, the Secretary of War, were always strained. Even Mabini himself complained to Aguinaldo about Luna's war measures. He was so bitterly opposed to the peace policy of the Paterno cabinet that he forcibly arrested its leaders although they were his superiors. As a result of all these acts Aguinaldo prepared himself for any eventuality, for he became convinced that Luna was aspiring to oust him from power. He relieved Luna of his command of military operations in Central Luzon, and put under arrest officers supposedly in favor of General Luna. He asked Luna to see him at Cabanatuan, but Aguinaldo was absent when Luna arrived. Luna found that Aguinaldo's own bodyguard was officered by a man whom he had previously dismissed; and Luna's death was caused by a conflict with this bodyguard. After an examination of the documents at our disposal, the worst that can be said about General Aguinaldo's part in the death of Luna is that after Aguinaldo became conlack of ammunition: nothing but the actions of rash courage and extraordinary energy could hinder its dissolution. "Andres Bonifacio's death had plainly shown Mr. Aguinaldo's ambition of power, and the personal enemies of Luna by means of clever intrigues exploited this weakness to ruin him. If Aguinaldo, instead of killing Luna, had supported him with all his might, it would be too presumptive to say that the revolution would have triumphed; but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had a higher idea of the courage and military capacity of the Filipinos. If Luna had been living, I am certain that the deadly blow given by General Otis would have been checked or at least avoided in time, and Aguinaldo's incapacity in the military command would not have been so clearly demonstrated. Moreover, to get rid of Luna, Aguinaldo availed himself of the same soldiers the former had punished for breach of discipline; then Aguinaldo killed the discipline, destroying his own army. With Luna, its firmest support, the revolution fell, and the ignominy of the fall, weighing entirely upon Aguinaldo, caused his moral death, a thousand times more bitter than the physical one: then Aguinaldo ruined himself, condemned by his own actions. That is the way Providence punishes great crimes."

Page  216 216 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS vinced that Luna was plotting to become the head of the revolution, he created a situation which he knew might likely cause the death of his opponent. In justice to the documents we have, we must say, however, that we have found no documentary evidence supporting the view that Luna was aspiring to oust Aguinaldo himself; but his arbitrary and high-handed acts undoubtedly convinced Aguinaldo and other officials that such was his opponent's intention. (1) The Seat of Revolutionary Government Moves Farther North 'It has often been claimed that the Revolutionary Government entertained the idea at the beginning that the Filipinos could triumph over the Americans. While this feeling may have been shared by the soldiery and lower officials, the responsible leaders, Aguinaldo, Mabini and others, certainly never for a moment thought that this was possible. This is born out by many proofs. In his personal letter to Mr. Benito Legarda(2) Aguinaldo said: "I believe what you tell me as to the reenforcements of the enemy which will not be long in arriving. Not only do I believe this, but I am convinced of this fact, and even before the out-break of hostilities was sure that with their wealth and innumerable and powerful elements of war, they could whenever they so desired, send as many as they (1) To what extent the loss of Luna weakened-as it undoubtedly did weakenthe military power of the Revolutionary Government is for writers on military topics to discuss. The following comments of General Concepcion, a supposedly pro-Luna man, as to the real merit of General Luna as a military commander, are however of interest: "According to what chiefs and officers closest to General Luna have told me, there had been occasions in which the forces under his command went to the extent of hating him, since in battles, without attending to reasons. circumstances or conveniences, he *as taking them to real suicide; in a word he gets mad when he hears the enemy's fire... People versed in the mi'ltary art concede to General Luna great merits as chief of a column, whose radius of action he can dominate with his eye, but not as director of great operations, because his foolhardiness (ceguedad) might be the cause of useless loss of lives and perhaps of lamentable defeats. "To my mind it is not foolhardiness (ceguedad) which dominate Luna but the desire to give example of true heroism to his soldiers and his conviction that he lacked men who could follow him with intelligence and resolu. tion. V. Concepcion, Apuntes, Vol. II, Entry for May 81, 1899. (2) Published in the Philippine Information Society Pamphlet of April 22, 1901, p. 29.

Page  217 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 217 -needed. In reply to this I must tell you that it is impossible for me to turn back front the enterprise which I have undertaken-that of determining our country, and especially as I have sworn that as long as life lasts I shall labor until I gain the acknowledgement of the independence of the Philippines." Mabini, who was most firm in his determination to decide the independence question by the arbitrament of war if the United States refused its recognition, was in his heart convinced that the Revolutionary forces were no match for the more numerous, better disciplined, and better armed American army. Yet, as was natural, he was loudest in his declaration both to the soldiers and to the people that victory would be attained if they would only put up their best efforts. From Nueva Ecija Aguinaldo was again forced to move his capital to Tarlac. Operations in other parts of the Philippines were in full sway, and with the exception of the Island of Negros, the Christian inhabitants resisted the American invasion; but as in Luzon the insurgents were defeated, and gradually American sovereignty was extended. One of the most hotly contested battles was fought early in June at Zapote Bridge, south of Manila, where three thousand Filipino troops heavily intrenched met four thousand American soldiers. Nearly one thousand Filipinos lost their lives. (1) The Revolutionary Congress met again in Tarlac with greatly reduced numbers and on July 14, 1899, elected the following officers: President, Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista; Vice-Presidents, Felix Ferrer, Alberto Barretto, Tiburcio Hilario, Mateo Gutierrez, and Juan Nepomuceno; Secretaries, Pablo Tekson, Basilio IIilario, E. Gutierrez David, Enrique Makapinlak, Alfonso Ramos and Luis Navarro.(2) On August 20, 1899, Felipe Buencamino as Sec(1) Fernandtez, A Brief History of the Philippines, pp. 255-270. For more detailed accounts of the campaign see Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime, Ch. XVII, also War Department Reports for 1899, 1900 and 1901. (2) Docutnentos Cowstitueionales Vol. II, p. 43.

Page  218 218 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS retary of Foreign Relations, sent a memorandum to the Congress of the United States setting forth the reasons why the Filipinos aspired for independence. (1) On August 23, the Congress elected Mabini President of the Supreme Court and Gracio Gonzaga Attorney General. Mabini, it may be remembered, was head of the cabinet up to May 9, 1899. On August 31, 1899, Aguinaldo issued another manifesto in which he said: "I make it known to the civilized world that the people and army of the Filipinos do not forget the understanding of alliance. and friendship which I contracted in their name with the representative of the United States who came here, Admiral Dewey, through the auspices of the American consuls at Hongkong and Singapore." Again another attempt for peace was made, and General Aguinaldo instructed a commissioner, General Alejandrino, to convey to General Otis the following message: "General Aguinaldo invites you to accept the beautiful mission of pacifying in this war by securing from the government in Washington a generous and spontaneous declaration of our independence as was recently done with regard to Cuba according to telegrams published in the newspapers here, especially the 'Manila Times'." But General Otis would never accept a conference on the basis of the recognition of the Philippine government. He would accept representatives to talk peace but they must be known to be representatives of General Aguinaldo and not of President Aguinaldo as head of the republic. Period of Guerrilla Warfare In November it was decided to discontinue open warfare and begin guerrilla methods, in view of the a'pparent superiority of American arms. The Philippine Islands were divided under separate military commanders. At the meeting held at Bayambang, Pangasinan, on November 12, 1899, it was decided to give every military commander "full (1) For text of this memorandum in Spanish see Dommnentos Com-tituviorala Sobr Plyiias Vol II, Dee. no. 48.

Page  219 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 219 and extraordinary powers to issue orders by proclamation, impose contributions of war and to adopt all such measures as may seem necessary for the good service of the country." The troops henceforward were to "maneuver in flying columns and in guerrilla bands." (1) From the time of the establishment of guerrilla warfare on November 12, 1899, to the time of his capture, March 23, 1901, President Aguinaldo's life was by no means one of ease and comfort as befits the head of a government. During this period he was in constant flight hiding in the mountains, suffering from thirst, hunger and the inclemency of the wveather, sleeping sometimes on bare ground, attacked by malarial fevers and pursued by an ever-active army. On three occasions he was surrounded on prac(1) This meeting and the plan adopted were described by CGeneral MacArtlmr as follows: At a council of war held at Iyambanrig, Pangasinan, about November 12, 1899, which was attended by General Aguinaldo and many of the Filipino military leadern, a resoluticn was adopted to the effect that the insurgent forft.., e incapable of fulther resistance in the field, and as a consequence it was de', t3 enerals and the men to return to ~their own province sistance by means of guerisl As affording an interestis.g, proceedings of the council, a copy of ture of Aguinaldo, found in possession of G captured May 6, 1900, is respectfully inserted immediately below. In accordance with the present politico military status in this, the center of Luzon, and using the powers I possess, in accordance with my council of gove rnment, I decree the following: 1. The politico-military command of the center of Luzon is hereby established, comprising the provinces of Bataan, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Sambales, and Pangasinan. 2. The superior commander in question will have full and extraordinary )powers to issue orders by proclamation, impose contributions of war and to adopt all such measures as may seem for the good service of the country. 3. Thy troops which will operate in all of the described districts will maneuver in flying columns and in guerrilla bands; these will be under the orders of the aforesaid superior commander, to whose orders all the ether leaders and generals will be subject, reporting to him and receiving from him the orders and instructions of the government; nevertheless, all orders received direct from the government will be obeyed and advice of same will be given to the superior commander aforesaid. 4. Sr. Don Pantaleon Garcia, General of Division, is appointed PoliticoMilitary commander of the center of Luzon, and he will assume, in addition, the judicial powers which belong to me as Captain-General. Given at Bayambang, November 12, 1899. The President, (Signed) EMILIO AGUINALDO..MaoArtkhT's Report of 190, page 1.

Page  220 220 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS tically all sides. He had barely 100 soldiers left, and he was obliged to allow his wife, sister and other women to be surrendered to the enemy.(1) The announcement of the end of open warfare in favor of guerrilla methods was heralded in American quarters as the end of the real revolt. Statements emanating from Washington and from General Otis emphatically reported the end of the rebellion and maintained that those who remained were only bandits. Aguinaldo, however, took care to order his military commanders in charge of the guerrillas to continue observing the laws of war, especially in the treatment of prisoners. This second period showed more than ever the tenacity with which the people held on to the ideals of the revolution. In order to be successful, the guerrilla system required the almost unanimous support of the people. It was most trying for the American army; for the revolutionists would disband when hard pressed and would mingle with the peaceful citizens or go about their daily labors.. At the call of their chief, when, an opportunity offered itself, they (1) o p.,i- iftict. -,imtn! A. Villa, Rkept a full Aiary,, which showvs the hardshi sSuffered by. Aguiialdo and bhi party during, these tctuhiesome times. The following are exkcerrts from this diary: "Night is coming upon us; our vision grows dim, our legs and knees are already weak and tremulous, our breathing. laborious, and our thirst intense. The clinging mud increases our troubles. The night is veiy dark. The leafy mountain trees shut out the starlight of the heavens. We no long:.r see one another. Along that narrow path-18 inches wide-which we travel lie the deep precipices of death; and looking down into the depths suffices to make one have a feeling of faintness and swimming in the head, or to imagine himself on the verge of death. Each one of us uses as a guide the trunk (sic) of a tree, probing into the darkness with the point of it for the location of an abyss. December 22-It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in Ambuyuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful journey they had sufr::ced. They were seated on the ground. In their faces were indications of the ravages of hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer suiffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of every patriot who loves his country. May 28-We went into the woods. After getting quite a distance inside, the honorable president selected a place for us to rest. At 8 A.M. we all lay down on the ground and were fast asleep in a few minutes. This made the fourth day we had eaten nothing but herbs. Neither had we slept any or rested. Hence our faces were cadaverous, our complexions palli,. our eyes sunken, our cheeks hollow-in fact, there was a completet debilitation of the body, attended with profound physical and mental plotration." —'iTylor, Vol. V, Exh. 991.

Page  221 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY would again don their uniforms and shoulder their guns, and at some unexpected place, they would give battle to the Americans. "The Filipinos," said Elliott,(1) "conducted their irregular warfare with skill and a considerable degree of success, and thus succeeded in postponing for a few months the day of complete submission. During that time they made life very unpleasant for the Americans and subjected their own people to untold miseries." Captain Taylor supports the view that the guerrilla system had the practically unanimous adherence of the people: * * * This policy was generally accepted, and in consequence the military leaders enjoyed a very extensivw cooperation of the whole mass of the Filipino people in s' port of their movements. The cohesion of Filipino society in behalf of insur: interests is most emphatically illustrated by the fact L assassination which was extensively employed, was genera., accepted as a legitimate expression of governmental authority. The individuals marked for death would not appeal to American protection, although condemned on account of their being supposed to be in favor of American control; nor would they give information which might have assured their safety even when they could easily have reported their danger to American commanders, who, in many cases, were stationed within the barrios where the victims dwelt. The amnesty, which had expired on September 2, 1900, had not produced any useful effect; and by December it was apparent that the fact that President McKinley had been reelected would not produce any change in the hostility of the insurgent leaders still in the field.(2) Even with the capture of a town and the establishment of the local government by the military authorities, the people of the locality and even the municipal officers would (1) The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime, p. 484. (2) That the authority given the guerrilla chiefs sometimes hld to abuses and crimes cannot be doubted. Torture and cven assassination were employed in order to punish those who were deemed traitors to the cause. The cases cited by Dean C. Worcester in his Philippines Past a-nd Present, Chap. XXVI, are taken mostly from Taylor's Philippine Insurgent Records. But torture and the famous "water cure",sometimes resulting in death, were also employed by American officers to extort confession. (See Storey and Codman, Marked Severities, a pamphlet published in 1902. A new edition was published in 1907). (8) Taylor, Vol. II, 18 HS.

Page  222 22 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS continue rendering aid to the revolutionists. It must be remembered in this connection that Philippine towns consist of both an urban and a rural population, covering many square miles. They correspond in size and character not to the regular incorporated towns of the United States but rather to the counties. The poblacion, or town proper, is simply the business portion, containing perhaps not more than one per cent of the entire population. The rest of the people are scattered over large rural areas, iri small villages or barrios miles apart, or on farms which may be located on far away hills, mountains, or plains. A town may be composed of twenty or more such bskrios. "he taking of a certain town by the military officials meant the taking of the poblacion, where the prominent peof the town lived and where the church, the municipal 'nment, and the business houses were located. While.aking of the poblacion always accomplished the cessa-,on of open opposition within the entire area of the town, tnder the guerrilla system it did not mean the complete ab-,ence of insurgents within the town limits, for the American army did not have sufficient forces to occupy every one of the twenty or more villages. The rural parts of the town might still be infested with disbanded revolutionists who were apparently plying their ordinary trades, but who upon the signal of their chief would shoulder their guns again. The system, to be successful, needed the unanimous support of the people, for one spy in a town might cause the discovery of many of the revolutionists. Even the town governments established by the military officials themselves became, to quote Judge Elliott "centers of insurgent activities. It was from them that the serious opposition to pacification came. The acceptance of American authority, which was involved in the holding of municipal office, was never, with the people, more than a mere form. In fact, the municipal politicos seem to have regarded the oath of loyalty to the United States as a performance which had a real value, because it tended to throw the Americans off their guard. Their hearts were always with their friends in the bosca, to whom they

Page  223 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 223 rendered every assistance in their power. The offices of municipal president and councilmen were the best possible vantage grounds for their purposes. Most of the towns had complete secret insurgent municipal governments, which operated simultaneously and within the same sphere as the American organized local government, and in many instances the offices were held by the same persons. The officials acted thus openly in behalf of the United States and sepyetly in behalf of the insurgents, apparently with equal solicitude for the interests of both. In such matters as the peace of the town, the regulation of markets, labor on roas, streets and bridges, and the opening and conducting of schools, these men were very active and accepted with alacrity the guidance and assistance of the Americans. At the same time they were collecting contributions and supplies, recruiting men and sending military information to the Filipino leaders in the field. Nearly every town, regardless of the fact of American occupation, was thus a base for insurgent military activities. When closely pressed a band of guerrillas simply dissolved and reappeared as peaceful citizens of a near-by barrio. It is doubtful whether the skill with which the system was operated has ever been equalled." (1) General MacArthur, in his official report described the conduct of th& guerrilla warfare in the following words: Wherever throughout the Archipelago there is a group of the insurgent army, it is a fact, beyond dispute, that all contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. In other words, the towns, regardless of the fact of American occupation and town organization, are the actual bases for all insurgent military activities, and not only so in the sense of furnishing supplies for the so-called flying columns of guerrillas, but as affording secure places of refuge. Indeed, it is now the most important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed, and seek safety in the nearest barrio,-a maneuver quickly accomplished by reason of the assistance of the people, and the ease with which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a peaceful native, as referred to in a preceding paragraph. (1) Eiott, op cit., pp. 484-64.

Page  224 224 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The success of this unique system of war depends upon almost complete unity of action of the entire native population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to admit of discussion; how it is brought about and maintained is not so plain. Intimidation has undoubtedly accomplished much to this end; but fear as the only motive is hardly sufficient to account for the united and apparently spontaneous action of several millions of people. One traitor in each town would effectually destroy such a complex organization. It is more probable that the adhesive principle comes from ethnological homogeneity, which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consaguineous leadership, even when such action is opposed to their own interests and convictions of expediency. These remarks apply with equal force to the entire archipelago excepting only that part of Mindanao occupied by Moros and to the Jolo group.(1) Aguinaldo was captured in the town of Palanan on the isolated coast of Isabela on March 23, 1901. At first he was reluctant to take the oath of allegiance; but upon the persuasion of Chief Justice Arellano, he was finally induced to take it. On April 19 he issued a manifesto calling upon the people to accept peace. "The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace", he said. "So be it. There has been enough blood, enough tears, and enough desolation. This wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are animated by a desire to serve our noble people, which has thus clearly manifested its will. So do I respect this will, now that it is known to me. "After mature deliberation, I resolutely proclaim to the world that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning to see their dear ones enjoying the liberty and the promised generosity of the great North American Nation." While the capture of Aguinaldo undoubtedly weakened further resistance, it did not by any means completely end the rebellion. Soon afterwards, it is true, followed the sur(1) MUeArthur'a Report for 1900, 'in Report of Lt. Gen. Comniadsung the Army for 1900, Pt. 3, pp. 61-62. Worcester takes exception to the above findings of General MacArthur. but Worcester's anti-Fillipino attitude is well-known. (See The Philippines-Past and Present, Vol. 1. p. 320).

Page  225 OPPOSITION TO AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 225 renders of generals and officers like Juan Cailles, Joaquin Aleiandrino, M. Tinio and the Villamor brothers. General Malvar, however, who was commander in chief of the BatangAA zone, assumed leadership, first of Southern Luzon and later of what remained of the entire revolutionary army. From Mount Makiling, his hiding place within forty miles of Manila, he issued a manifesto stating that it was his purpose to struggle until the recognition of Philippine Independence, leaving to the Central Committee in Hongkong the solution of the diplomatic problem. Malvar was for more than a year longer able to elude his American pursuers and to maintain guerrilla warfare in the department of southern Luzon which comprised the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas and Mindoro. In the Visayan Islands there was still some opposition in Samar, directed by General Lukban, and also some in Cebu and B3ohol. The correspondence between General Malvar and Major John Parker, who was in hot pursuit of the Filipino leader, is of some interest. "General"; said the American major, "you have gallantly fought, and have had great achievements which will leave a memory in the history of our country and in the minds of our children. But, sir, you have already fulfilled the duty of a soldier, and it is not possible to prevent the American soldiers from carrying out the order of their superiors, and still less to send them away. I will soon give orders to surround you and take you prisoner. I desire nothing but peace and prosperity in this place where I have to reside. I think it is in your power to bring that peace and prosperity. I would rather you would come to your native town as an honorable and honest soldier, who has fufilled his duty, this being better than to be a prisoner like General Rizal. I will feel myself flattered by the honor of receiving your honorable capitulation, and happy to see you in your own house here at Tanawan or at Santo Tomas. I await respectfully your answer." To this letter General Malvar sent the following reply: I and all the forces under my command are witnesses before the whole world of the valor of the American blood, of

Page  226 226 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS the honor and discipline of their army, of the superiority of their artillery, and of the humanity and chivalry of their nation. But the same facts cause us to hope greatly that the American people, deceived by certain Filipinos, who misinformed them that the people want annexation, may be acquainted with the fact that for every soldier they lose on the battlefield the Filipinos lose 100; their very power and greatness will compel them to give us the independence which has been announced since the first coming of the powerful fleet of the United States for the honor and glory of the American People. I must also signify to you that till the moment when our scarce bullets shall meet for the last time the overwhelming numbers of those of your powerful army, our shots demand not the death of any American, but the freedom of a people who for 300 years have dragged the chains of slavery. For your kind attention, I am, yours truly, MIGUEL MALVAR. (1) Little by little Malvar's chief officers were either captured or were induced to surrender, until finally in April 1902, with a few faithful followers remaining, he himself surrendered. On May 6th he issued a proclamation saying that the war had ended. On September 8, 1902, the Philippine Commission certified to the President of the United States the fact that the insurrection in all the Christian provinces had completely ceased and that "a condition of general and complete peace has been established." (1) These letters were printed in the New York Evening Post, May 14, 19O, quoted In Van Meter, The Trsth About the Philippinre, pp. 383, 384.

Page  227 CHAPTER VIII DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT The activities of the diplomatic agents of the Revolutionary Government, together with the international aspects of the politics of the period, would seem to warrant treatment in a separate chapter. The decree of June 23, 1898, creating the Revolutionary government, provided (') for a Revolutionary Committee or Junta, abroad, which should be divided into three delegations: one of diplomacy, one of the navy, and the other of the army. The Revolutionary Committee at Hongkong In accordance with that proviso on August 10, 1898, the executive body of the Revolutionary Junta with residence in Hongkong was appointed as follows: (2) Vicente Ilustre, president; Cipriano Kalaw, vice-president and treasurer; Teodoro Sandico, secretary, and Justo Lukban and Gracio Gonzaga as members. Jose M. Basa, Doroteo Cortes, Galicano Apacible, Crisanto Lichauco, Luis Rafael Yangco, Andres Garchitorena, and Arcadio del Rosario were also appointed members. On that same day Felipe Agoncillo was ordered to go to the United States as representative of the Revolutionary Government. Other designations of representatives abroad were as follows: Pedro P. Roxas and Juan Luna in Paris; Antonio Regidor and Sixto Lopez in London; Mariano Ponce and Faustino Lichauco in Japan, Heriberto Zarcal in Australia. A few days previously, on August 6th, 1898, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation requesting the foreign governments to proceed to the formal recognition of the Philippine Republic. He ended his proclamation as follows: (1) Art. 81. (2) Taylor, Exh. 98.

Page  228 223 THE DIVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS.Vherefore the undersigned, by virtue of the powers which belong to him as president of the revolutionary government of the Philippines and in the name and representation of the Philippine people, asks the support of all the powers of the civilized world and earnestly entreats them to proceed to the formal recognition of the belligerency of the revolution and the independence of the Philippines since they are the means designated by Providence to maintain the equilibrium between peoples, sustaining the weak and restraining the strong, to the end that by these means shall shine forth and be realized the most complete justice in the indefinite progress of humanity. Given at Bacoor, in the Province of Cavite, the 6th day of August, 1898. The president of the revolutionary government. EMILIO AGUINALDO. By the decree of August 24, 1898, the exact work of the Revolutionary Junta was determined. Article 5 of the decree read: "The Exceutive body will represent the government abroad; but it can not bind the government by any treaty or agreement without express authority. It can, however, enter into and settle those matters which do not require any treaty or special agreement, provided that the instructions received from the Revolutionary Government are complied with." (1) There was to be a director for each of the three delegations, diplomacy, navy and army. The representatives in the other countries were to communicate with the Revolutionary Government through the executive body, which was also authorized to administer the money of the revolution which was deposited abroad. Soon afterwards the executive body was reorganized, leaving Galicano Apacible as President with J. Lukban and C. Lichauco as members. Subsequently other additions were made. The greater portion of the diplomatic work fell on Felipe Agoncillo, the representative to the United States. He arrived in Washington on September 27, and on October 1, he was privately received by President McKinley. Although Agoncillo was well received, the Pres (1) For copy of the decree see Kalaw, Docimentos Costituionaa_. Vol. XI, Doo. No. 81.

Page  229 DIPLOMACY OF THE RE VOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 229 ident appeared non-committal as to the Philippines. The impression that he gathered was that there was no intention on the part of the President to recognize the Philippine Republic, and so he advised Aguinaldo to prepare himself. (1) He was told that the American commissioners in Paris might hear him as to conditions in the Philippines. Agoncillo's surmise was correct. There was no hope, so far as McKinley was concerned, for the recognition of Philippine independence. By this time the administration at Washington had decided to retain the Philippines. The motives back of this decision were mixed, as all motives in politics are. Sentimental impulses due to Admiral Dewey's victory and commercial considerations, were in the writer's opinion strongest at that time. Later on the humanitarian spirit entered in. (2) The day after the signing of the protocol, the President caused a very significant cablegram to be sent by the navy department to Admiral Dewey. This was indicative of the fact that the President was beginning to heed the growing popular demand to secure the Philippines for naval and commercial purposes. The cable read as follows:(3) Dewey, c/o American Consul, Hongkong. The President desires to receive from you any important information you may have of the Philippines, the desirability of the several islands, the character of their population, coal, and other mineral deposits, their harbor and commercial advantages, and, in a naval and commercial sense, which would be the most advantageous... ALLEN, Secretary. On the same day that the above cablegram was sent Manila fell into the hands of the American troops. This event must have stimulated the already growing desire for the possession of the Philippines. Of the five commis(1) Taylor. Vol. HI. Exh. 620. (2) See Kalaw. The Case for the Philippines, Chap. II. (8) Natvy Department Report, 1898, Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, pp. 122-128.

Page  230 230 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS sioners appointed to negotiate the final treaty with Spain, three were already known to favor the acquisition of territory in the Far East. (1) The Paris Conference When Agoncillo saw the President on October 1, the President had already decided on a course of action with regard to the Philippines, and that was to demand Luzon from the Spaniards. This was the reason for the evasive answer he gave the Filipino representative. In fact on the very day of the interview the American and Spanish commissioners were meeting in Paris. To Paris, then, Agoncillo went to present his case before the peace commissioners. Several days afterwards General Merritt arrived with statements on conditions in the Philippine Islands from General Greene, Major Bell, Admiral Dewey, Colonel Jewett, and the Belgian consul, Andre. These statements of Philippine conditions were to guide the American commissioners in deciding the fate of the Philippines. The papers read were of practically the same tenor-that it would not be wise to return all of the Islands or. perhaps even any of them to Spain, that the natives would not offer much resistance to American rule, and that, above all, the cession of the entire archipelago would be a "good business proposition" for the American nation. The opinion which probably weighed most on the American commissioners as coming from an impartial observer was that of the Belgian consul in Manila, Mr. Andre. He said: The United States can assure a steady government in these Islands, and in their hands the country will increase in wealth, and will, in a short time, be able to return to the United States money laid out; and it would be certainly much cheaper and more humane to take the entire Philippines than to keep only part of it and to run the risk of a second war with Spain for the very same reason that provoked the present conflict. It is the duty of the United States to do so and to protect the entire country.(2) (1) Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, Vol. II, p. 312. For the complete text of the President's instructions to the Peace Commission, see H. Doe. 1, 55th Cong. srd. Sess., p. 904. (2) Sen. Doc. 62, S'5th Cong. 3rd Sess., Pt. I, p. 389.

Page  231 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 231 John Foreman, the well-known writer on the Philippines, was also asked his opinion, and he said that it would be best to take all of the Philippine Islands. The information received failed, however, to harmonize the conflicting views of the American commissioners as to the disposition of the Philippines, and on October 25, 1898, the commissioners cabled their different opinions to Washington. President McKinley's answer through Secretary Hay showed a change of policy. Now the President wanted the entire Philippines; he was now convinced that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the Islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the occasions of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. (1) After receiving further instructions the commissioners from Washington, put forward an ultimate proposal for the occasion of the whole archipelago and the payment by the United States of $20,000,000. Realizing that this proposal admitted of no other alternative and that they must accept it or break off negotiations, the Spanish commissioners finally submitted to what they called "the law of the victor", and on November 29 formally agreed to the proposal. The treaty was finally signed on December 10, 1898. Agoncillo's Protest Agoncillo's presence in Paris did not have any influence either on the peace conference itself or on the American commissioners. He was refused a hearing by both of them. (2) The most that was done was the submission by General F. V. Greene of "Brief Notes by Senor Agoncillo." (3) (1) Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 936. (2) To give greater efficacy to the diplomatic work of the Revolutionary government a commission was appointed to work abroad for recognition of the Philippine Republic by the other nations. This commission was composed of Felipe Agoncillo, president; General Emilio Riego de Dios, vice-president; Gregorio Araneta, secretary; Benito Legarda, Juan Luna, Jose Losada, Pedro P. Roxas, Antonio Regidor, Felix Roxas, and Jose Albert, members. (Kalaw, Documentos Constitucionales, Vol. II, p. 34). (3) Printed in Sen. Doe. 62, Pt. 1, 55th Cong. 3rd ses. pp. 429-440. The notes deal with the relations between Dewey and Aguinaldo and Artacho and Aguinaldo's proclamation of May 24, 1898.

Page  232 232 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Two days after the signature of the Treaty of Paris, on December 12, 1898, Felipe Agoncillo filed his official protest, stating that the agreement recently entered into "cannot be accepted as binding by my government inasmuch as the Commission did not hear the Filipino people or admit them into its deliberations, when they have the indisputable right to intervene in all that might affect their future life." (1) Ratification of the Treaty in the Senate After the signature of the treaty, the American Commissioners returned to Washington. Agoncillo went also "in the hope that something might still be done in the American capital, and in truth, in Washington his cause had a better chance of winning, for considerable opposition was developed in the Senate with regard to the cession of the Philippines. It was argued on the one side that the United States had no constitutional power to acquire territories for the purpose of governing them as colonies; on the other, that the constitutionality of the treaty should be dealt with by the courts and not by the Senate. Again this argument was answered to the effect that any annexation was within the political and not the judicial jurisdiction of the nation but that the government of foreign peoples against their will was forbidden in the Federal Constitution. It was evident at the time that, to the majority of senators, the vital question was not whether there was such a thing as a Philippine nation or not, but whether the United States were to be led into a policy of colonization,. or whether they were to remain true to their traditional policy of holding no peoples whatever as subjects. The Administration was not prepared to favor the extension to the Filipinos of American citizenship, yet it persisted in the desire to retain the Philippines indefinitely, against the will of their inhabitants. Whether President McKinley admit(1) Copy of Agoncillo's letter in Spanish is printed in Kalaw, T. M., Documentos Cownstitucinales, Vol. II, as Doc. 36. It is rather interesting in that it endeavors to establish the fact that the relations between Spain and the Philippines was based on a free union by means of the historic Pact of B3lood between Legazpi and Sikatuna and by the Constitution of Cadiz, in the discussion of which representatives of the Philippines took part

Page  233 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVT. 233 - ted it or not, that was certainly an imperialist policy, necessarily leading to the establishment of an American colonial system. Strong opponents of such a course naturally appeared. These, calling themselves Anti-imperialists, contended that the principles of the American republic and the holding of colonies were incompatible; that the American nation could have no subjects, since it was composed of free citizens; and that their government could not consistently rule a people without that people's consent. In order to save America from such a policy, the opponents of the treaty proposed to amend it or to pass a resolution declaring that the Philippines would be ultimately, if not immediately, given their independence. They declared that if such a resolution were to be passed first or a similar amendment accepted, they would support the treaty. A number of resolutions were introduced to accomplish that purpose, chief among which was that of Senator Bacon, providing for the expression of the intention of the United States to turn over the Philippines to their people "when a stable and independent government shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such."(1) Many of the opponents of ratification felt that the treaty was an injustice to the Filipinos, and therefore opposed it. They did not understand why the Cubans should be treated differently from the Filipinos, especially when Admiral Dewey repeatedly asserted that the Filipinos were better qualified for self-government than the Cubans. Agoncillo's Activities in Washington In the meanwhile, Agoncillo had also been active. On January 5, 1899, his secretary, Mr. Sixto Lopez, addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, requesting that Mr. Agoncillo be accorded the privilege of an audience with him to arrange for the presentation to the President of the envoy's letters of credentials, and suggesting the advisability of an understanding between the respective na(1) For complete text on the Bacon resolution see Kalaw, The CasOe for the Filipino, pp. 45-47.

Page  234 234 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS tions. Inclosed in the letter was a memorandum on the Philippine Republic. Not even a letter of acknowledgment was received, in reply to this and on January 11, another letter was sent to the Secretary of State, this time signed by Mr. Agoncillo himself. "In view of the present status of affairs in the Philippine Islands," wrote Mr. Agoncillo, "and the fact that in the present strained position, the impetuous action of a Filipino or the overzeal of an American soldier, acts based on the impulse of the moment, may create a condition resulting in grievous loss of life as well as a memory that both nations might carry with them for years, I again urge upon you the necessity of early and frank communication between the representatives of the countries in question." No answer being received to this letter and trouble between Filipinos and Americans looming ever larger and larger in Manila, Mr. Agoncillo again, on January 24, addressed a communication to the Secretary of State reiterating his earlier fear that the amassing of American troops in the Islands while no understanding had been reached between the two Governments was fast creating an actual condition of war.(l) Mr. Agoncillo's letters were entirely ignored. The Memorial to the Senate On January 30 a memorial was sent to the Secretary of State with the request that it be presented to the Senate of the United States, the fight over the treaty being then at its height in the Senate. This document was perhaps the most interesting of all the state papers issued by the Filipino Junta on behalf of the Filipino people. It sets forth the history of the relations between the Americans and the Filipino and the grounds upon which the Philippine Republic based its claim for recognition. The constitutional basis of Mr. Agoncillo's appeal was as follows: (1) Agoncillo's prophecy to the effect that trouble was sure to come in the Islands if an understanding were not reached between the two peoples soon came true, for on February 4, five days after his memorial was sent to the Senate, actual war was begun. Hostilities having commenced, Mr. Agoncillo's work as an envoy was ended. His secretary, Mr. Sixto Lopez. nevertheless remained in America and did some propaganda work.

Page  235 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 235 Lest it may be thought that, in addressing you, I am exceeding the just rights of those whom I have the honor to represent, I may be pardoned for calling your attention to the fact that the Constitution of the United States provides in substance that no person, howsoever humble he may be, shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law-meaning after the preferment of charges, their careful examination by a tribunal competent and of acknowledged authority to deal therewith, and at a trial where the accused or defendenat may be present in person or by attorney. This constitutional declaration is not the origin, but the expression of a principle-a right inherent in the nature of things-and which receives no added moral sanctity because of its recognition in written papers, and is of no less application because circumstances require it to be called into play by a nation seeking the recognition of its independence. I cannot believe that in any possible action on the part of the American republic towards my country there is an intent to ignore, as to the ten millions of human beings I represent, the right the free government of America preserves to the lowliest of her inhabitants; but rather prefer to think that in the rush of arms this right for a rnorment may have been obscured in the minds of some of America's liberty-loving and enlightened citizens. My justification for addressing you is that I am solicituous lest by any inadvertence or omission of my own, a spacious foundation may be laid by virtue of which the rights of my countrymen may be jeopardized and injuries inflicted upon them, rebounding hereafter, with added force, against the well-being of America. Mr. Agoncillo went on to show that even before the signing of the protocol the Philippine Republic was already entitled to recognition, for Philippine independence had already been proclaimed and a government de facto established, laws promulgated, and Spain's further dominion made impossible. This consideration was important because some writers may claim that after the protocol whatever progress was attainled by the revolutionists against Spanish arms would have no bearing on the question in view of the fact that the protocol was meant to preserve the status quo pending the negotiations of the treaty. Mr. Agoncillo also argued that Spain could not deliver possession of the Philippines because she had already been ousted

Page  236 236 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS by their people. "It was not possible," the memorial stated, "for Spain to yield any right as to property of this nature as against the Government of the Philippine Islands, for by all authorities upon the subject of international law, public property goes to the captor of the country, and may not be transferred by an expelled nation to a foreign government against the right of the nation which has gained possession of the country by conquest." (1) On January 25 it was agreed that a vote on the treaty should take place on February 6. The opponents of ratification were quite confident that the Administration could not carry two thirds. In the midst of this struggle Mr. Bryan came to Washington and urged the Democratic senators to support the treaty. Mr. Bryan contended that the treaty committed the United States to no Philippine policy and that after the ratification the issue of imperialism should be brought before the American people for decision. "The ratification of the treaty", he said, "instead of committing the United States to a colonial policy, really clears the way for the recognition of a Philippine Republic. Lincoln, in his first inaugural message, condensed an unanswerable argument into a brief question when he asked, 'Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?' The same argument is represented in the question, Could the independence of the Filipinos be secured more easily by diplomacy from a foreign and hostile nation than it can through laws passed by Congress and voicing the sentiments of the American people? If independence is more desirable to our people than a colonial policy, who is there or what is there to prevent the recognition of Philippine independence? It is absurd to say that the United States can be transformed from a republic into an empire without consulting the voters."(2) (1) Agoncillo's memorial to the Senate is printed in M. M. Kalaw, The Case for the PFipinos, pp. 64-80. The letter to the Secreta y of State accompanying it ia printed in the Congressioiial Record for January 31, 1899. Original carbon copies of the memorial as well as of the various letters forwarded by Agoncillo or his Secretary to the State Department were given the undersigned by Mr. Jakson H. Ralston, who advised Agoncillo during his stay in Washington. (2) At the Democratic Banquet, Saint Paul, Minn., February 14, 1899. I

Page  237 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 237 This step of Mr. Bryan's was resented by many opponents of the treaty. Senators Hoar and Turner were especially strong in their disapproval of Mr. Bryan's position. They maintained that the major issue was the ratification of the treaty, for such ratification would commit the United States to a policy of indefinite retention. "We have covenanted with Spain," contended Senator Turner, "to admit her ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as our own for the period of ten years. We have made divers and sundry stipulations, having no limitation of time, for the security of property and individual right in all territory ceded or relinquished by Spain, including ecclesiastical property, which necessarily presupposes continued sovereignty. We have made stipulations concerning judicial proceedings, which presupposes the same thing. We have covenanted to admit certain articles of Spanish production free of duty in the Philippines for ten years. And, finally, we limit these limitations so far as they apply to Cuba to the time of our occupancy of that island, but we make no such limitation concerning the Philippines." (1) Senator Lodge's speech was probably the ablest presentation of the situation by those who favored ratification. He appealed to the wisdom and patriotism of the American people, to whom, he said, could be left the final decision of the future of the Philippines. He virtually told the opponents of the treaty that the time for deciding the question of policy was after ratification. He said in part: There is only one question demanding actual and immediate decision now before Congress and people, and that is whether the treaty with Spain shall be ratified or not. I have heard no opposition expressed to any part of the treaty except such portion of it as relates to the Philippines, and that, therefore, is the sole point upon which I desire to touch... The treaty ceded the Philippines to us. It is wisely and skillfully drawn. It commits us to no policy, to no course of action whatever in regard to the Philippines. l1) Speech In the Senate. January 19. 1899.

Page  238 238 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS When that treaty is ratified we have full power and are absolutely free to do with those islands as we please. Suppose we reject the treaty, what follows? Let us look at it practically. We continue the state of war, and every sensible man in the country, every business interest, desires the reestablishment of peace in law as well as in fact. At the same time we repudiate the President and his action before the whole world, and the repudiation of the President in such matter as this, is, to my mind, the humiliation of the United States in the eyes of civilized mankind and brands us as a people incapable of treating affairs or of taking rank where we belong as one of the greatest of the great world powers. At last the decisive day, the 6th of February, arrived Every attempt to pass any of the resolutions declaring America's purpose towards the Islands had failed. Many of those who would otherwise have opposed retention adopted the view expressed in Mr. Lodge's speech. They did not want to give "bonds to Spain" for "good conduct" in a matter wholly their own to decide. They promised that once the legal title to the Philippines was secure, the Senate would immediately proceed to decide what should be done with the Islands. Two days before that set for the vote on the treaty, the Filipino-American War broke out, the Filipinos, it was claimed, having treacherously begun the hostilities. This belief was strengthened by the fact that the day before the outbreak, Mr. Agoncillo, probably alarmed by the press attacks upon him and the statements that he was likely to be arrested, had fled to Montreal, Canada. From this arose the belief that he knew of the intentded attack and hence had made his escape. This fact, together with Mr. Bryan's support, decided the fate of the treaty. In spite, however, of this favorable turn of events for the supporters of the treaty, when the Senate met in-executive session on February 6, the Administration was not sure of victory. It needed two thirds of the votes, and it had only 58 sure votes, 29 being against, the remaining three doubtful. Within an hour two of the doubtful votes were declared to be for the treaty, and the third was

Page  239 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 239 east for it after two roll calls, the final vote being 61-29 (including pairs). There was only one vote to spare. (1) The Bacon Resolution Thus was the title of the United States to the Philippines completed and American annexation became an accomnlished fact. There are differences of opinion as to whether Mr. Bryan's influence did change some Democratic votes; Senator Hoar was positive that it did, while Mr. Winslow, of the Anti-Imperialist League, believes that what changed the deciding votes was the outbreak in Manila two days before. Immediately after the ratification the opponents of colonization endeavored to press for action upon the series of resolutions that had been presented before the ratification. It was agreed to take up first the resolution introduced by Mr. McEnery, which was as follows: Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, etc. That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain it is not intended to irncorporate the inhabitants of said islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States. But it is the intention of the United States to establish on said islands a governnment suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local selfgovernment, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands. This resolution was not by any means satisfactory to the opponents of colonialism. It did not promise independence and was very vague as to the final disposition of the Islands. Senator Bacon thereupon offered the following amendment: Resolved, further, That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent Government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the Government of the United Stats to recog(1) Lodge. War with Spain, p. 23.

Page  240 240 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS nition as such, to transfer to said Government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the Islands to their people. Here was the issue, plainly put, whether upon the establishment of self-government inder.ndence should be recognized. Unfortunately the Filipino-American War had started and this afforded a reason for refraining from announcing any definite policy. "We will not tell the Filipinos what we propose to do with them, until they lay down their arms," was the argument now advanced by the advocates of Philippine retention. The vote on the Bacon Amendment was a tie, and VicePresident Hobart defeated it with his deciding vote, the original McEnery resolution being finally adopted. The House, however, failed to act on it, and so it died a premature death. (1) Propaganda Work Continues Neither Congress nor the President was willing to recognize the Philippine Republic or even the right of the Filipino people to future independence. So the cause which Agoncillo represented was lost. But the failure of Agoncillo's mission did not stop the diplomatic and propaganda activities of the Revolutionary Junta. The Hongkong Junta continued as the central body directing the propaganda work abroad and advising the (1) One vote, more than once, would have saved the country from what I think is its wretched policy in regard to the Philippine Islands. There was just one vote to spare when the Spanish treaty was ratified. One senator waited before voting until the roll-call was over and the list of the votes by the clerk, before he finally voted for the treaty. He said he did not wish to butt his head against the sentiment of his State if he could do no good; but if his vote would defeat it, he should vote against it. If there had been one less vote. his vote would have defeated it. The treaty would have been lost, in my opinion, if Senator Gray, one of the commissioners who made it, who earnestly protested against it. but afterwards supported it, had not been a member of the commission. The resolution of Mr. Bacon, declaring our purpose to reoogp nize the independence of the Philippine people, if they desired it. was lost by a single vote. The Philippine treaty would have been lost but for Mr. Bryan's interposition in its behalf. It would have been defeated, In my judgment, if Speaker Reed, a man second in influence and in power in this country to President McKinley alone, had seen it to be his duty to remain in public life, and lead the fight against t." —Hoar, Autobiogrphy of Sevent4 Yeows Vol. IL p. 110.

Page  241 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 241 Revolutionary government on its foreign policy, with Apacible still at the head. From Montreal Agoncillo went to Europe, where he continued his propaganda work. His activities in Europe have been well depicted by Taylor in his reports. Though unsympathetically, Taylor followed the steps of the Filipino representative with apparent interest. The report states: (1) On March 9 he was in London, and from there informed Apacible that he had lost his documents and everything else in a shipwreck on his way from America. He also assured him that while in Montreal his assassination had been attempted. From London he went to Paris, where, in July, he informed a French newspaper that the statement which had been published in the United States that he had advised Aguinaldo to attack the Americans was absolutely false. He had left Washington for Montreal simply because he had been ordered by his government to send in cipher complete reports upon the vote in the Senate upon the treaty between the United States and Spain. As he had been prohibited from sending cipher dispatches in the United States he had gone to Montreal to send them. This, he said, completely explained why he had left Washington immediately before the outbreak of hostilities. In apparently the same interview Agoncillo solemnly assured the world that the Filipino government had never thought of confiscating the property of the friars; it had only taken measures to prevent them fromni transgressing the laws and had required the religious corporations to pay the taxes to which other corporations were liable (P. I. R., 158.6). In Paris Agoncillo undertook to represent a republic which had never really existed, and to speak for a government which was fast disintegrating into roving parties of bandits. He traveled, issued statements, and kept up a correspondence with the Junta; he gave interviews to men who would print them and he attempted to interest governments in the cause of the insurrection, and so continued, with an ever-relaxing grip upon realities, advancing farther and farther into the land of dreams and illusion. On June 6, 1899 (P. I. R., 399.12), he assured the Junta that if the war in the Philippines did not end President McKinley would not be reelected. In July (P. I. R., 451.8) he advised the junta to make a formal protest against tile use of explosives or asphyxiating projectiles by the Americans. If this did not prevent their use he advised poisoning the bullets used (1) Taylor, Vol. II. 11 KK.

Page  242 242 DIPiOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. by the insurgents and also the food and drink of the Americans. In August (P. I. R., 477) he advised that negotiations in regard to the Spanish prisoners in the Philippines should be undertaken through him. Only the Spanish Government itself should be dealt with, and a cash payment should be exacted before any delivery was made, as this alone would avoid their being deceived. On August 13 he cabled from Paris to Apacible that "the triumph of Bryan is the triumph of our cause." It seemed that Agoncillo got into trouble with Regidor and Lopez in Europe probably on account of Agoncillo's departure from Washington on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities. The Revolutionary Government seemed, however, to place more confidence in Agoncillo as is shown by the letter written to Galicano Apacible on September 12, 1899, from the Department of Foreign Affairs, possibly by Buencamino. Don Emilio and the Government request you to use all your influence to bring about an agreement between the gentlemen above referred to, or to tell us plainly whether the moment has arrived to withdraw all relations with Sefiores Regidor and Lopez, in order that we may reach a definite decision before answering their letters.(1) Apacible's Proposed Terms On September 5, 1899, Apacible advised the Revolutionary Government that there were two ways open, one was to continue the struggle until Bryan was elected and the other was to deal directly with President McKinley. It was decided to try both ways. Sixto Lopez, in an article published in the Independent (2) asked: "Why not negotiate? If negotiation fails it will then be time enough for war. True, in the past our overtures of peace and good will have not been received in a hearty manner by the administration. But let that pass. It can not be undignified to do what honor and righteousness demand. Who will help the cause of peace? Could any cause be worthier the genius of the statesmen of a great nation?" Apacible himself went to Toronto, Canada, by way of Europe. There he was met by Rafael del Pan with whom (1) Taylor, Vol. IV, Exh. 744. (2) December 14, 1899.

Page  243 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 9A3 and with Sixto Lopez, he continued the campaign, endeavoring to negotiate with the administration or with the Democrats. Apacible in an address written at Toronto in June 1900 and entitled To the American People, proposed the following bases for American-Philippine relationship: (1) We shall indemnify the United States for 20 million pesos paid to Spain. (2) Perpetual and free commercial relations favorable to American interests and to the development of our country shall always unite us. (3) The United States shall have reasonable places in the Philippines for the establishment of coaling stations, outside the city. (4) We shall not permit monopolies of any kind in the Philippines and we shall give American citizens all conditions and guarantees necessary for those who want to be there. (5) We are ready to give you all that you want in our country provided it is just and does not constitute a violation of our political independence or the integrity of our land. Imperialism as an Issue in 1900 But the greater hope of the revolutionary agents remained in the Democrats. There was every reason to believe that imperialism would be an issue in the coming November (1900) election. By securing the ratification of the treaty of peace and refusing to pass any resolution that would pledge "near" or ultimate independence, while at the same time insisting that they did not want to make Filipinos citizens of the United States the Government gave an opportunity to the Democrats to brand the Republican party's policy towards the Island as one of imperialism. Among the Republicans themselves there was a small but fervent group of opponents of President McKinley's Philippine policy. A most tenacious campaign against American colonialism was that carried on by the Anti-Imperialist Leagues. The first Anti-Imperialist League was formed in Boston in 1898, "to oppose, as inconsistent with American ideals, the forcible extension of the sovereignty of the United States over foreign people and in particular

Page  244 244 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS to work constantly for the early and complete independence of the Philippine Islands." Within a year the league had become a national organization with about one hundred branches in the principal American cities, chief among which were New York, Philadelphia, Springfield, Chicago, Cincinnati, Washington, D. C., and Los Angeles. (1) The campaign carried on by these men consisted in the making of speeches and the distribution of pamphlets, especially the latter. The anti-imperialist movement will be long remembered by the number and quality of pamphlets scattered all over the United States. Mr. Winslow thinks that fully 7,000,000 of them were distributed. The Anti-Imperialist League sent investigators to study conditions in the Islands, and these brought back reports that were of great use to the cause of Philippine independence. The league welcomed Filipino visitors to Boston and endeavored in every possible way to make the desires of the Filipino people known to the Americans. A national conference of anti-imperialists was held in Chicago on October 17 and 18, 1899, presided over by Edwin Burritt Smith, with about 160 representatives from all over the country. Here the anti-imperialist movement was on a national basis, organized under the name of the American Anti-Imperialist League. A committee (1) Among the foremost promoters of anti-imperialism were: George F. Hoar, Grover Cleveland, Samuel W. McCall, George S. Boutwell, George F. Edmunds, Wayne McVeagh, Andrew Carnegie, J. C. Schurman, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Goldwin Smith, Edward Atkinson, Nelson A. Miles, W. D. Howells, F. B. Sanborn, Moorfield Storey, John F. Shafroth, Augustus 0. Bacon, E. W. Carmack, Donelson Caffery, Jane Addams, Edwin Burritt Smith, Thomas Mott Osborne, Herbert Welsh. David Starr Jordan, Henry Wade Rogers, Charles A Towne, George G. Mercer, Edwin D. Mead, James L. Slayden, Rufus B. Smith, W. J. Bryan. Champ Clark, George L. Wellington, B. R. Tillman, George Turner, R. F. Pettigrew, William E. Mason, John Sharp Williams, Robert L. Henry, W. A. Jones, John J. Lentz, Horatio C. Potter, Francis G. Newlands, Henry D. Green. T. M. Patterson, David A. DeArmond, Thomas W. Hardwick. John A. Martin. Eugene F. Kinkead, J. Harry Covington, Erving Winslow, and Isidor Rayner. (From The Anti-Imperialist League by Erving Winslow, The Fipiso Pople, September 1912. Vol. I, No. 1.)

Page  245 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 245 headed by Carl Schurz prepared a declaration of principles, which was passed by acclamation. (1) A great many things, good and bad, have been said of the anti-imperialists. In the course of their campaign they incurred the enmity and even the hatred of many of their own countrymen by opposing the policy of the American Government in retaining the Islands. They were called traitors when they dared raise their voice in sympathy with the struggling Filipinos. But there is one thing that they were never accused of, and that is personal interest. They were a small but very sincere group of political idealits, fighting for the preservation of time-honored American political principles, without any hope of material gain for themselves. It is true that the anti-imperialist movement was not started out of pure love for the Philippines; it was formed to check the tide of imperialism which had started with the Spanish-American War and which, its leaders contended, was a menace to American institutions (1) The declaratlon of principles reads, in part, as follows: "We hold that the policy known as imperialism is hostile to liberty and tends towards militarism, an evil from which it has been our glory to be free. We regret that it has become necessary in the land of Washington and Lincoln to reaffirm that all men, of whatever race or color, are entitled to life. liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We maintain that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. We insist that the subjugation of any people is "criminal aggression" and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our government. We demand the immediate cessation of the war against liberty, begun by Spain and continued by us. We urge that Congress be promptly convened to announce to the Filipinos our purpose to concede to them the independence for which they have so long fought and which of right is theirs. We propose to contribute to the defeat of any person or party that stands for the forcible subjugation of any people. We shall oppose for reelection all those who, in the White House or in Congress, betray American liberty in pursuit of un-American ends. We still hope that both our great political parties will support and defend the Declaration of Independence in the closing campaign of the century. We hold with Abraham Lincoln that: "No man Is good enought to govern another without that other's consent. When the white man governs himself, that is self-government; but when he governs himself and also governs another man, that is more than self-government-that is despotism. Our reliance Is in the laws of liberty which God has planted in us. Our defense is in the spirit which prizes liberty as the heritage of all men in all lands everywhere. Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves, and under a just God cannot long retain it." We cordially invite the cooperation of all men and women who remain loyal to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States.

Page  246 246 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS and government. Imperialism manifested itself in the seizure and retention of the Philippines by America, and therefore they endeavored to free the Islands as a means of keeping America from that danger. The Filipinos, too, believed that their country should be freed from America; so what was more natural than that there should be an alliance, as it were, between these two groups of men fighting the same battle? But while to escape from imperialism was the prime object of the anti-imperialists, it cannot be denied that many of them, after thus espousing the cause of a weak people struggling for freedom, acquired a sincere interest in the welfare of that people and manifested righteous indignation at their forceful subjection by the American Government. The foremost leader of the movement, the late Senator Hoar, whose reputation for uprightness and morality has never been excelled by that of any American statesman, was certainly inspired by the deepest sympathy for the struggles and privation of the Filipino people and by the most earnest solicitude for their fortunes, their liberty, and their happiness. During his declining years, in reviewing the long and fruitful record of his distinguished public life, he looked back upon his efforts to arouse the conscience of his people and induce them to recognize the right of the people of the Philippines to self-government and independence as the proudest, noblest, and most sublime of his public endeavors. "I would rather have," he said in his Autobiography of Seventy Years, "the gratitude of the people of the Philippine Islauds, amid their sorrow, and have it true that what I may say or do has brought a ray of hope into the gloomy caverns in which the oppressed people of Asia dwell, than to receive a ducal coronet from every monarch of Europe, or command the applause of listening senates and read my history in a nation's eyes." The campaign of the anti-imperialists helped the Democrats in a large measure to bring the issue of imperialism to the front. Some Democrats, it is true, were favorable to expansion, but most members of the party welcomed the issue of imperialism and were willing to stake their

Page  247 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 247 fortunes on it in the coming presidential election. The Republican national convention was the first to be held. It took place in Philadelphia on June 19-21, 1900. The dream of a vast Oriental commerce and an Asiatic market that would be developed through holding the Philippines as a base had not yet faded from the minds of Republican leaders. The permanent chairman of the convention, Senator Lodge, very frankly said: We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. While we regard the welfare of these people as a sacred trust, we regard the welfare of the American people first. We see our duty to ourselves as well as to others. We believe in trade expansion. This spirit was manifested throughout the whole proceedings. There were also vague asseverations of American duties and responsibilities as a world power, but not the remotest suggestion as to when these duties and responsibilities would end. "Let faint hearts anoint their fears," declared Senator Beveridge, "with the thought that some day American administration and American duty there may end. But they never will end. England's occupation of Egypt was to be temporary; but events which are the commands of God are making it permanent. And now God has given us the Pacific empire for civilization." (1) Most Republican leaders, however, were not quite sure that the American people as a whole were ready to accept such sentiments as these. Some of the Republicans themselves, while not so radical as to join the anti-imperialist group and attack the Administration's Philippine policy, were against permanent retention. In the House of Representatives, for instance, in February, 1899, several Republican congressmen, like Mr. Hepburn of Iowa and Mr. Henderson, declared for temporary occupation only. These considerations probably induced the Republican convention to evade the issue of permanent or temporary retention, and simply to declare in its platform: (1) Speech at Philadelphia, February 15, 1899, quoted in Kalaw The Case for the Fiipinnos, p. 21.

Page  248 248 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Our authority could not be less than our responsibility, and wherever sovereign rights were extended it became the high duty of the Government to maintain its authority; to put down armed insurrection and to confer the blessings of liberty and civilization upon all the rescued people. The largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our duties shall be secured to them by law. The Republican national convention nominated President McKinley without difficulty. As for the Democrats, there was never a doubt as to who would be the nominee. Mr. Bryan had no rival.. He was generally accepted as a fit spokesman for anti-imperialism. Some of the strong Republican, and even Democratic anti-imperialists, however, were disgusted with his support of the Paris treaty, without which, they thought, its ratification would not have been possible. On this account Senator Hoar refused to support him for the Presidency. "He made it the law of this land," Senator Hoar said, "that the American Congress should dispose of that distinct, alien people, whether they liked it or not." But aside from his intervention in the ratification of the peace treaty, his ideas on coinage, the issue of 1896, lost Mr. Bryan the support of many who would otherwise have opposed Mr. McKinley because of his Philippine policy. Though a staunch anti-imperialist champion, Mr. Bryan still remained earnestly for the free coinage of silver. Prominent Democrats impressed upon him the necessity of renouncing the silver platform altogether, making imperialism the main issue of the campaign, and thus securing the full support of the gold Democrats and the anti-imperialist Republicans; but Mr. Bryan would not agree to this plan. (1) This question was debated in the Committee on Resolutions of the Democratic convention, but it was finally agreed to respect Mr. Bryan's wishes. Judging from the enthusiasm manifested in the Democratic convention over the anti-imperialism plank of the (1) Stanwoode A Histom of th PreAdenp 1897, 1909, VoL. U, P. 67.

Page  249 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 249 platform, the Democrats were ready to dispute the Presidential merits on this single question. The platform declared: We condemn and denounce the Philippine policy of the present Administration. It has embroiled the republic in an unnecessary war, sacrificed the lives of many of its noblest sons, and placed the United States, previously known and applauded throughout the world as the champion of freedom, in the false and un-American position of crushing with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self-government. The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they cannot be subjects without imperiling our form of government; and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization or to convert the republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to give to the Filipinos: 1. A stablle form of government. 2. Independence. 3. Protection from outside interference such as has been given for nearly a century to the republics of Central and South America. The convention proclaimed imperialism to be "the paramount issue of the campaign." At the same time it plainly stated that it took no backward step from the party's former position on other questions. It would appear however, that the Democratic policy toward the Philippines was not a "scuttle" policy, as it is often charged with being. Briefly, it desired to establish a protectorate over the Philippines. In his letter of acceptance, Mr. Bryan explicitly promised that, if elected, he would immediately convene Congress to enact into law the platform promise of making a protectorate of the Philippines. "An American protectorate," he said, "gives to the nation protected the advantage of our strength, without making it tthe victim of our greed. For three quarters of a century the Monroe Doctrine has been a shield to neighboring republics and yet it has imposed no pecuniary burden upon us. After the Filipinos had aided us in the war against Spain, we could not honorably turn them over to their former masters; we would not leave them to be the victims of the ambitious designs of European nations, and since we do not

Page  250 250 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLINTICS desire to make them a part of us or to hold them as subjects we propose the only alternative." Bryan and the Insurgent Cause The campaign of Mr. Bryan and the anti-imperialists kept the Hongkong Junta in a very optimistic mood. It was now its policy to infuse that optimism into the revolutionary capips of the Philippines. On June 16, 1900, General RiegMde Dios, temporarily in charge of the junta, wrote to the guerrilla commander in Bulacan Province, General I. Torres, (1) and urged him to have more endurance and constancy because the impression was that the Democratic party would win in the coming elections in the United States, and Bryan was firm for the independence of the Philippines. "The attitude of those who protect us", said de Dios, "cannot be more manly and resolute; 'Continue the struggle until you conquer or die, Mr. Beecher of the League in Cincinnati wlites us; 'I shall always be the champion of the cause of justice and of truth,' says Mr. Winslow of the Boston League. 'Not even threats of imprisonment will make me cease in my undertaking,' Doctor Denziger assures us. 'I shall accept every risk and responsibility,' says Doctor Leverson. 'If it is necesary, I shall go so far as to provoke a revolution in my own country,' repeats MIr. Udell. 'It is necessary to save the republic and democracy from the abyss Qf imperialism and save the worthy Filipinos from oppression and extermination' is cried by all, and the sound of this cry is ever rising louder and louder." Similar letters were sent to the other commanders telling them not to give up the struggle nor to listen to the commission (the Taft Commission) which was being sent to the Philippines by President McKinley. On May 1, 1900, Isidoro de los Santos wrote a long letter from Hongkong to Aguinaldo in Tagalog, telling him of the progress of the diplomatic work of Apacible, del Pan and Sixto Lopez, "If this letter is to be believed," said Taylor in his reports,(2) (1) Taylor, Vol. II. 16 KR. (2) Taylor. Vol. II, 12 XK.

Page  251 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 251 "the agents in the United States of the junta had been able to form relations which might be of great value to them." Coming from such a critical source as Taylor's Insurgent Reports, the foregoing is really a compliment to the activities of the Filipino agents. Santos' letter reads in parts as follows: (1) Commissioners. * * * Sefores Kant (G. Apacible) and Raff (Sixto Lopez) duly carried out your last instructions given at Tarlac. Sefior Del Pan, -ling by way of Japan, about the middle of Octoler, and Sefor Caney (G. Apacible), sailing by way of Europe about the 1st of November, met in Toronto about the middle of February following. But before the arrival of Kant, Raff had already come from Hayti (the United States) and was able to pry in upon our political friends and enemies. When they met each other they continued the voyage incognito, as Raff had done previously, making themselves known to a very few people; but later on, and according to the instructions carried by Caney, they made themselves known to a greater number of people, and have' succeeded in interviewing Bryan who happened to be in N6w York. Sefior Raff said that Bryan feared being present at a conference, lest he might be called a traitor by members of his own party, and also by those of the opposite or "imperialist" party, who are quite proud over the victories they have gained against our people over there. Nevertheless Raff was able to be present and talk -at some of the anti-imperialist meetings, our political friends introducing as a friend from the committee (at Hongkong)' and as an advocate of the cessation of the war over there in order that our sacred rights may be given consideration by them. And as Bryan could not personally take part in the conference, he sent a most trusted person, his right-hand man, Dr. Gardner. The results of the conference between Sefor Raff and Dr.,Gardner, the latter acting in the name of Mr. Bryan, are as follows: ' 1st. That we may fight on, and Bryan will never cease to defend our sacred rights. 2nd. That we must never mention Bryan's name in our manifestos and proclamations, lest the opposite party might say he is a traitor. 3rd, That we are in the right; and hence he promised in the name of Bryan that if this Sefior Bryan is victorious in the presidential campaign, he will recognize our independence without delay. Your honored self can easily conclude from all the foregoing that Sefior Del Pan, after the receipt of these (I) Taylor, Vol. Ii. 12 KK. A'

Page  252 252 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS promises, concurred with him; and he returned to inform Senor Apacible about the results of the conference. So these two studied over the plan of the policy to be adopted and carried out. I write you what their opinions are, viz.: 1st, that they will reside there, pending the outcome of the presidential contest, aiding the propaganda and enlivening it until November, the date set for the desired thing. Owing to what Dr. Gardner said and promised in the name of Bryan, some one ought to stay there in order that Bryan may be approached, if he is elected, so he can sign the recognition of our independence; and this should be done at once, lest in his excitement over the victory he should forget this promise. 3rd, For carrying out the two propositions just mentioned, they request 2,000 pounds sterling, that is $20,000 in silver, to be used for the propaganda, for paying newspapers and for bribing senators-this last clause is somewhat dangerous and impossible. And fourth, that the money must be sent immediately, and that you should be informed not to mention the name of Bryan in the manifestos and proclamations. In order to answer quickly and decisively that proposition, and as I did not have the desired money here, I answered as follows: "Plan approved; for the sake of economy we have decided that one of the two retire, but before doing so make arrangements, establish communications with leaders of Bryan's party, and he who remains should thus cultivate the relations; he who is to retire will locate himself in Paris near Sefior Katipalad (Agoncillo) with whom he will seceretly discuss political problems that may arise. So he will watch for the opportune moment of Bryan's election, in order to go immediately to Hayti (United States) and formally arrange the contract with Bryan." On June 24, 1900 President Emilio Aguinaldo wrote to one of his Generals as follows: "'In order to help the cause of Philippine Independence in the coming presidential election in the United States of America which will take place early in September of this year, it is very necessary that before that day comes, that is to say, during thesc months of June, July and August, we should give the Americans some hard fighting which will redound to our credit and cause the downfall of the Imperialist party." (1) In another letter he suggested that in case he should (1) Taylor, Exh. 998.

Page  253 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 253 become a prisoner General Mariano Trias might be elected to succeed him so as to continue the war.(1) McKinley's Position In the meanwhile let us turn to the position of the Republican Party, especially of President McKinlev. "The American people are asked by our opponents," McKinley said in his letter of acceptance of the Republican nomination. "to yield the sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines to a small fraction of the population, a single tribe out of eighty or more inhabiting the archipelago, a faction which wantonly attacked the American troops in Manila while in rightful possession under the protocol with Spain, awaiting the ratification of the treaty of peace by the Senate, and which has since been in active, open rebellion against the United States. We are asked to transfer our sovereignty to a small minority in the Islands without consulting the majority and to abandon the largest portion of the population, which has been loyal to us, to the cruelties of the guerrilla insurgent bands. More than this, we are asked to protect this minority in establishing a government, and to this end repress all opposition of the majority. We are required to set up a stable government in the interest of those who have assailed our sovereignty and fired upon our soldiers, and then maintain it at any cost or sacrifice against its enemies within and against those having ambitious designs from without." (2) (1) Taylor, Exh. 998. (2) While President McKinley was thus proclaiming to the American people that American sovereignty was being joyfully received by the majority of the Filipinos, Mr. Roosevelt, the vice-presidential nominee, on the other hand. was drawing graphic pictures of Filipino civilization. "The reasoning which justifies our having made war against Sitting Bull," he said, "also justifies our having checked the outbreaks of Aguinaldo and his followers, directed, as they were, arainst Filipino and American alike... To grant self-government to Luzon under Aguinaldo would be like granting self-government to an Apache reservation under some local chief." These words were not said on the mere spur of the moment at some political mass meeting. They are to be found verbatim in Mr. Roosevelt's ca-efully prepared letter of acceptance of his nomination as Vice-President. In his spectacular electoral campaign tours he made extensive use of these unjust misrepresentations of Filipino life and civiliration, depicting in glowing colors and with much exaggeration the supposed similla.rit between Sitting Bull and Aguinaldo, between an Apache reservation and the home of the Filipino people.

Page  254 254 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS But these were not by any means the only arguments employed by the Republicans in 1900. The imperialistic rallying cry was still attracting hearers. Visions of military glory and commercial advantage had not yet faded. Some still spiritedly contended that American occupation of the Philippines was but the next logical step of American expansion. (1) Later, as the contest raged with greater fury, Mr. Bryan was seen to be laying stress upon other questions. His firm position on these other issues during the convention had already alienated the backing of many influential men who would otherwise have supported his anti-imperialist attitude, no matter how much they might personally have preferred Mr. McKinley. The injection into the campaign of questions other than imperialism doubtless decided many such men to throw their support to Mr. McKinley. The issues of the campaign were, therefore, confused. There are Americans who deny that "imperialism" was in effect the "paramount" issue. Some writers say that if Mr. Bryan had clung to the sole issue of imperialism, the American people, who at heart have always been anti-imperialist, would have supported him. The result of the election was, therefore, in no definite sense the expression of a desire of the American people permanently to retain the Philippines. Propaganda Work Continues The defeat of Mr. Bryan, while a great blow to the Revolutionary propagandists did not deter them from encouraging the people to fight on. Although President McKinley was imperialistic, Congress might go contrary to McKinley, they thought. They pointed out that the fight for independence must necessarily be long. "With the exception of Brazil," Mr. Riego de Dios said, "which secured its independence in two years, and this on account of special circumstances which existed at the time of the declaration, all the -other nations have been obliged to struggle (1) See The Battle of a80o. Issues and Platform. of all Parties, p. 191.

Page  255 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 255 twelve, sixteen, eighteen and twenty years. Even the United States did not succeed in seeing their independence recognized until after nine years. "Forward, therefore, heroic compatriots! No weakness! Independence costs and has cost everywhere, and everywhere has demanded much painful suffering and supreme abnegation. Only by struggling shall we succeed in saving the honor of the country and avoiding our enslavement. If we do not do so, aside from the consequent scorn and shame, we shall justify McKinley, and the latter will be completely at liberty to develop upon our soil and on our heads his despotic intentions and our detractors will repeat what in their zeal to injure our reputation, denying that we have intelligence and convictions, they have more than once said; that is that we only desire independence through caprice like grown up children, not because we understand its meaning nor because we think that the happiness of the country depends upon it. "Yes, forward, brave men, heroic generals and partisans. Patriotism is known by the magnitude of the sacrifices and he who weakens at the middle of the way will not arrive at the end. Forward! Independence for our motto thus far. The worthy and honorable never go backward. Great hearts become grand in the presence of obstacles. See! the country tearful and covered with blood asks you to do this. We hope that you will not fail."('T) Aguinaldo, as we have seen, was captured in March, 1901. Even this fact did not immediately stop the activities of the junta. They struggled on, urging the people not to be discouraged, for Aguinaldo's policy had been perhaps too lenient to those who had been traitors to the cause. The revolutionary agents in Europe met upon the invitation of Sixto Lopez and proposed to establish a Philippine cabinet to consist of the following: President, Sr. Eduardo Lete; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Tomas Arejola; Secretary of the Interior, Sr. Isabelo de los Reyes; Secretary of Finance, Sr. Galicano Apacible; Secretary of Public In(1) Taylor, Vol. V. Exh. 1177.

Page  256 256 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS struction, Sefior Cayetano Lucban; Secreatry of War, Sr. Emiliano Riego de Dios. It was the plan to have General Riego de Dios direct the war operations from Singapore where he was at that moment located. This project was never carried out.(1) Dissolution of the Junta At the end of 1901 Apacible was still President of the Hongkong junta with Cayetano Lukban as Secretary and Vicente Ilustre, Riego de Dios, Rodriguez and Castillo as members. Agoncillo had also returned from Europe. Sixto Lopez, after a brief stay in Hongkong went back to the United States under the auspices of the anti-imperialists, and with the help of his able secretary, Mr. Patterson, did excellent propaganda work. (2) In Manila, however, even leaders with nationalist feelings began to see the necessity of establishing peace. With the individual rights promised by America, they probably thought that they could later on agitate by peaceful methods for what they could not get by means of war. Some of these prospective nationalists (3) conceived the idea of sending an unofficial delegate in the person of Venancio Concepcion to the Hongkong Junta to see if its members could be induced to accept peace. When Concepcion arrived in Hongkong, he could not convince the members of the Junta to accept American sovereignty because he could not tell them what form of government the United States proposed to establish in the Philippines. The members of the Junta expressed their disappointment at the unconditional acceptance of American sovereignty on the part of the socalled autonomists. (1) Taylor, Vol. V, Exh. 1180. (2) It is interesting to note that out of the six or seven revolutionary agents who were still active in propaganda work even after the capture of Aguinaldo, four, Galicano Apacible, the President of the Junta, Felipe Agoncillo, Sixto Lopez, and Vicente Ilustre, came from the province of Batangas. The last General to surrender, it may be remembered, was General Miguel Malvar, from the same province, Also, it must not be forgotten that Mabini, the indomitable spirit of the Revolution, was a native of the same province. (3) Alberto Barretto, Leon M. Guerrero, Justo Lukban and Joaquin Luna.

Page  257 DIPLOMACY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOV'T. 257 Agoncillo and Apacible claimed that the failure of their mission was due to the following facts: (1) The statements of Tavera and Legarda before the Schurman Commission that there were only a few ambitious persons who desired independence and that it was necessary to have the Philippines annexed to the United States because the people were not ready to enjoy self-government; (2) the celebration initiated by Paterno in commemoration of the amnesty proclamation;(1) (3) the establishment of the Federal Party which placed itself unconditionally at the service of the American government, composed as it was by the Imperialists, and its petition for annexation; (4) the telegram from Buencamino to McKinley offering to organize five thousand Filipino soldier to fight and annihilate the insurgents who continued in arms; (5) Aguinaldo's oath of allegiance recognizing American sovereignty and counselling the people to accept peace. (2) The final dissolution of the Hongkong Junta was made on July 31, 1903. The following letter was published in "El Renacimiento." (3) I have the honor to advise you that on this date the Philippine central committee established abroad is officially dissolved. Mr. Mariano Ponce having taken charge of the funds archives library and other properties. Hongkong, July 31st, 1903. CAYETANO LUKBAN, Secretary. (1) Infra, p. 266. (2) Concepcion, Apuntes, Entry for November 5, 1901. There was, however, another element of Filipinos in Hongkong which was already in favor of peace, and at least Concepcion was able to form what he called the Junta de la Paz, composed of the following: President, Juan Lecaros; Treasurer, Jose Maria Basa; Secretary, Valentin Guidote; Assistant Secretary, Julio Borbon. (S) El Renwcitiento, August 10th. 1908.

Page  258 CHAPTER IX THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM (1900-1905) From the moment it became apparent that the United States meant to stay in the Philippines and that the Filipino forces had no chance of defeating the invading army, the more conservative Filipinos became convinced that the only course left for them was to accept the best possible terms from the United States. At first they thought that the United States might consider a protectorate over the Philippines. Dr. Pardo de Tavera, who afterwards became the foremost exponent of permanent annexation to the United States, was originally in favor of a Philippine Republic under American protection. In his letter to General Otis on September 21, 1898, he said: "The number of those who advocate a Philippine Republic under the protectorate of the United States is growing greater every day. I am the most ardent defender of that idea and its principal propagandist." But after the beginning of hostilities, when it was found out that sooner or later the Filipinos would have to succumb to American rule, the conservatives also began to modify the plan under which they would accept American rule and guidance. Not long after the first shot was fired, the Schurman Commission, as we have seen, reached the Philippines and issued its first proclamation. (1) Dr. Tavera immediately endorsed it. He was the first editor of La Democracia which was afterwards made the organ of the Federal Party. The first issue of the paper, dated May 16, 1899, contained an editorial written by him and completely endorsing the program laid down by the Schurman Commission. The editorial was in part as follows: The Commission assures the Filipino people of the good - will and fraternal feelings which the President of the United States and the American people have toward them. The Commission also states that the American mission has the (1) Supra, pp. 184, 185.

Page  259 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 259 purpose of insuring the well-being, prosperity and happiness of the Filipino people as well as its aggrandizement, so that it may occupy an honorable position among the most civilized in the world. Such noble purposes and promises solemnly made should not make the people of these Islands indifferent at such a time as this in their history. The time is therefore come when the Filipino people should all unite so that under the promise of liberty and justice an end might be put to intolerance and distrust, and we may again have the laws, of peace, that beautiful peace without which we can do nothing, expect nothing. We believe in the noble purposes of the American people and heed the call of the Commission. We propose in La Democracia to give them our cooperation so that the just aspirations of our country may be realized. Dr. Tavera later on became a. tremendous factor in American-Philippine relations, for he was the right-hand man of Governor Taft in the establishment of civil government. In general principles he was followed by Florentino Torres, Felipe Buencamino and some others, who were then known as autonomists. Mabini as Negotiator We have seen how Mabini was ousted from office because the majority of the members of the Revolutionary Congress were in favor of the measure of autonomy offered by the Schurman Commission, and how he was succeeded by Paterno and Buencamino. It seemed, however, that Aguinaldo was not very well satisfied with Paterno and Buencamino, and as soon as they were in Manila, Aguinaldo ceased to have any dealings with them. In December of 1899 Mabini had been captured and taken to Manila, where he remained for almost a year, until September 23, 1900. But even as a prisoner he continued writing articles advocating the ideals of the revolution. At this time the Schurman Commission had already left, since its work as a committee on investigation to report to Washington on conditions in the Philippines, was over. Its report was intended to serve as a guide for whatever action the Administration at Washington might decide to take. In 1900, a new commission, the first civil commission, presided over by Judge William H. Taft was on the way to

Page  260 260 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS the Philippines. This commission was to stay to govern the Philippines. First, it was to be a legislative body, then later on, it was to assume executive functions. Upon the coming of this commission, Aguinaldo wrote the following manifesto to the people: "Do not be deceived. Be strong and unshakeable in your determination to obtain liberty and independence. The people of the towns and provinces of the archipelago should receive the envoys of McKinley well, but should let them know the firm determination of the people to become arbiters of their own destiny, without vacillation, for fortunately the time of fear has already passed." Whatever attempt Buencamino may have made to induce Aguinaldo and the Congress to accept a program of autonomy, it seems that Aguinaldo remained true to the ideals of independence and determined not to agree to any understanding with America which was not based upon independence or the recognition of the future right to independence. He was undoubtedly encouraged to maintain this attitude by the Hongkong Junta. (1) He respected Mabini more than anybody else because of Mabini's adherence to the same ideal. That was the reason why even when Mabini was in Manila, he was still sought by Aguinaldo in all diplomatic negotiations with the Americans. Thus, on August 10, 1900, Aguinaldo sent the following power of authority to Mabini: I hereby deliver and confirm ample powers and prerogatives upon Apolinario Mabini to accept conferences and discuss conditions of peace under the basis of the recognition of Philippine independence. He should transmit to'this office the results of the negotiations for the approval of, the government. Similarly, I authorize said Apolinario Mabini to choose the members which he may deem necessary for the carrying out of the present plan and he is to be the President of such a committee of members. Mabini thereupon began negotiations. It seenfs that at this time he was even willing to accept American sovereignty temporarily, provided the following guarantees were' made by the American government: (1) Supra, Chap. VIIL

Page  261 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 261 (1) The enjoyment by all Filipinos of all individual rights both natural and political which are enjoyed by the citizens of the most free and cultured nations. (2) Complete equality between Americans and Filipinos within the territory of the Philippines. (3) A government organized in such a way as to offer the surest guarantee for the realization of the two foregoing points. Mabini had conferences with Taft and correspondence with Major J. Franklin Bell, but they could not come to any agreement. His conference with the Taft Commission was most interesting. His own account of it is as follows: Thursday, August 1, 1900.-At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I was taken to the Ayuntamiento and introduced to the North American Commission. Chairman Taft, two other members of the Comnmission, an interpreter and a stenographer were present. I had asked for this conference so as not to have it said of me that I had assumed a very arrogant attitude without having sought the means of understanding in accordance with the circumstances. When the conference was called to order, I stated the following: I have been a prisoner since December last and have not been set free without previous knowledge of American sovereignty. The word "sovereignty" in international law does not have a fixed and exact definition; so much so that in the South African question England even pretends to claim sovereignty over the two republics, notwithstanding her having recognized the complete independence of those Republics as regards internal affairs. My efforts in behalf of my country have no other motive than that of procuring a most solid guaranty for the liberty and rights of the Filipinos. If American sovereignty, therefore, offers the same guaranty as that which self-government can offer, I see no inconvenience in recognizing this sovereignty for the sake of peace. I ended by saying that I had sought the conference in order to know to what extent American sovereignty would limit what naturally belongs to the Filipino people. After listening to the remarks of his companions, Mr. Taft answered me thus: "The American Government has for its object that of giving to the Filipinos a good government. The sovereignty that the United States of America proposes to give is the same that Russia or Turkey would propose to give if they should occupy the Philippines, with the only difference that the exercise of this sovereignty will

Page  262 262 TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ever be inspired by the spirit of the constitution of the United States. Following the mandates of this constitution, the Commission will endeavor to establish in the Philippines a popular government within the limits recently approved for Porto Rico." To this I replied that the principles on which the American constitution rests declare that sovereignty resides in the people as a matter of natural right: that the American Government in not having contented itself with limiting the sovereignty of the Filipino people but instead in having nullified the same, had clearly committed an injustice which sooner or later would require reparation or expiation; and that there, could not be a popular government where the people were not given real and effective participation in the organization and direction of the government. They made a counter reply, saying that they were not authorized to discuss abstract questions because they had orders that they should insist upon their opinion, even if force had to be used, after hearing the opinions of the Filipinos. I then said that as far as I was concerned, the conference was ended inasmuch as I thought it useless to discuss with force and to give my opinions to those who would not listen to the voice of reason. Mr. Taft then asked whether I wanted to help them in their study of the taxes that could be imposed on the people; to which I answered that considering the fact that all taxes imposed without the consent of the representatives of those required to pay the tax was an injustice, I could not take part in the proposed study without the representation and mandate of the people. I see that the Americans are decided in dragging us to the bitter alternative of dishonor or death. Now that this is so I shall try to behave as an honorable man who puts his duties and honor above everything else. Between dishonor and death, it is our duty to prefer the latter.-(Sgd.) Apolinario Mabini. Note.-I have limited myself to jotting down the substance; it is to be remembered that in the conference, the expressions used were duly tempered because of social courtesy and usage. (1) In a letter dated November 12, 1900, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo asking him what other course of action remained (1) Printed as notes by T. M. Kalaw in Palma, Our Campaign for Indepetdknce. Manila 1923S, pp. 13, 14. A report of the interview from another side is found in WilUiamns, Odysse of the Philippine Commission, p. 70.

Page  263 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 263 to Mabini as negotiator of peace in view of the fact that President McKinley had been re-elected. McKinley, he said, "has stated many times that he cannot grant independence and McKinley has been re-elected. Nevertheless, if the members of the revolution should continue to insist upon independence I shall be with them; but if they should feel without strength to continue defending said ideal and authorize me to ask for something else, I shall also be with them in everything which does not prejudice the honor of all. Such is my duty and I cannot act otherwise." Aguinaldo replied on March 8, 1901 stating he wanted peace with honor"In truth the war which the imperialists are waging against the little Filipino people is lamentable, but the aspiration to enjoy legitimate rights and inherent liberties, obliges it, though weak it be, to defend and make use of all possible means to sustain the defense for the honor and dignity of the nation. "We desire peace with greater reason than they do; we want peace; but peace founded on just principles of rights pertaining to man-at once stable and honorable for both parties. Peace does not depend upon the Filipino people, it must come from the good and impartial decision of the Americans. We, representing the aspirations of the popular masses, of those popular masses free from oppression and threats, continue and shall continue the Titanic struggle unto the end; it must be remarked that if a few have presented themselves to the enemy, there are many more who have set out to increase the ranks, as can easily be seen everywhere; a reaction in the towns has been very noticeable during the past few months." Paterno's Peace Proposals On June 21, 1900, General MacArthur issued his amnesty proclamation granting immunity and pardon for all those who had taken arms against the United States, provided they surrendered within ninety days from the pub(1) Taylor, Vrl. V. Exh. 1014.

Page  264 264 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS lication of the amnesty. The sum of thirty pesos (fifteen dollars) was also offered for each gun presented. On this same day Pedro Paterno held a great political meeting in the house of Maximino Paterno, in Manila, which was attended by the most prominent political leaders of the day, including those who were known to sympathize with the revolutionists. Six former cabinet members under Aguinaldo were present. Paterno explained the object of the meeting, saying that in order to obtain the pacification of the country, it wvas necessary that certain basic principles be accepted by the American government. After discussing the question of the military officials of the Revolution and the expulsion of the religious organizations, the following resolutions were approved: (1) 1. A general and absolute amnesty for the prisoners of both parties, including those who are under sentence or are now held for trial by the military authorities. 2. A guarantee of safety for the persons and property of all revolutionists who have presented themselves, or may do so hereafter, and the restitution, in consequence, of all confiscated property. 3. Acknowledgement of the military rank of the generals, field and line officers, of the Filipino army, and of their right to be admitted into the armed forces which may be organized hereafter in accordance with such laws as may be established. 4. A reasonable allowance to be provided from the public funds of the Filipino government to disabled soldiers, and the widows and orphans of soldiers who may have died during the campaign. 5. The guarantee of the free exercise of all the personal rights confirmed by the Constitution of the United States, and especially that of petition to the public powers of the Union. By virtue of this clause, immediately upon the adoption of these measures the Philippine political parties, including the Nationalist party which aspires to independence, will be permitted to operate freely, and two of them will be allowed to establish their clubs, committees, and press organs, both in this capital and in the provinces. (1) For an account of the meeting see El Nuevo Dia, Cebu, June 30, 1900, VOL I, No. 42.

Page  265 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 265 6. Orders for the cessation of hostilities shall be issued simultaneously by both parties within their respective territories. 7. The immediate establishment of civil government in this Capital and in the provinces with Filipinos in charge, or, if that should not be possible, the appointment of special commissions of Filipinos, whose duty it shall be to facilitate the presentation of the men in arms, apply the amnesty with restitution of property, establish the municipalities in accordance with the law of March 20 last, and hasten the liberation of the American prisoners. 8. The expulsion of the religious communities as foreign organizations eminently dangerous to the public order of the Philippines. "It was intended," General MacArthur said in his report, "that the foregoing paper should have been signed by the following ex-Secretaries of the Filipino government who were present at the meeting which adopted the resolutions, but the signatures were to be appended only in the event of the adoption of the principles of the resolutions by the American authorities: "Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, Ex-President of the Cabinet. "Don Leon Guerrero, Ex-Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Agriculture, "Don Aguedo Velarde, Ex-Secretary of Public Instruction. "Don Maximo Paterno, Ex-Secretary of Public Works. "Don Ambrosio Flores, Ex-Secretary of War. "Don Felipe Buencamino, Ex-Secretary of Foreign Affairs. (1) "It was, of course, impossible," General MacArthur continued, "to accept the eight measures presented, or even to discuss some of the propositions embodied therein; but it was deemed expedient to animate the public mind as much as possible in behalf of pacification, and, as the effect of such discussion was in its very nature educational, encouragement was given to make further inquiry in the premises." General MacArthur then published a manifesto (1) MAccArthur's Report for 1900, p. 12.

Page  266 266 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS assuring the inhabitants of the Philippines that no civil government would be established in the islands without embodying the fundamental provisions of a bill of rights, including the right to life and property, due process of law, speedy public trial, freedom of religion, of speech, of the press and of association, and opportunity for insurgents to hold public office.(1) Paterno's Foiled Celebration Paterno's prestige among the local leaders grew in view of the recognition given him by MacArthur in publishing provisions about individual rights which were to be incorporated in any government established in the Islands. Of course, these provisions did not satisfy Paterno, but their publication encouraged him to make another step. He hit upon the idea of capitalizing the amnesty proclamation in order to agitate openly for a protectorate under the United States. lie proposed a big celebration in commemoration of the amnesty proclamation. MacArthur saw nothing wrong in the idea and in fact endorsed it, but on condition that no mention of independence should be made. The act would be simply an expression of gratitude to the United States for the granting of amnesty. A big banquet was to be held, which the members of the Taft Commission and the military commander promised to attend. Secretly, Paterno had told some of the Filipino leaders to prepare speeches in favor of independence under the protectorate of the United States, and to deliver these speeches at the banquet. The American officials were thus going to be surprised, the idea of Paterno being to show the American people that the better way to solve the Philippine problem was to grant the Philippines its independence as a protectorate of the United States. The day set for the banquet, July 28, 1900, came and everything was prepared. But Mr. Taft learned that the speeches would all advocate independence under American protection, so he immediately wrote the following letter to Paterno: (1) MacArthur's Report for 1900, p. 13.

Page  267 THE PERIOD OF SUPPESSED NATIONALISM 267 Manila, July 28, 1900. Dear Sir: The members of the Commission accepted an invitation to be present at the banquet this evening. We are advised that a number of the speeches which have been submitted to you for delivery this evening in express terms support the view that an independent government should be established in these Islands under the protectorate of the United States. As that phrase is ordinarily understood, it would mean, as applied to the present situation, that the United States shall guarantee to protect the government of the Philippine Islands from interference or aggression by foreign powers and should have little or no voice in that government. In other words, that the United States should assume responsibility to the world for a government in which it could exercise no direct influence. No one having any authority to speak for the United States has ever said one word justifying the belief that such a protectorate will be established. It is impossible. We of the Commission who are sent here with iTstr-uctions to establish a civil government have no authority whatever to consider or discuss such a proposal. By destroying the power of Spain in these Islands, and accepting the sovereignty thereof, the United States assumed a responsibility to the world to establish here a civilized government of law and order, which should duly respect the rights of all, whether foreigners or natives. It proposes to meet this responsibility by making a government in which the citizens of the Islands shall exercise as large a measure of self government as is consistent with the establishment of law and order. Such a government has been established in Porto Rico. Further than this, the government of the United States wvill not go. The discussion of a protectorate as a possibility involves a misrepresentation which may induce submission to the authority of the United States by deceit. The members of this Commission cannot tbe a party to any such misrepresentation. They could not therefore be present at the banquet tonight and hear the subject of a protectorate discussed without rising to state its utter impossibility. To avoid such a result in a banquet at which they are only guests, they prefer to withdraw their acceptances. On behalf of the Commission: Very respectfully, (Sgd.) WM. H. TAFT, President.

Page  268 268 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Selior Pedro A. Paterno, Calle San Roque, Santa Cruz, Manila. The following similar letter came from General MacArthur: OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Manila, July 28, 1900. Mr. Pedro Alejandro Pateano, Manila. My dear Sir: It has been intimated to ine that speeches are to be delivered at the banquet this evening to the effect that an independent government should be erected in these islands under the protection of the United States. Such speeches cannot be delivered without disregarding the assurances you gave me when proposing the organization of the banquet to the effect that the speeches should be confined exclusively to expressions of satisfaction at the extension of the amnesty by the United States; and that no questions related to the future form of government to be instituted in these islands should be discussed. I shall expect you to conform strictly to your obligation in this particular, and not encourage or permit any oratory such as that referred to in the opening paragraph of this note. Very respectfully, (Sgd.) ARTHUR MACARTHUR, U. S. Military Governor in the Philippines. The celebration was continued, but the speakers had to be content with keeping their set speeches in their pockets. Paterno would have said, in part: "At one end is the American people requiring the recognition of their sovereignty in order to fulfill their international obligations, At the other end is the Filipino people under the leadership of Aguinaldo who demanded the recognition of their national Independence even at the cost of their last drop of blood. "Are there any means worthy of honor for reconciling the two extremes?

Page  269 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 269 "The Filipino people unanimously answer-'protectorate'." The other set speeches were of the same tenor. (1) Birth of the Federal Party The banquet incident made the Taft commission lose faith in Paterno, whose chance to be a peacemaker again faded away. Evidently no policy might prosper except one which would recognize American sovereignty without any condition and would willingly cooperate with the authorities for the extension of American rule. The element which welcomed the original Hay plan was again in the ascendant. With the temporary eclipse of Paterno, the so-called autonomist group under the leadership of Felipe Buencamino and Florentino Flores tried to step in to become the pacificators of the country. This group had already discarded the idea of independence. It was determined to work for peace and the acceptance of American sovereignty. In a sense the leaders of this group were right originally in agitating for the acceptance of the Schurman plan of restricted autonomy, for the offer given by Secretary Hay through the Schurman Commission was certainly more liberal than the government later on established by the Taft Commission; yet it undoubtedly fell short of the ideals and expectations of the revolutionists throughout the year 1898. The autonomists, as they were then called, were determined to establish, political party which would cooperate with the government in the establishment of peace. Dr. Pardo de Tavera, who, as we have seen, originally endorsed the first proclamation of the Schurman Commission, injected a new idea into the policy of the proposed party. When its definite establishment was discussed, he proposed that its ultimate aim be that of statehood under the United States. The name? What name was better deserved, argued Dr. Tavera, than Federal Party, for was not its final ideal annexation or federalization with the United States? The originator of the idea later on became the undisputed leader (1) Palma, op. cit. p. 11; copies in Spanish are in the writer's collection.

Page  270 270 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS of the Federal Party, which was formally organized at the important meeting held on December 23, 1900. This meeting, where the Federal Party was finally established, was attended by some 124 sympathizers of a peace plan. The meeting was presided over by Florentino Torres. A directorate of seven members was provided for, and the following were elected in the order of the number of votes they obtained: T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Cayetano S. Arellano, Frank S. Bourns, Florentino Torres, Ambrosio Flores, Jose Ner, and Tomas G. Del Rosario. There was also elected a council of government of twenty-five members, in which figured Arsenio Cruz Herrera, Felipe Buencamino, Ignacio Villamor, Teodoro Yangklo, and Baldomero Roxas. Those present signed the manifesto and platform. Among those who appeared to have signed although they had not been elected either to the directorate or to the council of government were Felipe Calderon and Pedro A. Paterno. They probably formed the nucleus of those who were nationalists but who joined the party believing that its most important plank was the establishment of peace and not annexation to the United States. First Platformnt of the Federal Party The program of the party for the government of the Philippines was planned to cover two periods, the preliminary period and the constitutional period. The preliminary period provided for "the recognition of the sovereignty of the United States, which will be represented in these islands by a liberal, democratic and representative government" and for "individual rights, liberties and guarantees of person, property and domicile, with freedom of worship and complete separation of church and state." It also provided for "municipal government or self-government substantially like that of the United States, and provincial or departmental government subject only to the high inspection of the central government," for armed militia, for free elementary education, and the enforcement of the civil service laws.

Page  271 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 271 The "Constitutional Period" provided that:1. The Philippine people will have five representatives to the Congress and the government of the Union, who will remain in Washington. It will be one of the objects of this party to obtain from the Congress of the United States a law favorable to this object. 2. A House of Representatives, elected by suffrage, in the same manner as councilors and alcaldes, in number proportional to the qualified electors of each department or province. 3. A Senate, composed of individuals, one-half elected in senatorial districts by the alcaldes of the town, comformably to the law, and the other half named by the governorgeneral. The Chamber of this Senate will form the territorial congress. 4. A governor-general, named by the honorable President of the United States; department governors, named by the governor-general, subject to approval by the government at Washington; and provincial governors, likewise named by the governor-general, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The governor-general will have secretaries, the number to be fixed by law. The governor-general was to be given the right of the veto under the conditions contained in the Federal Constitution for the Presidential veto. Taxation bills should originate in the Hlouse. The independence of the judiciary should be maintained, and justices of the peace should be appointed by the president of the Supreme Court upon suggestion from the municipalities. With regard to the future political status of the Islands, the platform stated: "The territory of the Philippine Islands may be considered as one of the States of the Union, but it can never be ceded in whole or part by the United States to any foreign power."' The Federal program ended with the following words: "The foregoing fundamental principles constitute in a concrete form the aspirations of this party, which hopes, at the same time, that the amendments and objections which may be made by the government of the United States will be of the most liberal and democratic nature."

Page  272 272 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Mr. Taft and the Federalists The immediate obiect of the Federal Party was to secure the surrender of the revolutionists and to induce them to_ recognize American sovereignty. In consideration of the services of the Federal Party three of its memnbers, Pardo de Tavera, Benito Legarda and Jose Luzurriaga were appointed members of the Philippine Commission. The Federal Party naturally secured much influence with the American Government. In fact it became the party in power. People who wanted to hold government positions had to affiliate with the Federal Party as a primary recommendation. "In the appointment of natives," said Mr. Taft, "the fact that a man was a member of the Federal Party was always a good recommendation for him for appointment, for the reason that we regarded this Federal Party as one of the great elements in bringing about pacification, and if a man was in the Federal Party it was fairly good evidence that he was interested in the government which we were establishing, and would do as well as he could." (1) While the relationship between Mr. Taft and the Federalists was very cordial, and the party certainly received great impetus because of the protection given it by the government, Mr. Taft did not apparently favor the plank for statehood, although at the time of its adoption he did not oppose it. When the founders of that Party for the first time appeared before the Taft Commission for the necessary permit to carry on the activities of the party, Dr. Tavera made it plain that the party wanted ultimate statehood. Dr. Tavera stated: "Some assurances in regard to the future had to be made and as you gentlemen probably know already it was stated as one of the ambitions of this party that ultimately after peace had been established the people might aspire to a condition of government where they will enjoy all the personal liberties and privileges of American citizens and that they may be able to demonstrate in the future their fitness for the organization of this country into a (1) Mr. Taft's statement before the Senate Committee in the Philippines, January 1902, Sen. Doe. 331 pt. 57th Cong. 1st Sea. p. 67.

Page  273 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 273 state of the Union, that being expressed as an aspiration of the party for the future of the Philippine people." (1) When in 1902 Mr. Taft went to the United States, however, where he found that the idea was not popular' among Congressmen and Senators, he tried to explain that the statehood plank should not be taken seriously, for it "forms no part of the missionary work which the party did throughout the Islands." (2) He said that "the real reason for the spread of the federal party was the urgent desire - for peace on the part of substantially all classes except those people who were in the mountains." (3) In February, 1901, another party which did not aim at annexation was established under the name of Partido Conservador. Enrique Barbera, Francisco Ortigas, Macario Adriatico, Gregorio Singian, Eusebio Orense and others were behind the movement. Mr. Taft showed no opposition to it; for the party would cooperate in the establishment of peace and would limit itself to asking for a liberal government from the United States. The majority of the founders seemed to have nationalistic leanings, or at any rate were opposed to annexation. The party was branded as a pro-Spanish party, especially by Dr. Tavera. According to him these conservatives wanted to conserve the Spanish customs and to defend the privileges and the superiority of the Spanish race, although they apparently intended to advocate independence. Their difference from the Nationists was that they proposed the aggrandizement of the Philippines without Saxonizing it, by ever remaining within the Spanish moulds, and, after the independence of the Islands, by receiving further protection from Spain. Among the conservatives, however, there were sincere nationalists like Macario Adriatico. The founders of the party obtained (1) From report of the intevi ew had by the Commission with Mes-srs. Pardo de Tavera. Buencamino, Arguelles, Villamor. and Dr. Bourns, representing the Federal Party, December 24, 1900. Executive Bureau files. (2) Sen. Doe. s81, Pt. 1, 57th Cona. 1st Ses. p. 62. (3) Ibid, p. 60.

Page  274 274 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS permission from Governor Taft for the organization of the party, but did not prosper greatly in the spread of their doctrine. (1) The Americanization of the Philippines Dr. Tavera's main reason advocating ultimate statehood was his belief that it would be more honorable and dignified for the Filipino people to be a member of the American union as a state, than to remain in the category of a subject people or possession. With the coming of the Taft Commission Dr. Tavera superseded every other leader in the work of cooperation and pacification, and with his appointment as commissioner he actually became the most influential Filipino leader in the government. Dr. Tavera was eminently qualified for leadership in that trying period. He had always been a liberal and his uncle, with Father Burgos, was one of the leaders of the liberal movement in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. (2) Ie was a friend of Dr. Rizal since both Rizal and Tavera had scientific inclinations. (3) Dr. Tavera was anti-Spanish by temperament, and naturally sympathized with the liberals. His scholarship leaned towards sociology and linguistics, but he knew enough of political conditions to realize that American institutions were far superior to those of Spain. The situation created by the coming of the Americans was peculiar. On the one hand stood the revolutionists who were for independence and who would not agree to any relationship with the United States except on the basis of the recognition of Philippine independence; on the other hand, the United States stood for unconditional submission. So the war had to continue and all negotiations were bound to fail. But it was evident that the Filipinos, poorly armed, poorly clad, poorly fed, and exhausted after their (1) See letter of Dr. Tavern to A. Regidor, Oct 2, 1901. Copy in the writer's collection. (2) Supra, p. 29. (3) Recent letters, however, found in the Philippine Library and Museum seem to indicate that at the time of Rizal's trial, Tavera represented himself to the Spanish authorities as against the national hero and totally opposed to the aims of the rebellion.

Page  275 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM two revolutions with Spain, were no match for the well-disciplined army and limitless resources of the United States; that sooner or later the complete conquest of the Philippines would be effected. It was necessary that some Filipino should come forward, recognize the fact as it was and lead the way in accepting the best possible terms under America -someone who could appreciate the best that was in Amnerican institutions, the best that America could give the people of her own will. A Filipino who had taken an active part in the revolution would not be able to play the role successfully, for he would be immediately accused of inconsistency. Dr. Tavera had held the post of Director of Diplomacy under Aguinaldo but he had soon resigned because of differences in policy with Aguinaldo and Mabini. He was the man for the occasion. His anti-Spanish attitude gave him some prestige among those who were progressively inclined. At least he could be expected to tell Mr. Taft and the members of the Civil Commission what bad things should be reformed in the Philippines and what institutions should be established to correct the evils which Spain had allowed to grow. At that time, the Spanish element in Manila was none too friendly toward the United States. The war had just ended, so that the anti-Spanish attitude of Dr. Tavera was approved by the American authorities, although the American authorities did not openly say that they favored him because he was antiSpanish. It is in his role as interpreter of American intentions towards the Philippines that Tavera perhaps rendered the greatest service to his party and his people. He was quick to learn American methods of government as distinguished from what hle conceived to be erroneous Spanish methods. When the Taft Commission later assumed the legislative work for the islands, travelling all over the country and explaining American ideas, Tavera was among the first Filipinos to try to explain to the people and to his party the meaning and the intent of the new Commission. He laid emphasis on the policy of the Philippine Commission to travel around, to study the conditions of the people themselves and to be

Page  276 276 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS in contact with the masses in the provinces. The American Commission, he said, desired to be in contact with the people so that they could explain to them face to face the intentions of the United States and so that they might know the people's desires and aspirations. He enunciated the fundamental American doctrine that henceforward there would be no people to serve the government but the government to serve the interests of the people. Under the old Spanish doctrine, the order was reversed, for then the people were supposed to serve the government. But Tavera went further than simply extolling the merits of American institutions. He would completely Americanize the entire Philippines. This weas to be effected in the following way: (1) After peace is established, all our efforts will be directed to Americanizing ourselves; to cause a knowledge of the English language to be extended and generalized in the Philippines, in order that through its agency the American spirit may take possession of us, and that we may so adopt its principles, its political customs, and its peculiar civilization that our redemption may be complete, and radical. Our undertaking will not be an easy one; the ancient domination inculcated in our spirit, customs and habits, which can not be easily changed; but just as the Filipinos saw by experience that they had been deceived in supposing that independence was possible, and in believing the calumnies which were heaped upon the Americans, now they will also learn by experience that the progress and eivilization of our country depends upon a complete assimilation of the American spirit. The routine and spirit of tradition which is peculiar to countries not in an advanced stage of civilization and an erroneous idea concerning our own history are reasons which have led certain Filipinos to adopt the idea of retaining as useful and glorious the enervated form of civilization left us by the former domination. There was a considerable difference, however, between the Americanism of Tavera and that of the other members of the Federal Party, whose blind adoration for things American and whose subservience to Americani authorities (1) H. Pardo de Tavera, Origin ekand Growth of the Federal Party, letter addressed to General MacArthur. May 14. 1901.

Page  277 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 277 remind one more of the relationship between master and subject. One unfortunate example of the other kind of Americanism was manifested in the trip of another Federalist leader to Washington in 1902, when he appeared before members of Congress "as the commissioner of the Federal Party as well as of the influential insurgents and all the commanders of the Katipunan Society." (1) He afterwards said: "I am an American and all the money in the Philippines, the air, the light and the sun I consider American." (2) He suggested that the proposed legislative cham- \ bersabe called a "chamber of Americans and not of Filipinos." Dr. Tavera, on the other hand, wanted to put the Filipino people in a dignified position; and even in his work as commissioner, he won the respect of the Americans because of his insistence that the Filipinos be treated with due courtesy. There were cases when he fought even American chiefs of bureaus when he was not shown due respect as a member of the Commission. In connection with certain unfavorable comments he made on constabulary matters, the assistant chief of the Bureau of Constabulary said in an indorsement that Mr. Tavera should "be called to account for his language." Mr. Tavera immediately questioned the propriety of an assistant chief, even tough he were an American, in calling down a Commissioner, even though he were a Filipino. He won his point, for the assistant chief had to apologize to him in public. (3) In November, 1901, the Federalist Party made a decided move in favor of annexation to the United States. Its convention passed the following resolution: "In behalf then of the Federal Party, this convention has the honor to present very respectfully to tlie Congress the following petition praying a declaration by the Congress of the United States to the effect that the Philippine Islands as they are described in the Treaty of Paris and subsequent conventions with Spain, are an integral part of the Republic of (1) Insular Affairs Reports and Hearings, 190I-190s. p. 231. (2) Ibid, p. 293. (8) The original of the correspondence about this incident was shown the writer by Mr. Tavera himself

Page  278 278 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS the United States of North America, the said Philippine Islands constituting a territory with the rights and privileges which the Constitution of the United States grants to the other territories, such as that of becoming eventually a state of the Union." (1) By this time the Federal Party was at the height of its power. According to the report of the Secretary of the Federal Party in 1901 there were 296 organized committees throughout the archipelago "with more than 200,000 members". According to the same report, the Federal Party had been instrumental in the surrender of eleven generals, fourteen colonels, fourteen lieutenant colonels, twenty majors, six chiefs of guerrillas, forty-six captains, one hunderd six lieutenants, 2,640 soldiers and 4,440 guns. "On February 22, (1901)" said Doctor Tavera, (2) "the 'Americanista' sentiments of the Federals were in evidence in Manila, when a memorable demonstration was held on the Luneta drive, where more than 7,000, belonging to all classes of society, applauded the name of Washington and paid homage as sincere as it was enthusiastic to the American flag. In all the pueblos of the archipelago where the party had been organized, demonstrations of the same nature took place, this being the first time that enthusiastic public demonstrations of friendly sentiments toward the United States had been held." How many of those who originally affiliated with this party were actually in favor of annexation, it is hard to say. Subsequent events showed that the majority affiliated with it because they wanted peace and not because they wanted to become permanently a part of the United States. To a large extent what Mr. Taft said before the Senate Committee in 1902 is true: what attracted people to the party was its program for peace. (1) In his address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, in 1902, Mr. Taft referring to this petition, said: "The Federal Party filed a petition in Congress in which they ask for a declaration from that body to form the Philippines as a territory and ultimately become a state. While that is one of the prominent planks in that platform it should be said that there is an indifferent and ambiguous relation with its original program, its chief object being to secure peace under the sovereignty of the United States." (2) Report of the Philippine Commission, '1901, p. 163.

Page  279 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 279 Mabini on the Federal Partti The more radical nationalists did not join the Federal Party, even in its original organization. Foremost among them was Apolinario Mabini. Upon the publication of the Federal Party platform in December of 1900, Mabini wrote an article in one of the papers, entitled "The Federal Party". He was then a prisoner but was allowed to write for publications. "This significant name," he stated in his article, "is the first one which presents itself to my eyes. Its founders answer my inquiry agreeably by saying that the original name is the ideal of the party, which is that these Islands might in time be one of the States of the American Union. That is perfectly satisfactory, I say; but you must take into account that it is more compatible with the interests and habits of the Americans that we be given a limited independence than the condition of a state, because, as Mr. Root said, we are far from the American continent, and I may add that we have different color and different customs. I hope that I am wrong, but I am afraid that you are harboring a hope that can never be accomplished and for that reason you will foment the impatience first and the desperation afterwards of the people; and I am afraid also that while you call other people idealists, you are the ones who are committing that sin. Moreover, you who want to shorten the way to peace should be the first ones to advocate independence in the future, for who knows if those who advocate independence and who want independence, in view of the present circumstances will be willing to get it after a certain time." The above is prophetic of what actually happened in the Philippines, namely, the repudiation of the annexation plan and the growth of the conviction that the Filipino people could not be a part of the American Union. In another article, which showed still more his continued leanings towards revolutionary ideals, and which caused his deportation to Guam, Mabini said; "I understand that those who are still in the field are convinced that they are fighting not because they have lack of confidence in America but in order that the United

Page  280 280 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS States may not consider an unconditional surrender absolute subservience to its will. They bel'eve that if they surrender unconditionally, they will have very few grounds on which to question whatever arrangements the Americans may establish in the Philippines, even if those arrangements are inimical to their interests. That is the reason why, inasmuch as they cannot obtain a concrete declaration as to the kind of government that is intended here, they prefer a forceful submission to voluntary submission so that the people cannot afterwards reproach them for having voluntarily accepted a very uncertain future." (1) Some of these nationalists went to the extent of plotting revolts in the very towns controlled by the Americans and even in Manila. On July 1, 1900 General Ricarte was captured in Manila while recruiting volunteers for the revolution. He boldly admitted before the military authorities that he was in the city to start an uprising. These activities within the American lines caused no little worry to the administration at Manila and Washington. Before the presidential election of 1900 American officials did not want to take any drastic action, lest the Democrats in the United States should find more campaign materials. As soon, however, as the result of the elections was known, and the guerrilla war seemed to persist, a change of policy was decided upon. On December 20, 1900, General MacArthur, in command of the American army, issued a proclamation warning the people that the laws of war would be strictly enforced and that all those who were found to be aiding the revolutionists would be dealt with severely. (2) Accordingly many persons were imprisoned, and the order helped in no small measure in the rapid pacification of the country. Not content with this measure, in order to show the severity of the new policy, General MacArthur asked authority from the War Department to deport leaders whose activities were in the opinion of the General not conducive to the pacification of the Islands. The authority (1) El Idicrio Politico de Mabiki, p. 28. (2) House Doe. S, 57th Con.. let Sea pt. 2. p. 98.

Page  281 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 281 once secured, General Macrilthur on January 26, 1901, ordered the denortation to the Island of Guam of thirty-two prisoners "whose overt act has clearly revealed them as in ai'd of or in sympathy with the insurrection, the guerrilla warfare by which it is being maintained, and whose continued residence in these islands would, in every essential regard be inim;cal to the pacification thereof." Among the most important leaders deported were Apolinario Mabini, Artemio Ricarte, Pablo Ocampo and others. () The Sedition Law In spite of the drastic measures taken against the sympathizers of revolt, the path of the Federalist party was not by any means rosy. There were people who early showed dissatisfaction over the annexation ideas of the party. With the approval in 1901 of the Federal petition for annexation, many of the nationalists who were willing to join or had joined the party because of its peace program now held themselves aloof. One of them was Pedro Paterno. Pater-. no was not in favor of annexation; he, and with him other nationalists, signed the platform of 1900, for that platform simply stated that the territory of the Philippine Islands might be considered as one of the states of the Union. This plank, as Paterno explained in his letter to Governor Taft dated November 9, 1901, (2) does not say shall be or must be considered a state." "The Philippines," he continued, "have purely special and individual interests; they have their own life distinct from that of the Mother Country, and it is natural that they should also desire self-administration, self-government." In the Federal Convention of November, 1901, he therefore opposed the annexation plank which was approved. His plan would simply create an autonomous government composed of a governor represent-, (1) In reply to an inqui:y of the United States Senate, when the news of Mabini's deportation reached the United States, General MacArthur cabled: "Mabini deported: a most active agitator; persistently and defiiantly refusing amnesty, and maintaining correspondence with insurgents in the field while living in Manila, Luzon, under the protection of the United States; also, for -offensive statement in regard to recent proclamation enforcing the laws of war. His deportation absolutely essential. (Senate Document 135, Fifty-sixth Congress, Second Session). (2) Copy taken from files of Executive Bureau.

Page  282 282 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ing American sovereignty, a cabinet responsible to Congress, with voice but no vote on the floor, and a Congress composed of a Senate, which should represent "the harmonizing of the rights of the Filipino people with the interests of American sovereignty," and a House of Representatives which should be "the seat of popular will." The definite plank of annexation of the Federal Party thus made the division between the Federals and the nationalists more marked. Many of the nationalists who had originally sympathized with the party now showed dissatisfaction with it. Then and there they would have organized themselves into a party, had it not been for the passage of the sedition law at about the same time that the annexation resolution was approved. One paragraph of the Sedition Law (1) reads thus: "Until it has been officially proclaimed that all war or insurrection against the authority of the sovereignty of the United States no longer exists in the Philippine Islands, it shall be unlawful for any person to advocate independence of the Philippine Islands or separation from the United States whether by peaceful or other means or to officially publish pamphlets advocating such independence or separation." (2) This fell like a bomb in the ranks of the nationalists. It was undoubtedly aimed at them. Hitherto their activities had been zealously watched by the government. Now, forestalling their plan of peaceful propaganda for independence, there was issued this veritable command which in effect strictly prohibited the establishment of any party or association advocating the independence of the Islands. Naturally the promulgation of this law was greeted by the Federalists with joy. El Nuevo Dia and El Renuacimiento. From now on, people with nationalist inclinations had to content themselves with vague allusions to a "national ideal," which they dared not define, much less clarify. But (1) Act 292. (2) The editorial of El Renacimienta of November 2, 1901 irsinuates that the probable approval of a sedition taw was due to the expected establishment of the Nationalist Party.

Page  283 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 283 despite these official inhibitions, opposition to the Federals and their plank grew. It came especially strong from young men who had not attained prominence during the revolt. In May 1900, Sergio Osmenfia, then a young man of twentytwo, started El Nuevo Dia, a daily with nationalistic tendencies, in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu. With him were associated Rafael Palma and Jaime C. de Veyra. (1) It must be remembered that at that time there was still some opposition in the field, for Aguinaldo had not yet been captured and several provinces were still in active guerrilla warfare. There was strict censorship of the press. The hardship suffered by the Cebu newspaper represented the life the nationalists had to live in those early years of American rule. "El Nuevo Dia", to quote Jaime C. De Veyra,(2) "was suspended twice; its offices were frequently searched by the military authorities; its personnel was threatened with banishment and all its equipment was to be thrown into the sea if peace was not restored in Cebu; but it firmly held to its policies at a time when some newspapermen at Iloilo were being subjected to what was known as the "water-cure", and in Manila the newspapermen were being imprisoned or, as in the case of Mabini and Gerona, exiled to Guam. "Even in the very capital, of the Archipelago it was impossible to issue a newspaper with liberal tendencies, and all that could be done by the more conciliatory elements was to publish papers with an indefinite stand, such as La Democracia and La Union. Persons with revolutionary sentiments had to write under disguise in La Patria at first, and then in La Fraternidad and El Liberal later under the responsibility of a Spanish editor. It is thus that El Nuevo Dia, in the heyday of its life, embodied the ideals of the Revolution in all their purity; so much so that a political adversary branded it as the 'organ of the Revolution with white gloves'." (1) thrv-* men afterwards became prominent in the establishment and activ4es of the Nationalist Party. Infra, p. 302. (2) De Veyra, J. C. "El Nuevo hia", A Story of a youthft4 adventure, in The Phgir4>,r Republic, March, 1924 p. 7., 12.

Page  284 284 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Another paper with nationalistic tendencies founded about this time was El Renaciuiento. It was published in Manila in 1901 under the leadership of Rafael Palma, who had left Cebu purposely to start another liberal paper in Manila. It was in his work as editor of El Renacirtiento that Mr. Palma distinguished himself as a writer and a thinker. While there was no organized nationalist party, these two dailies acted as vehicles of nationalist views, tempered, as we have seen in the case of El Nuevo Dia, by the circumstances of the time, the Sedition Law and the censorship of the press. The following editorial taken from an early issue of El Renacimiento reflects the repressed feelings and idealism of the nationalists: An era of turbulence has just extended its arid breath over the Philippines. The buildings still in ashes, the soil hot and filled with waste, and the tombs still fresh with human blood, indignantly cry against such mortality. Nothing has escaped! Sorrow and sacrifices have been offered on the altar of the great Ideal, the Ideal which has turned its back on the men who would be disdainful and ungrateful. Now it behooves us to reconstruct everything,-homes, churches, schools, customs, traditions, wealth-everything that has been lost amidst the ruins of the catastrophe. Great has been the evil but great also has been the fruit. On the one hand there has been destruction, death, the cessation of production and the stoppage of commerce; on the other, the life of right, the abnegation of the people, civic spirit and the supreme desire to struggle for liberty. Much has been lost, but much has also been gained: we have gained men for our history, light for posterity, and martyrs for heaven. (1) Abortive Nationalist Parties of 1902 On July 4th, 1902, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation stating that complete peace existed in the Philippines and granting amnesty to all those who had taken part in the rebellion. This was a sign for the nationalists and other elements opposed to the Federals to organize. On August 24, 1902, the political leaders exiled in Guam, among whom was Mabini, were told that they could (1) Editorial of September 21, 1901.

Page  285 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 285 return to the Philippines provided that they took the oath of allegiance to the United States "without mental reservation in purposes of evasion." Mabini refused to take the A oath, maintaining that he first wanted to see conditions in the Philippines; for how could he honestly invoke the name of God, swearing that he would be loyal to American sovereignty if he should find out that the people had not yet accepted American sovereignty? Finally on February 25th, after being satisfied that the country wanted peace, the principal leaders having surrendered or being in captivity, he took the oath of allegiance. In a manifesto to the people he explained his action in the following words: "When the country went to war, I believed that my duty was to be by her side and to help her suffer until the end; now that she feels helpless to continue fighting for her rights, I believe that I should also be by her side, in order to tell her that she should not be discouraged, but should have more confidence in herself, in justice and in her future." (1) The people with nationalist leanings now believed that the time had come for the formation of political parties favoring independence. Peace was officially declared and even the political exiles at Guam were allowed to return, hence there should be no more opposition on the part of the government to such a procedure; but Governor Taft was still very reluctant to permit the establishment of parties which openly mentioned the word independence. Among the first ones to move was Paterno, who tried to organize his Liberal Party in October of 1902. The main object of his party was "to establish in the Philippines by following the road of evolution, a responsible self-government whose object will be to form and to establish the Filipino nationality." It should be noticed that he did not use the word "independence". Judging from the newspaper records, it would seem that Governor Taft did not show any objection to the party, for when, as usual, Paterno discussed its establishment with tb Governor, Mr. Taft seemed to (1) Bocobo A a MAi *, of this' p A t 1913 (1) Bocobo. Apo~iaria Mabi-ni 'pino Peo-pie, August, 1913.

Page  286 286 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS like the plan of building a Philippine nationality with no mention of independence. (') Later on, in December of the same year, Paterno changed the name of his party to Partido Independista, probably because he believed that the feeling for independence was growing. The program of the party was also changed, and this time it frankly advocated the independence of the Philippines as the aspiration of the people, to be secured by political means as an act of justice from the American people. (2) Another proposed party whose name immediately suggests to us the origin of the great parties of a later date was the Nacionalista Party founded by Poblete in 1901. The ideal of the party was as follows: "The Nacionalista Party will actively work within the law to secure for the Filipinos at the earliest possible date a most ample autonomy and in opportune time independence under the protectorate of the United States of. America." "Of the original signers of this party," said Mr. Allen, chief of the Constabulary "five have been sentenced to Bilibid, one is there awaiting trial, one is the actual president of the Katipunan, one is the Minister of War of the same, and in fact most of the rest are wanted for serious infractions of the law."(3) In 1902 this party was reformed, for as Mr. Allen said, some of the original signers were already in jail. (1) See El Renacimiento for November 7, 1902. The party was temporarily governed by the following committees: Executive Committee: Presidente Don Pedro A. Paterno; Vice-Presidente Aguedo Velarde, and Secretary, Julian Gerona. Advisory Committee:Hugo Ylagan, Maximo Paterno, Jacinto Limjap, Manuel Sityar and Ceferino de Leon. (2) See Paterno's letter to Governor Taft of December 24, 1902, inclosing new platform of the party. Executive Bureau files. (3) Letter of Henry T. Allen, Chief of Constabulary to William H. Taft, November 22, 1902. The officers of the party in 1901 were as follows: Presidentes:-Santiago Alvarez, Pascuali H. Poblete. Vioe-President:-Andres Villanueva. Secretaries:-Macario Sakay, Aurelio Tolentino, Modesto Santiago, Cecilio Apostol, Alejandro Santiago, Cenon Nigt. Aguedo del Rosario, Domingo Moriones, Jose Palma. Lope K. Santos, ii Wbn Torres, Salustiano Crur, Nicolas Rivera, Francisco Carreon, Brieeio Valentino Dlaa, Eurelio Santos, Valentino Solis.

Page  287 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 287 This time Dominador Gomez was made President, Poblete Vice-President, and Manuel Artigas, Secretary. Gomez was then at the height of his power as a politician. He had founded the Union Obrera, or labor union, for which he had been prosecuted three times, and he frankly admitted to Mr. Taft that the nationalist party was simply a branch of this union. A party, five of whose original signers had already been sent to jail, would naturally not be very attractive to Mr. Taft; so when on December 5, 1902, Dr. Gomez and Mr. Poblete paid their respects to the Governor for the necessary permit so that the party could carry on its activities, Mr. Taft said: "Now if I could impart one lesson to you it would be to forget politics for two years and to take steps only to the uplifting of the agricultural prosperity of this country." (1) The Democratic Party of 1902 The party launched at this time which can claim closest relationship with the Nationalist Party of latter years was the Partido Democrata, started by Jose Maria de la Vinfia, Justo Lukban, Leon Ma. Guerrero and Alberto Barretto. Three members of the Organization Committee on September 19, 1902, called on Governor Taft to secure his placet for the establishment of the party. The party aimed at independence, and after reading its proposed platform and manifesto, Governor Taft disapproved them saying that they showed opposition to the government. Several modifications were made, and further conferences were held with Governor Taft. As modified, the Partido Democrata program was as follows: ESSENTIAL BASIS First.-The securing of the independence of the Islands through lawful means. INCIDENTAL BASES Second.-Modification of the present administration of the Philippines so at to give the Filipinos a greater degree of self-government, as an announcement of the capacity of the Filipino people. 4 (ldtt^ the initial establishment of this paity see El Grito del Pueblo, August 28, cuh.

Page  288 288 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Third.-Modification of article seven of the Philippine Bill;-s follows: (a) Immediate establishment of two legislative chambers upon the completion of the Census. (b) Both these legislative chambers to be elected by popular suffrage, to safeguard the interests of the Filipino people, and to be patterned after the two Houses of Congress in America. (c) The bills passed by the Philippine Legislature to become laws subject to the same rule set forth in the American Constitution. Fourth.-Admission of Philippine products into the United States customs free. Fifth.-Protective legislation for the Philippine industries. The ideal of independence was explained by the committee as follows: The independence of the Philippines constitutes the unanimous aspiration of the inhabitants of these Islands. Said aspiration has been clearly and evidently set forth not only in the war against Spain, but hlso in the struggle against the sovereignty of the United States. The struggle of the Filipinos for the independence of their country has lasted from 1896 until the present year. Now that American sovereignty is acknowledged in the Islands, it is our duty to remain faithful to this sovereignty. But as the sovereignty of the United States is not a symbol of slavery but one of liberty, as under this sovereignty we are allowed to express the feelings and desires of the people of the Islands, whose unanimous desire is the independence of the country, the Democratic Party will defend this aspiration and try to realize it, not by the violent means used during the war, but by all the lawful and peaceful resources allowed by the constitution of the Islands, with the special hope that it will be obtained from the spirit of justice of the American people. The aspiration of the Philippines towards independence was not born among our people from a vague feeling which is natural and legitimate among all people but from a deep conviction emanating from its capacity in all the arts of good government arld the mission which it believes itself called upon to fulfill in the destinied of humanity. This essential lbsis of our platform once established, the purpose of the other bases is to bring the people, as soon as, possible, near the ideal of its independence, within theu*ntcditions which are imposed by the accomplished facts.

Page  289 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 289 But Governor Taft continued in his unfavorable attitude. He was afraid that propaganda for independence, though peaceful, might be misunderstood by the authorities and the ignorant people to the detriment of the party organizers themselves. "He took care to suggest, however," said Mr. Palma, "that if the word 'independence' were eliminated from the program, he would have no objection to recognizing the new party. Debates and doubts ensued among the organizers of the party, but in the end the opinion prevailed that the grapes wek.still green and must be allowed to ripen; they therefore, retreated to their original position of watchful waiting." (1) In another communication to Governor Taft, the committee on organization advised the Governor that they had decided to disband the party for the time being. It said: "Taking into consideration your unfavorable criterion in regard to the formation of our party, and the fact that, if we are looked at with suspicion by the authorities, it would be impossible to carry on our propaganda and to keep up our party with the freedom required for the exercise of our liberties, the Committee on Organization has decided, by a majority, to suspend for the present, the organiztation of the Democratic Party."(2) The most that people with nationalist leanings coul do in view of the discouragement by the authorities of attempts to make political propaganda of indepe was the establishment of the Comite de Intereses on October 26, 1904. It was a civic society rather litical organization. Its main object was the et of a permanent committee in the United Stat fer Philippine interests. But this object wE tarried out. Its other activities were supposeI conduct public lectures, to teach the masses and obligations, to urge them to keep community, (1) Raael Palma, Our Campaign for Ind0 () Letter to the Civil Governor of the n ia, November 16, 1902. Executive Bureau files.

Page  290 290 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS to inculcate habits of morality, industry, economy, and to combat social evils such as indifference to public questions, favoritism, communism, and superstitions., Another example of suppressed nationalism was seen in the proposed popular meeting called in Manila for October the 9th, 1904, by a committee of which Teodoro Sandiko seemed to be the visible head. The purpose of the meeting was to support the work of the committee on independence composed of Americans, which had been established in the United States to work for Philippine independence during the presidential campaign in 1904. Mr. Hashim, owner of the Grand Opera House, which was and is still the largest theater in Manila, had agreed to the use of the place provided that the organizers of the meeting held themselves responsible for whatever disturbances might occur. The committee agreed to this; and although many prophesied that the meeting would be a failure or that it might lead to serious consequences, the number of people who began congregating about the place long before the appointed hour exceeded the expectations of the most optimistic. But the crowd found the theater closed, for Mr. Hashin had evil dently been told by government officials not to permit the eting. According to some observers there were fully housand people. They gained entrance through the r and filled the seats, with thousands more outside d to get in. The owner insisted contrary to his p a n^ understanding, that he could not permit the use of' l iter. Thereupon Mr. Sandiko explained the situation '|t1l people and advised them to return peacefully to their ht i o They dispersed without the least disturbance, but evidntty with hearts heavy with disappointment. Everybody ' w itnessed the event knew that the people were for inde ie te dthat, although the peculiar circumstances then. Atnd the attitude of the government prevented tihe, i ment of the nationalist party or parties, when such a or parties were actually estab-....' ^r'-, 1: 4 * I; il f 'r I , i r

Page  291 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 291 lished they would surely have tremendous popular support. (1) By 1905 the maiority of the members of the Federal Party had discovered that their plan of statehood was impracticable and was objected to by both Americans and Filipinos. In 1904 an Honorary Commission composed mostly of members of the Federal Party had been sent to the St. Louis Exposition and it was there that they first saw that very few Americans contemplated the possibility of making the Philippines a state of the Union. Differences in race and customs, and the distance, were strong barriers. Mr. Juan Sumulong was among the first ones to realize the inadvisability of the statehood plan. He was a member of the Honorary Commission, and in one of the articles he wrote in America he said: It can be admitted that the real aspiration of the great majority of the people is as follows: 1. The immediate establishment of a government of Filipinos, by Filipinos, aided by Americans. 2. The immediate independence of the country as soon as it is possible, according to the Nationalists, and after a probatory period, according to the Evolutionists. 3. A protectorate by the United States over the Philippine Republic, or if this is not possible, an international guaranty obtained with the help of the United States guaranteeing the inviolability of Philippine Independence. (2) Thus although the Federal Party had not yet official changed its annexation plank, it was alrea re one of its leaders that the party was in fa ence after a probationary period. After t Commission in Manila it became a foreg the party must change its program as regapolitical status of the Philippines. Even imself came back from the United States 1 man. (1) Gregorio Aglipay, head of the Filipino Inh, attempted to establish a Republican Party in the Philiper, 1-904, with independence as its ideal. Isabelo de los Rey El Grito del Pueblo was to be its organ. It was intended of the Republican Party in the United States. It was thoking it a branch of the real Republican Party the permaissi rties could be secured. Like the others, this party had an ephemi (2) 178 North American Review, 1904.

Page  292 292 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS At the banquet given in his honor after his return he ended by saying that he hoped "God will give us enough confidence so that we can await in peace the coming of the day when the Americans wvill give the Filipino people the government that the Filipino people wants." (1) He, however, objected to the elimination of his original plank. Although he was beginning to see that his idea was losing in popularity, all that he would advocate was that the American people should give to the Filipino people the government that they wanted, A convention was called early in 1905 to decide this question. Dr. Tavera proposed the approval of the following plank: "That the U. S. should not legislate definitely as to whether the Philippines should remain forever under the American sovereignty without consulting the wishes of the Filipino people." That was as far as he would go, hence he was defeated. The Federal Party, while expressing itself in favor of the policy of President Roosevelt, approved the following: "As regards the ultimate and definite political status of the Islands, the Federal Party expects and desires that in due time the government of the Philippines may be an independent republican government maintaining with the government of the U. S. if this is necessary, the political ties which they will determine by mutual consent." (2) (1) La Democracia, Nov. 7, 1904. (2) Copy furnished the writed by Dr. Tavera. At the hearings before the Congtssional Parti, in August 1905 Tavera explained how he was defeated A- the tons ttI as follows: "The Federal Party during the last year, t1r;:.h-t: Welosing, in a measure, its popularity with the people, thought; ag~e:";At(^ Ykof the platform which sought annexation to the United l A, Lt s4bgtute for it another plank, asking that independence be Ivea * 4te ~in the future, when they were prepared to receive it and wel^Sl;l^ In the last assembly of this party, or convention, I went to the he purpose of insisting that they should retain the original plank t3 tthe platform, namely, that of seeking annexation to the United Sttl a When I *ei ggestions to the convention I was with the opposition that annex impossibility; that it was very evident that no such thing could t in the United States; that there were people of another color in is of different customs, and a heterogeneous people in one way of,, <s that it was impossible to expect that the United States would bi jhilippine Islands. After this discussion. and when it came to a voN ed that I wasB the solitary member of the convention who sustained the former platform, namely, annexation to the

Page  293 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM 293 In August 1905 a Congressional Party headed by Secretary of War Taft and composed of some fifteen senators and repreesntatives came to the Philippines to study local conditions. About that time, there was as yet no organiza — tion among the Nacionalists. The Comnite de Intereses Filipinos was still in existence, composed of the more conservative Nationalists, but it had not been able to realize all its objects. On the other hand, the more radical nationalists were insisting on their plan for "immediate independence." The presence of the Congressional Party gave them an op- - portunity to express their views. They sent Vicente Ilustre - and Alberto Barretto to speak before the Congressional Party and Ilustre advocated immediate independence. He presented a memorial to that effect, but the document was, in one respect, unfortunate. When arguing in favor of Philippine independence, it gave as a proof of the people's capacity the supposed existence in the Islands of what he called a "directing class" and "the popular masses"-the first to direct the latter: (a) It is an irrefutable fact that the Filipino people are governable. The period of Spanish domination and the present American sovereignty bear out this assertion. The political condition of a country principally depends upon the degree of governableness of its people. The more governable the popular masses are, the better the political condition of the country. When a people such as the Filipinos give signal evidence of their capacity to obey during a period of over three hundred years, free from disturbances or deep political commotions, it must be granted, considering that all things tend to progress, that they possess the art of government, all the more so because, among other powers, they possess that of assimilation in a marked degree-an assimilativeness which distinguishes them from other people of the Far East. (b) If the masses of the people are governable, a part must necessarily be denominated by the directing class, for as in the march of progress, moral or material, nations do not United States, and they then introduced, or sought to introduce, this other plank of a platform looking for ultimate independence at some future date. I desire it understood that I was not alone in this idea, but I was the only one at the convention who voted for this plank of annexation." (Copy from Executive Bureau files).

Page  294 294 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS advance at the same rate, some going forward whilst others fall behind, so it is with the inhabitants of a country, as observation will prove. (c) If the Philippine Archipelago has a governable popular mass called upon to obey and a directing class charged -" ~ with the duty of governing, it is in condition to govern itself. These factors, not counting incidental ones, are the only two by which to determine the political capacity of a country; an entity that knows how to govern, the directing class, and an entity that knows how to obey, the popular masses. The degree of culture of the directing class and of the poular masses of the Filipinos is comparable, strictly and relatively, between the two-between one class and the other. In view of all the foregoing, and placing our trust in the justice of the American people, we petition the Congress of the United States of North America, in the name of the Filipino people, for the immediate independence of the Philippine Islands under a declaration of perpetual neutrality.(1) The Comite de Intereses Filipinos also presented a memorial but it simply asked for independence as soon as possible. The Nationalists of Cebu also handed in a resolution the importance of which lay in the fact that it was prepared by Sergio Osmena, asking for a definite status (but not mentioning independence) and for reforms in the government such as modifications in criminal procedure, greater independence of the judiciary and reorganization of the constabulary. With the trip of the then Secretary of War Taft and his congressional party ended what We have termed "the period of suppressed nationalism." It was a transition period, necessarily following a long drawn-out war, wherein the adherence of the Filipinos to the ideal of independence and their opposition to American rule were found to be much stronger than was expected. While it was not the purpose of the American Government to suppress the freedom of speech and of association, it was deemed necessary to forbid all political agitation for independence, lest such agitation prolong the opposition to American rule. (1) Among those who signed this petition were Dr. Simeon A. Villa, Dr. Justo Lukban, Dr. Galicano Apacible, Vicente Ilustre, Alberto Barretto, M. P. Leuterio. Macario Adriaticoo, Pascual Ledesma, Dr. Dominador Gomes, and Teodoro Sandiko. Copy from Exeoutive Bureau files

Page  295 THE PERIOD OF SUPPRESSED NATIONALISM Personally, however, the writer believes that the period was made unnecessarily long, and that as soon as the last outstanding general, Miguel Malvar, surrendered, the people should have been allowed to organize themselves into political parties, peacefully agitating for independence. The policy of attraction after that time would have rendered better results. At the same time, we do not want to minimize the work of the Taft Commission, especially of its Chairman, in establishing civil government in the Islands and in inducing the people at least to acquiesce to American rule. Pf

Page  296 CHAPTER X. TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 1906-1913 We have followed, in the last chapter, the growth and decline of Federalism in Philippine politics at a time when nationalist sentiments were debarred from public expression. It was, as we have stated, a period of transition which followed the wake of the forceful extension of American sovereignty in the Islands. The Commission Government Before continuing the discussion of the growth and spread of nationalist sentiment and the subsequent establishment of nationalist parties, we shall pause to describe briefly the kind of government which existed in the Philippines up to the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly in 1907. From the surrender of Manila on August 13, 1898, to September 1, 1900, the government of the Philippines was military both in its nature and in its personnel. The authority emanated from the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, combining in himself executive, legislative and judicial functions. He in turn delegated these powers to the military governor of the Philippines. The military government issued military orders which had the force of law; organized a judiciary, and attempted the establishment of local governments. It must, however, be said to the credit of President McKinley and of American governmental institutions, that real military power was allowed to continue in the Philippines only so long as civil government was impracticable. It was the President's idea to establish civil government at the earliest possible time; and in order to accomplish this end he appointed, on March 16, 1900, the second Philippine Commission, vested with the power of exercising the legislative function and of establishing courts of justice, which should in turn be vested with judicial authority.

Page  297 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 297 The Commission began exercising its legislative functions on September 1, 1900. In June, 1901, an executive order was issued by the President, conferring the executive authority which had hitherto been exercised by the Military Government on the president of the Philippine Commission. The Military Governor, however, was not relieved of all duties, for in provinces in which insurrection still existed, his authority was continued. The military government in the parts of the Islands inhabited by the Christian Filipinos was terminated on July 4, 1902, by an order of President Roosevelt. The administration of the government of the Philippine Commission extended from 1901 to the creation of the Philippine Assembly in 1907. After this time the legislative power in the parts not inhabited by the Moros and other non-Christian tribes was shared with the Philippine Assembly. The Commission, however, retained its exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the provinces inhabited by non-Christian people. To the credit of the Philippine Commission are many important laws. Among these there may be mentioned the Municipal Code, The Provincial Government Act, the Special Provincial Government Act, the Charter of Manila, the Baguio Charter, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Corporation Law" the Civil Service Law, the first Election Law, and the Accounting Act. The Executive Department After 1901 the executive power was vested in the Governor-General, who was also a member of the Philippine Commission. He was appointed by the President of the United States with the consent of the United States Senate. In turn he had the power of appointment with the consent of the Philippine Commission of most of the officials in the Philippine Government. Being a member of the Philippine Commission, in fact its chairman, the GovernorGeneral also had a voice in legislation. There was no lawv providing that the president of the Commission should be at the same time the Governor

Page  298 298 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS General, but this practice was continued. A great deal of the power of the Governor-General came fromn military sources, and when Congress in the Philippine Bill of 1902 ratified the action of the President, the many prerogatives that had been enjoyed by the Military Governor were retained. In the Philippine Bill of 1902, the act of the Philippine Commission which organized the executive departments, passed on September 6, 1901, was approved and ratified. This action of Congress implicity conferred general supervision over the departments upon the Governor-General. The same bill, however, provided that in the future the appointment of heads of the executive departments, as also those of the members of the Commission, the Governor-General, and Vice-Governor, should be made by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The administrative work of the government was done by different bureaus grouped into four departments. These were the Department of the Inerior, the Department of Commerce and Police, the Department of Finance and Justice, and the Department of Public Instruction. Three of the bureaus remained under the immediate supervision of the Governor-General. Although the secretaries of the departments were selected from the members of the Commission, the offices were distinct, and a different salary was attached to each office. Under this organization, therefore, the heads of the executive departments had seats in the Legislature. A Vice-Governor was appointed from the Commission, who was to act as Governor-General in the latter's absence. Local Government In obedience to President McKinley's instructions, the first task of the Taft Commission was the establishment of local governments. Previous to their arrival the Military Governor had promulgated general orders establishing municipal and provincial governments in the Philippines, but these orders were not actually put into effect; and so

Page  299 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 299 to the second Philippine Commission fell the work of organiziing local governments. A new municipal law, Act No. 82, was passed on January 31, 1901, providing a complete system of municipal government, composed of a president, vice-president. and councilors chosen for each municipality by the qualified voters of the town. The system of municipal government thus established has continued, on the whole, up to the present time.(1) Manila, because it was the capital and metropolis, was granted practical self-government by a special law. The Act following the Municipal Code, Act No. 83, organized the provincial governments in the regularly organized provinces. There was to be a provincial board composed of the Governor, the District Engineer, and the Treasurer. Later the Superintendent of Schools replaced the District Engineer on the provincial board. The Governor was the only one elected. He was, however, not chosen by the voters who elected the municipal officers. He was elected by the councilors of the municipalities assembled in a convention. A further step towards provincial self-government was made in 1907, with the direct election of governors and third members by the qualified voters of the province, the third members having replaced the superintendents of schools. This gave the Filipinos a majority in the board, the treasurers at that time, who were the appointed members of the board, being mostly Americans. Another step was later taken with the substitution of a municipal President for the provincial Treasurer as member of the provincial board. The last step toward provincial autonomy was the election of the entire membership of the provincial board, the Governor and the two members, by the qualified voters of the province. Up to 1907 the Federal Party may be said to have been the party in power, for not only did its leaders hold the only positions given to Filipinos in the government at that time, (1) 1920.

Page  300 300 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS but it also was able to win all the local elections held before the opening of the Philippine Assembly. This is, however, due to the fact that it was practically the only organized political party in existence, for the government had prevented the nationalists from organizing themselves. In the elections for provincial governors held in February 1906, out of 29 governors only five were nationalists. The governors were not elected by popular vote but by members of the municipal councils. The predominance of the Federal Party, however, was destined to be of short duration, brought about, as it was, merely by, the necessity of establishing peace, which was its main object. (1) Nationalists Allowed to Organize Of the five nationalists elected, only one had held an important position in the RevolutiQpary Government, Teodoro Sandico, of Bulacan.. The otiher four, Sergio Osmena of Cebu, Manuel Quezon, of Tayabas, Jaime de Veyra, of Leyte, and Isauro Gabaldon, of Nueva Ecija, were young men who were just beginning to take an active part in politics. The first two, Osmenia and Quezon, became afterwards, as we shall see, the greatest leaders of the Nationalist Party. By this time the ban against the establishment of parties based on independence had already been lifted. This happened during the governor-generalship of Mr. Ide, who became acting Governor-General in November, 1905, and Governor-General on April 12, 1906. The country was quite peaceful, for those who remained of the revolutionists in some provinces were really nothing but bandits. (1) In December 1905 the biennial elections by popular vote for municipal officers took place. No record is kept of their party affiliations. An elector had to be a male at least twenty-three years old and had to possess one of the following qualifications: he must have held a public office during the previous Spanish administration, must be paying at least 15 dollars of taxes a year or must be able to read and write English or Spanish. (The age limit was reduced to 21 years in 1916). "The municipal elections" stated the report of the Philippine Commission (1906 pt. I, p. 41) "were conducted on the whole in an orderly manner and without disturbance of the public peace." Many elections, however, were protested, but the majority of the appealed cases were sustained. Out of the 29 governors elected 15 cases were. contested. Of these all but two were sustained. (Report of the Philippine Commission, for 1906, pt. I, p. 41).

Page  301 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 301 The date for the calling of the Philippine Assembly was approaching, and the nationalists were again busy, trying to form a party. The radicals who advocated "immediate independence" before the Congressional Party, insisted on the approval of the phrase. In the meetings held in the latter part of 1905, the conservatives were apparently in the majority in Manila. Berretto, Osmenia, Ilustre, Vifia, Iedesma and others insisted on a platform with those "sacred words"; while del Pan, Agoncillo, Apacible, and others,.opposed it. The radicals insisted on going ahead, and in the latter part of 1906 established the Partido Independista Immedaitista.(1') The Two Nationalist Parties of 1906 In the'same year;, 1906, two other nationalist organizations appeared. The:Pdrtido Urgentista founded by Dr. Gomez, as its name indifdtes, urgently demanded independence. The other group was called the Comite de la Union Nacional and was composed of the more conservative nation-? alists. All, however, maintained that nationalists should sacrifice some of their individual ideas so that there might be but a single nationalist party. (1) Letter of,.Alberto Barretto dated at Manila, December 18, 1906, addressed to Sergio Osmenfa, Cebu, the original of which is in the writer's possession. The letter in par-t read: "True to what we have agreed, we invited to a much greater 'assembly; Messrs. del Pan, Velarde, Paterno and others representing the other parties, in order to bring forth the platform which you have proposed. In the meeting the platform was strongly opposed because of the word immediate which it contained in the beginning. We supported it with vigor, Gomez, Lukban and myself, but we were defeated in the voting, because those who had been apparently with us, Ocampo, Apacible, Agoncillo, and Mendiola went with them (the conservatives) and in that meeting it was agreed that a new committee be appointed to draft a new platform. When the new platform was drafted-in which the ideals of the party were not concretely expressed, and in which that sacrosanct word did not appear-the signers of the memorial of August 29th opposed it, and the new project was also disapproved by the majority of those present. In view of the fact that the conservatives did not want to agree to the essential basis of our ideals, at the last meeting it was decided to dissolve the group, in which two tendencies could be clearly seen, the radicals and the conservatives. We the radicals, who are composed of Ilustre, Lukban, Vifia, Ledesma, Luciano de la Rosa, Manalo and others, about twenty in all, have decided to continue working until we have a great number of followers and can publish our platform. Once the platform is approved, I shall send you a copy, and we expect that you will join us."

Page  302 802 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Very soon, the Partido Urgentista and the Comite de la Union Nacional merged under the name of Union Nacionalista. Thus, there remained only two nationalist groups or parties: the Partido Independista Immediatista, and the Union Nacionalista. Some of the prominent men of the first party were Alberto Barretto, Sergio Osmenfia, Manuel Quezon, Justo Lukban, Fernando Ma. Guerrero, and others. Those of the Union Nacionalista were Rafael del Pan, Rafael Palma, Galicano Apacible, Felipe Agoncillo, Pablo Ocampo, Leon Ma. Guerrero, and others. There were no very notable differences between the two parties except that the more conservative unionistas while in favor of early independence were opposed to the phrase "immediate independence." The Partido Independista Immediatista promised to work for the immediate independence of the Philippines and to negotiate with the United States for an international treaty which should establish and guarantee the perpetual neutrality of the Islands. The Union Nacionalista believed "that the Filipino people- are actually worthy of independence, that they are able to direct their own destiny within their own civilization without the help of foreign elements." At the meeting held on January 17, 1907, the principal leaders of the Partido Independista Immediatista, took up the proposed fusion. They also endeavored to elect officials and Alberto Barretto and Justo Lukban each received 26 votes for the presidency. These two leaders were also the candidates for vice-president, receiving 19 and 18 votes respectively. Macario Adriatico and Jose Vales were elected secretary and treasurer respectively. Among the counsellors were Sergio Osmefia, Manuel L. Quezon, Teodoro Sandiko, Isauro Gabaldon, and Fernando Ma. Guerrero. (') The Birth of the Nacionalista Party Negotiations were continued for the merging of the two nationalist groups, and by February 1907, four months before the election for the assembly, the prospects were again bright for a fusion. "This time," commented El (1) R mient4nto, January 18, 1907.

Page  303 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 303 Renacimiento, (1) "it seems that the fusion of the nationalist parties will become a reality. Differences have been smoothed over, distances have been shortened and the formidable epithet immediate no longer seems to inspire the jealousies and fears of old. It is for this reason that our firm belief is that if things continue as they are, the fusion of the two nationalist parties existing at present will in a short time be a fact." The Union Nacionalistas, whose main object was the union of all nationalist forces, seemed to be giving way; and inasmuch as the point of contention was the phrase immediate independence, once that phrase was approved, the fusion would be a fact. One thing which facilitated the fusion was the absence of selfish politics, for at that time the nationalists were the opposition party with no spoils to divide among the members. They were mostly a group of young idealists, inex- X perienced in politics but thoroughly convinced of the justice of their cause. On the other hand they had to contend with a well-organized party in power, backed up by the ad-, ministration. It was natural that they should find it much more advisable to unite and oppose the foe with a solid front. Conferences between representatives of the Union Nacionalista and the Partido Independista continued for a few days more. The final agreement took place on March 12, 1907, at 194 Lacoste Street, Manila. The agreement consisted of twelve articles, and was signed on behalf of the Partido Independista, by Jose de la Vifia, Francisco Liongson, Macario Adriatico, and Vicente Miranda, and on behalf of the Partido Union Nacionalista by Rafael Palma, Galicano Apacible (in place of Pablo Ocampo), Leon Maria Guerrero, and Rafael del Pan. They agreed that "the fusion of the two parties should be brought about through the formation of a new political party, an organism which should be called the Partido Nacionalista." The directorate of each of the parties should call a federal assembly or convention on April 7th for the final approval of the fusion. After the approval of the fusion by the (1) February 21, 1907.

Page  304 304 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS separate assemblies, the separate directorates would each elect five members to form a committee on arbitration to decide upon the candidates for assembly seats in the different districts of the Philippines; for it must be remembered that by this time the two parties had probably already presented candidates for the coming elections. The directorates of the two parties would then meet as the directorate of the new Nacionalista Party. There would be a permanent secretary and a treasurer, but the chairman would be chosen by lot on any given occasion. The local committees would be fused in a similar way. The daily La Independencia, which was the, organ of the Partido Independista, would continue to be the organ of the new Nacionalista Party. But most important of all the articles of agreement at that meeting of March 12, 1907, was the platform approved for the new party. It follows: PROGRAM OF THE NATIONALIST PARTY We, the undersigned citizens of the Philippine Islands, for ourselves and for those countrymen who shall ratify this document, proclaim that we do hereby constitute into a political party called the Partido Nacionalista, whose ideals and purposes are contained in the following principles and declarations: The party, believing that it interprets the true and just aspiration of the Filipino people, proposes: The attainment of the immediate independence of the /"'Philippine Islands to constitute it into a free and sovereign nation under a democratic government, without prejudice to the adoption in due time of any form of guarantee which would be convenient to the interests of the Filipino people and suitable to the circumstances. This purpose is founded upon the natural and evident right that peoples have to their independence, and on the fact that our people, as was shown in the struggles and revolutions which they have maintained, desire and are ready to receive at any moment their independence. The Filipino people from time immemorial have possessed a civilization which has been improved through living and contact with the Spanish people during more than three centuries of sovereignty and also through the present contact with, and practices of, the systems and institutions of the American people. Like other cultured peoples of the

Page  305 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 305 world, they have assimilated many elements of culture without losing thereby their typical characteristics and it is for this reason that they believe themselves capable of main- taining a decent and orderly government such as is required by their collective interests and their relationship with other nations. It is a proven fact that they managed their affairs wisely and peacefully during the brief period of their independence. We do not consider the variety of ethnic families or the diversity of dialects an obstacle to the maintenance and enjoyment of self-government or independence, since at the present time all the Filipinos consider themselves members of a common country united by their common origin and birth inasmuch as the diversity of tongues has not embarrassed their relations as it has not embarrassed other nations which also include districts speaking different dialects. Our people are thoroughly adaptable to democratic institutions and have men with sufficient wisdom and intelligence to organize a stable self-government, and wealth and natural resources sufficient to maintain an economical public service, the more so when it is hoped that under their own laws the material conditions of the islands will develop and increase satisfactorily for the benefit of the Filipinos. Filipino individuals and societies have at all times shown a decided love for order and unbroken respect for law; therefore it cannot be presumed that the establishment of selfgovernment in the country would lead to disorders and internecine strifes, much less when what is proposed to be established is a regime desired by all parts of the Philippines. The dismemberment of any portion of our territory, as it was described in the Treaty of Paris, is a challenge to our national integrity and the Partido Nacionalista will consider it its duty to oppose any such intent or purpose and to work for the conservation of the entire territory for ourselves and our descendants. It is our firm conviction that the peace, order, progress and happiness of a people can be happily realized only through self-government, for nobody knows the needs of a country better than its own people, or can better apply to them the most adequate remedy. Our aspiration is just, noble and incontrovertible, because it is born of the natural desire for emancipation and it is based on eternal principles of justice which animate all people who feel able to govern themselves, and we have

Page  306 306 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS not the least doubt that this is the solution which would most assuredly and lastingly consolidate the moral and material peace of our country. With such purposes the party will work constantly for the attainment of the aspirations of the country by peaceful means within the pale of law, struggling for everything that would redound to the benefit of Filipino interests and which the party will continue to follow even after the country is free and independent. (1) Federal Party Changed to Progresista Party Important developments also took place in the ranks of the Federal Party. We have mentioned in the last chapdter how in May, 1905, this party discarded the plank for annexation and aimed at ultimate independence. At first there was a plan to merge it with the Union Nacionalista, the Federalists probably considering themselves already possessed with nationalist sentiments since the change of their program. Mr. Taft, who was then secretary of war, but who continued to keep a keen interest in the party, was consulted by cable as to this proposed course of action. He advised against any fusion or combination with the Union Nacionalistas. (2) (1) The minutes of the meeting, together with the platform in Spanish, can be found in La Independen6ia, March 15, 1907. It was republished in El Renacimiento, March 16, 1907. (2) This interesting correspondence between the Federalists through Governor Smith and Mr. Taft is as follows: Manila, December 24, 1906. CABLEGRAM SENT: Sec. War, Washington................ oo...o......................o., PRIVATE: We have now three distinct political parties. Federals, Naclonalistas and Immediatistas, the latter will probably endeavor to get a resolution through the Assembly demanding immediate independence. Federals are willing to leave question of independence to the United States in the hope that when they have demonstrated capacity to govern themselves the United States will grant them nationality. The Union Nationalistas are willing to make union with Federals on the basis that the Federals join them in asking that Congress declare its ultimate purpose with reference to Philippines. I have stated to the - Federals it might prove very awkward to have any petition presented at this time and that any declaration by Congress that nationality would be coneceded

Page  307 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM A convention of the Federal Party was held in Manila in January, 1907, which finally decided, as a further repudiation of the old Federalist idea, to change its name. The Federal Party was now converted into the Partido Nacional Progresista. "In Philippine politics," stated the President of the party, Arsenio Cruz Herrera, "the Partido Nacional Progresista will continue fulfilling the same mission which the Partido Federal has been fulfilling up to the present, which is to build in the Philippines in due time, an independent democratic government after the establishment of Roosevelt's plan, by way of experiment which would tend to show the capacity of the Filipino people." (1) Convention of Local Governors In the meanwhile an important convention had been called in Manila. Upon the suggestion of the nationalist governors, Governor General Smith was prevailed upon to call a convention of provincial governors, which took place in October, 1906. Its purpose was to discuss measures to expedite the calling of the assembly and the needs of the different provinces. Although in the minority, the five nationalists were able to make Sergio Osmefia chairman of the convention. when the Filipinos were prepared to receive it would result in continued agitation of the question for selfish purposes by demagogues, and that any public anti-election union between the two parties would not serve to strengthen either. Federals have agreed to abide by your judgment in the matter... SMITH. Mr. Taft's Answer. Washington, December 27. 1906. CABLEGRAM RECEIVED: Smith, Manila. I feel Federals should stand on the proposition as outlined in your telegram and not unite with Union Nationalistas in any petition to Congress. I entirely concur in your suggested objections to such petition and union. Tell the Federals how much I appreciate their consulting me as to the matter. TAFT.. NO DISTRIBUTION. Manila, Decemnber 28, 19i6. (Ei, Bureau files). (1) From Manifesto dated January 12, 1907. El Rcdnacimiento, Janmary 14, 1901.

Page  308 308 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS In fact they dominated the convention. The meetings were held secretly, but other government officials were allowed to attend and to take up matters pertaining to their departments. The convention recommended to the administration the extension of greater autonomy to the provinces. At this time the provincial board, which governed the provinces, was composed of a governor elected by the members of the municipal councils, the treasurer and the superintendent of schools. The last two were appointive and were Americans. As a result of this petition the Commission in 1907 enacted a law eliminating the superintendent of schools from the provincial board and putting in his stead a "third member" elected by the voters of the province. Thus the Filipinos were given control of the provinces. The election of governors was also turned over to the voters, and the governors were given greater powers as executive heads of the provinces. Another question taken up by the local governors was the convening of the Philippine Assembly. According to the Philippine Bill of 1902 the Philippine Assembly was to be established two years after the publication of the Census provided there was complete peace certified by the Governor General to the President of the United States. The census was published in 1905, so normally the event should take place in 1907. But a Governor General who was not in sympathy with its establishment could delay it by fostering trouble or by simply refusing to certify that there was complete peace in the Philippines. Governor General Smith, however, was in complete sympathy with its establishment, and he worked hard so that the Assembly might be convoked without any unnecessary delay. He assured the governors that this was his purpose and naturally the local governors pledged their help to accomplish this end. True to his promise Governor Smith, on March 28, 1907, issued his peace certificate declaring that since the publication of the Philippine Census in 1905 there had been no serious disturbances of the public order save those by outlaws and religious fanatics and that the great mass of the Filipino people for the pre

Page  309 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISMI 309 vious two years had been "law-abiding, peaceful and loyal to the United States." The President of the United States was then formally requested to authorize the Philippine Commission to call a general election for the choice of delegates to the Philippine Assembly. The Elections of 1907 President Roosevelt issued the necessary authority and elections were called for July 30, 1907. The campaign was fought on the issue of immediate independence. The Federalist leaders were insistent in denying the capacity of the people for the immediate establishment of a republic. "If the country were governed solely by Filipinos," said Dr. Pardo de Tavera, "our government would not be democratic but autocratic, and the people would be oppressed by those who would be in power." (1) This policy, as we have seen, was diametrically opposed to the nationalist platform, which advocated immediate independence. There were registered 104,966 voters. Of these 98,251 voted. The result of the contests for the 80 seats of the Assembly was as follows: Nacionalistas................... 59 Progresistas..................... 16 Independents.................... 5 (2) Strange as it may seem, the elections of the local officials aroused more popular interest. On November 5 of the same year, the elections by popular vote of governors and third members were held. "With the returns from three towns still missing", states the Philippine Commission, (3) "the registration for the election of provincial governors and third members under the general election law was 171,642. This registration exceeded that of the registration for the Assembly election by 69,525. The number of (1) From a speech published in La Democracia, Feb. 11, 1907. (2) Data taken from Algunos Datos Referentes al Origen y Desarrollo del Partido Naeionalista prepared officially by the party for presentation to the WoodForbes Mission in 1921. In his Special Report to the President, p. 44, Secretary of War Taft gave the following figures: Nacionalistas 31, Independientes 20, Progiesistas 16, Inmcdiatistas 7, Inlependistas 4. Catolico 1, Nacionalista independents 1. (3) Report for 1907, pt. I, p. 84.

Page  310 310 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS votes cast for provincial,governors and third members was 161,697, as compared with 98,251 for assemblymen, a difference of 73,446, from which it would seem that there were 73,446 voters who were not sufficiently interested to vote for assemblymen." It would seem, therefore, that the vote for governors would be a safer barometer of the real feelings of the people. The governors elected were as follows: Nacionalistas............. 16 Progresistas..................... 15 This showing made the Philippine Commission still doubt whether the people were really supporting the nationalist platform. Some candidates stood on independent platforms, which the Philippine Commission classified as a non-radical vote. Analyzing the different votes, the Commission states: Of 161,697 votes cast 44,288 were for the candidates of the Nationalista Party, 38,153 for those of the Progresista Party, 17,458 for those who stood on an independent platform, 1,563 for Independista candidates, 2,983 scattering, and 1,351 for candidates whose party affiliations were unkown. Adding to the Nationalista Party vote the entire Independista, half the scattering, and half the unknown would give a vote of 48,018, as the strength of those holding radical views. Adding to the 38,153 Progresista votes the 17,458 independent would give 55,611 as the number of voters representing conservative and moderate views as to the political policy now pursued in the Philippines.(1) The Philippine Assembly The coming of the Philippine Assembly was heralded as unparalleled in the history of dependencies. Secretary of War Taft made a special trip to the Philippines to inaugurate it. If he was disappointed at the results of the election, he did not show his disappointment. He realized that the Nationalists and not the Federalists would control, but he remained optimistic. The Nationalists themselves were divided into two groups, represented by the young and the old element. Some of the leaders who had been active (1) Report of the Philippine Commission, Part I. 1908, p. 87.

Page  311 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 311 in, the revolution, and even during the Spanish regime, had been elected, such as Pedro Paterno, Felipe Agoncillo, Aguedo Velarde and Leon Maria Guerrero. They had been trained in Europe and could not appreciate American institutions as readily as the younger members like Osmenia and Quezon. As between the two elements, the American authorities had more sympathy with the younger ones, who would be more likely to understand the workings of American institutions. Moreover, some of them had already distinguished themselves as governors of their respective provinces. Osmenia and Quezon, although barely 30, had been governors of their provinces, where they had left good records. Osmefia, it must be remembered, had started El Nuevo Dia, and although away from Manila had taken an active interest in the organization of the Nacionalista Party. The fact that he was out of Manila must have been to his advantage; for although he was in sympathy with the immediatist plank, his absence kept him away from the petty struggles which had taken place among the nationalists in Manila preparatory to the formation of the party. Besides, he had connections both with the radical and the conservative wings. His election in 1906 as chairman of the assembly of governors; in spite of the fact that the Federalists were then in the majority, gave him great prestige. He was therefore the logical candidate for Speaker of the Assembly. "There was no dispute about his election," said Rafael Palma.(1) "Sergio Osmenfia, Delegate from Cebu, was chosen speaker of the Assembly by acclamation." Even Secretary of War Taft expressed satisfaction over the election. In his report to the President he described Osmenfia as "a young man not 30, but of great ability, shrewdness, high ideals and yet very practical in his methods of dealing with men and things. The Assembly could have done nothing which indicated its good sense so strongly as the selection of Senfor Osmenia as its presiding (I) Our Campaign for Independce, p. 25.

Page  312 312 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS officer." (1) If the nationalists found in Osmena an efficient, calm and farsighted presiding officer, they also secured in young Manuel L. Quezon an effective floor leader, a logical speaker, a ready debater, and a democratic mixer. But the election of the speaker did not settle all the issues between the young and the old Nacionmlistas. The elder Nacionalistas accustomed to Spanish parliamentary law insisted upon the adoption of the rules of the Spanish Cortes, but the younger element would cling to American parliamentary law, and again they won. Although many of the members had not read it, they adopted it. Once secure in his place as speaker, Mr. Osmenfia followed the policy of reconciling the two elements. Some of the younger members thought he was giving undue weight to the elder Nacionalistas because the pick of the committee assignments was given them. Right at the start Osmena showed his great quality as a harmonizer. It was to his credit that this division between the young and the old did not grow into any real division. By the process of natural selection, and also because in subsequent legislatures many of the older people gave way to the young, all traces of the earlier conflicts vanished. Many of the pessimists who had opposed the establishment of the Philippine Assembly prophesied that it would be ultra-radical and revolutionary and would show no cooperation with American officials. Great was their surprise when the question of independence was not touched upon except at the last day of the session, when the legislative (1) Special Report of WiUian H. Taft, Secretary of War, to the President on the Philippines, p. 44. Mr. Palma continues his comments on Mr. Osmefina: "The wisdom 3f his election was shown by his achievements. He measured up to the circumstances at all times. In his frail and slender physique which seems to bend to the slightest touch, there resides, by the rarest of contrasts, the most formidable physical and moral endurance. His vast knowledge, his persuasive eloquence, his quick and searching intuition about men and things, reinforced by his incomparably winning ways, all combine to make him a fine leader of the multitude. He is ever ready to confront political battles of any description and does not flinch in the face of the greatest dangers. But amidst it all, he keeps before him the highest and most serene vision of the ideals and the principles he faithfully follows and executes, reconciling them with the sternest realities, never losing that rare equipoise and that exhaustless energy which are the secret of success in many a contest." Op. cit., p. 25.

Page  313 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 313 work was finished. The feeling which predominated was that the American people were watching what this asembly would do, and hence the nationalists who had been branded as demagogues had to show that besides their idealism they had constructive ability. The first bill approved was received with satisfaction. They knew that the American people were greatly interested in the establishment of schools in the Philippines; so what greater proof could they show of their appreciation for the good things America was doing in the Islands than the support of the school system? Their first bill was the so-called Gabaldon law, which appropriated 1,000,000 pesos for the construction of the schools in the barrios. Attitude Towards Independence Yet the path chosen by the nationalists inethe Assembly did not meet the warm approval of certain radical elements. The radicals wanted to approve a resolution in favor of immediate independence; but the effects of a resolution approved by the Assembly but disapproved by the commis sion, was feared. Finally they hit upon a plan. The ideal of independence would be expressed by the Speaker and would then be approved by the assembly. So at the end of the work for the session after the Assembly had demonstrated its willingness to cooperate in the great undertakings of the government, Speaker Osmenfa delivered an address which read in part as follows:. The Filipino people accepted peace, principally because they expected justice from the American people. Far from holding aloof from or making difficult the work of the government in its implantation, they did everything they could to promote and improve it. They went to the polls when the municipal government was established; they also willingly took part in the government of the provinces when, amid countless difficulties and when the ruins of the revolution still loomed grim and terrible, they were called upon to do so; and they chose their representatives when the solemn hours came for the most difficult test of their capacity to manage their own destinies. But neither before nor after did they yield to promise or fear; before and after they aspired for their national independence, both when they cast their votes in favor of a free and independen't life, and

Page  314 314 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS when yesterday on the battlefield they offered the lives of their best sons for the sake of our country and of her ideals. We must thus speak clearly in this august place, where fallacy does not lurk, where deceit has no place and where truth finds its seat, and where justice presents itself with all of its lofty attributes; we must speak thus in this place where we feel with full sense of responsibility our love, our most legitimate veneration for the Philippines. The Filipino people aspire today as before taking up arms for the second time against Spain, as thereafter in the din of arms and then in peace, for their National Independence. The phrase "immediate independence" engraved in the banner of the majority is not new, it has not been invented only today, nor does it signify a new idea; the phrase "immediate independence", the present slogan of the Filipino people, has been their slogan always, and embodies and signifies their true aspiration, that aspiration which has not suffered mutation nor change, which has not even cooled, which has not been forgotten by the sons of the country for even a moment thru all the ad'versities suffered and all the vicissitudes that have arisen; it has not been forgotten, no, this ideal has not dimmed not even at the moment of taking the oath of allegiance to the constituted government, because that allegiance does not repudiate our ideals and because we believe that fidelity to America permits us to be true to our conscience as Filipinos, to our sacred desire for our National Independence. Allow me, gentlemen of the House, following the dictates of my conscience as a delegate, as a representative of the country, under my responsibility as Speaker of the House, to declare solemnly as I do now before God and before the world, that we believe that our people aspire for their independence, that our people consider themselves capable of leading an orderly life, efficient for themselves and for others, in the concert of free and civilized nations, and that we believe that if the people of the United States were to deqide at this moment the Philippine cause in favor of the Filipinos the latter could, in assuming the consequent responsibility, comply with their duties to themselves and to others, without detriment to liberty, to justice, and to right. The statements by the Speaker were put to a vote on June 19, 1908, by the assembly, with the following result: in favor, 55; against, 15; absent, 9. Every Nationalist or

Page  315 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM Independent member voted in favor and every progresista voted against.(l) Growth of the Power of the Speaker During his visit in 1907, Secretary of War Taft made a remark at a bancuet which greatly influenced the politics of the period. He said that the newly elected Speaker should be considered the second man in the Philippine Government, This statement made the Speaker outrank even the Vice-Governor and the Commanding General of the Army. He became leader of the Nationalist party in power and at the same time the most representative official in the government, being "the elect of the elect." For practical purposes in order to secure cooperation in legislation and popular support for his policy, a Governor General had to consult the Speaker even on matters which did not pertain to legislation. All these factors combined to make the Speaker the foremost Filipino official in the government. He was given a salary of 16,000 pesos, exclusive power over the contingent funds of the assembly and privilege to travel on official business over the Islands. He was also authorized to appoint assembly. members to work on legislation with per diems during the recess. Inasmuch as members did not have permanent salaries but only per diems, this power of the speaker wa's a potent one in so far as the whipping of recalcitrant members into line was concerned. Thus thev position of Speaker became eminently a political one and was used tremendously by the incumbent to preach nationalistic doctrines all over the Islands. It was not, however, narrow partisan nationalism which was preached. In fact Speaker Osmefia tried to secure the cooperation of the op(1) La Independencia como Aspiraci.s Naclonal-Asamblea FiUliya, Deumewnto, 6753-AS, pp. 3. 4. "Those who expected the first Filipino Assembly to be a radical, if not revolutionary, body, devoting its time and efforts to plots and protests against the constituted authorities, have been disappointed. Not only have its meinbers cooperated amicably with those authorities but their course throughout has shown a genuine appreciation of American achievements in the Philippines and a desire to continue the work so well begun." Charles S. Logingler, The First Filipito Assembly and it9 Work. In North American Review, No. 188, October 1908.

Page  316 316 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS position in all measures which did not affect the political platforms of each. Soon the people became convinced that the party in power was now the Nationalist party and not the Federal Party. In deference to the electoral mandate the American authorities were now consulting Nationalist leaders for advice on public matters and even on appointments. Thus the Governor-General was obliged to give support to the party with which he differed on political problems, and to repudiate the party which had shown adherence to the established American policy. This was naturally another attraction for the Nationalist Party. And with the growth of influence of the Nationalists, the desire for independence grew. The Elections of 1909 At the elections held on November 2, 1909, the Nationalists gained a few more seats. The number of registered voters was double that of 1907, there being now 208,845 voters of whom 92.40 per cent voted. The proportion of registered voters to the population was 3.03 per cent, and the proportion of votes cast to population was 2.81 per cent. Elections were held at the same time in 31 regularly organized provinces for provincial governors, third members of the provincial boards, and municipal presidents, vice presidents and councilors. Eight protests against the provincial governors and three against third members were filed. All of these protests were dismissed except in one case where the court declared the protestant elected. In the assembly there were 62 Nacionalistas, 17 Progresistas and 2 independents. The votes cast were classified as follows: Nacionalistas................. 92,996 Progresistas................. 38,588 Unknown.................... 26,412 Independent................. 10,464 Liguero..................... 3,621 (l) <1) Report of the Philippine Commisision, 1910, pp. 45-47.

Page  317 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 317 The Second Philippine Assembly proved to be a more radical body than the first one. Friction was more frequent between it and the upper house or Philippine Commission, controlled by Americans. To some extent the harmony seen in the previous legislature was due to the tact shown by Governor General Smith. In May, 1909, a new Governor General, W. Cameron Forbes, was appointed, who had no sympathy with the ideal of independence and frankly announced that his policy was that of economic development. He was even willing to curtail the appropriations for schools so that he could carry on his policy of public improvements. The assembly, on the other hand, showed more radicalism encouraged by the support it had from the people. It attempted to repeal the treason and sedition act which had early prevented the establishment of political parties, and the flag law which prohibited the display of the Philippine flag. It approved bills extending the powers of local governments and abolishing the death penalty; but the Commission disapproved all these measures. Joint Petition for a Philippine Constitution The growing dissatisfaction with the political situation of the Islands invaded even the minority members of the assembly. The Progresista Party on September 1, 1910 joined with the Nacionalista Party in petitioning for the immediate establishment of a Philippine Constitution. The petition was handed to the Secretary of XWar, Jacob N. Dickinson, who was then in the Islands on a visit, through the respective presidents of the two parties, Sergio Osmefia and Vicente Singson Encarnacion. The memorial states that "whatever may be the ultimate and definite political status of the country and whether we secure independence immediately or some time later, it is evident that the Filipino people need at this very moment a constitution." This constitution would not be the ultimate ideal, but one instituted in order to secure immediately a guarantee of the rights and liberties of the people. It was desired that the following provisions be secured in the proposed constitution:

Page  318 318 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS (1) A Philippine bill of rights enacted by the people themselves. (2) Extension of legislative powers, such as authority to enact naturalization laws. (3) Separation of powers and the establishment of an independent judiciary. (4) An elective senate. (5) Extension of popular legislative power throughout the archipelago. (1) (6) Establishment of impeachment so as to require responsibility from the high officials of the government. (7) The continuation of Chinese exclusion. (8) Sale of public lands and friar lands. (9) Filipinization of the public service.(2) On December 5, 1910, the Philippine Assembly, with the support of both parties, passed a joint resolution requesting the Congress of the United States to authorize the Filipino people to prepare and adopt a constitution of its own. This resolution was laid on the table by the Commission almost by unanimous vote.(3) </ Another serious conflict at this time between the assembly and the commission was the election of resident commissioners in 1911. The first commissioners elected in 1907 were Pablo Ocampo on the part of the Assembly and Benito Legarda on the the part of the Commission. In (1) It may be remembered that at the time the Philippine Commission controlled by the Americans had exclusive legislative power over the non-Christian tribes. (2) Besides this joint memorial or memorandum, on the same date, the Nacionalista Party, through its President, Sergio Osmefia, submitted to Secretary of War Dickinson, an extensive memorial on immediate independence. It covered the following points: (1) Capacity shown by the Filipinos in the organization of popular selfgovernment, especially the revolutionary government. (2) Capacity shown by the Filipinos during American administration. (3) Consideration of the reasons alleged against the granting of Independence. (4) Difficulties and obstacles of indefinite retention to the independence of the Philippines. (See Memorial Poltico del Partido Nacionalista v Memorandum conjunto de los Partidos Nacionlista y Progresista, Documentos Nos. 4581 and 4581-a-, Second Philippine Legislature, first period of session, Manila, 1911, Imprenta de I. R. Morales). (8) Report Philippine Comnmisson 1911, p. 17. For explanation of the votes in the Commission see Commission Journal, Secnd Philippine Legislature, Special Session, 1910, pp. 341-347.

Page  319 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 319 1909 Manuel Quezon was elected in place of Mr. Ocampo, but Mr. Legarda was reelected. In 1911 a new election took place, and both the Assembly and the Commission proposed the re-election of their respective candidates. By the law, the choice of each house was to be submitted for the ratification of the other house and no election was complete without such ratification. On the part of the Commission there was no objection to Mr. Quezon, but the Assemrnbly objected to Mr. Legarda on the ground that Mr. Legarda had not favored independence in the United States and the Assembly maintained that if the commissioners in the United States were to represent the Philippine Islands and the people, they must voice popular sentiments. The sentiment of the people, in so far as it was known by means of the election to the Philippine Assembly, was for early independence. If Mr. Legarda was not in favor of that, hle could not properly represent the people of the Philippine Islands. This was the position of the Assembly. There was no election, and the matter was laid before Congress, which approved a law lengthening the term of office of the commissioners to four years instead of two.(1) Another source of conflict between the Commission and the Philippine Assembly was in the handling of the Appropriation law and the systematization of the expenses. The Bureaus acted as independent departments in so far as finances went. They sent their estimates directly over the heads of departments to the legislature. The bureau chiefs had absolute control over the money appropriated for their bureaus. They also had control over the income of the bureau. Some of them even exceeded the amount appro- priated for them and would take the money from the income of the bureaus. A special committee of the Philippine Assembly was appointed in 1911 and it proposed the following "common bases" for the passage of appropriation bills, which were rejected by the Commission: (1) ERecctn de ComuitiO do RA*ediet % We Egtado USidos. (Manila. 1911.)

Page  320 320 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS First-Every Appropriation Law should originate in the Philippine Assembly. Second-Suppression of all provisions of an organic or reorganic character in an Appropriation Law. Third.-Inclusion in the Appropriation Law of all those Bureaus and offices which have their own income. In preparing the appropriation for the expenses of the latter, there should be included not only the expenses for the maintenance of the said Bureaus but also the expenses for the production of the services to which they are dedicated. Fourth-Specification of the items of expenses for the salaries of the personnel as well as for the materials used, provided that for the salaries of the personnel of each Bureau there should not be appropriated more than the amount really necessary for the semester or for the fiscal year, whichever may be the case. Fifth-A complete separation of the total expenses for the personnel, materials, and other expenses of each office or bureau, provided that the expenses so allotted cannot be destined for an object different from that which appears in the Appropriation Law. Sixth-All the income of each office and bureau should be deposited in the Insular Treasury to form a part of the general funds. Seventh-Suppression in the Appropriation Law of all allotments of a permanent character. Eighth-Inclusion in the Appropriation Law or complete exclusion therefrom for a Special Law of all the items referring to public works of a permanent character. Ninth-Complete and separate specification of the amount necessary for the commutation and payment of accumulated licenses, expenses for trips, transportation, etc., provided that the sum voted for this purpose cannot be used for other purposes. Tenth-All the amount not expended at the end of the fiscal year to revert to the Insular Treasury to be a part of the general funds.(1) These conflicts caused the failure of the passage of Appropriation bills from 1911 to the end of Mr. Forbes' regime. There is a provision in the Philippine Bill of 1902 which states that in case of failure to pass the general appropriation bill the total sum appropriated the year before will be deemed appropriated for the ensuing year. Because of this provision Governor Forbes did not mind these.(1) Printed as footnotes in Palma, Our Campaign for Independence, pp. 28, 29.

Page  321 TRIUMPHANT NATIONALISM 321 deadlocks, for in reality he secured more power by means of them. The legal provision that the previous sum would be re-appropriated was interpreted by Governor Forbes to mean that he could redistribute the sum even by creating new offices, provided that the total did not exceed the total of the previous year. It was the opinion of many that these acts of Mr. Forbes were illegal, but they have never been taken up in the courts. (1) Dissatisfaction over the slow pace with which Governor Forbes was Filipinizing the government exasperated many. The conflicts the assembly had with the commission on matters which entailed democratic principles encouraged the people in the belief that popular rights could now be obtained through legal channels; that the issue of the revolution was now being pushed forward not in bloody fields but in the session halls of the Ayuntamiento and in the congressional chambers at Washington. The campaign of Resident Commissioner Quezon, of which we shall speak in another chapter, added flame to the already almost universal fires of nationalism which had swept the entire Philippines. While Mr. Forbes had no sympathy for the political program of the Nationalists, neither was he personally a friend of the early Federalists, especially of their leader, Dr. Pardo de Tavera. In fact, Mr. Forbes belonged to the other faction in the commission and had never looked with lukindly eyes towards the Federal chieftain. It was even -rumored that the resignation of Dr. Tavera from the Commission was due to the appointment of Mr. Forbes as Governor General. On the other hand, Speaker Osmena and Governor Forbes, while opposed to each other on many political questions, remained personally good friends. It must be remembered that at this time the Governor General had no veto power, for he was only the chairman of the upper house; so that in order to get the legislation he wanted (1) Elliott, Charles E., The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government, pp. 116-119. * 1

Page  322 322 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS he had to secure the cooperation of the assembly and especially of its speaker. (1) Notwithstanding these friendly personal relations, the conflicts between the Filipino and American elemients, as represented by the Assembly and the Commission respectively, were becoming greater every year. Far more serious consequences were prevented by the coming into power in the United States, of the Democratic party, which inaugurated reforms in the Philippines. (1) "During the later years of the Forbes administration legislation became largely a matter of private arrangement between the governor-general and the speaker. The governor-general was, of course, anxious to secure the passage of necessary laws. Mr. Osmefia, the speaker and leader of his political party, was greatly interested in his party and his own position and in legislation which would bring nearer the day of independence. He generally marauvered so that every important law, or the conditions of its enactment, was in some subtle way made to strengthen the native influence in the government. The influence exercised by Osmefia was often insidious but none the less real and effective. The Filipinos regarded him as the real head of the government. The situation was very difficult and probably the governor-general can not properly be criticized -for showing excessive deference to the speaker and his party. It was necessary in order to secure legislation which was required to carry out the policy of the administration." (Elliott, Charles B., The Philippines to the. wnd of the Commission Government, p. 125).

Page  323 CHAPTER XI THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 1907-1916 The Nationalist Party, it may be remembered, won the elections of 1907 and every subsequent election on the issue of immediate independence. It will be our task in the present chapter to record the attempt of the party, or its representatives in the United States, to secure the independence of the Philippines. In Chapter VII we have taken up the diplomacy and propaganda work of the Revolutionary Government which covered the period from 1898 to 1902. The attempt of the Comite de Intereses Filipinos established in 1904 to send a national committee to the United States had not been carried out. From the end of the propaganda work of the Revolutionary Government to the election of the first Resident Commissioners in 1907, the Philippines did not have any representative, official or unofficial, in America. During this period a notable change had taken place in American public opinion with regard to the Philippines. America's Sober Second Thought on the Philippines The American people were now coming to the period of sober second thought. They were beginning to realize the responsibility they had assumed in the Philippines. America of 1898, (1) flushed with Dewey's victory, dreaming of the imperial days when the vast oceans should be sprinkled with American colonies, was not at all the America of 1902 or 1903 after spending millions of her money in the war of subjugation, and after sending over 100,000 of her soldiers to the wilds of the Philippines. The powerful appeals of men of such unblemished political character as George F. Hoar, Carl Schurz, and many others, who were unwillingly forced to oppose the Philippine policy of their beloved party because their sense of justice and morality would not permit them to do otherwise, could not fail to impress many of their countrymen. (1) Lord Bryce, in his American Commonwealth, p. 579, speaks of this stage of American imperialism as the "sudden imperialistic impulse of 1898-1900."

Page  324 324 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Pressed by the logic of circumstances and the changing mind of the American people, those who were opposed to the independence of the Philippines were now seen to have softened in their representation of the objects of American occupation in the Philippines. Glory, power, and commerce were no longer invoked to any marked extent. American retention of the Philippines was now defended on an entirely different ground-philanthropy. America was in the Philippines to fulfill a noble mission, the mission of educating the Filipinos and preparing them for self-government. "It is a significant concession to public opinion," declared Senator Carmack, "that we no longer hear the argument of greed and avarice and the hunger for other men's possessions openly and defiantly proclaimed. I cannot help thinking that something has been yielded and something gained when the President of the United States no longer talks of seizing 'points of vantage' and no longer defends our Philippine venture by glorifying England's despotic rule over subject races and her bloody march to empire across the bodies and through the blood of slaughtered people. It may not signify any change of heart or of purpose, but it shows a realization of the fact that the public conscience is awake, and it shows that the authors of this policy begin to understand that they cannot justify 'criminal aggression' by pointing to the profits of the crime. It is a cheering sign that the sober second thought has come, that the better nature of the American people is again in the ascendant, when the party responsible for a buccaneering war is compelled to veil the grossness of its designs." (1) The Philippines for the Filipinos The coming of "America's sober second thought ", the reaction against imperialism, brought also a change for the better in the Philippines. William IH. Taft was sent to the Islands to establish civil government, and he found an intolerable situation there. Imperialism had many adherents among his countrymen who had preceded him. Amer (1k) Speech in the Senate. May i31, 1902.

Page  325 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 325 ican merchants were convinced that the Philippines were theirs to get the most out of. Military men found the Islands a stepping-stone to further glory and promotion. The wishes and aspirations of the Filipino people counted for naught. Any mention of independence was anathema. The greatest service Mr. Taft ever rendered the Filipino people was his struggle against these military men and merchants. He made them understand that Philippine exploitation would not be tolerated at home, and announced to them his ever famous motto, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." The whole American community rose up against him in this phase of his policy. American newspapers-controlled by the the American interests, of course-spared no words in condemnation of his attitude. Replying to a vicious attack of an American paper, he said: There are many Americans in these islands, possibly a majority, and this includes all the American press, who are strongly opposed to the doctrine of "The Philippines for the Filipinos." They have no patience with the policy of attraction, no patience with the attempts to conciliate the Filipino people, no patience with the introduction into the government as rapidly as their fitness justifies of the prominent Filipinos. They resent everything in the government that is not American. They insist that there is a necessity for a firm government here rather than a popular one, and that the welfare of Americans and American trade should be regarded as paramount. (1) To gain popular favor for his policy of the "Philippines for the Filipinos," Mr. Taft and his associates in the Philippine Commission petitioned the Congress of the United States to grant the Filipino people a lower legislative house, so that, together with an appointive higher council, it might form the legislative branch of the Philippine Government. They also asked that the Philippines be allowed to elect two delegates to the Congress of the United States. In spite of the opposition of certain Republican senators, these provisions were embodied in the Philippine bill of 1902, often called the Philippine Organic Act. (2) (1) Address at Manila, December 17, 1908 printed as Senate Doe. No. 191, 68th Cong. 2d ses. (p. 8). (2) For the discussion of the passage of this measure in Congress, see Kalaw, M. M.. The Case for the Filipinos. pp. 1332-140.

Page  326 326 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS After the passage of the Philippine Organic Act the interest of the American people in the future of the Philippines grew less and less. Whatever fear they might have had as to the establishment of a truly imperialistic policy in the Islands was smoothed away by loud protestations of benevolent intentions repeatedly made by Republican leaders. These leaders even went further; they not only repeated the principle of the "Philippines for the Filipinos," but they also plainly intimated that the Philippines were ultimately to be given their independence. Now such an idea had not been even hinted at by President McKinley, the man must responsible for acquiring the Islands. The word "independence" or its equivalent never found place in any of his utterances, speeches, or manifestos. He did promise the Filipinos "individual rights" and, vaguely, ultimate self-government in some hazy, distant future, though never the complete withdrawal of American sovereignty from the Islands. With this apparent change of attitude and intent, imperialism became no longer an important issue in American politics. The Republican convention of 1904 was not animated by the same imperialistic tendency that had inspired the Philadelphia convention four years before, as is seen from the following words of Senator Root, spoken when he was chairman of that convention, which undoubtedly could not have been delivered at Philadelphia: No one can foretell the future; but there seems no reasonable cause to doubt that under the policy already effectively inaugurated, the institutions already implanted, and the processes already begun in the Philippine Islands, if these be not repressed and interrupted, the Philippine people will follow in the footsteps of the people of Cuba; that more slowly, indeed, because they are not as advanced, yet as surely, they will grow in capacity for self-gG ernment and, receiving power as they grow in capacity, will come to bear substantially such relations to the people of the United States as do now the people of Cuba, differing in details as conditions and needs differ, but the same in principle and the same in beneficent results. When we compare the foregoing words with Chairman Lodge's bald statement at the convention of 1900 that com

Page  327 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 3"2 7 mercial expansion was the primary motive of Philippine acquisition, we cannot help being convinced that something had really been yielded to America's sober second thought. Ultimate Independence Now the Policy The first authoritative intimation from the American Government that the Philippines might be ultimately independent was found in the message of President Roosevelt in 1908, in which he said: I trust that within a generation the time will arrive when the Filipinos can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent or to continue under the protection of a strong and disinterested power, able to guarantee to the Islands order at home and protection from foreign invasion. In opening the Philippine Assembly on October 16, 1907, Mr. Taft, then Secretary of War, likewise stated: The policy looks to the improvement of the people both industrially and in self-governing capacity. As this policy of extending control continues, it must logically reduce and finally end the sovereignty of the United States in the Islands, unless it shall seem wise to the American and the Filipino peoples, on account of mutually beneficial trade relations and possible advantage to the Islands in their foreign relations, that the bond shall not be completely severed. In his special report to the President after the inauguration of the Assembly, Mr. Taft definitely interpreted President McKinley's Philippine policy as meaning ultimate independence. He said, in part: It necessarily involves in its ultimate conclusion, as the steps toward self-government become greater and greater, the ultimate independence of the Islands; although, of course, if both the United States and the Islands were to conclude after complete self-government were possible that it would be mutually beneficial to continue a governmental relation between them like that between England and Australia, there would be nothing inconsistent with the present policy in such a result. All these, indeed, were eloquent expressions of American purposes; but they had never been authoritatively stated by Congress, which is the only agency that could

Page  328 328 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS pledge the American people to that legislative program. For a people like the Filipinos, who had already experienced so many bitter disappointments and disillusionments, declarations from executive officers alone were not sufficient to allay their fears as to their future. Those who were loudest in preaching the doctrine of ultimate independence were also most careful not to allow Congress to declare such an intention. Mr. Taft was the first to oppose the suggestion that Congress itself express the very feelings and purpose which time and again he had himself seen fit to utter. He then said that for Congress to promise independence in the future would mean endless and harmful political agitation in the Islands, since the Filipinos would at once insist that they were now ready for independence and demand that, therefore, it be granted them. Propaganda of the Retentionists The majority, if not all, of those who proclaimed the benevolent intentions of the American people but who would not have Congress, the only authoritative source, express them, had really set their hearts on indefinite-which is equivalent to saying permanent-retention. They would not publicly state this view, since they knew that the American people were not in favor of it. In the meanwhile they had been doing their best to feed the American pride with glowing reports of the beneficent results of their mission in the Philippines. They. knew that herein lay their only strength. The policy of indefiniteness, of drifting without knowing where, could be maintained only by convincing the American people that the enterprise in the Philippines was bringing unprecedented results in the way of uplifting a people, but that at the same time the end of that mission was yet a long, long way off. American governors of the Philippines, from Mr. Taft down to Mr. Forbes, saw to it that the American press was constantly supplied with reports of their work in the Islands. They were aided in this work of publicity by the War Department. As the American people read these reports, they were naturally filled with pride over such a

Page  329 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 329 noble work. They beheld a people alleged to be semi-barbarous drawn out from the deep recesses of tropical jungles into the sunlight of civilization; they saw good roads built where there had been, according to report, nothing but the trails of the headhunters; costly hospitals erected where there had been disease-breeding huts; they pictured splendid schoolhouses towering over vast wildernesses, children recruited, pestilence stopped, commerce enhanced. In every phase of this development they saw the ingenious hand of the pioneer American. Thus the propaganda in America during this period, (1) save for a few anti-imperialist protests, was monopolized by American officials who were in-imical to early Philippine independence. Much of it created ill-feeling on the part of the Filipino people, for many of the over-enthusiastic publicity agents, in their eagerness to emphasize the splendid results of American occupation, naturally or unconsciously belittled the part taken by the Filipinos and ignored the culture and progress already attained by them. In answer to the irreconcilable anti-imperialists who would not cease to contend that the Filipinos were capable and of right ought to be free and self-governing, and who would now and then call the attention of the public to some evils of the Philippine government, many of these men would go to the extreme of deliberately misrepresenting conditions in the Philippines, slandering the entire Filipino people, and picturing them as a mere coterie of contemptible and barbarous tribes forever separated from one another by warring jealousies and hatred. Because these. men who spread the reports resided or had resided in the Islands and were therefore supposed to be cognizant of conditions here, and because they had powerful agencies for disseminating information, such as the War Department, they very largely dictated to the public what it should think on conditions in the Islands. Official reports on Philippine progress flooded the remotest parts of the country. The Igorots who were sent to (1) 1902-1907.

Page  330 E330 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS the St. Louis Exposition had planted in the minds of hundreds of thousands of Americans an indelible impression of the Filipinos as not far removed from savagery. There was hardly a magazine in the Union which did not embellish its pages with photographs of "headhunters," which directly or indirectly conveyed to the lay mind the idea that they were the typical Filipinos. There was hardly a newspaper that did not fill its columns with stories of Uncle Sam's achievements in the Philippines, and of the wonderful transformation being made of the backward Filipino. Many an audience was regaled with the same story, only sometimes told with more vividness, even with the glamor of romance, because the speaker himself had been on the scene and had participated in the great enterprise. In order that this may not be deemed an unfair way of characterizing the mental attitude of the American official in the Islands during the Republican regime, and his foregone conversion to belief in the incapacity of the Filipino people, I shall quote the confession of an ex-official himself, a former member of the Philippine Commission, the Hon. W. Morgan Shuster. He wrote in the Century Magazine for January, 1914: The records of our congressional committee and of the war department are filled with reports, speeches, letters, testimony, and statistics going to show what the party then in power wanted the American people to think about the Filipinos. If any one thought differently, he became at once, in official eyes, a dreamer, an anti-imperialist, or a demagogue. His opinions were taboo in high governmental circles, and he was deemed an unsafe man to hold important office. This was only natural, and I recall it merely to show how the opinion of the American people on the question has really been formed. The opinion of the ordinary American citizen as to the Filipinos is largely influenced by the statements or the pronouncements of the very few men in public life who have had, or were thought to have had, exceptional facilities for knowing the real facts and situation. Thus the views of Ex-Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, of ExSecretary of War Root, of Senator Lodge, of the different Philippine governors and members of the Philippine Commission, and of the commanding generals who have served in the Islands have beenf the real source of "American public

Page  331 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 331 opinion." As a matter of fact, it is doubtful whether the views of any of these gentlemen were reached in a strictly impartial and judicial manner. With the possible exception of Mr. Taft, they took up the subject, as I did, with a previously formed conviction that the facts were going to sustain the accepted government belief and policy, which were that the Filipinos were not fit to be, and should not of right be, independent, at least for a very long time to come. How long, few ventured to predict. It is said that Mr. Taft, when invited by President McKinley to go to Manila as head of the Civil Commission, stated that he was opposed to our holding the Islands. That, however, was before he had been intimately connected with administrative policies already adopted, which were based on the opposite belief. Mr. Quezoin's Campaign. We have dwelt at some length upon the state of public opinion in America with regard to the Philippine question so as to make clear the difficulties encountered by the Filipinos in their American campaign for independence. Without desiring to belittle the work of the first Resident Commisioners in Washington, and of the other Filipinos, like Mr. Sixto Lopez, who had been in the United States and had done a noble work for the cause of Philippine independence, it may justly be stated that the Filipino side of the questions was effectively presented to the American people for the first time by Mr. Manuel L. Quezon. Being a nationalist, he was elected commissioner in 1909 on a platform that pledged him to work for the immediate independence of the Philippines. The Progresista Party, as we have seen, had been badly defeated at the polls, and the feeling for political emancipation had grown very intense in the Islands. Popular indignation was increasing every day against the flagrant misrepresentations of Philippine conditions made to the American people. The Commissioner-elect was therefore urged to take aggressive steps in representing the.political unrest of the Archipelago to the American people and Congress. Mr. Quezon had had a glimpse of America during his return trip from Russia a year before. His second trip, when he assumed office, informed him more fully of the state of American public

Page  332 332 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS opinion, particularly its obsession by the idea that America was fulfilling a noble mission in the Philippines and that the government that had been instituted there was the best that could possibly be provided. After several months of observation and study in the capital, Mr Quezon delivered his maiden speech before the House, on May 14, 1910. This speech is interesting to all who followed his work in that it carried the tone and spirit that up to recently characterized his utterances and attitude toward the American people. It was an agreeable surprise to those Americans who had expected an inflammatory harangue on Philippine independence. It was a disappointment to many Filipinos who had urged him to denounce in the bitterest of terms the evils of American administration in the Islands. Not a few even accused him of having betrayed the cause and of having become an Americanista. He acknowledged in the warmest terms the brilliant achievements of the American officials and government in the Philippines; but he warned Congress of the almost unlimited powers wielded by those men and of the unpopular character of the government. He then appealed to the pride and patriotism of the American people, to their devotion to the principle of liberty and self-government, and reminded them that in spite of all the good things done by America in the Philippines, the Filipinos preferred to be free and independent. The first issue which came before Congress in 1910 between the defenders of American administration in the Islands and the Filipino advocates of independence, was the friar-land controversy. The friar-land estate in Mindoro called the San Jose Estate, amounting to 55,000 acres, had been sold by the Philippine Government to an American corporation. Charges were made that administrators in the Philippine Government were enriching themselves by buying the best of these lands. These acts were denounced by Congressman Martin, of Colorado, as exploitation, pure and simple. He was strenuously supported by the Anti-Imperialist League of Boston, which claimed that its original contention that Philippine exploitation was the prime ob

Page  333 THE INDEENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA ject of Philippine occupation was now being justified. It was also argued that such sales were illegal, inasmuch as the law explicitly provided that public lands should not be sold to corporations in tracts of more than 2500 acres each, and that friar lands were as much public lands as the other doma1ins of the Philippine Government. The Filipino people vere a unit in their disapproval of this sale, viewing it with much concern and alarm. Although the House of Representatives was still controlled by the Republicans, Congressman Martin succeeded in having the Committee on Insular Affairs authorized to investigate the truth of the charge. Governor Forbes, Commissioner Worcester, Secretary Carpenter, Attorney-General Villamor and Rafael del Pan, attorney for the Government, were called to Washington to testify. They all, of course, endeavored to justify the action of the Philippine administration. The majority of the committee made a report favorable to the Philippine Government, but it was evident that many of its members did not approve of a situation in which the employees of the Philippine Government bought lands which they themselves were holding practically as trustees of the Filipino people. It was contended that friar-lands were in no sense public lands; but although the Philippine officials were thus apparently vindicated, one notable thing about the whole agitation was the appearance for the first time of an entirely new element in the discussion of Philippine questions in the United States. That element was the voice of the Filipino people expressed through their representative. On the friar-land question, it was a dissent from the position of the administration, and it was Mr. Quezon who voiced that dissent. General Edwards, then Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, foresaw other obstacles that this new element in the discussion might place in the way of the policy of the department, and openly warned Mr. Quezon that should he insist on continuing in that attitude, every effort would be made to retire him from the Resident Commissionership. (1) (1) Information personally secured by the writer as Secretary to Commissioner Quezon.

Page  334 334 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Mr. Wilson and the Philippines In the meanwhile the political situation was fast changing in America. The Democrats gained control of the House in the elections of 1910. In March 1912, Congressman Jones of Virginia introduced a bill providing for a "qualified independence" in 1913 and for complete independence eight years afterwards. The bill was reported by the Committee on Insular Affairs, but was never brought to the floor. Democratic prospects became brighter. The Baltimore convention of 1912 was held; and though the Philippines were not an important issue during its deliberations, it ratified the party's former position on imperialism. The Philippine question, however, was hardly touched upon during the presidential campaign of 1912. It was less prominent as an issue that year than in any previous election. The American people did not know, nor did they care to know, Mr. Wilson's views'on the Philippines. When asked his views Mr. Wilson chose to answer that he had not given the question much thought. The American people, harassed by domestic controversies, excited by the prospect of a change of party in power, did not have the Philippines in mind when they voted in 1912. It was only after the election of President Wilson that real curiosity was aroused as to what he would do with the Philippines. After several months of delay, which led to many conjectures as to what this new Philippine policy would really be, President Wilson, with one stroke of the pen, changed the whole trend of the Philippine experiment by appointing a majority of Filipinos to the Commission. It was moreover, only after he had heard what the Filipino people, through their representative, had to say that he appointed the new executive of the Islands, Francis Burton Hanrison, a man who had pronounced views on Philippine independence. In explaining his action to Congress, President Wilson said: "I believe that in this way we shall make proof of their capacity in counsel and their sense of responsibility in the exercise of political power, and that the success of this step will be sure to clear our view for the steps

Page  335 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 335 which are to follow. Step by step we should extend and perfect the system of self-government in the Islands, making test of them and modifying them as experience discloses their successes and their failures; so that we should more and more put under the control of the native citizens of the Archipelago the essential instruments of their life, their local instrumentalities of government, their schools, all the common interests of their communities, and so by counsel and experience set up a government which all the world will see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their own control. At last, I hope and believe, we are beginning to gain the confidence of the Filipino people. By their counsel and experience, rather than by our own, we shall learn how best to serve them and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision." (1) The Jones Bill of 1914 President Wilson's reforms were welcomed by the Filipino people; but they were also expecting legislation looking tovhe i4l early independence. They were at least hoping that lrr. Jones' first bill would be approved now that the Democratic party had won the presidency and both houses of Congress. (2) Mr. Jones, however, soon discovered that the majority of the American democrats were not ready or willing to set a definite date for Philippine independence. Yet it was absolutely necessary that if no radical Philippine Independence measure could be passed, at least a Congressional statement of policy towards independence should be made. It must be remembered that up to that time the American Congress had not decided upon the future political status of the Philippines. The organic act of 1902 was simply an act "temporarily to provide for the civil affairs of the Philippines." It was urgent that the American people through their Congress should formally commit themselves to a policy of independence. In view of this consideration and because he found out that he could not get the support of his party for his first bill, he modified (1) Message to Congress, December 2, 1913, Congressional Record. Vol. 51, page 4.5. (2) For text of Mr. Jones' first bill see HI. R. 224S3, 6'2d Congress, 2(1 session.

Page  336 336 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS it and in 1914 introduced what was then known as the Jones Bill No. 2. This modified Jones Bill, did not contain the fixed date of 1921 for independence but simply a statement, in the form of a preamble, that independence would be granted as soon as a stable government could be established in the Philippines. The preamble, which subsequently became a part of the Jones Law, reads as follows: Whereas, it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipiency of the War with Spain to make it h war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein and Whereas, for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestarafairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, i;f airing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence: Therefore(1) The bill would also make the government of the islands more autonomous with the creation of an elective senate and certain reforms in the executive departments. The attitude of the Filipino people on the new Jones Bill was probably best reflected by the magazine edited by Mr. Quezon entitled "The Filipino People." In its July issue, 1914, it editorially endorsed the measure as follows: That it will be a disappointment to many who had hoped that the present Administration of the, United States intended to effect the immediate separation of the Philippines from the domination of America, we have no doubt. That they will feel that the new bill represents far less than ought to have been conceded, that they will deeply regret the failure to state the date at which independence is to be definitely <l) See H. B. 17856, 68rd Corgsress. 1st sessio.V (1) Sec H. R. 17866;, 6rd cor~gre&'.s, let Ses. icn.V

Page  337 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 337 granted, and that they will in some cases urge a policy of postponement rather than the acceptance of a compromisewe likewise understand. We do not, of course, regard this bill as a finality. Were it so, we should never consent to its consideration or enactment. Did it debar us from continued agitation and effort to secure the enactment of final independence legislation, we should oppose it to the uttermost. But such is not the case. The issue now presented is that of securing some forward step while a party friendly to the aspirations of the Filipino people is still in office. To adopt a measure which at least represents some progress, which gives assurance that ground already gained shall not be lost, is, we think, only the part of wisdom, and is dictated by every, consideration of expediency and of the immediate interest &f the people. Were we to reject any concession, even the smallest, that would advance the welfare of the people of the Philippines, we should be false to our trust and neglectful of our responsibility to public interest. If, by accepting the new Jones Bill we can obtain the permanent maintenance of the more beneficent order of things in the Philippines, produced by the advent of Governor-General Harrison and the greater power of self-government given to the inhabitants of the Islands, we shall at least prevent a recurrence to the abhorrent tyranny-now happily past-of the imperialistic period. If, besides this immediate and practical concession, we can secure a positive promise of independence from Congress, such as is afforded in the preamble to the new Jones Bill, we shall have before us a hopeful, instead of an indefinite and uncertain, future. We, therefore, favor the passage of the new Jones Bill, advise its acceptance by the people of the Philippines, and pledge ourselves to its support. If enacted, the measure shall have our hearty and sincere cooperation, to the end that it shall be put into effect in good faith, without reservation, and with every presumption in its favor. That, both now and ever, it will be the duty, as it undoubtedly is the intent, of all Filipinos to continue undiminished effort for the actual practical establishment of independence, free of all foreign control, we take for granted, and we once again solemnly pledge, both to the Filipino people and to those American citizens who-have steadfastly supported the cause of free government, that there shall be no cessation or intermission of our efforts to secure the independence of the Philippines, either now or in the future, whatever Congress may do or may fail to do. Without the ultimate accomplishment of that end, all else would be as nothing, and better govern

Page  338 338 THE DEVELOPMENTT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS ment, wiser management, and larger generosity would but aggravate the disappointment of a people balked of its dearest and most legitimate aspiration. For what it is, therefore, for the sake of its genuine merits, and in the hope of realizing its ultimate benefits in the form of a more vigorous impulse toward complete independence, we accept the new Jones Bill, but we hold fast to our program-unalterable, unassailable, and permanent as it is. We recognize no substitute, admit no alternative, concede no reduction of our righteous demand for the absolute independence of the Philippines. Anything that may fall short of that ideal must be regarded as a tentative step, affording an earnest of later good, desirable no doubt in temporary effects, but no more than a partial measure of progress toward a final goal. The bill was discussed in the House of Representatives from September 26 to October 16, 1914. There was practically no opposition to the legislative features of the bill. Some of the Republicans even suggested giving a larger measure of self-government to the Filipinos. Minority leaader Mann said that he would reduce the bill to onethird its original size, thus giving the Filipinos a freer hand in the administration of their affairs. But he, together with most of the Republicans, was opposed to this preamble. The bill was passed on October 14, 211 to 59 votes, the Democrats voting solidly with 11 Republicans and Progressives. The bill was sent to the Senate and was included in the administration's legislative program for their December session. Its early consideration, however, was soon found to be out of the question, not because of any serious opposition to it, but because the shipping bill, the first on the program, being an emergency measure, met so much opposition that more than two-thirds of the time of the senate was spent in fruitless debate and filibustering. During the last days of February, 1915, when it became certain that the much combatted shipping bill could not be passed, an effort was made by prominent members of the Senate, with the cooperation of the president, to secure an agreement with the Republicans by which the Philippine bill could be voted on. A vote at that stage of the session could be secured

Page  339 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA only by the unanimous consent of the members, for Congress had only a few days to live, and, due to the rule of the Senate which allowed unlimited debate, one or two senators were enough to talk the bill to death. A canvass of the senators was made, and it was found that there would be some opposition to the preamble, but a compromise was offered by some Republican senators, who wanted to change the word "independence" in the preamble to "self-government." This plan was rejected on the ground that it would put the Democratic party in an embarrassing position and that it would be better to have no bill at all than to have the preamble mangled in the way suggested by the Republicans. There were other amendments suggested by the opposition which would explicitly provide that the promise of independence might be revoked by other Congresses or fulfilled at some time in the future without basing such fulfillment on the fitness or unfitness of the Filipino people. All these proposals were of course rejected. It was also suggested to pass the bill without the preamble and to introduce the preamble in the form of a joint resolution to be pressed for action not at this session but at the coming session. The advocates of independence objected to this plan. In the first place, this would have meant to pass the bill practically as it was reported out of the senate committee without any chance to amend some of its provisions, which were not very satisfactory but which could be wisely acquiesced in could the bill be passed with the preamble. A more potent reason, perhaps, was that, once the bill had become a law without the preamble, it would be very hard to pass a joint resolution at the coming session, for congressmen would then say that inasmuch as they had just passed legislation for the Philippines at the previous session they should wait and see how that law was working in the Philippines before considering further legislation. Although at that time there seemed to be more evident disposition on the part of the American people to deal justly with the Filipinos, yet such a sentiment was still a passive and not an active one.

Page  340 340 TIHE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Regrets for the failure to pass the bill were expressed by administration leaders, especially by President Wilson. He sent the following messages to (Governor Harrison and Commissioner Quezon: March 6, 1915. HARRISON, MANILA. Secretary of War has already told you of the impossibility of passing Philippine bill at the session of Congress just closed. It was constantly pressed by the administration, loyally supported by the full force of the party, and will be pressed to passage when the next Congress meets in December. It failed only because blocked by the rules of the Senate as employed by the Republican leaders who were opposed to the legislation and who would yield only if we withdrew the assurance of ultimate independence contained in the preamble. That we would not do. The bill will have my support until it passes and I have no doubt of its passage at the next session of Congress. Please express to the people of the Philippine Islands my deep and abiding interest in their welfare and my purpose to serve them in every possible way. In this I amn expressing the spirit and purpose of the majority of the Congress and of the whole government of the United States. Please accept my congratulations upon the success of your administration and my earnest assurance of belief in a happy and prospeious future for the Islands. The people of the Islands have already proved their quality and in nothing more than the patience and self control they have manifested in waiting for the fulfillment of our promises. Continuance in that admirable course of action will undoubtedly assure the result we all desire. WOODROW WILSON. March 12, 1915. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington. My dear Mr. Quezon: May I not wish you a safe and pleasant voyage and a happy return when you resume your duties here again? I will be very much obliged if you will take some occasion when you are at home to express the admiration I have felt for the self-respecting behavior of the people of the Philippines in the midst of agitations which intimately affect their whole political future. Nothing is needed to establish their full reputation with the people of the United States as

Page  341 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 341 a people capable of self-possession and self-government but a continuation in the moderate and constitutional course which they have pursued. Cordially and sincerely yours, WOODROW WILSON. (1) The Clarke Anendie-ntt On the very day of the opening of the Sixty-fourth Congress Mr. Jones of Virginia reintroduced his Philippine Bill in the House of Representatives, and a few days later Senator Hitchcock took similar action in the Senate with his bill. Immediately upon the organization of the Senate Philippine Committee, Mr. Hitchcock called a meeting, and, after conducting brief hearings, on December 17, 1915, filed a favorable report, with a change made in the preamble. Independence, as now recommended to the Senate, was to be granted the Filipinos when, in the judgment of the United States, it would be "to the permanent interest of the people of the Philippine Islands". This change did not meet with approval by the Filipino leaders. It was hoped that ill-feeling and friction between Americans and Filipinos would thus be much lessened if not entirely ended, because, under the new preamble, no allusion or argument that was hurtful to the national pride of the Filipino people would likely be made. The feeling for independence had manifestly remained unabated in the Islands, for upon the convening of the Philippine Assembly (1) The Filipino People, Vol. 3, No. 7, Washington. D. C., U. S. A., March, 1915. Mr. Elliott in his book. The Philippines, To the End of the Commission Government, p. 424, was surprised at the cordiality and consideration given by President Wilson to Mr. Quezon as shown by the above letter. The deference is not due to personal attachment but to a constitutional one. It follows from the general concept which President Wilson had of the constitutional relationship between the two peoples. In President Wilson's idea, Mr. Quezon represented an entire people and not a mere congressional district. Legally Mr. Quezon had not even the rights of a Congressional member; but actually he represented 10,000,000 people who had come under American rule against their own will. The same principle which induces the premier of England to treat with deference the representatives of the self-governing colonies in matters touching the dominions, applies though to a much less extent to the relations of Mr. Quezon to the Democratic administration. Legally the dominions are under Parliament; but in practice the premier of a dominion government has more prestige in London than a simple M. P.

Page  342 342 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS on October 16, 1915, that body again unanimously passed a resolution petitioning Congress for the enactment of an independence bill. "We again reiterate," the resolution read, "in the name of the Filipino people, the national desire and purpose set forth on many former occasions... We wish to assure a stable future for our people. We desire an increase of the elements of our national life and progress. We ask yet more, and for that reason, in reiterating, as we hereby do reiterate, our urgent petition for liberty and independence for the people of the Philippine Islands, we, the elected representatives of the Filipino people, express our confidence that the efforts of the President of the United States to secure the fulfillment of his promises and the realization of our lawful hopes will obtain early and complete success." The quick action of the Senate Philippine Committee at once placed the bill on the Senate calendar, and when that body reconvened after the holiday recess, it was the first feature of the so-called "administration legislative program " to be ready for action. The debate began in the Senate on January 5, 1916, and attention was at once centered on the preamble, as modified by the Senate Committee on the Philippines. Question was immediately raised as to what possible interpretation could be given the independence promise contained therein. Would it settle in a satisfactory manner the vexatious Philippine problem? Would it really pave the way for the independence of the Philippines? Could it not be construed to mean that the American nation was free to refuse ever to grant the Filipinos their independence because of the belief that the permanent interests of the Islands would always demand retention by the United States? In the opening speech of Senator Hitchcock he was interrupted by Senator Cummins of Iowa with this same inquiry. "Suppose," said Mr. Cummins, "that I believe it would be better for the people of the Philippine Islands to remain permanently attached to the United States as a State, with all the privileges of a State, or otherwise, would I not fulfill the promise or assurance of the preamble in voting to retain the Philippine

Page  343 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMP.LGN IN AMERICA 343 Islands as a part of the territory of the United States?" To this Hr. Hitchcock very candidly answered, "I presume the Senator would." Here was the confession of the authorof the bill himself that the preamble was not an explicit pledge that the Philippines should be given their independence. Interest was aroused by this revelation. American sentiment in favor of Philippine independence had always been widespread, but was rather dormant, because of the lack of interst on the part of most citizens in Philippine affairs, because of the great distances that separate them from the Islands, and because of the impression created among them by the retentionists that the Filipinos needed generations of training and trusteeship before the question of independence could be wisely discussed. This dormant sentiment was now for the first time beginning to take definite form. Again the question was raised by Democratic senators as to whether' or not the preamble of the bill really carried out the platform pledge of the Democratic party. Would a measure which merely made the Philippine Government more liberal and which, according to the statement of the author himself, might or might not lead to the granting of Philippine independence, be really in accord with Democratic platforms and promises? Was it not in effect a further evasion of the question of independence? Sentiment in favor of a more definite statement of policy thereupon increased in the Senate. Taking advantage of this trend of feeling, Senator Clarke of Arkansas, on January 12, 1916, made it known that he would introduce an amendment which would grant the Filipinos their independence in two years, would instruct the President to negotiate neutralization treaties with as many nations as were willing to sign such agreements, and would make the United States the sole guarantor of such independence in case no nation was willing to join as a signatory. The President was reported to be opposed to this amendment on the ground that a definite and irrevocable date when independence should be granted was a most unwise provision because nobody knew in what situation the United States would

Page  344 344 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS find itself at any particular time. When Senator Clarke learned of the objection of the President to the establishment of a definite fixed date, he modified his amendment so as to make the granting of independence effective in not less than two and not more than four years, with a further provision to the effect that the President might extend the time to one year more and might again submit the subject to Congress. The President, thereupon, withdrew his objection. Mr. Clarke further perfected his amendment and when finally passed, it had taken shape as follows:, The President is hereby authorized and directed to withdraw and surrender all right of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control, or sovereignty now existing and exercised by the United States in and over the territory and people of the Philippines, and he shall on behalf of the United States fully recognize the independence of the said Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same of the government instituted by the people thereof, and full power to take the several steps necessary to institute such government is hereby conferred upon the said Philippines acting by and through governmental agencies created by this Act. This transfer of possession, sovereignty, and governmental control shall be completed and become absolute not less than two years nor more than four years from the date of the approval of this Act, under the terms and in the manner hereinafter prescribed: Provided, That if the President, prior to the expiration of the said period of four years, shall find that the condition of the internal or external affairs of said Philippines in respect to the stability or efficiency of the proposed government thereof is such as to warrant him in so doing, he is hereby further authorized, by proclamation duly made and published, to extend the said time to and including the date of the final adjournment of the session of Congress which shall convene next after the date of the expiration of the said period of four years, and thus afford the Congress an opportunity in its discretion to further consider the situation in the said Philippines; but any such extension of time by the President shall not otherwise suspend or nullify the operative force of this Act, unless the Congress shall hereafter so direct. For the purpose of a complete and prompt compliance with this direction, the President is hereby invested with full power and

Page  345 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 345 authority to make such orders and regulations and to enter into such negotiations with the authorities of said Philippines or others as may be necessary to finally settle and adjust all property rights and other relations as between the United States and the said Philippines, and to cause to be acknowledged, respected, and safe-guarded all of the personal and property rights of citizens or corporations of the United States and of other countries residents or engaged in business in said Philippines or having property interests therein. In any such settlement or adjustment so made in respect to the rights and property of the United States as against the said Philippines the President may reserve or acquire such lands and rights and privileges appurtenant thereto as may, in his judgment, be required by the United States for naval bases and coaling stations within the territory of said Philippines. Upon the motion of Senator Kenyon of Iowa (Republican) the following guarantee and neutralization provisions had been stricken out: Immediately upon the passage of the Act, the President shall invite the cooperation of the principal nations interested in the affairs of that part of the world in which the Philippines are located, in the form of a treaty or other character of binding agreement, whereby the cooperating nations shall mutually pledge themselves to recognize and respect the sovereignty and independence of the said Philippines, and also to mutually obligate themselves, equally and not one primarily nor to any greater extent than another, to maintain as against external force the sovereignty of said Philippines. If any of the nations so invited to join the United States in such undertaking shall decline to do so, then the President shall include as parties to such convention or agreement such nations as may be willing to join therein and assume such obligations; and if none are willing to so unite therein, then the President is authorized to give such guaranty on behalf of the United States alone for the period of five years from and after the expiration of said period of four years, or any extension thereof, and pending the existence of such separate guaranty by the United States, the United States shall be entitled to retain and exercise such control and supervision in the said Philippines as may be necessary to enforce order therein and to avoid external complications. (1) -(1) Kalaw, The Case for the Filpirios, Ch. M.

Page  346 :346 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The Clarke Amendment was adopted in the Committee of the Whole House of the Senate by a vote of forty-one to forty-one, Vice-President Marshall casting his deciding vote affirmatively. The final vote on the bill as amended was taken on February 4, 1916, fifty-two ayes and twentyfour nays, the Democrats solidly voting for it while six Republicans joined with them. With the possible exception of one or two leaders, the support manifested in the Philippines for the measure, even if it did not have any guarantee for independence, was strong. The Philippine Assembly adopted the following resolution: Whereas, the Clarke Amendment to the Philippine Bill now pending before the Senate of the United States specifies the conditions under which independence shall be granted to the people of the Philippine Islands, expedites the granting of that independence, and safeguards the internal and external affairs of the said islands pending the granting of said independence; Whereas, said amendment makes the independence provision of the preamble more clear, explicit, unequivocal, and expeditious, and fixes the responsibilities which the people of the United States and the people of the Philippine Islands shall respectively assume before and after the granting of said independence; Therefore Resolved, that the Philippine Assembly should recommend, as it does hereby respectfully recommend, the passage of said amendment by the Congress and the President of the United States. After the passage of the Clarke amendment in the Senate it was naturally sent to the House. Now the opponents of independence had awakened, and they began a tremendous campaign. Caucuses were held by the Democrats in the House to decide on the Clarke amendment. Some twenty-eight Democrats showed their determination not to be bound by the decisions of the caucus, so that although the caucus favored independence, these twenty-eight Democrats who refused to be bound by its decisions assured the defeat of the Clarke amendment. The following cable

Page  347 THE INDEPENDENCE CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA 34117 gram from Mr. Quezon to Speaker Osmeija tells of the tremendous fight against the Clarke amendment: WASHINGTON, April 27,1916. SPEAKER, Cebu. Opposition to Clarke Amendment among democrats strong. Majority of Catholic members against it. Last night no decision was reached. There will be another caucus tonight. Suggest you secure cable from Filipino Clergy or Bishops favoring Senate Bill with Clarke Amendment, addressed to President through Governor Martin. President has written letter indorsing Senate Bill including Clarke Amendment. Cable Harrison urging he cable some of the New York Democrats. Work of publicity essential. Talk to Ferguson and have them authorize me to ask Far Eastern Bureau to openly advocate independence. QUEZON. The next day President Quezon foresaw the defeat of the Clarke Amendment. He cabled Speaker Osmena as follows: WASHINGTON, April 28, 1916. SPEAKER, Cebu. Indorsement from Harty and other bishops including Apostolic Delegate would be essential. The result of caucus indicates that Clarke Amendment will be defeated. Twentyeight Democrats refused to obey caucus decision and in view of small Democratic majority this means defeat Clarke Amendment. Almost all those who rebelled are Catholics. QUEZON. The cable of May 2 tells of the defeat of the Clarke Amendment: WASHINGTON, May 2, 1916. SPEAKER, Manila. Referring to telegram from your office of second instant, House not only defeated Clarke Amendment but instructed its conferees not to agree to any fixed date. The defeat of Clarke Amendment, therefore, in this bill is definite. Instruct me whether I shall work that Senate agree to Jones

Page  348 348 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Bill. Defeat of Clarke Amendment by big majority in the House, and its passage by only the Vice-President's vote in the Senate proves that I was right when I said that in my opinion Congress is against fixing in advance date for independence. I have fought all I could for Clarke amendment. QUEZON. (1X Approval of the Jones LaIv As between no legislation and the Jones Bill, the decision was naturally for the Jones Bill. Several explanations as to the defeat of the Clarke amendment have been given. One was that the Catholics of America had instructed the Catholic members of Congress to vote against it. As a result all but three Catholics voted against the Clarke amendment. Another explanation was that Mr. Murphy, of Tammany Hall, wanted to show the President that Tammany Hall could yet defeat him, for the President had been having his own way in legislation before this time. After the defeat of the Clarke Amendment in the House of Representatives, the Jones Bill with its preamble, which had passed in 1914, was again approved with hardly any opposition. Conferences were then held between representatives of the Senate and House, and on August 29, the Jones bill, with some modifications, was finally approved. (2) (1) These cablegrams are taken from the private collection of the writer. He was secretary to Commissioner Queson at the time and thus had opportunity to observe, collect documents, and note down facts about the proceedings of Congress on Philippine bills. (2) Public No. 240, 64th Congress, S. 381.

Page  349 CHAPTER XII BEGINNINGS OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY UNDER GOVERNOR I-TARRISON'S ADMINSTRATION (1913-1916) It will be our task now to describe the politics and the governmental development in the Philippines from the first year of Governor Harrison's administration to the passage of the Jones Law. At the beginning of this period Philippine politics took on a broader aspect; for the Filipino people, through their leaders, were given a much greater participation in governmental affairs, hence their activities branched out into practically every part of the governmental machinery. "The New Era" Upon the day of his arrival in Manila on Ooctober 6, 1913, Governor Harrison delivered a message from President Wilson and outlined his general line of policy. He was met on the Luneta by an immense crowd who came to hear what the new administration had to offer. In delivering the President's message, Governor Harrison said: Citizens of the Philippine Islands: The President of the United States has charged me to deliver to you the following message on behalf of the government of our country: "We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the advantage of the United States but for the benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands. Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence. And we hope to move towards that end as rapidly as the safety and the permanent interests of the Islands will permit. After each step taken, experience will guide us to the next. The Administration will take one step at once and will give to the native citizens of the Islands a majority in the appointive Commission, and thus in the Upper as well as in the Lower House of the Legislature a majority representation will be secured to them.

Page  350 350 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS We do this in the confident hope and expectation that immediate proof will be given, in the action of the Commission under the new arrangement of the political capacity of those native citizens who have already come forward to represent and to lead their people in affairs." This is the message I bear to you from the President of the United States. With his sentiments and with his policy I am in complete accord. Within the scope of my office as governor-general I shall do my utmost to aid in the fulfillment of our promises, confident that we shall thereby hasten the coming of the day of your independence. For my own part I should not have accepted the responsibility of this great office merely for the honor and the power which it confers. My only motive in coming to you is to serve, as well as in me lies, the people of the Philippine Islands. It is my greatest hope that I may become an instrument in the further spread of democratic government. To every Democrat, government rests only upon the consent of the governed. And we do not maintain that selfgovernment is the peculiar property of our nation, or that democratic institutions are the exclusive privilege of our race. On the other hand we do not believe that we can endow you with the capacity for self-government. That you must have acquired for yourselves. The opportunity of demonstrating it lies before you now in an ever-widening field. As for ourselves, we confidently expect of you that dignity of bearing and that self-rdstraint, which are the outward evidences of daily increasingInational consciousness. In promising you on behalf of thq Administration immediate control of both branches of yourjpegislature I remind you, however, that for the present we, ire responsible to the world for your welfare and for your ipogress. Until your independence is complete we shall demand of you unremitting recognition of our sovereignty. You are now on trial before an international tribunal that is as wide as the world. We who appear before this august court in the light of your advocates are proud of the privilege that has fallen to us and we do not shun the responsibilities of our role, which is without a parallel in history. We shall eagerly await convincing proof that you are capable of establishing a stable government of your own. Such a government may not necessarily denote an entire reproduction of our own institutions but one which guarantees to its citizens complete security of life, of liberty, and of property. We now invite you to share with us responsibility for such a government here. Every Filipino may

Page  351 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY ETC. best serve his country who serves us in this endeavor. And to that end I call upon every good citizen of these islands and all who dwell therein, whether of native or foreign birth, for assistance and support. People of the Philippine Islands! A new era is dawning! We place within your reach the instruments of your redemption. The door of opportunity stands open and, under Divine Providence, the event is in your own hands. Many of those who took at face value the statements of Mr. Taft, that the American policy in the Islands was the general extension of self-government to the natives, were not a Armed at the change President Wilson had thus inaugurated in the Commission. They said that it was not only in line with, but was the natural and immediate sequel to, Mr. Taft's policy. The Filipinos had had a lower house for some years, with evident success, and therefore it was now time to give them control of the tipper house. There were others -especially those who had taken part in the administration of the Philippines-wrho contended that the reform gave all power to the Filipinos and thus destroyed the basis of American government in the Islands. There were, on the other hand, still those who thought the reform not sufficiently radical to satisfy the President's past pledgs nor sufficiently conservative to protect the interests ofAmericans in the Islands. In reality, howeveri. Mr. Wilson's administrative policy was different from MriTaft's. Mr. Taft made this clear, for he never let an op lrtunity slip by without a criticism of the new policy. ~le two administrative policies may be contrasted as follows: Mr. Taft would control the whole Philippine Government, direct the entire development of the country and the progress of the people, giving the natives advisory and some slight legislative power, while at the same time promising them in a distant, vague future self-government. Americans would be the directing force in this formative period of Philippine nationhood; the Filipinos a mere advisory or negative element. Mr. Wilson, on the other hand, would give them at once the control of, quoting his own words, "the essential instruments of their life, their local instrumentalities of government, their A

Page  352 352 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS schools, all the common interest of their communities," so that they could "set up a government which all the world will see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their control." "By their counsel and experience rather than by our own, we shall learn how best to serve them and how soon it will be possible and wise to withdraw our supervision," says Mr. Wilson. He would give them, in a word, "the instruments of their redemption," and as their Governor, Mr. Harrison interpreted it, teach them selfgovernment by the exercise of self-government. Governor Harrison followed to the letter his new policy. He did govern in the Islands with as much consent of the governed as was possible under the circumstances. Moreover, he made it public that to a large extent he owed his appointment as governor to Resident Commissioner Quezon. "At the very beginning," he states, "I made of record the fact that I had come to govern the Islands in consultation also with the Filipinos. I was thus brought into immediate and daily contact with Mr. Sergio Osmenia, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, president of the Nacionalista party and the leading Representative of the Filipino people. This remarkable man had already been Speaker for five years, and still holds that office. I found him extremely well informed, not only about Philippine affairs, but about American history and Constitutional law. Wise, astute, and cautious, of an impressive personality, he was also possessed of most remarkably good manners, which never failed him. For the past thirteen years he and Mr. Quezon have been the dominant personalities in Philippine politics." (1) His first duty was the appointment of the new members of the Commission. The Filipinos were now to have five of the nine members of the upper house. Mr. Osmefia furnished him with twelve names and he proposed to submit the list to the Philippine Assembly "so that all the elected representatives of the people might have a share in the selection." But this plan, said Mr. Harrison, was (1) HarrLon, Francis Burton, The Corner-Stone of Phiippine Independence, p. 64.

Page  353 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY ETC. 353 vetoed by the Secretary of War. (1) A coalition commission was formed. The five Filipino members of the Commission represented what might be called a non-party combination with preponderant nationalist leanings. They were as follows: Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice, and member of the Commission, independent with nationalist leanings; Rafael Palma, member of the Commission, nationalist, reappointed, being the only nationalist who had been a member of the old Commission; Jaime C. de Veyra, member of the Commission, nationalist; Vicente Hustre, member of the Commission, independent nationalist of the radical type; and Vicente Singson Encarnacion, member of the Commission, leader of the Progresista Party in the Philippine Assembly. Filipinization The next work of Mr. Harrison was concerned with Filipinization. He found that since 1907 no increase of Filipino employees in the government had been effected. In 1913 there were actually more Americans in the service than in 1907 or 1908. (2) This was contrary to the Republican policy enunciated by President McKinley in his instructions to the Taft Commission, in which it was stated: "In all cases the municipal officers, who administer the local affairs of the people, are to be selected by the people, and that wherever officers of more extended jurisdiction are to be selected in any way, natives of the Islands are to be preferred, and if they can be found competent and willing to perform the duties they are to receive the office in preference to any others." Filipinos were first appointed as assistant chiefs of bureaus as a preparation for greater responsibilities. About half a dozen resignations were asked from Americans. The municipal board of the city of Manila, which consisted in the majority of Americans, was now Filipinized, a majority (1) Harrison, op. cit., p. 75. (2) Harrison, op. cit., p. 75.

Page  354 354 THE DVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS of Filipinos being appointed. From 1914 to 1916 more than 600 Americans left the service. They were given financial inducements in the shape of retirement pay. In some individual cases, this policy undoubtedly worked some hardship. Indeed, hardly had the new regime been set in working order in the Islands when reports of its disastrous effects began to flood the entire Union. American employees, it was reported, were dismissed by the hundred; their families were dying of hunger. Government efficiency had become a thing of the past. Governor Harrison was denounced and vilified in the eyes of his own people as the principal source of all these evils. Business was said to be totally paralyzed. In so far as Philippine politics was concerned, one of the immediate results of the new policy, especially of the appointment of a majority of Filipinos on the Commission, was the breaking of the deadlock which had existed since 1911 between the upper house and the assembly with regard to the appropriation bills. The proposal of the assembly with regard to the methods of passing appropriation measures was approved, which meant a decided triumph for the leaders of the lower house. (1) Another immediate effect of Mr. Harrison's policy in the Philippines was the establishment of friendly relations between Americans and Filipinos. Confidence in America, which had been rather badly shaken because of the previous conflicts between the Commission and the Assembly, was received. Even if there had been in the beginning as a result of Filipinization some impairment in the efficiency of the public administration-and a change of personnel usually means that-such an impairment was more than compensated for by the good feelings engendered and the opportunity thus allowed the Filipinos to get governmental training by actually holding positions of responsibility. It has never been claimed that popular government or self-government is more efficient than an imposed bureau (1) Supra, p. 819.

Page  355 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY ETC. cracy. Yet the writer wvill not even admit that there was a general and continuous impairment of governmental efficiency as a result of Filipinization. There was a remarkable improvement made in some directions, especially by virtue of the reorganization of the executive departments, of which we shall speak further later on. The Democrata Party is Established (1914) While the Democratic administration in the Philippines certainly strengthened the Nationalist Party, because its avowed policy was to rule with the cooperation of the party in power, whichever that might be, less than a year of the new era in the Philippines saw the secession of a small group of nationalists from the party's fold under the leadership of Teodoro Sandiko, and the establishment of a new party called the Partido Democrata Nacional, popularly known as the Third Party. In' its manifesto of April 2, 1914, it gave several reasons for its existence. It charged the nationalists with establishing "a system of centralized administration and very personal or autocratic government," with preventing "free and open discussion of questions of general interests," and with refusing to be guided "in their acts and decisions by the voice and demands of public opinion." "They have not even established in due form the Executive Committee of the party," it said. "They have simply taken up with a few groups of friends those subjects in which the party as a whole is interested, submitted them all to a few persons and confabs of relatives, thus converting into well-organized comedies what should have been public discussions in the entire country, having gone to the extent of solving grave matter of social interest around the table of certain clubs which had been established for other ends. This conduct is probably what induced the American imperialists to maintain that the independence of our country would mean the government of a few and the total sacrifice of the people to their whimsa statement which we must rectify at once, not with vain protests but with decisive acts. Since these alleged leaders

Page  356 356 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS of nationalism refuse to hear our fraternal advice that they desist from their roles as tzars in politics, it is necessary that we separate from them, leaving them to their impenitent oligarchy." The new party advocated the initiative, referendum and recall, the preferential ballot system in the election of representatives, the abolishment of the existing rules of the assembly, "which tend to convert it into a blind machine," the extension of suffrage to those who could read only the native dialect, industrial and commercial independence, pensions for invalids and the old, the strengthening of the judiciary, and greater autonomy for provincial governors. "Abroad," the manifesto continues, "we shall urge the attainment of political independence guaranteed by the most secure of all gurantees, to wit, the good treatment and protection which the lives and properties of foreigners will receive, to whom we shall open the doors of the well-known Philippine hospitality and even of our naturalization laws if they in good faith so desire." The party approved rules in the convention of October 10, 1914.(1) The Progresista Party, on the other hand, waJs apparently also getting ready to accept the plan of early independence and to discard its program of independence after a period of preparation. At the convention of the party held on February 11, 1914, a resolution was passed requesting the Congress of the United States definitely to declare 'that it is the purpose of the United States to grant the Philippines its independence, conserving at the same time its territorial integrity," and asking that independence be "under the protection of the United States until the country is able to repel foreign invasion." This was but a restatement of its resolution of November, 1911. (2) The opposition parties were opposed not only to the nationalist party in power, but also to Governor Harrison's policy of consulting the nationalists in the legislature, es(1) While this manifesto was signed on April 2, 1914, a similar one, perhaps the rough draft, appeared in El Comercio, March 21, 1914. (2) The Filipino People, July, 1914, p. 24.

Page  357 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY ETC. 357 pecially their leader, Speaker Osmefia, to the exclusion of the opposition party. In reply to this accusation, Commisioner Quezon, in a brillant address said: We have no independence as yet, we cannot get it now, but the American administration, in spite of the fact that while its flag is here, it has the sovereign right to rule the country according to its will, consults those Filipinos who have been elected by the people to represent them. Is the administration criticised for this act? Gentlemen, the best proof that President Wilson is sincere and that Governor General Harrison is sincere in their desire to give the Philippines its independence and pending the granting of that independence to govern the country in accordance with the will of the Filipino people, is the fact that they consult a representative Filipino in the matter of public policy for the country. (Applause) What do they complain of? Because a Filipino is consulted? I think not. Do they want the Americans to govern us according to their sacred will disregarding our opinion and our desires? If that is their desire let them.say so, and they will know how the people will take it. (Applause, voices no, no). They do not complain if the Filipinos are consulted but they do criticise the fact that Speaker Osmefia is consulted? And from whom is the advice to be sought? (Laughter) Who is the Filipino now who has the right to say that he represents the Filipino people? Is it perchance the Filipino who says "I am the Filipino people?" (Laughter, applause). Speaker Osmefia may make a mistake when he endeavors to express the will of the people, and perhaps in fact he does make mistakes. But even if on every occasion Speaker Osmefia should make a mistake, if the administration of Wilson and Harrison desires to establish here a really democratic administration, it must consult with the only Filipino who has received by popular suffrage the national representation... When D. Juan Sumulong becomes Speaker of the Assembly, when my illustrious friend, former colleague and respected governor, Colonel Sandiko becomes Speaker of the Assembly, I shall be the first in demanding that they be. consulted in all things that are done in the Philippines. (Loud, long, and enthusiastic applause). (1) (1) Speech delivered at the banquet commemorating the incorporation of the Lige Popular Nacionalista into the Nationalist Party, Manila, September 12, 1915.

Page  358 358 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS Progresista-Democrata Fusion The elections of 1916 made it evident that the opposition parties must do something in order to maintain an effective opposition. The stain of federalism from which the Progresistas could not escape continued telling heavily on them. The Nationalist Party made further gains. The close cooperation between Harrison's administration and the nationalists must have been to a large measure responsible for this ever-growing strength of the party in power. What had possibly induced a portion of the conservative Filipinos to look with kindly eyes towards the Progresistas was the belief that the American government would be better disposed to the Progresistas because of their leaning toward the previous policy of the American administration. Now here was a new administration which did not hide its support even for the ideals of the nationalists; how then could the people be expected to be more conservative than the Americans themselves? The fact also must be added that the domestic policy of the nationalists under the leadership of Osmenia was not as radical as people- expected in the beginning. The following results, therefore, of the elections of 1916, did not surprise many people: Nacionalistas............ 75 Progresistas.................... 7 Democratas Nacionales...........2 Independientes................... 6(1) The elections for provincial governors in that year were equally disastrous for the Progresistas: Nacionalistas.................... 22 Progresistas..................... 3 Independientes.................... 7 If there'were still some Progresistas who had hopes that in time the people might turn back to them, such hopes completely vanished after the elections of 1916. Their greatest handicap was the fact that they were the descendants of the Federalists who had repudiated the ideal of in(i) Nine of the members of the- lower house however, were appointed by the Governor General to represent the non-Christian provinces.

Page  359 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY ETC. 39,B dependence. On the other hand, the new party, the Democrata Nacional, seemed to show more convincing signs of life in Manila, where they were able to elect one representative. The Dernocratas, it may be remembered, were just as strong for immediate independence as the nationalists. In fact they were charging the Nationalists with being insincere in their plea for independence and with showing gross incapacity for managing the affairs of government, an incapacity which became in the eyes of the American imperialists a great obstacle to independence. The Progresista leaders saw that the only way out of the dilemma was fusion with the Democratas. The amalgamation of the two opposition parties took place on April 22, 1917. The Progresistas were apparently willing to fuse on any terms. The meeting which decided the fusion was attended by the presidents and the directorates of the two parties, other leaders and committee members from the nearby and some Visayan provinces. The Progresistas were willing to forego their ideal of evolutionary independence in favor of immediate independence, and they would even accept the name Partido Democrata provided that the word "nacional" was omitted. So the fused party became known as Partido Democrata. The following officers were elected at the meeting: President, General Teodoro Sandiko; First Vice-President, Joaquin Quintos; Secretary, Gregorio Perfecto; Treasurer, Guillermo F. Ruiz. The Members of the Board of Directors were Pedro Gil, Alfonso E. Mendoza, Antonio Montenegro, Geronimo Santiago, Eulogio Rodriguez, and Domingo Antonio. (1) The Jones Law In the meanwhile Governor Harrison, with the cooperation of the Nationalists, continued in this new policy of attraction and Filipinization. During the first three years of Mr. Harrison's administration, no reform of importance was made in the machinery of government. It was only the personnel which suffered changes. Mr. Harrison and (1) See La Naid4n, organ of the Partido Democrata, for April 23, 1917.

Page  360 360 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS the nationalist leaders believed that the period was a transition one, for they were expecting definite legislation from Congress which would settle the independence problem and provide a new government in the Islands. This legislation, as we have seen, came in the form of the Jones Law. Let us see what governmental changes were provided for in the spirit and in the letter of this law. The Jones Law was first reported to Congress on Aug ust 26, 1914. Congressman Jones, in reporting the measure, explained its objects, in part, as follows: Every Philippine administration has at some timne or other put forward the statement that as soon as it had been demonstrated that the inhabitants of the islands were capable of self-government complete independence should be granted to them. This opportunity the proposed bill will grant them. It creates such a degree of autonomy as will enable them by demonstrating their capacity for self-government to hasten the date for final separation between the United States and Philippines. The object, therefore,. of the bill, according to its author, was to give to the Filipinos every opportunity possible for the exercise of self-government, in order that they might justify their claim for it. But the Jones Law, not only extends in a very large measure the autonomy of the Filipinos, but also promises them in its preamble that, when through the exercise of the powers granted them they shall have shown that a stable government can be established in the Philippines, independence shall be granted them. When the bill was first presented there was opposition on the part of the Republicans to the preamble containing the promise of independence. But most of the other legislative features of the bill were approved by even the Republican members of the House. The report on the Jones Bill submitted by Republican members of the House Committee on Insular Affairs stated that they "would be glad to extend to them (the Filipinos) from time to time as may be justified a larger measure of self-government. Many of us have no objections to an elective senate or to some of the other changes in existing law provided in the bill."

Page  361 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONM01Y ETC. 361 In 1916 when a strong movement was initiated in the United States for the passage of a more radical measnre, the Clarke amendment, the Republicans also took a step forward, and advocated a more liberal measure for the Philippines. They would now accept the Jones Bill introduced in 1914, including its preamble, which wvas similar to the present Jones Law, only with more liberal provisions. In dissenting from the position of the majority in the House Insular Committee on the Clarke amendment, the Republicans, on April 12, 1916 said: The minority entirely agree with the majority that the Philippines should be given a new fundamental law granting to the people a larger measure of self-government. The minority would gladly support the passage of the Jones Bill without the preamble. They would even support the Jones bill with the preamble as a substitute for the Senate Bill with the Clarke amendment.(1) In pursuance of such an attitude the Jones Law, exactly as it had passed the Lower House in 1914, was repassed by practically unanimous vote. As is commonly known, the Senate showed more radical tendencies toward the Philippines, for it passed the Clarke amendment. The Conference report presented to the two houses was adopted by both without much opposition, and the Jones Bill became the Jones Law. Mr. C. B. Miller, who had opposed the bill in 1914, on August 18, 1916, switched in favor of the bill, and said: "I am willing to give the bill a full, fair and generous trial, aiding in every possible way the success of the enterprise." Another Republican member, this time of the Upper House, Senator Colt, said: "The bill, in part, is simply a confirmation of our settled line of policy to install in the Philippines, step by step, the American system of self-government." While there were some questions expressed as to the time when the Filipinos should sever their relations with the United States, there was hardly a dissenting vote on the policy of the bill to extend autonomy in the Philippines. (1) Re-pt. 449, Part 2, 64th Codg. 18t her., p. 14.

Page  362 062 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS Thus another Republican Senator, Mr. Nelson, said: "It seems to me that the proper course is to give those people a high, fair, and good degree of self-government, but to let them remain under the Stars and Stripes as a part of the domain of the United States of America." So much for the Republican support of the bill. We shall learn the real extent of the autonomy granted in the bill from the initiators of the measure themselves, the Democratic leaders. Congressman Jones, on August 18, 1916, explained the extent of the autonomy as follows: It virtually places it in the power of the Philippine people to say when they shall receive the full substance of self-rule and independence. That they can and will establish a stable government upon a firm and enduring basis I have never permitted myself to doubt; and they may confidently rely upon the plighted word and good faith of the American people that when these conditions are met they will be given coniplete independence. For these reasons I entertain the hope-indeed, I firmly believe-that the provisions of this bill which relate to the future political status of the Philippine Islands will meet the approval of a vast majority if not of all of their educated and thinking people. It is because of my abiding faith in their intelligence and patriotism that, for one, I am willing to commit their destinies into their own hands and keeping. The governmental features of this bill will work many important changes in the organic law of the Philippines. Without materially altering the structure of the present government, it practically confers all legislative power upon that people, thus giving to them the control of their domestic affairs in all essential particulars. In another part of the speech, Mr. Jones referred to the bill as a covenant between the American people and the Filipino people. He said: When the President of the United States affixes his signature to this already too long-delayed measure of justice and right, it will mark an epoch in the history of this Nation as well as in that of the Philippine Islands, for the pages of the annals of the world will be searched in vain for its counterpart. For it not only bestows upon the Philippine people a measure of self-government such as they have never enjoyed under the sovereignty of this or any other nation, but it establishes what to them is dearer than all

Page  363 BEGINNING OF FILIPI NO AUTONOMY ETC. else-the everlasting covenant of a great and generous people, speaking through their accredited representatives, that they shall in due time enjoy the incomrparable blessings of liberty and freedom. (1) The purpose of the measure, as explained in its preamble, isTo place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing their exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence. That the Filipino people also expected a substantial degree of autonomy under the Jones Law was shown by the attitude of their representative in Congress during the discussion of the measure. Resident Commissioner Quezon, on August 18, 1916, said, on the floor of Congress: Heretofore we have been the least and the last factor in the Philippine affairs. Hereafter we shall be the first and most important factor. Heretofore things were done by the Philippine government not only without the consent but on many occasions against the strong opposition of the Filipino people. Hereafter nothing will be done without our consent, much less in defiance of our opposition. So I say, Mr. Speaker this bill is a long and very decisive step toward the complete emancipation of the Filipino people. It marks an epoch in our national history. We are convinced that the promise of independence contained in the bill will be faithfully fulfilled, for we know that we are dealing with a Nation in the truest sense jealous of its honor and its good name. In explaining the meaning of the Jones Law to the Filipino people, Governor General Harrison, on September 1, 1916, said: "It should never be possible, and it will now never be so here, for an executive to ride ruthlessly over the people he is sent here to govern, without due regard for their sentiments and due consideration of their wishes." (1) Quotedl in Kalaw, Present Governmient of the Philippines, p. 7.

Page  364 364 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS Such were the manifest purposes and intention of the Jones Law as they were gathered from the utterances of those who were responsible for its passage and as they were interpreted by the Filipino representative. Henceforward the Filipino people were to enjoy the largest measure of autonomy compatible with the exercise of American sovereignty. They were no longer to be ruled "ruthlessly" by a Governor-General, in defiance of their wishes and desires. It was their "counsel and experience" which would be followed in the governance of the Philippines, rather than the "counsel and experience" of the Americans. The Main Defect of the Jones Law Although the Jones Law was certainly a much more liberal measure than the Organic Act of 1902, it made the problem of popular government in the Islands in a way more difficult. Being a complete constitution made by an alien people, outlining a framework of government for another people, ten thousand miles away, living a different life and nourished by different political traditions, its practical application presented some very serious problems. The solution of these problems by the Filipino people would in itself help to indicate the grade of political capacity they have attained. The fundamental defect of the Jones Law consisted in the fact that Filipinos were granted and told to operate a complete system of government in the framing of which they had but a very small share, if any. Under the Jones Act, besides the Philippine Assembly, two other governmental instruments or powers were given the Filipinos: to the lower elective house was added an elective senate, and the Philippine Legislature was given the power to reorganize the executive departments, with the exception of the Department of Public Instruction. The organiwation of the new government brought forth several serious problems. These three organs of government, two legislative and one executive, must collectively possess, for their proper and efficient operation, first, harmony of action, and second, effective responsibility to the people. These qual

Page  365 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY ETC. 365 ities should exist in all governments, but particularly in a governmental organization still dependent on a foreign flag. While we remain under American sovereignty we must have complete harmony of action and community of purpose in all the governmental organs that may be given us; and, lest these organs be used arbitrarily, they must be made amenable to public opinion and responsible to the people. How could this be done? When we had only one organ for expressing the people's will, the Philippine Assembly, and a new Governor wanted to use this organ so that he might govern with the sanction of public opinion, it was easy to place the responsibility on the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly. He was, as one editor graphically described him, at the head of the Philippine Government on behalf of the Filipino people. Who was to take that place under the new arrangement? Should it be the Speaker of the Assembly as before? But how about the President of the Senate? And the heads of departments? How was the collective counsel of the people to be represented? Who was the Filipino power in the government who, by virtue of what he represented, was entitled to be heard first on important state affairs? Who was to be mainly responsible for the failure and success of the Filipino part in the government? Party Organization Thus the problem of unified and responsible leadership became an issue among the Nationalist members from the beginning of the operation of the Jones Law. Hitherto the relationship between the party in power and the government had been simple. The recognized leader or Presi-^ dent of the Nationalist Party held at the same time the highest political position in the government open to a Filipino, the speakership of the Philippine Assembly. There was, therefore, no duality of party leadership, one legal and the other extra-legal, which is often the case in the United States, as we shall see.

Page  366 366 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINF POLITICS The Nationalist Party had, however, a separate party organization quite apart from, but naturally working in harmony with, the government. The Nationalist Party was organizeI under three main units of Division: * * * (a) The Municipal Colleges and the Municipal Committees: (b) The Provincial Colleges and the Provincial Committees; (c) The National Convention, the National Committee and the Executive Committee. Each Municipal College was composed of those affiliated with the party within the limits of the municipality in which it was organized. For this purpose Manila was divided into as many Municipal Colleges as there were districts. The members of the Municipal College met when convoked by the Municipal Committee, the Provincial Committee or the National Committee to nominate official candidates of the party. The Municipal College elected every four years at the date set by the National Committee, a Municipal Committee, composed of a President, a VicePresident, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and as many members as there were districts in the municipality. In a town dominated by the party the municipal committee was composed of chief elective officials of the locality. The Municipal College nominated by a majority vote the official candidates of the party for municipal positions. It elected three delegates to the Provincial College from each electoral division into which the municipality was divided. The College could.istruct and bind its delegates to vote in the Provincial College. The Provincial College elected a Provincial Committee composed of a President, a VicePresident, a Treasurer, a Secretary and three members. It nominated the candidates by a majority of the votes and elected one delegate-at-large for the whole province and two delegates for each electoral district into which the province was devided. These delegates represented the province in the National Convention. Like the Municipal College, the Provincial College could instruct and bind the National del

Page  367 BEGINNING OF FILIPINO AUTONOMY ETC. 367 egates to vote a certain ticket and advocate definite platforms in the National Convention. The National Convention was the repository of the final authority of the party. It defined the fundamental ideals of the Nacionalista Party and solved the grave problems of the Party. It could be convoked by the National Committee, which set the exact date and hour for its meeting. The Convention was presided over by a temporary chairman designated by the National Committee, and the Secretary of the National Committee acted as the Secretary of the Convention. The Order of Business of the Convention was as follows: 1. Appointment of the committee on credentials and rules; 2. Report of these committees; 3. Permanent organization of the Convention upon the election of a President and a Permanent Secretary; 4. The appointment of committees on platforms, resolutions, and other committees; 5. The adoption of the platform and other resolutions; 6. The settlement of new business not included in the preceding sections; 7. The designation of the National Committee which is composed of members from each provincial delegation; 8. Adjournment. The National Committee met immediately after the meeting of the National Convention to elect a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary-Treasurer and two members, who constituted the Executive Committee of the Party. (1) The Democrata Party was organized somewhat like the Nacionalista Party. There were municipal Assemblies and Municipal Committees equivalent to the Municipal Colleges and Municipal Committees of the Nacionalista Party; Provincial Assemblies and Provincial Committees also equiva (1) Reglamento del Partido Nacionaista aprobado en la convenci6n general del partido, 10 de Octubre de 1914.

Page  368 368 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS lent to the Provincial Colleges and the Provincial Committees of the NacionaUista Party; a Grand General Assembly and a Central Committee and a Directorate which were the counterparts of the National Convention, the National Committee, and the Executive Committee of the Nacionalista Party. The Grand National Assembly designated a Central Committee composed of a member from each provincial delegation, and this central Committee elected a President, two Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, and a Secretary and twelve vocales all of whom constituted the directorate of the Central Committee of the Democrata Party. The President of the Nacionalista Party, as we have seen, was at the same time the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, the highest political position in the government, the theory being that the leader of the Party in power should also be the man responsible for the carrying out of the party policies in the government. In accord, perhaps, witt a similar theory, during the fifth legislature the President of the Democrata Party, the Hon. Emiliano T. Tirona, was also the minority leader in the House of Representatives.

Page  369 CHAPTER XIII PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT (1) (1916-1920) The most important reform provided for by the Jones Law was the establishment of an electiveSenate to take the place of the appointive Philippine Commission. The legislative power was now to be vested in a Senate and a House of Representatives, both elected almost entirely by the qualified voters of the Islands. Power of the Legislature The Jones Law confers general legislative power on the Philippine Legislature subject to specific restrictions. Some of these restrictions are as follows: (1) It cannot diminish, although it may increase, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance. (2) It cannot amend, alter, or repeal the provisions regarding appointive senators and representatives. (3) It cannot legislate on the tariff relations between the Philippines and the United States. That is left exclusively in the hands of Congress. (4) It cannot abolish the Bureaus of Education and NonChristian Tribes, or the Philippine Health Service. (5) It cannot assume executive functions apart from the supervision of the Governor-General. (6) It cannot levy export duties. (7) It cannot violate the provisions of the bill of rights. (8) It must follow certain forms in the drafting of bills. (9) Congress reserves the power to alter, amend, or repeal any law, franchise, or rights granted by the Philippine Legislature. (10) The Governor-General, and, in some cases, the President can veto legislation. All bills relating to the tariff, public lands, timber and mining, immigration, and the currency or coinage must receive the signature of the President of the United States before they may be made effective. r- The'Philippine Senate consists of twenty-four members, two senators from each of the twelve senatorial dis(1) This subject is move eytensivfly dealt with in a Succeediynl' volume, Philippi'ne Goverament ut decr the Joanes Law, by the.same author.

Page  370 370 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS tricts created by the Jones Law. The two senators representing the non-Christian district are appointed by the Governor-General. Besides lawmaking the Philippine Senate has three administrative functions to perform: (1) It confirms the appointments made by the Governor-General; (2) it approves the reservations made by the GovernorGeneral of any Friar lands, and the concentration of the inhabitants from outlying barrios for the maintenance of public order; (3) its consent is necessary before the Governor-General can change the import duties on rice established by the Philippine Tariff Act. k-ll The House of Representatives is composed of ninetythree members, nine of whom are appointed by the Governor-General to represent the provinces inhabited by nonChristian people. There must be at least one representative from each province. To be a representative one must be a qualified elector, over twenty-five years old, able to read and write either Spanish or English, and an actual resident of the district for at least one year immediately prior to his election. The New Legislature The elections to Assembly seats which took place in June, 1916, were held valid for membership in the new House of Representatives which succeeded the Assembly. Only a special election for senators was thus required to complete the legislative machinery provided for in the Jones Law. Twenty-one of the twenty-two elective senatorial seats were captured by the Nationalists. On October 16, 1916, the new legislature was inaugurated and on this date the governmental machinery brought over by the Jones Act actually began functioning. Even in the early days of its organization the absence of an officially united and responsible leadership among the nationalist elements in the government, which we have mentioned in the last chapter was apparent. The two houses of the legislature were both elective, with equal legislative powers. The lower house, with its traditions dating from the inaug

Page  371 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 371 uration of the Assembly ten years before, its brilliant record as the spokesman of the people, and the conflicts it had waged with the Commission, together with its supposedly more popular character because of a shorter tenure of office, impressed its members with its importance. On the other hand, there was a new glamor in the name of Senate, and hence the people had from the beginning an instinctive feeling that somehow or other it was a more important body. President Quezon, in his inaugural address, referred to the popular character of the Senate, intended to represent, so he claimed, the maturer judgment of the people. "Wherever the bicameral system exists," he said, "the lower house is supposed to serve as a very sensitive thermometer, registering the most momentary and temporary changes in public sentiment, while the senate must represent the serene, mature and prudent judgment of public opinion. In other words, the senate must be a safe, immovable dam to contain any overflow of popular passion. The voice of the people is the voice of God only when it expresses a judgment formed within the safe channels of serene reflection... We must take a step forward only when we are sure of ourselves, and such steps must necessarily be few. We must act when we are sure that we know public opinion and that this opinion has been formed conscientiously." (1) Speaker Osmena had chosen to remain in the lower house, although he could have gone to the Senate had he wanted to. In fact, Mr. Quezon had wired him from Washington as soon as the Jones Law was sure of passage, urging him to run for the Senate, for Afr. Quezon believed that in the long run the Senate would be a more influential body, because of its power to confirm appointments, than the lower house. Mr. Osmena, however, believed that the place of leadership should continue to be the lower house because in a certain sense it is nearer the people, for its entire elective membership is changed every three years; (1) Philippine Review!, October 1916, p. 76.

Page  372 372 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS whereas the Senate changes only half of its elective menmbership during a similar period. It may therefore happen that the people put a new party in power in the lower house, thus repudiating the policy of the ruling party, and yet the Senate may continue to be dominated by the losing party. There is possibly a sentimental reason also why Speaker Osmena wanted to remain in the low house; that is the historic associations connected with the lower body. "We have the traditions of the Philippine Assembly," said Speaker Osmena in his inaugural address, "of which this House is the successor, fecund in principles of government and in political practices which have secured for the people powers and responsibilities that can not be neglected or ignored by anybody. The fact that simultaneously with ours, another House, also elective, was organized, does not change our character as immediate representatives of the people, nor does it obstruct our passage so as to render our line of action other than clear, categorical, and sure. Whatever may be the part assigned to the other branches of the government, be they legislative or executive, the important mission of constantly pulsing public opinion, of combining mature judgment and immediate action, of promoting necessary changes and initiating measures concerning public revenues or expenditures, lies completely with this House. Others will take charge of the work of improving the details of the legislation, of adding the elements of moderation and prudence to the action, of giving the collective efforts continuity, stability, and permanency."(1) That there should have been rivalry between the two houses was only natural. Harmony and cooperation between the two bodies was made possible by the presence of an ex(1) The Philippine Review, October, 1916, pp. 80-81. It seems that later on Speaker Osmenfia realized that while theoretically he was correct in assigning to the lower house a more popular character, Mr. Quezon showed more practical acumen when he believed that the power of appointment of the Senate would make the latter a much more powerful body. Yet, while older men have gone to the senate, in truth through the leadership of Mr. Quezon the senate became, during the period from 1916 to 1920, the more radical body. As a matter of fact, the mental make-up of Speaker Osmefia calm, deliberate and cautious, fitted the more dignified senate chamber, while the impetuousity of Mr. Quezon would have made him a better leader of a radical body.

Page  373 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 373 tra-legal factor, the political parties. Caucuses were at once held by majority members of the two houses and, because of the overwhelming majority of the Nationalist Party, a party policy could be enunciated and followed. Still the pride which the members had in their respective chambers could not be easily overcome, and a certain kind of rivalry had at once sprung up. The Senators showed an unmistakeable consciousness of their importance. Their first action was to meet at a beautiful mansion on Calle General Solano, alloting one splendid room to every Senator and arranging their session hall in a magnificent fashion. The salary law which was passed soon afterwards provided for a higher salary for Senators than for Representatives, 4,000 pesos for Senators and 3,000 for Representatives. The President of the Nacionalista Party, however, continued to be Speaker Osmefia of the lower house, and the Senators, for party discipline, had, though somewhat reluctantly, to follow his leadership. Reorganization of the Executive Departments The first task of the new legislature was the reorganization of the executive departments. There was never any doubt that under the Jones Law the Filipino people would have control of legislation subject only to the GovernorGeneral's veto power and, in a few instances, to the final approval of the President of the United States. The provision for an elective legislature could not mean anything but that. The point disputed at the time the Jones Law reached the Islands was how much executive power was intended to be given the Filipino people. It is true that the Jones Law gave the Philippine Legislature power to "increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments, or make such changes in the names and duties thereof as it may see fit" and to provide "for the appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General"; (1) so that the Legislature might pass a law requiring the appointment of executive secretaries to (1) Sec. 22. Jones Law.

Page  374 374 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS be subject to the Senate's confirmation (as was afterwards done). But in the same section of the Jones Law it is also provided "that all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-General." It was clear however, that the intention was to give the posts of departmental secretaries (except the secretaryship of public instruction )to the Filipinos. Now the question was, Would the Filipino executive heads appointed by the Governor-General, even with the consent of the Senate, be responsible to the Governor-General or to the people or to their respresentatives? It is true that the appointment of department secretaries, like all others made by the Gov — ernor-Geenral, might require the consent of the Philippine Senate; but under the American federal system the President's cabinet is also appointed with the consent of the Senate of the United States, and yet the American cabinet members are in reality mere agents of the President. They are not responsible to Congress, and the Senate's consent generally comes as a matter of form. The executive power under the Jones Law is, as in the American government, vested in the chief executive, the Governor-General. Therefore, it was, in the opinion of some, more than likely that the heads of the executive departments would be mere agents of the chief executive. It would not mean further extension of power to the Filipino people. But under Governor Harrison's administration the liberal constructionists triumphed. We must get the answer from the spirit and purpose of the act, they said. The purpose of the act is to give to the Filipinos as large a control of their affairs as can be given them without impairing the rights of sovereignty of the United States. The mere granting of two branches of the legislature would not make the government an autonomous one if the people were not given a hand in the execution of the laws and in the administration of the government. Considerable executive power must, therefore, be allowed the people. This interpretation appeared to be in consonance with Governor Harrison's

Page  375 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 375 statement given on September 1, 1916, in which he said that under the Jones Law no Governor-General could rule ruthlessly over the people and that "an executive should consult the people, through their representatives, as to who shall serve them in office." Inasmuch as the cabinet members are not elected by the people, they must be appointed only after consultation with members of our legislature, "the representatives" of the people. It must be remembered that even before the passage of the Jones Law the practice of Governor Harrison was to consult the people's representatives on all appointments. He had even suggested that the names proposed for membership in the upper house, or Philippine Commission, be first submitted to the Philippine Assembly.(1) This practice, together with Governor-General Harrison's liberal interpretation of the Jones Law, assured a certain amount of responsibility of the cab- inet to the legislature. Governor Harrison found no objection to such a system. The proposed system would indeed be at variance with the American practice of the complete separation of the executive from the legislative departments; but there is an excuse in America for such a separation, and that is the responsibility of the chief executive to the people. The secretaries of departments are responsible to him directly and not to Congress, for he is in turn directly responsible to the people. The peculiar situation in the Philippines demanded the adoption of another system. The GovernorGeneral still remained an American, a representative of a foreign government and sovereignty, and responsible to the American and not to the Filipino people. It was, therefore, felt that if there were to be checks and balance among the political powers of the Philippines, they should be exercised by the Governor on the one hand and the Filipino element on the other. There were several reasons why the reorganization of the executive departments was imperative. In the first place, the Jones Law authorized such reorganization, and it (1) Supmrv, P. 352.

Page  376 376 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS was necessary to write into law the understanding that the new executive secretaries would be responsible to the legislature. In the second place, it was urgent to effect a more logical and scientific regrouping of bureaus and offices. This need had been, felt even long before the passage of the Jones Law, and for that purpose the Emergency Board provided in the Appropriation Law of 1915 was authorized to act as an efficiency board "to investigate and analyze as minutely as possible the organization of the bureaus of the Insular Government for the purpose of determining the utility of each of them, the possibility of their improvement by eliminating all duplication of work... and in general indicating such changes in the direction and organization of the bureaus as will tend to simplify the system of work followed and result in economy and increased efficiency." In the third place, it was necessary to provide for harmonious action and cooperation between the executive heads and the Legislature. And in the fourth place, it was felt that the new department heads should have more authority and power over the offices and bureaus under them. Cabinet Responsibility to Legislature The Reorganization Act, as finally passed,(1) provides several means whereby the responsibility of the executive heads to the legislature can be effected. The secretaries of departments, excepting the Secretary of Public Instruction, are appointed at the beginning of each legislature and wi>th the consent of the Philippine Senate instead of for good behavior as before. This will, by inference, mean that the executive heads are to be appointed after each triennial election, and that they are to be chosen in obedience to the popular will as expressed in such election. Members of the Legislature can become at the same time cabinet members. It is true, however, that because of the provision of the Jones Law prohibiting members of the (1) Act No. 2666, as amended by Act No. 2803, and incorporated as Chapter V in the Administrative Code of 1917.

Page  377 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 3377 legislature from occupying positions created by them, in 1916 there was no cabinet post open to a member of the Legislature except the secretaryship of the Interior, and this was later filled by a senator. But in subsequent elections all the cabinet posts, except the secretaryship of education, if deemed necessary, could be filled by legislative members. Secretaries of departments may be called by either of the two Houses of the Legislature for the purpose of reporting on matters pertaining to their departments. The importance of the latter provision should not be overlooked. As expressed by Senator Palma, it "may not look like very much on paper, but in reality it signifies a great deal. The department heads will not only have to give the information required of them, but being often subjected to minute interrogation they will have to explain and defend their official acts. If the Houses can demand of them that they give an account of their official acts, they are responsible to the Houses, though ultimately responsible to the Governor-General." Again, only "a citizen of the Philippine Islands," thirty years of age, who has resided in the Islands continuously during three years next preceding his appointment, can be appointed. This means that only Filipinos can become secretaries of departments, for practically no American is a citizen of the Philippines. Speaker Osmefia, in explaining his vote on the Reorganization Law, said: The fundamental theory of this bill is that, inasmuch as the country must exercise all the powers conferred upon it by the Jones Act, without sterile vacillation or cowardly renunciation, the departmental direction of the administrative activities should, so far as possible, be in the hands of Filipinos. For this reason the Chief Executive has ceased to be a departmental head in the sense in which he used to be, and the Secretary of Public Instruction, who is not responsible to the Philippine Legislature, will, under the new plan, have no executive functions but those assigned to him by the Congress of the United States. Neither the GovernorGeneral nor the Secretary of Public Instruction will perform the duties of any departmental office belonging to other Secretaries, during the absence or temporary incapacity of the

Page  378 378 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POITTICS latter. This distribution of the executive power is in accordance with the legitimate desires of the people and involves a frank determination to assume the responsibilities of a real and ample autonomy. It will inaugurate a regime of publicity. The public problems will be treated, not in the dead form of written indorsements and in the privacy of the office, but face to face, in a direct and personal manner, in the Senate or in the House of Representatives. There will, finally, come about between the Legislature and the Executive a reasonable intelligence, not hidden and clandestine, but open, subject to the vigilant action of the people. The setting aside of unjustified antagonism as well as renunciation by a clear definition of each of the coordinate powers will correct certain defects which have hitherto seemed inevitable under the socalled presidential or congressional system.(1) The Reorganized Departments Acts 222 and 1407 of the Philippine Commission, which were responsible for the organization of the executive departments up to 1916, left a great deal to be desired in the way of a logical and scientific arrangement of bureaus. The departments, as created by the first Act, were denominated the Department of the Interior, the Department of Commerce and Police, the Department of Finance and Justice, and the Department of Public Instruction. "The mere mention of the names given to these departments," said Senator Palma, "shows that organization to be theoretically defective. No country in the civilized world has organized a department of commerce and police, because commerce and police involve completely contrary and antagonistic ideas. The commerce is essentially pacific, while the police is essentially warlike. Nor is it good logic to join finance and justice, because, as the chairman of the select committee which has had this bill under examination said very well yesterday, finance and justice do not imply homogeneous ideas, nor do they include identical functions; on the contrary, our experience leads us to affirm that the jurist does not always have a thorough knowledge of finance, but that in the majority of cases lawyers are the poorest finan (1) Phkipin Review, October, 1916.

Page  379 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 379 ciers of the world, at least so far as the management of their own interests is concerned. "Act No. 1407 reorganized the departments and bureaus and offices of the Government, abolishing certain bureaus and offices and, creating others in their stead. "This organization was not better than the previous one, because under it bureaus whose activities were very dissimilar were kept in the same department. In the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Health remained side by side with that of Lands and the Bureau of Agriculture with that of Quarantine Service. In the Department of Commerce and Police the Constabulary continued side by side with the Bureau of Public Works and the Bureau of Posts together with that of Port Works. The Department of Finance and Justice still performed its legal functions and at the same time did the work of collecting customs dues and internal revenue taxes. The Department of Public Instruction continued to solve educational problems and have charge at the same time of the Bureaus of Supply and Printing, a rare combination, indeed."(1) In the reorganization of the departments, the plan of the Efficiency Board was chiefly followed. Instead of the four old departments there were to be six departments to correspond to "the six principal purposes which a fairly well organized government has to accomplish, to wit: e (1) "The political direction of the various local administrative units, such as departments, provincial and municipal governments, and special governments"-The Department of the Interior; (2) "The guardianship of the State over the mental development and physical welfare of the citizens"-The Department of Public Instruction; (3) "The collection of the public revenues and administration of the finances and business of the government"-The Department of Finance; (1) Philppine Review, October, 1916.

Page  380 t>s80 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS (4) "The enforcement of the law and maintenance of order and safe-guarding of the citizens and their rights"The Department of Justice; (5) "The guardianship in connection with the preservation of the natural resources and the development of its sources of wealth"-The Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and (6) "The carrying out of such work and services as can not be performed by private citizens, conducive to the common welfare and public prosperity"-The Department of Commerce and Communications. (1) Departmental Control We have stated that the fourth reason for the reorganization was to give greater control and power to the department heads. Heretofore, each bureau had been almost a department by itself. It sent its estimates directly to the Legislature through the Executive Secretary, and the department head had had almost nothing to do with it. It had great power of making regulations. The control of the department head was very slight. The Reorganization Act, therefore, as amended by Act No. 2803(2) provides that the department head shall have direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, repeal or modify the decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices when advisable in the public interest. Even in the matters of appointment and removal and the enactment of regulations, the department head has been given control. He has the power "to promulgate all rules, regulations, orders, circulars, memorandums, and other instructions" for the "proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his department."(3) Chiefs of bureaus can (1) Philippine Review, October, 1916. (2) Section 79-c of the Administrative Code, 1917. (3) Ibid.

Page  381 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 381 promulgate circulars of information or instruction only upon authorization by the department head. The department head also, upon the recommendation of the chief of the bureau or office, has the power to appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly vested by law in the Governor-General. He may remove or punish them except as especially provided otherwise in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The department head also may change the distribution of the employees or subordinates among the several bureaus and offices. Under the former executive organization the GovernorGeneral was a department secretary himself, and had under his control the Executive Bureau, besides the Bureau of Audits and the Bureau of Civil Service. Under the new law the Executive Bureau was transferred to the Department of the Interior, with the provision that the foreign correspondence and the giving of passports should he retained in the Governor-General's office. All executive functions of the Philippine government, as provided by the Jones Law, are subject to the supervision and control of the Governor-General, and it was through liberal interpretation on the part of Governor Harrison that a great deal of the control and supervision of the departments was delegated to the department heads. Section 74 of the Administrative Code as amended states, after a repetition of the Governor's ultimate and supreme execuitive power, that "the departments are established for the proper distribution of the work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. Each department secretary shall assume the burden and responsibility of all activities of the government under his control and supervision." There is in each department an undersecretary to aid the secretary of the department in the performance of his duties. The undersecretary holds his office during good be

Page  382 382 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS havor, for unlike the secretaryship, there is no provision for a periodic renewal. He performs the duties of the secretary in the latter's absence. Upon the inability of both the secretary and the undersecretary to act, the Governor-General may temporarily designate a secretary or undersecretary of another department to perform the duties. Besides the six regular departments of the government, for administrative purposes, there are four other officials who have departmental authority over the offices under them. They are the Governor-General, who has departmental authority over the Bureau of Audits, the Bureau of Civil Service and over all other offices and branches of the service not assigned by law to any department; the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives, who are department heads for the officers and employees of the Senate and the House, respectively; and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who is the department head of the employees in the Supreme Court. Such is the reorganization effected in 1916 of the executive departments of the Philippines. It has suffered no statutory changes up to 1921.(1) (1) In the actual distribution of bureaus the scientific division has not been strictly followed; hence we find the Philippine general hospital and the Board of Medical Examiners given to the Department of the Interior, and the Library and Museum to the Department of Justice. The following are the bureaus and offices under their corresponding deo partments: Office of the Governor-General Bureau of Audits Bureau of Civil Service Philippine National Guard Department of the Interior Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes Philippine General Hospital Board of Pharmaceutical Examiners and Inspectors Boards of Medical, Dental, and Optical Examiners Board of Examiners for Nurses Executive Bureau Philippine Constabulary Commissioner of Public Welfare Cities of Manila and Baguio Provincial and Municipal governments

Page  383 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 383 Speaker Osmefia's Refusal of Secretaryship of the Interior Immediately after the passage of the Reorganization Act, the question of cabinet membership came up. The necessity was again felt for a unified and responsible leadership among the governmental organs granted the Filipinos. The experience of the two houses even before the reorganization of the executive departments clearly showed the lack of such leadership. The leadership of Speaker Osmenfa was not an open one, but extra-legal, exercised in the party caucuses not by virtue of his speakership, but because he was the president of the party in power. He was no longer, by virtue of his official position, the most representative Filipino in the government, for the Senate President could also claim a similar, if not greater, representation of the people. The Senators did not look with great favor upon Department of Public Instruction Bureau of Education Philippine Health Service Bureau of Quarantine Service Department of Finance Bureau of Customs Bureau of Internal Revenue Bureau of Treasury Mint of the Philippine Islands Bureau of Printing Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Courts of First Instance and Inferior Courts, General Land Registration Office Public Utility Commission Philippine Library and Museum Bureau of Prisons Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources Bureau of Agriculture Agricultural Colonies Bureau of Forestry Bureau of Lands Bureau of Science Weather Bureau Department of Commerce and Communications Bureau of Public Works Bureau of Posts Bureau of Supply Bureau of Commerce and Industry Bureau of Labor Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey

Page  384 384 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS the leadership of a member of the Lower House, and it was chiefly the personality of the Speaker and party discipline which made coordinate action between the two bodies possible. The jealousy between the two bodies prompted the idea of placing party leadership outside the legislative chambers. It was also felt that the important executive position should now be occupied by the recognized party leaders. A movement was started, therefore, to make the secretaryship of the interior the position of leadership of all the organs of government granted to the Filipinos. In a caucus of the majority members of both Houses, held on December 23, 1916, a resolution was passed urging Speaker Osmefia to leave the speakership and accept the secretaryship of the interior. "It is incumbent upon him," states the resolution, "more than upon any other, in this critical period of reconstruction and precedents, to take charge of the difficult task of guiding the nation in her first steps to the new life and to lead the forces of his party within the legislature as well as outside of it, thus preserving intact that unity of initiative and action, without which the responsibility of the party to the people would be an impossibility." Speaker Osmen-a, after mature deliberation, declined / the secretaryship of the interior in a long memorandum submitted to the caucus of the majority members of the two Houses on January 3, 1917. He said that he was "entirely in accord with the principle of a united and responsible leadership," but that under the present circumstances he feared that the leadership should not be in the executive department. He said that it was necessary that the organs of government should work as a united and organic whole, but the secretaryship of the interior might not answer the purpose of such leadership. In the first place, there being no other members of the Legislature in the Cabinet but himself, he claimed that the position of the president of the party in the executive power would be anomalous. As he was the chosen leader of the House, the House might be expected to follow the leadership of the Cabinet, but because

Page  385 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 385 the Senate had no representative in that body it would be a very hard task to have the Senators also recognize his or the Cabinet's leadership. The people were expecting a great deal from the much-talked-of "premiership", while nobody knew the extent of executive discretion which the GovernorGeneral would give the Secretary of the Interior. For all these reasons, he deemed it wise not to accept the secretaryship of the interior. In his conclusion, he urged his party to find some other means of establishing a united and responsible leadership, so that the action of the Filipino organs in the government might be efficient, coordinated, and harmonious.(1) Thereupon the majority members of the legislature approved the following statement: 1. That the party reaffirms the principle of responsi&te leadership contained in its resolution of December 23, 1916; and 2. That the party takes cognizance of the present circumstances and does not insist upon its request that its president accept the post of secretary of the interior. The Cabinet The cabinet was finally appointed on January 11, 1917. Senator Rafael Palma, who was generally considered as ranking in leadership among the nationalists next to Osmefia and Quezon, was appointed Secretary of the Interior. He was probably the first elective member of the legislature under the American flag to hold a cabinet position at the same time that he was serving his term as a lawmaker. The other Filipino members of the cabinet were: Secretary of Finance, Alberto Barretto, one of the organizers of the Nationalist Party, at the time judge of the court of first instance; Secretary of Commerce and Communications, Dionisio Jakosalem, ex-governor of Cebu; Secretary of Justice, Victorino Mapa, ex-secretary of finance and justice; Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Dr. Galicano Apacible, formerly head of the Hongkong Junta and Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the Assembly. A few months later Mr. Charles E. Yeater of (1) For complete text of his memorandum see La Vanguardia. January 5, 1917.

Page  386 386 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS Missouri was appointed Vice-Governor and ex-officio Secretary of Public Instruction. "The constitution of the Philippine cabinet," states Mr. Harrison, "necessarily removed the governor-general from such immediate contact with the bureau chiefs as had previously existed... As a general policy, I endeavored to give to the Filipino executives all possible opportunity to, exercise their own discretion, and even forced upon them responsibilities of decision and action as frequently as possible." (1) The Council of State The appointment of a Filipino cabinet which did not include the two foremost leaders of the party in power, Mr. Osmenfa and Mr. Quezon, did not solve the problem of an open and responsible leadership. Although everybody knew that Speaker Osmefia continued to be the Filipino power in the government, his influence was no longer due mainly to his official position, but because he was the president of the triumphant party. This was a bad precedent, for then anybody who could by any means become the leader of the party in power might be the most influential man in the government, and there would be the same problem of government by irresponsible party bosses which sometimes infests American states and cities. Governor-General Harrison was also alive to the proW lem of harmony and cooperation among the responsible elements in the government, and, in his message of October 16, 1917, he said: Whatever may be our ideas theoretically as to the best method of conducting the affairs of our government, that method should be followed which will tend to bring all responsible elements of the public administration in close cooperation, prevent unnecessary friction in adjusting and operating the component parts of the administrative machinery, and thus secure rapid and united action and substantial results. This cooperation is particularly essential in moments of difficulties and crises. A lack of coordination of the (1) Francis Burton Harrison, op. cit., pp. 2)8-209.

Page  387 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 387 elements of government or the failure of the great measures of government demanded by the public interest will not result in the final favorable opinion which the world will form of the political capacity of the Filipino people, but such final favorable opinion will of necessity be based upon the united and responsible action of the government, working and operating like an organized and efficient whole, and keeping in view the necessities and aspirations of the people to whose security and welfare we are jointly consecrating our best efforts. It was urgent that out of the different instrumentalities of government granted by the Jones Law to the people, a definite body should be created or recognized to represent more narrowly the counsel of the people, to breathe harmony and efficiency into the legislative and executive departments, and to assign a place in that body to a Filipino leader who would stand at the head of the government on behalf of the people and who should be raised to that position by a triumphant majority through his undoubted leadership and the confidence he might command in the entire nation. In actual practice Filipino leadership was dispersed among cabinet members and the presiding officers of the two houses, Senate President Quezon and Speaker Osmefia. They were the chief advisers of the GovernorGeneral. They formed an incoherent group with only party discipline and loyalty to impel them to work harmoniously. In order to solve this problem and to have a definite body which could advise him on matters of importance, with the acquiescence and support of Filipino elements in the government, the Governor-General decided to create a Council of State. He first announced his desire in his message of October 16, 1918, when he said that he was "now ready to establish a Council of State to include the authorized spokesmen of the two Houses of the Legislature in addition to the members of the Cabinet to advise the Governor-General on Matt of public importance." An executive order was sseubsQty isued to that effect, and the members of the Cabinet and the presiding officers of both House were appointed members of the Council of

Page  388 388 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS State "to aid and advise the Governor-General on public matters." The order reads thus: OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Manila, October 16, 1918. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 37. A Council of the State is hereby created to aid and advise the Governor-General on matters of public importance, said Council to consist of such persons as may be from time to time appointed and summoned by the Governor-General. There shall be a president and a vice-president of the Council the president ex officio being the Governor-General and the vice-president such member of the Council as may be elected by the Council. FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON, Governor-General. 159910. In a sense, however, the Council of State was not a new creation. Ever since the establishment of civil government here there has always been some sort of Council of State in the Philippines. The writer does not mean that there have been bodies in the past with the name of "Council of State," but that the principle underlying the present Council of State had always been followed by American governor-generals. They had always endeavored, in their government of the Philippines, to secure the advice of the most representative Filipinos that they could find. That was the reason back of Governor Taft's preliminary steps when he called into power three prominent Filipinos, Dr. Tavera, Mr. Legarda, and Mr. Luzuriaga, the leaders of the only political party in existence, the Federal Party, and had them appointed to the Commission. Governor Taft began the practice of consulting the Filipinos who he thought represented the best opinion of the people of the Philippine Islands. This practice was inspired by President McKinley, who repeatedly told the American people that American sovereignty was acceptable to, and in accordance with, the wishes and aspirations of the great

Page  389 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 389 masses of the Filipino people. What the leaders of the Federal Party were at that time to the Civil Governor, the present leaders of the Nacionalista Party, as represented in the Council of State, are to the Governor-General-with only two important differences. The leaders of the Federal Party were not elected by the people, directly or indirectly, and their power was smaller. Because these Federal leaders were not elected by the people, it was not certain that their advice and counsel was approved by the people. As it turned out, in the first national election of 1907, the Filipino people repudiated them and elected a majority of the opposing party to power. But save for these incidental differences, the principle back of the practice of securing the counsel of prominent Filipinos in the government of the Philippines was one and the same. It is the same principle underlying the Council of State created in 1918. Functions of the Council of State Immediately upon its creation, and upon motion of Senate President Quezon, Speaker Osmenfa was elected VicePresident of the Council, and "so became once more officially recognized", to quote the words of Governor Harrison himself, (1) "as the 'Second Man' in government circles." The council met once a week, usually on Wednesday. The Governor-General presided over the council, and in his absence the Vice President. The Council of State was established, among other reasons, to solve the problem of responsible leadership in the government. Composed as it was of the ranking executive officials -and the recognized legislative leaders, it became the highest council in the Trmleh-T-and strove to harmonize the executive and the legislative departments. But it was not at the mercy of the transient moods of the legislature, for there was no provision for its dismissal in case its policy was disapproved by the Legislature. The Governor-General relied on it for advise on all domestic questions. Later on it was given certain concrete powers (1) Harrison, op. cit., p. 212.

Page  390 390 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS through legislation. Its functions at the end of 1920 may be enumerated as follows: 1. It coordinated and harmonized the action of the Filipino elements in the government. 2. It advised the Governor-General on important matters. 3. It was given certain ordinance power by law. For instance, the law passed by the Fifth Philippine Legislature penalizing the monopoly, holding, and speculation in rice, specially provided that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, could issue the necessary rules and regulations to enforce the measure. 4. It prepared and approved the budget before the Governor-General sent it to the Legislature. 5. It decided upon the expenditure of government funds provided by the Philippine Legislature for specific purposes, like universal free education and the sending of government students abroad. 6. It decided upon the policies of the different departments of the government. (1) The Budget System Another reform introduced after the passage of the Jones Law was the budget system. Prior to 1916 a budget system was not deemed advisable, for a very simple reason. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that all appropriations must be made by law.(2) This apparently gave the Philippine Assembly, established in 1907, co-equal power with the Philippine Commission on money matters. But such (1) "The new body drew.the executive still closer to the Legislature, and virtually insured the support of any reasonable executive policy among the legislators. It thus greatly enhanced the power of the machinery of government. On the other hand the council sometimes displayed that delay and vacillation inherent in divided responsibility. An executive board is never as strong in action as a single executive agent, and although the council was by its terms only an advisory body, its decisions gradually acquired an aspect more and more definite. "Although I frequently offered, during the first year of its existence, to sign a bill establishing by law the Council of State, the Speaker always hesitated to press the matter in the House, and the bill was never introduced." (Francis Burton Harrison. The Cornerstoa of PhiUppvie lnependece, p. 212). (i) Sec. 6. par. 16.

Page  391 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 391 was not the fact. The other provision that in case of a, deadlock on an appropriation bill the entire sum appropriated the year before should be considered as appropriated for the ensuing year, (1) gave the Governor-General almost dictatorial power in fiscal matters. He could create offices in defiance of the opposition of the representatives of the people, and could dispose in whatever way he wished of all the money of the government so long as the entire sum did not exceed the sum previously appropriated. Thus while other popular legislative bodies had the distinction of commanding and controlling all money bills, serving' thereby as a great check upon the executive, the Philippine, Assembly was deprived of this function and was, as a re-, sult, a considerably weaker body than most legislative assemblies. Under the circumstances the budget system could not have been established. There was no executive responsible, or who could be made responsible, to the Filipino branch of the Legislature, and to whom the preparation of the budget could be entrusted. Nay, it was even more advantageous for the Filipino people to demand one principle of the Congressional system: the initiation of all money bills in the lower house. This demand was gained, after a long struggle with the Commission although with no great advantage, for, there being constant deadlocks between the two houses on appropriation bills, the fiscal power remained practically in the hands of the Governor-General. That there was a lack of a systematized plan in our previous financial system can be easily seen in the number and nature of appropriation bills annually passed by the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Legislature. From April 3, 1915, to March 16, 1916, for instance, thirtyseven Acts were passed carrying a total appropriation of over 38,000,000 pesos. These acts showed a lack of systematized groupings of objects for the easy comprehension of the public or the legislature. (1) See. 7. par. S.

Page  392 392. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The procedure followed in the submission and preparation of estimates was similar to the practice of the government of the United States prior to 1920. Thirty days before the opening of the regular session, each bureau chief sent to the Executive Secretary a statement of the receipts and expenditures of his bureau or office during the year and an estimate of the receipts and necessary expenditures thereof for the ensuing fiscal year. Like the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, the Executive Secretary simply compiled these estimates and sent them to the legislature. He had no power of revision or coordination. There was no executive responsible for the fiscal plan of the government. Bills appropriating money were considered on their individual merits, and not on a well-defined fiscal plan for the entire country. Such, in brief, was the system of government finance in vogue prior to the enactment of the Jones Law. The coming of the Jones Law did not immediately solve the problem. Section 21 of the Jones Law states that, "The Governor-General shall submit to the Philippine Legislature within ten days of the opening of each regular, session a budget of receipts and expenditures, which shall e the basis of the annual appropriation bill." But in spite of this provision, the Filipino leaders were not ready to follow the fundamental principles of the English budget system, which allows the executive to frame the financial measures and to present those measures to the legislature for approval or disapproval. Under a strictly English principle, it may be remembered, the legislature/4ecomes merely an organ of control, all appropriation measures coming from the executive alone. The above provision of the Jones Law would not in itself have induced the legislature to give up its prerogative of determining the financial policy of the government. It would have continued to insist upon preparing its appropriation bills, which might be very different in essential particulars from the "budget of receipts

Page  393 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 393 and expenditures" submitted by the Governor-General in accordance with the Jones Law. The principles of a budget system could be established only if both the governorgeneral and the legislature would give up or delegate to others some financial prerogatives. Again the GovernorGeneral came to the rescue, and following the generous spirit of the preamble of the Jones Law, he delegated the formulation of the budget first to the cabinet then to the council of state. The legislature, on the other hand, agreed to give up its ancient prerogative of framing the financial program of the government. The old practice of having bureau chiefs prepare and submit estimates was changed. Their estimates must now go to the department secretary and then to the Department of Finance for revision. The Governor-General, in a message, sent the budget as prepared by the Council of State to the Legislature for approval, amendment, or rejection. Before the preparation of the budget, a general line of policy was first agreed upon by the Council of State. Once the general policy was decided, a circular was sentin July to all offices and bureaus requesting them to send in their estimates, which should include the probable receipts and the proposed expenditures for the coming year. These estimates were made under the supervision and con'trol of the department heads, who had the power to cut down or add items. These different estimates were then submitted by the department heads to the Secretary of Finance not later than August 20th of every year. The main work of the Department of Finance was to coordinate the different departmental estimates in accordance with the general plan agreed upon at the council meeting. It often happened that a certain item submitted by a departmental head was already duplicated by another item from a different department. Any conflict between a departmental head and the Secretary of Finance was submitted to the Council of State for decision. The final budget was approved at the meeting of the Council.

Page  394 394 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Once the budget was definitely approved by the Council of State. the Governor-General would submit it with a message to the Legislature. The message was read by the Secretary of Finance in a joint session of the Legislature. The lower house, by agreement with the upper, was the first one to take up the budget. It set a date for the appearance of the Secretary of Finance to explain the details of the budget and to answer all questions propounded by the members. This appearance usually lasted a number of days, and opportunity was given the members, especially those of the minority party, to discuss the several items of the bill. To explain further the details of the budget, the individual departmental secretaries might be called, although this was not often done, the Secretary of Finance generally assuming responsibility for the whole budget. It was the accepted rule in the discussion of the budget that the Legislature might diminish the estimates, but not increase them. Once the budget was approved in principle, it was sent to the Committee on Appropriations with instructions to draft the appropriation bill in accordance with the budget. This Committee again examined the different items of the budget, and then framed and submitted its appropriation bill. The Committee generally followed the instructions of the House and usually suggested in its bill only those changes that were absolutely necessary. After the appropriation bill was approved by the House, it was sent to the Senate, where the Secretary of Finance again appeared to explain the different items contained therein. The financial plan of the Council of State did not cover all the proposed financial activities of the government. It usually left a surplus for the Legislature to appropriate the way it pleased. This took the form of new ventures and activities. The totality of the English budgetary principle was not, therefore, as yet followed, whereby all requests for money must come from the executive. But a long and decisive step had been taken towards financial reform.

Page  395 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 395 Budget of the Government of the Philippine Islands for the Fiscal Year, 1921. Recapitulation Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 1921 1920 (estimated) (actual) Pesos. Pesos Income.................84,289,932.00 73,694,016.82 Fiscal Year 1919 (actual) Pesos 78,019,153.33 Revenue from taxation. 56,036,000.00 Incidental revenue..... 4,681,600.00 Earnings and other credits............ 23.572,332.00 Current Surplus at the beginning of the year.............. Total available for Expenditures............84,289.932.00 Expenditures.......... 83,549,778.00 48,391,760.00 4,101,300.00 21,200,956.82 45,229,969.10 3,706,882.42 29,082,301.81 24,803,881.30 32,868,312.07 98,497,898.12 82,014,111.38 110,887,465.40 86,083,584.10 Expense of revenue collection.............. 1,688,370.00 Operating expense of commercial & industrial units................ 14,502,504.00 Public debt........... 3,459,281.00 General administration. 5,202,098.00 Protective service......10,373,411.00 Social improvement.... 9,093,423.00 Economic development.. 10,437,851.00 Aid to local governments..............15,347,095.00 Retirement gratuities, Act 2589........... 600,000.00 Emergency service.... 3,000,000.00 Outlays and investments.............. 9,845,745.00 1,744,110'.39 14,605,411.24 2,728,560.00 4,994,223.05 9,707,442.96 8,608,808.77 10,034,664.04 14,245,420.07 750,000.00 1,000,000.00 1,516,970.64 12,851,210.24 2,276,517.71 4,782,416.73 11,525,611.90 7,699,090.83 11,807,526.62 13,738,758.67 806,014.27 19,079,466.49 13,595,470.86 I -- -- Current Surplus at the end of the Year....... 740,154.00 16,483,786.74 Deduct - Appropriation balances for public works.................... 12,248,407.44 24,803,881.80 Current Unappropriated at the End of the Year............. P4,235,379.30

Page  396 396 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS The Presiding Officers of the Legislature The Philippine legislature in actual practice indirectly assumed certain administrative prerogatives. In a way it became a part of the administrative machinery. This was the reason why, upon the election of the new legislature in 1919, Acting Governor-General Yeater was obliged to convene it immediately in order that the Philippine government could properly function. He said that for the proper conduct and continuance of various governmental activities it was "absolutely necessary that the new Legislature be called so that it might reorganize as soon as possible and, through its leaders, continue to assume and perform the duties and responsibilities which our laws and constitutional practices have conferred upon the Filipino people." An immediate organization of the legislature was needed so that the new Filipino cabinet could be appointed. We have seen that by the Reorganization Act the Filipino secretaries of department were to be chosen at the beginning of every legislature, ostensibly from the majority party which had just triumphed. Another reason why, for administrative purposes, an immediate legislative organization was necessary was the administrative function assigned to the presiding officers. The most salient feature of the legislative system of this period was the importance of the part played by the presiding officers of both houses. This had its historic explanation in the power of the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly. Upon the organization of the Assembly in 1907, the Rules of the American House of Representatives were adopted and it may be remembered that at that time the Speaker of the American House of Representatives was the most influential leader in legislation at Washington. He appointed all the chairmen of committees; he was a member himself of the committee on rules; and he must first give official recognition to members desiring to speak. These powers placed in him an effective control of legislation. The American system was on the whole adopted in the Philippines with the added advantage for our Speaker that

Page  397 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 397 he was considered next in rank and importance to the Governor-General, for he was the most representative Filipino official in the government. He was consequently given even greater prerogatives than the American speaker. He was given control of greater contingent funds; he could appoint members of the Assembly to work during recess with per diems; and could require the services of any other employee of the Philippine government. All these prerogatives of the Speaker of the Assembly were preserved to the presiding officers of the two Houses, with additions of further and greater powers. Together with the Governor-General they formed the most powerful committee in the government, a committee which was in many cases above the Council of States. This committee was in fact a super-cabinet. It controlled the voting power of all the great corporations owned by the government, such as the Manila Railroad Company, the Philippine National Bank, etc.; its consent must be secured before funds for public improvement could be alloted by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications; it was the final judge as to the voting of emergency funds, which amounted to about 3,000,000 pesos a year; and it even approved the contracts of university professors. Add to these the fact that they were members of the Council of State-in fact its recognized leaders, the Speaker of the House being also the Vice-President of the Council of State-and we may realize the tremendous powers wielded by our presiding officers. They were not only regulators or judicial officials who enforced the rules of their respective houses; they were also the greatest factors in legislation, the most influential political officials, and the leaders de facto of our Council of State. The President of the Philippine Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives were the most powerful presiding officers in the world. Interpellation The Reorganization Act, as we have seen, provides for the appearance of cabinet members on the floor of the leg

Page  398 398 THE DEVELOPMEN OE PHILIPPINE POLITICS islature. The procedure (1) in the lower house was for any member to draft questions he desired to ask the department secretary and then to incorporate them in a resolution requesting the house to call for the secretary. If the motion was approved, the secretary might be requested to appear On grounds of public policy a secretary might refuse to comply with the desire of the house. Generally, he promptly acceded to the wishes of the house and came prepared to give full information on the question submitted to him. The department secretary might also of his own accord and without invitation of the house appear on the floor of either house to explain matters pertaining to his department. During the period under study no cabinet officer took advantage of the latter provision. (2) The close connection between the administration and the legislature relieved the majority of the members from the actual preparation of bills. Many of the bills were drafted in the executive departments and then introduced by one or more mnembers of the legislature. An individual member might also require the services of the legislative Reference Division of the Philippine Library and Museum in the preparation of bills and the research of data and ma(1) Rule XXVII-A of the Rules of the House of Representatives regulates the interpellation in the lower house as follows: 1. Every petition for the appearance of a cabinet member should be in writing and in the form of a resolution. It must necessarily refer to some administrative subject or matter within the secretary's jurisdiction and should contain only concrete and specific questions and no arguments, inferences, im. putations, personalities, epithets, ironic expressions, hypothetic questions or affirmations of facts, unless these are necessary to explain the question. 2. The Speaker will decide if the question is in order or not, and if not he will declare it out of order, from which an appeal may be had to the house as in other cases. 8. Once the resolution is approved and the date set for the secretary's answer, the secretary of the House will send a copy of the same to the secretary concerned and another to the Governor-General, stating the date and hour in which such answer should be given. The secretary will be given at least three days to answer, from the date of the approval of the resolution, unless the house should consider the matter an urgent one, and decide for an immediate answer or within a shorter period of time. 4. Once the answer is given, no debate on the matter will follow. 6. When a cabinet member who is not a member of the house desires to speak on a matter related to his department, he shall address the Speaker, who will set the date and hour for his appearance. (2) The appearance of cabinet members was seldom resorted to except during the discussion of the budget.

Page  399 PROGRESS TONARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 399 terials. Similarly, a bill prepared and introduced by a member of the legislature was often referred to the department most famliar with the matter covered by the bill. For instance, a bill reforming the Code of Criminal Procedure was likely to be of interest to the Department of Justice; and a bill appropriating money for some agricultural purposes would be referred to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Of course, this did not appear in the official record and was mostly done by the legislative leader who was a member of the Council of State. The Council of State could also suggest measures and have these measures introduced in the legislature through a member who was at the same time a member of the legislature or through any other member; but it could not officially introduce measures. The Committee System The American Committee system was adopted with slight modifications. The Senate had about twenty-four committees and the House thirty-three. Some of the most important committees were the committees on appropriations, rules, accounts, and external relations. Among the other committees were the committee on elections, to take charge of the contested seats of the house, and the committees on judiciary, public instruction, commerce and industry, labor and immigration, agriculture, public lands, mines, forests, and banks and banking. All bills and resolutions on money questions, that is, those relative to taxation, expenditures, debts, accounting, and everything that touched directly or indirectly the public purse, were referred to the committee on appropriations. During the early days of the Philippine Assembly, the appropriation committee was a sort of committee of committees, because the chairmen of other committees were including among its members. Next to the appropriation committee, the committee on rules was the most important. This committee had charge of all matters affecting the rules of the house. It determined what bills should be discussed first, for it could request the house to take up any bill at once. This request was granted

Page  400 100 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS upon a majority vote of the members present. The committee on accounts had charge of all receipts and expenditures of the house. The committee on external relations covered all matters pertaining to the relations of the Philippines with the United States. The establishment of the Commission of Independence in a large measure did away with the prerogatives of the committee on external relations. The Governor-General It would be of no little interest to note the position of the Governor-General during this period. The learned English scholar, Mr. Bagehot, in speaking of the English Government said that there are two parts in that govment: one is the ornamental and ceremonial part, in whose name the government is carried on-the King of England, theoretically an absolute ruler; and the other is the active part, the one which really rules, which advises the ceremonial part in practically all the governmental work that it does-the House of Commons directly or through the cabinet. The Philippine government, under Governor Harrison's administration, was in a small way, approaching a similar arrangement. The Governor-General is vested by law with the executive power, but Governor Harrison rarely acted on matters of domestic concern, except with the advice of the Cabinet or Council of State. The guide for this exercise of governmental power was the spirit of the preamble of the Jones Law, which is, as we have seen, to grant the Filipinos the largest amount of autonomy compatible with the exercise of American sovereignty.(1) The Jones Law confers the veto power on the GovernorGeneral. Upon the passage of a bill or joint resolution it (1) The Governor-General is appointed by the President of the United States with the consent of the American Senate. He holds his office at the pleasure of the President. His position is considered a political one from the standpoint of American politics; that is, upon a change of party in the United States, a new governor-general is usually appointed. His salary is fixed by the Jones Law at P86,000 ($18,000) and -he lives in the historic Malacailang Palace.

Page  401 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENt 401 is sent to the Governor-General for signature. If he does not sign it or express his disapproval of it within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it is presented to him, then it wvill automatically become a law. If by reason of the adjournment of the Legislature, the Governor-General is unable to return it with his disapproval to the Legislature, then it becomes a law unless vetoed by him within thirty days after adjournment. After its return to the Legislature, a vetoed bill may be reconsidered; and upon a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each House, it can be again sent to the Governor-General. In case the Governor-General still refuses to approve it, he will refer it to the President of the United States, who will have the final voice in the matter. As a matter of policy Governor Harrison found several practical limitations on the exercise of the veto power. The creation of an entirely Filipinized legislature under the Jones Law undoubtedly intended to leave in the hands of the Filipinos ample legislative power. The veto power must, therefore, be sparingly exercised lest the legislative autonomy thus granted be materially curtailed in practice. In the use of the veto, the Governor-General has really two capacities. When he vetoes a bill which he believes is impairing the exercise of the rights of American sovereignty, he is exercising that power in obedience to the spirit of the Jones Law, as interpreted by Filipino public opinion; but when he vetoes a bill of purely domestic concern he is considering himself a part of the legislative machinery and, unless his action is supported by an overwhelming public opinion, it means a material derogation of that complete grant of the legislative powers which the Filipinos believe the Jones Law intended to give them. These considerations were undoubtedly the reasons why Governor-General Harrison did not often exercise his veto power. During the entire period of his administration under the Jones Law he vetoed only five bills.

Page  402 402 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Veto Power in the Philippines and in America The development of the veto power in the Philippines thus took a different trend from that of the veto power in the United States, after which the veto provisions of the Jones Law were patterned. The original purpose of the presidential veto power in America was not to make the President an indispensable part of the legislative machinry. On the contrary, the framers of the American Constitution were so enamored with the theory of the division of powers that they would not have dared have the executive actively participate in legislation. The veto provision was included "for the sake of protecting the Constitution, and, in particular, the executive, from Congressional encroachments," (1) Consequently, the veto power was not intended to be often exercised, and in the early history of America it was very infrequently used. Washington used the veto only twice. It was never used by John Adams, Jefferson, J. Q. Adams or Van Buren, who served full terms; or by W. H. Harrison, Taylor, Fillmore, or Garfield. In signing bills presidents have sometimes indicated objections which Congress has afterwards remedied by supplementary legislation.(2) The use of the veto in America as an active part of legislation is of but recent date. It took place only after the transformation of the presidency from a less representative institution into a more representative one. The Presidential veto has succeeded because quoting Bryce, "the President, being an elective and not an hereditary magistrate, is responsible to the people, and has the weight of the people behind him." The veto as an institution has always failed or has become obsolete whenever it has been exercised by an authority not responsible to the people. The King of England, ever since the time of Queen Anne, more than two hundred years ago, has never exercised it, although theoretically he has still this power. (1) Bryce, American Commonwealth, p. 69. (2) Cyclopedi of American Government, p. 616.

Page  403 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT But the better analogy is not between England and the Philippines. England is an independent country, and her Parliament is a sovereign body. The closer analogy is between the Philippines and an English self-governing colony. In English self-governing colonies, the Governor represents the sovereignty of the mother country. He has, like our own Governor, veto power in legislation. Quoting the rules and regulations issued by the colonial office on legislative councils and assemblies in English self-governing colonies, "in every colony the Governor has authority either to give or to withold his assent to laws passed by the other branches or members of the Legislature, and until that assent is given no such law is valid or binding." The colonial legislature, like our own legislature, is limited by a constitution, equivalent to our Jones Law. The extent of the autonomy granted to the English self-governing colonies and that given the Filipinos under the Jones Law is strikingly similar. In such English colonies, the rule is that, in all matters of local concern, the local authorities should be given a free hand, and in matters of imperial concern, Great Britain, represented by the Governor, shall act. In the Philippines the purpose as expressed in the preamble of the act is to give the Filipinos as large a control over their domestic affairs as will not impair the exercise of American sovereignty. In pursuance of the English principle, an English Governor has refrained from vetoing legislation of purely local concern. Yet it must not be supposed that he is not often tempted to use his veto power when he sees faulty legislation. The mode of correcting faulty legislation is by suggesting its alteration by subsequent legislation. The Filipino people therefore, did not expect the Governor-General to use his veto power so frequently or so effectively as it is used in America. The success of the exercise of the veto power in America has been possible only because the President is the people's national representative. His veto is the people's own veto. The case of our Governor-General is rather different. He represents external control, foreign to, and not representative of, the people. Unless advised by responsible Filipino counsellors

Page  404 404 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS or by an overwhelming public opinion, his veto cannot be said to be the people's veto, consequently it was very seldom used during the period under discussion. The system of semi-responsible government thus outlined continued practically without variation to the end of the Harrison regime in 1920. On June 3, 1919, the first general elections were held under the Jones law. The Jones Law enlarged the suffrage qualifications by allowing those who could read and write a native dialect to vote. The result of the elections was overwhelmingly in favor of the Nacionalistas as shown by the following record: House of Representatives: Nacionalistas.... 78 Democratas..... 4 Provincial Governors: Nacionalistas.... 35 Democratas...... 1(1) There were 717,295 registered voters, 672,122 of whom, or 92 per cent, voted. There were 46.2 per cent of the men of voting age who were voters. The almost unanimous verdict of the people in favor of the Nacionalistas perhaps can be explained in several ways. The first factor was the success of the Nacionalistas in convincing the people that they were in actual control of the government and that the Governor-General always followed their advice. The second factor, was the good times which obtained as a result of the war. Philippine products were selling at prices never dreamed of. Farmers were receiving for their sugar, hemp, tobacco, copra and other products, four or five times what they had been getting in pre-war days. The total. foreign commerce of the Philippines jumped from 202 million pesos in 1913 to 601 millions in 1920. (1) Report of the Governor-General, p. 4. The memorial of the Nationalist Party to the Wood Forbes Mission gives the following figures: Rerresentatives: Nacionalistas....................... 83 Democratas......................... 4 Independientes...................... 3 Provincial Governors: Nacionalistas....................... 34 Democratas........................ 1 Independientes..................... 1 The 86 Nacionalista Representatives include some appointive members.

Page  405 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 405 The minority party, however, claimed that there was much fraud committed during the elections, especially because of the defective election law. Governor-General Harrison himself saw the danger of the opposition's attitude and called attention in his report for 1919 to the "need of more uniform acceptance by the minority of the popular vote-the only safe basis for a democracy." "Unless this lesson is more generally and convincingly driven home," he continued, "there exists the germ of danger for the future. The first step should be an amendment to the election law establishing more firmly the rights of watchers at the polls, and thus depriving defeated candidates of their principal arguments." (1) One significant aspect of the elections was the fact that all parties were for. immediate independence, for it may be remembered that the Democratas and Progresistas had merged in 1917 under the general name of the Democrdta Party. Of course there were the usual protestations on the part of both parties as to their individual and meritorious labors for Philippine independence, each accusing the other of not doing all it could in favor of the sacred cause. The Nacionalistas had undoubtedly the better of this argument, for had they not brought over a Governor General who was for independence? At least the people must have thought so, otherwise they would not have given them the votes. The Democratas on the other hand came back and said that the Nacionalistas were satisfied with a mere Jones Law which did not specify the definite time when independence should be granted, whereas they, the Democratas, wanted a more radical measure. The Nacionalistas, moreover "pointed with pride" to what they had done in the government. The campaign, to quote again Governor General Harrison "really resolved itself, then, into an attack upon and defense of the actual administration of public affairs, and upon that issue the party in power was granted another term in office. Full responsibility for their very large share in the carrying on of the administrative as (1) Report of Governor-General for 191t, p. 4.

Page  406 4to THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS well as legislative work of the government, both insular and provincial, was assumed by the Nacionalista candidates, who faced their opponents squarely on that issue. Selfgovernment by parties is therefore clearly established and understood in the Philippines. Americans and their country are not attacked in the electoral campaign, except for the criticisms of the Governor-General in so far as his administration is considered by the minority as a part and parcel of the official record of the Nacionalista Party." (1) But the year 1920 saw the beginnings of economic depression. The Philippine National Bank was caught in the slump of prices and lost heavily. It had invested government funds in the building of sugar mills and in oil companies, and the sudden fall of sugar and oil meant a loss of millions in oil and the indefinite tying up of other millions in sugar centrals. Mismanagement of the bank's affairs was discovered. The Filipino President, Venancio Concepcion, a prominent Nacionalista leader, was convicted and afterwards sent to prison for loaning money to corporations in which he himself was personally interested or was co-owner. This became a great indictment against the Nacionalista regime. The relationship between the two political leaders, Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena, was also beginning to be strained. President Quezon was reported as saying that Speaker Osmefia's legislative policy was too reactionary to suit him. Even Governor Harrison seemed to be holding himself aloof from the Speaker, probably due to the fact that he was closer to the Senate President Hope for Democratic legislation in Washington in favor of Philippine independence dwindled mostly because of the quarrels President Wilson had with his Congress. Moreover, every indication pointed to the probability of the coming back into power of the Republicans in the elections of 1920. All these things must have contributed to the growing restlessness among certain Nationalists. (1) GoeroGcnerW's Report for 1919, page 4.

Page  407 PROGREMSS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 407 There was, however, an issue upon which the nationalists succeeded in again uniting at least temporarily, and that was the coastwise law which was approved by the American Congress. That law left to the President authority to require the carrying of all trade between the Philippines and the United States in American ships to the exclusion of any other ship. To protest against the measure a convention of the Nationalist Party was called, which met on July 19, 20 and 21, 1920. (1) On July 20, the convention unanimously passed a resolution protesting against the coastwise law on the ground that it was against the policy of independence, for it would increase the economic dependence of the Philippines upon the United States, it would establish great shipping interests in the islands, it would curtail the autonomy already given to the people, and it would, in effect, be an indirect tax upon the people without the consent of the Philippine legislature. The convention was adjourned with apparent harmony although opposition papers saw dissension and troubles ahead among the nationalists themselves. (2) The presidential elections in America came; and news of the defeat of the Democrats, the allies of the nationalists -so the opposition claimed-must have added to the dissatisfaction of certain nationalist members. It was now being claimed that the President of the Party was wielding too much power. Somehow or other, what had been decided in favor of responsible leadership with the creation of the Council of State, was now being questioned. Senators were claiming that even in matters of appointment, the President of the party was having the final say, although he was not a member of the Senate. (1) A copy of the minutes was furnished the undersigned. (2) In August 1920 two senators and several representatives from Washington camne to the Philippines on an unofficial visit. Their visit was taken ad. vantage of by American papers in Manila to print articles derogatory to Filipinos, their institutions and characteristics, which aroused resentment on the part of the people. Because of these attacks the Filipino employees of the papers declared a walkout. There was no disorder or even complaint of bad treatment or low salaries. It was simply a protest on the part of the employees gainst the tactics used by the American press. The conflict was solved partly by a promise on the part of the men responsible for the papers to reform their policies.

Page  408 408 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS Another convention was held on January 24th, 1921, for the purpose of electing the President and other officers of the party. Speaker Osmenfa maintained that the President of the Party must continue to be the responsible leader in the government, and indicated that he would not accept the presidency unless it again carried with it such an understanding. It may be remembered that the creation of the Council of State with its Vice-Chairman had for its main purpose the solution of this delicate question of leadership, but for some reason or other that leadership was not agreeable to many senators. The signs were plainly visible that Senate President Quezon was beginning to fret under the leadership of Speaker Osmenia. Another question raised at the convention was the advisability of adopting platforms, for the Nationalist Party had not adopted any platform since its original foundation in 1907. The answer to this was that the main object of the party was the attainment of independence and inasmuch as that was not yet secured, there was no necessity for any other platform. On the other hand, it was argued that since the Filipinos were now enjoying autonomy in their local affairs there were many domestic questions on which the party could make its stand known to the people. Speaker Osmenfa seemed to be willing to have a platform couched in general terms, while President Quezon wanted a more specific one. Mr. Quezon even intimated that he would not care if the Nationalist Party was divided if the division should come not on personalities but on issues. If the President of the Senate had any desire for separation, he did not want to force it on this occasion, probably believing that the time was not yet ripe and not being sure of victory; hence the convention ended with an apparent victory for Mr. Osmefia. The drafting of the platfrom was postponed for the next convention. Mr. Osmefia was elected President, Quezon, first Vice-President and Palma, second Vice-President of the Party. In February, 1921, Governor Harrison was relieved of his post and left Manila, with the governmental- system

Page  409 PROGRESS TOWARDS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 409 which had been etablished during his seven years of administration apparently intact; although portentous clouds could be seen hovering in a rather insecure political sky. What would be the Republican policy towards the Philippines? This was the question asked by the people as they saw the boat which carried the Democratic Governor-General fade away into the tempestuous China Sea.

Page  410


Page  412 I

Page  413 APPENDIX A ACT OF THE PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE(') (Original in SI anish. D. S. P. I. R., 674. 1.) Cavite Viejo, June 12, 1898. In the town of Cavite Viejo, in this province of Cavite, on the twelfth day of June eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, before me, Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista, Auditor of War and Special Commissioners appointed to proclaim and solemnize this act by the Dictatorial Government of these Philippine Islands, for the purposes and by virtue of the circular addressed by the Eminent Dictator of the same Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, the undersigned being assembled, among whom figure commanders of his army and the representatives of other who have not been able to attend and notable residents of various towns of the same, taking into consideration, that their inhabitants being already weary of bearing the ominous yoke of Spanish domination, on account of the arbitrary arrests and harsh treatment practised by the Civil Guard to the extent of causing death with the connivance and even with the express orders of their commanders, who sometimes went to the extreme of ordering the shooting of prisoners under the pretext that they were attempting to escape, in violation of the provisions of the Regulations of their Corps, which abuses were unpunished and on account of the unjust deportations, especially those decreed by General Blanco, of eminent personages and of high social position, at the instigation of the Archbishop and friars interested in keeping them out of the way for their own selfish and avaricious purpose, deportations which are quickly brought about by a method of procedure more execrable than that of the Inquisition and which every civilized nation rejects on account of a decision being rendered without a hearing of the persons accused, the people determined to start an insurrectionary movement in August, eighteen hundred and ninety-six, for the purpose of recovering the independence and sovereignty of which Spain deprived them through the Adelantado Miguel Lopez de Legaspi, who continuing the course followed by his predecessor Hernando de Magallanes, who arrived upon the shores of Cebu, and occupied that Island by virtue of the treaty of friendship which he celebrated with its King Tupas, although he was killed in the battle which took place on said shores, to which he was provoked by King Kalipulako de Maktan, who was suspicious of his bad intentions; he landed on the Island of Bohol, entering also into the celebrated blood compact of friendship with its King Sikatuna, for the purpose, after (1) From Teylor, Philippine Insurgent Records, Vol. III, Exhibit 28, 24 M. G.

Page  414 414 APPENDIX taking Cebu by force of arms, because the successor of Tupas did not permit him to occupy it, of coming to Manila, the capital, as he did, likewise winning the friendship of its Kings Soliman and Lakandula and afterwards taking possession of it and thus of the entire Archipelago for Spain, by virtue of an order of King Philip II; that in view of these historical datb, because in international law the prescription established by laws legalizing even the fraudulent acquisition of the property individuals is not recognized, there can be no doubt as to the legality of such a movement as the one that was quited but not entirely quenched by the pacification proposed by Pedro A. Paterno with Don Emilio Aguinaldo as President of the Republican government established in Biac-na-bat6, and accepted by the Governor-General, Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, under conditions which were established, some in writing and others verbally, among them a general amnesty for all deported and sentenced; that by reason of nonfulfillment of some of these conditions after the destruction of the Spanish squadron by the North American one and the bombardment of Cavite, Don Emilio Aguinaldo returned to start a new revolution, and hardly had he given the word to commence, on the thirty-first of last month, when several towns anticipated the movement, and on the twenty-eighth between Imus and Cavite Viejo here was engaged and captured force of one hundred and seventy-eight, commanded by a major of marine infantry. This movement spread like an electric spark through the other towns not only of this province, but also in Bataan, Pampanga, Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Morong, some of them with seaports. So complete is the triumph of our arms, truly marvelous and unparalleled in the history of Colonial revolutions, that in the first province mentioned there remain to be surrendered only the detachments at Naic and Indang; in the second there are none at all, in the third, resistance by the Spanish forces is localized in the town of San Fernando, where the greater part are concentrated the remainder being in Macabebe, Sesmoan and Guagua; in the fourth only in the city of Lipa; in the fifth, in the capital and Calumpit; and in the remaining two, only in their respective capitals. The city of Manila will soon be completely beseiged by our forces, and also the posts in the province of Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Union, Zambales and several others in the Visayan islands, where insurrection has broken out in several of their towns, having started in some almost at the moment of completing that pacification, and in others even before that, wherefore the independence of our territory and the recovery of our sovereignty are assured. And summoning as a witness of the rectitude of our intentions, the Supreme Judge of the Universe, and under the protection of the Mighty and Humane North American Nation, we proclaim and solemnly declare, in the name and by the authority of the inhabitants of all these Philippine Islands, that they are and have the right to be free and independent; that

Page  415 ACT OF THE PROCLAMATION ETC. 415 - they are released from all obedience to the crown of Spain; that every political tie between the two is and must be completely severed and annulled; and that, like all free and independent states, they have complete authority to make war, conclude peace, establish treaties of commerce, enter into alliances, regulate commerce, and execute all other acts and things that Independent States have the right to do. Reposing firm confidence in the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge for the support of this declaration, our lives, our fortunes, and our most sacred possession, which is our honor. We acknowledge, approve and confirm together with the orders that have been issued therefrom, the Dictatorship established by Don Emilio Aguinaldo, whom we honor as the Supreme Chief of this Nation, which this day commences to have a life of its own, in the belief that he is the instrument selected by God, in spite of his humble origin, to effect the redemption of this unfortunate people, as foretold by Doctor Jose Rizal in the magnificent verses which he composed when he was preparing to be shot, liberating them from the yoke of Spanish domination in punishment of the impunity with which their Government allowed the commission of abuses by its subordinates; and for the unjust executions of said Rizal and others who were sacrificed to please the greedy body of friars in their insatiable desire to seek revenge upon and exterminate all those who are opposed to their Macchiavellian purposes, which tramples upon the penal code prescribed for these islands; and for the sake of those persons who, though merely suspected, were convicted by the Commanders of detachments at the instigation of the friars without form or semblance of a trial and without the spiritual consolation afforded by our sacred religion; and likewise for the hanging for the same motives of the eminent native Filipino priests Doctor Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez and Jacinto Zamora, whose innocent blood was shed through the intrigues of those socalled religious orders which pretended that a military insurrection had broken out on the night of January 21st, 1872, in the Fort of San Felipe in the town of Cavite, accusing said martyrs of starting it, so as to prevent the execution of the decree-sentence issued by the Council of State in the appeal in administrative litigation (contencioso administrativo) interposed by the Secular Clergy against the Royal Orders where in it was directed that the parishes under them in the jurisdiction of this Archbishopic should be turned over to the Recoletos in exchange for those controlled by the Recoletos in Mindanao, which were to be transferred to the Jesuits. These were revoked completely, and the return of those parishes was ordered. The papers were filed in the Colonial Department, to which they were sent some time during the last months of the preceding year, for the preparation of the respective Royal Provision. That was what caused the tree of Liberty to bud in this land of ours, the iniquitious measures employed to suppress it only causing it to

Page  416 APPENDIX grow more and more, until, the last drop having been drained from the cup of our afflictions, the former insurrection broke out at Caloocan, extended to Santa Mesa, and continued its course to the adjoining places in this province, where the unequalled heroism of its inhabitants met with failure in the battles with General Blanco, and continued the struggle against the great hosts of General Polavieja for the period of three months, without any of the war material that we now possess, but commencing with arms peculiar to the country, such as the bolo, sharpened bamboo, and arrow. Moreover we confer upon our renowned Dictator, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, all the powers necessary for the due administration of his Government, including the prerogatives of pardon and amnesty. And finally, it was unanimously resolved that this Nation, independent from this day, must use the same flag used heretofore, whose design and colors and described in the accompanying drawing, with design representing in natural colors the three arms referred to. The white triangle represents the distinctive emblem of the famous Katipunan Society, which by means of its compact of blood urged on the masses of the people to insurrection; the three stars represent the three principal Islands of this Archipelago, Luzon, Mindanao and Panay, in which this insurrectionary movement broke out; the sun represents the gigantic strides that have been made by the sons of this land on the road of progress and civilization, its eight rays simbolizing the eight provinces of Manila, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Laguna and Batangas, which were declared in a state of war almost as soon as the first insurrectionary movement was initiated; and the colors blue, red and white, commemorate those of the flag of the United States of North America, in manifestation of our profound gratitude towards that Great Nation for the disinterested protection she is extending to us and will continue to extend to us. And grasping that flag, I displayed it to the assemblage, and all swore solemnly to recognize it and defend it to the last drop of our blood. In witness whereof, I commit the proceedings to writing in this act, which is signed with me by all those concurring in this act, as well as by the only foreigner, a North American subject, Mr. L. M. Johnson, Colonel of Artillery, who attended the meeting, to all of which I certify. Segundo Arellano, D. Tiburcio del Rosario, D. Sergio Matias, D. Agapito Zialcita, D. Flaviano Alonzo, D. Mariano Legaspi, D. Jose Auriano Santiago y Acosta, D. Aurelio Tolentino, D. Felix Ferrer, D. Felipe Buencamino, D. Fernando Canon Faustino, Jr., D. Anastacio Pinzon, D. Timoteo Bernabe, D. Flaviano Rodriguez, D. Gavino Masancay, D. Narciso Nayuga, D. Gregorio Villa, D. Luis Perez de Tagle, D. Canuto Celestino, D. Marcos Lacson, D. Martin de los Reyes, D. Ciriaco Bausa, D. Manuel Santos, D. Mariano Toribio, D. Gabriel Reyes, D. Hugo Sim, D. Emiliano Sim, D. Fausto Tirona, D. Rosendo Simon, D. Leon Tanjanque, D. Gregorio Bonifa

Page  417 ACT OF TIHE PROCLAMATION ETC. 417 cio, D. Manuel Salfranca, D. Simon Villareal, D. Calisto Lara, D. Buenaventura Toribia, D. Zacarias Fajardo, D. Florencio Manalo, D. Roman Gana, D. Marcelino Gomez, D. Valentin Polintan, D. Felix Polintan, D. Evaristo Dimalanta, D. Gregorio Alvares, D. Sabas de Guzman, D. Estevan Francisco, 1). Guido Yap-Finchay, D. Mariano Rianzares Bautista, D. Francisco Arambula, D. Antonio Gonzales, D. Juan Arevalo, D. Roman Delfino, D. Honorio Tionges, D. Francisco del Rosario, D. Epifanio Saguil, Don Ladislao Afable Jose, D. Sixto Roldan, D. Luis de Lara, D. MIarcelo Basa, D. Jose Medina, D. Epifanio Cuisia, D. Pastor Lopez de Leon, D. Mariano de los Santos, D. Santiago Garcia, D. Claudio Tria Tirona, D. Andres Tria Tirona, D. Carlos Tria Tirona, D. Estanislao Tria Tirona, D. Daniel Tria Tirona, D. Sulpicio P. Antonio, D. Epitacio Asuncion, D. Catalino Ramon,D. Juan Bordadom, D. Jose del Rosario, D. Proceso Pulido, D. Jose Maria del Rosario, D. Ramon Magcauan, D. Antonio Calingo, D. Mendiola, D. Estanislao Calingo, D. Numeriano Castillo, D. Federico Tomacruz, D. Teodoro Pateo, D. Ladislao Diwa, and also the only foreigner, the North American subject, Mr. L. M. Johnson, Colonel of Artillery, who was present at the ceremony, to which act I certify. (Signed) AMBROSIO RIANZARES. (Also signed by) Mariano Trias, Artemio Ricarte y Vibora, Salvador Estrella, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Mariano Noriel, Pantaleon Garcia Estanislao Viniegra, Esteban San Juan, Felipe Topacio, Rufino Nata, the Captain of Artillery: Francisco Constante, Juan Cailles, Daniel Tirona, Hugo C. Area.

Page  418 APPENDIX B CONSTITUTION OF BIAC-NA-BATO(') In Biac-na-bato on the first day of the month of November of the year one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven, the Representatives of the people of the Philippine Islands, assembled for the purpose of modifying the Constitution of this Republic of the Philippines, drawn up and proclaimed in the town of Naic, province of Cavite, on the twenty-second of Marclr of this year, in accordance with the provisions of Decree No. 29 of current year, after a long discussion, have unanimously agreed upon the following: CONSTITUTION OR FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. The separation of the Philippines from the Spanish monarchy and their formation into an independent state with its own government called the Philippine Republic has been the end sought by the Revolution in the existing war, begun on the 24th of August, 1896; and therefore, in its name and by the power delegated by the Filipino people, interpreting faithfully their desires and ambitions, we, the representatives of the Revolution, in a meeting at Biac-na-bato, Nov. 1st, 1897, unanimously adopt the following articles for the Constitution of the State: ARTICLE I. The supreme government of the Republic shall be vested in a Supreme Council, composed of a President, a VicePresident and four Secretaries, for the conduct of our Foreign Relations, of War, of the Interior, and of the Treasury. ARTICLE II. The powers of the Supreme Council of the government shall be: 1st. To adopt measures for maintaining and developing its existence, issuing such orders as it believes adequate for the preservation and security of the civil and political life of the nation. 2nd. To impose and collect taxes, to issue foreign and domestic loans, when necessary, and to issue paper money, to coin money and to appropriate the funds collected to the purposes required by the several branches of the State. 3rd. To authorize privateering and issue letters of marque and reprisal, to raise and organize troops and to maintain them, to iatify treaties, and to make a treaty of peace with Spain, with the ratification of the Assembly of Representatives. 4th. To try as a judicial body, should they think necessary, the President or any of the members of the Council, who should be accused of crimes, cognizance of which appertains to the Judicial Power. (1) From Taylor, Philippine lIsurgent Records, Vol. I, Exhibit 47.

Page  419 CONSTITUTION OF BIAC-NA-BATO 5th. To have the right of supervision and supreme direction of military operations, when they believe it to be necessary for the consummation of high political ends. To approve, reform or modify the Regulations and orders for the Army, prepared by the CaptainGeneral of the Army; to confer grades and promotions, from that of first lieutenant and to confer honors and rewards granted for services in war, at the recommendation of the said Captain-General of the Army. 6th. To select and nominate a Captain-General and a Lieutenant General. 7th. To convense the Assembly of Representatives when necessary, in acordance with the provisions of the Constitution. ARTICLE III. The Vice-President shall fill ad interim the office of President in case of vacancy. ARTICLE IV. For each Secretary there shall be a SubSecretary, who shall aid in the dispatch of business and shall in case a vacancy occurs fill ad interim the place of such Secretary. He shall have while so acting a vote in the Council of Government. ARTICLE V. The President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Sub-Secretary can hold no other office in the Republic. ARTICLE VI. The President, Vice-President, Secretary and Sub-Secretary shall be more than twenty-three years of age. ARTICLE VII. The basis of every election and appointment to any office in the Republic shall be aptitude for the discharge of the office conferred. ARTICLE VIII. Tagalog shall be the official language of the Republic. ARTICLE IX. The decisions of the Council of Government shall be determined by a majority vote, and all the members of the same shall take part in its deliberations. ARTICLE X. The executive power shall be vested in the President, or in his absence in the Vice-President, and shall have these powers: To approve and promulgate the acts of the Supreme Council of the Government; To provide for their execution within the period of nine days; To issue decree, rules or instructions for their execution; To receive ambassadors and to execute treaties. ARTICLE XI. In case of definite vacancies, in the office of President, Vice-President, and Secretaries, by death, resignation or other legal cause, the Assembly of Representatives shall meet for the election of others to fill the vacant offices. ARTICLE XII. Each Secretary shall have a vote in the passage of all resolutions and measures of whatever kind, and shall be able to take part in the deliberations thereon.

Page  420 420 APPENDIX ARTICLE XIII. The Secretaries shall have the right to choose and nominate their own assistants and other officials of their respective departments. ARTICLE XIV. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall have charge of: All correspondence with foreign nations regarding treaties and agreements of all kinds; appointment of Representatives to said nations, issuing instructions for and authorizing the expenses of such officials, as by act of the Council of Government reside in foreign parts, and preparation of passports for foreign lands. ARTICLE XV. The Secretary of the Interior shall be charged with: Collection of all statistics concerning the Republic; opening of roads and bridges; the advancement of agriculture, industry, commerce, art, professions and manufactures, public' instruction and posts, depots of cattle and horses for the use of the Revolution; establishment of police for the protection or security of public order, and for the preservation of the liberties and individual rights established by this Constitution, and the custody of the property of the State. ARTICLE XVI. The Secretary of War is in charge of all military correspondence; of the increase and decrease, of the organization and instruction of the army, is head of the staff, is in charge of enlistment and of providing clothings, hospitals, commissary and ordinance. ARTICLE XVII. The Secretary of the Treasury shall have under his charge all receipts and payments of the Treasury, making collections and payments in accordance with the regulations and decrees issued by the Council of Government; coining of money and issuance of paper money; the public debt; administration of the property of the State, and the further duties pertaining to the Treasury Department. ARTICLE XVIII. The Secreta)ries shall have charge of the drafting of all laws, correspondence, regulations and decrees appertaining to their respective offices. ARTICLE XIX. The Captain-General of the Army shall have command of all the armed troops in the towns, forts or detachments; the direction of the operations of war, except in the case reserved for the Council of Government, as set forth in Article 2, No. 5, aid he shall give such orders as he deems necessary for the discipline and safety of the troops. ARTICLE XX. The Lieutenant-General shall serve as CaptainGeneral of the Army, ad interim, in case of vacancy. ARTICLE XXI. Each province of the Philippines may have a representative delegate elected by universal suffrage, wli o shall represent it in the Assembly.

Page  421 CONSTITUTION OF BIAC-NA-BATO 421 ARTICLE XXII. Religious liberty, the right of association, the freedom of education, the freedom of the press, as well as freedom in the exercise of all classes of professions, arts, trades and industries are established. ARTICLE XXIII. Every Filipino shall have the right to direct petitions or present remionstrances of any import whatsoever, in person or through his representative, to the Council of Government of the Republic. ARTICLE XXIV. No person, whatever may be his nationality, shall be imprisoned or held except by virtue of an order issued by a competent court, provided that this shall not apply to crimes which concern the Revolution, the government or the Army. ARTICLE XXV. Neither can any individual be deprived of his property or his domicile, except by virtue of judgment passed by a court of competent authority. ARTICLE XXVI. Every Filipino is obliged to serve the Revolution with his services and property to the extent of his capacity. ARTICLES XXVII. The debts and other obligations contracted prior to the promulgation of this Constitution by the Generals and other Chiefs of the Revolutionary Army, as well as their notes and orders, are hereby recognized and ratified to-day, also all subsequent debts, certified to by the government. ARTICLE XXVIII. The officials of the Council of Government are entitled to the consideration and respect due to their rank, and if they be constant in them they shall be entitled to pensions according to regulations to be published on the subject. ARTICLE XXIX. The Council of Government has the power to remove any official from office if there be sufficient reason for it. Formal charges will be laid for the action of a court to be called the "Sworn Tribunal." ARTICLE XXX. The Supreme Council of Grace and Justice to be established by the Supreme Council of Government, shall have authority to make decisions and affirm or disprove the sentences rendered by other courts, and to dictate rules for the administration of justice. ARTICLE XXXI. The Supreme Council of Grace and Justice shall be independent in its functions and shall not be interferred with by any other power or authority. ARTICLE XXXII. Every official of the Republic shall render assistance to the others in the discharge of his duties. ARTICLE XXXIII. When the necessary Army is organized, a navy shall be created for the protection of the coasts of the Philippine

Page  422 422 APPENDLD Archipelago and its seas; then a Secretary of the Navy shall be appointed and the duties of his office shall be added to this Constitution. ARTICLE XXXIV. This Constitution shall be in force here in the Philippines for the period of two years from the date of its promulgation, in case that the Revolution shall not have terminated within that time. Upon the expiration of said period, a session of the Assembly of Representatives shall be called for a new Constitution and the election of new Council of Government and Representatives of the people. As it has been thus decreed by the Representatives of the Filipino people, and in the name of the Republic ordered by the Assembly thus constituted,-We, the undersigned, pledge with our word and honor fulfillment of what is set forth in this Constitution at Biac-na-bato, November 15, 1897. President, Emilio Aguinaldo, Severino de las Alas, Pascual Alvarez, Mariano Llanera, Mamerto Natividad, Isabelo Artacho, Vicente Lucban y Rilles, Melecio Carlos, Simeon Tecson, Mariano Noriel, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Salvador Estrella, Pantaleon Garcia, Escolastico Viola, Julian de la Cruz, Ciriaco Sartore, Jose Ignacio Paua, Agustin de la Rosa, Celestino Aragon, Gregorio H. del Pilar, Andres Presbitero, Benito Natividad, Pedro Duigon, Eduardo Llanera, Herminio Miguel, Deodato Manajan, Pedro Gualdes (?), Ambrosio de la Cruz, Matias San Bino, Miguel Catahan, Clemente Valencia, Modesto Porciuncula, Claro Fuelo (?), Emiliaro Tecson, Benvenuto Ramirez, Francisco M. Soliman, Maximo Cabigting, Ramon Tombo, Artemio Ricarte Vibora, Sinforoso de la Cruz, Agapito Bonson, Valentin Diaz, Tomas Aquino Linares (?), Cipriano Pacheco, Manuel Tinio, Anastacio Francisco, Serviliano Aquino, Wenceslao Viniegra, Doroteo Lopez, Vito Belarmino, Secretary, Antonio Montenegro, Secretary, Teodoro Gonzalez, Secretary.

Page  423 APPENDIX C (1) AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION OF JUNE 23, 1898, ESTABLISHING THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. Don Emilio Againaldo y Famy, president of the revolutionary government of the Philippines and general in chief of its army. This Government desiring to demonstrate to the Philippine people that one of its ends is to combat with a firm hand the inveterate vices of the Spanish adm-inistration, substituting for personal luxury and th-at pompous ostentation which have made it a mere matter of routine, cumbrous and slow in its movements, another administration more modest, simple, and prompt in performing the public service, I decree, as follows: CHAPTER.L.-Of the revolutionary government. ARTICLE L The dictatorial government will be entitled hereafter the revolutionary government, whose object is to struggle for the independence of the Philippines until all nations, including the Spanish, shall expressly recognize it, and to prepare the country so that a true republic may be established. The dictator will be entitled hereafter president of the revohitionary government. ART. II. Four secretaryships of government are created-one" of foreign affairs, navy, and commerce; another of war and public works; another of police and internal order, justice, education, and hygiene; and another of finance, agriculture, and manufactur- ing industry. The government may increase this number of secretaryships when it shall find in practice that this distribution is not sufficient for the multiplied and complicated necessities of the public service. ART. III. Each secretaryship shall aid the president in the administration of questions concerning the different branches which it comprises. At the head of each one shall be a secretary, who shall not be responsible for the decrees of the presidency, but shall sign them with the president to give them authority. But if it shall appear that the decree has been promulgated on the proposition of the secretary of the department the latter shall be responsible conjointly with the president. (1) From The Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, Senate Doc. No. 62, Part I. p. 433.

Page  424 424 APPENDIX ART. IV. The secretaryship of foreign affairs will be divided into three bureaus-one of diplomacy, another of navy, and another of commerce. The first bureau will study and dispose of all questions pertaining to management of diplomatic negotiations with other powers and the correspondence of the government with them; the second will study all questions relating to the formation and organization of our navy, and the fitting out of such expeditions as the necessities of the revolution may require; and the third will have charge of everything relating to the internal and external commerce, and the preliminary work which may be necessary for making treaties of commerce with other nations. ART. V. The secretaryship of war will be divided into two bureaus; one of war, properly speaking, and the other of public works. The first bureau will be subdivided into four sections-one of campaigns, another of military justice, another of military adminnistration, and another of military health. The section of campaigns will have charge of the appointment and formation of the certificates of enlistment and service of all who serve in the revolutionary militia; of the direction of campaigns; the preparation of plans, works of fortification, and preparing reports of battle; of the study of military tactics for the army and the organization of the general staff, artillery, and cavalry; and, finally, of the determination of all the other questions concerning the business of campaigns and military operations. The section of military justice will have charge of everything relating to courts of war and military tribunals, the appointment of judges and counsel, and the determination of all questions of military justice. The section of military administration will be charged with the furnishing of food and other supplies necessary for the use of the army,and 'the section of military health will have charge of everything relating to the hygiene and healthfulness of the militia. ART. VI. The other secretaryships will be divided into such bureaus as their branches may require, and each bureau will be subdivided into sections according to the nature and importance of She work it has to do. ART. VII. The secretary will inspect and supervise all the ' work of his secretaryship and will determine all questions weith the president of the government. At the head of each bureau will be a director, and in each section an officer provided with such number of assistants and clerks as may be specified.

Page  425 AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION ETC. 425 ART. VIII. The president will appoint the secretaries of hisown free choice, and in concert with them will appoint all the subordinate officials of each secretaryship. In order that in the choice of persons it may be possible to avoid favoritism it must be fully understood that the good name of the country and the triumph of the revolution require the services of persons truly capable. ART. IX. The secretaries may be present at the revolutionary congress, in order that they may make any motion in the name of the president or may be interpelated publicly by any one of the representatives; but when the question which is the object of the motion shall be put to vote, or after the interpelation is ended, they shall leave and shall not take part in the vote. ART. X. The president of the government is the personification of the Philippine people and in accordance with this idea it shall not be possible to hold him responsible while he fills the office. His term of office shall last until the revolution triumphs, unless under extraordinary circumstances he shall feel obliged to offer his resignation to congress, in which case congress will elect whomsoever it considers most fit. CHAPTER II.-Of the revolutiotnary congress. ART. XI. The revolutionary congress is the body of representatives of the provinces of the Philippine Archpelago elected in the manner prescribed in the decrees of the 18th of the present month. Nevertheless, if any province shall not be able as yet to elect representatives because the greater part of its towns shall have not yet been able to liberate themselves from Spanish domination, the government shall have power to appoint as provisional representatives for this province those persons who are most distinguished for high character and social position in such numbers as are prescribed by the above-named decree, provided always that they are natives of the province which they represent or have resided therein for a long time. ART. XII. The representatives having met at the town which is the seat of the revolutionary governmeAnt, and in the building which may be designated, will proceed to its prelimiary labors, designating by plurality of votes a commission composed of five individuals charged with examining documents accrediting each representative, and another commission composed of three individuals who will examine the documents which the five of the former commission exhibit. ART. XIII. On the following day the above-named representatives will meet again, and the two commissions will read their res

Page  426 426 APPENDIX pective reports concerning the legality of the said documents deciding by an absolute majority of votes on the character of those which appear doubtful. This business completed, it will proceed to designate, also by absolute majority, a president, a vice-president, and two secretaries, who shall be chosen from among the representatives, whereupon the congress shall be considered organized and shall notify the government of the result of the election. ART. XIV. The place where congress deliberates is sacred and inviolable, and no armed force shall enter therein unless the president thereof shall ask therefor in order to establish internal order disturbed by those who can neither honor themselves nor its august functions. ART. XV. The powers of congress are: To watch over the general interest of the Philippine people and the carrying out of the revolutionary laws; to discuss and vote upon said laws; to discuss and approve prior to their ratification treaties and loans; to examine and approve the accounts presented annually by the secretary of finance as well as extraordinary and other taxes which may hereafter be imposed. ART. XVI. Congress shall also be consulted in all grave and important questions the determination of which admit of delay or adjournment; but the president of the government s4hall have power to decide questions of urgent character, but in that case he shall give account by message to said body of the decision which he has adopted. ART. XVII. Every representative shall have power to present to congress any project of a law, and every secretary on the order of the president of the government shall have similar power. ART. XVIII. The sessions of congress shall be public, and only in cases which require reserve shall it have power to hold a secret session. ART. XIX. In the order of its deliberations as well as in the internal government of the body the instructions which shall be formulated by the congress itself shall be observed. The president shall direct the deliberations and shall not vote except in case of a tie, when he shall have the casting vote. ART. XX. The president of the government shall not have power to interrupt in any manner the meetings of congress nor embarras its sessions. ART. XXI. The congress shall designate a permanent cornmission of justice, which shall be presided over by the auxiliary vicepresident or each of the secretaries, and shall be composed of those persons and seven members elected by plurality of votes from among

Page  427 AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION ETC. 427 the representatives. This commission shall judge on appeal the criminal cases tried by the provincial courts, and shall take cognizance of and have original jurisdiction in all cases against the secretaries of the government, the chiefs of provinces and towns, and the provincial judges. ART. XXII. In the office of the secretary of congress shall be kept a book of honor, wherein shall be recorded special services rendered the country and considered as such by said body. Every Filipino, whether in the military or civil service, may petition congress for notation in said book, presenting duly accredited documents describing the service rendered by him on behalf of the country since the beginning of the present revolution. For extraordinary services which may be rendered hereafter the government will propose said notation, accompanying the proposal with the necessary documents justifying it. ART. XXIII. The congress will also grant on the proposal of. the government rewards in money, which can be given only once, to the families of those who were victims of their duty and patriotism as a result of extraordinary acts of heroism. ART. XXIV. The acts of congress shall not take effect until the president of the government orders their fulfillment and execution. Whenever the said president shall be of the opinion that any act is unsuitable or against public policy or pernicious, he shall explain to congress the reasons against its execution, and if the latter shall insist on its passage the president shall have power to oppose his veto under his most rigid responsibility. CHAPTER III.-Of military courts and justice. ART. XXV. When the chiefs of military detachments have notice that any soldier has committed or has perpetrated any act of those commonly considered as military crimes, he shall bring it to the knowledge of the commandant of the Zone, who shall appoint a judge and a secretary who shall begin suit in the form prescribed in the instructions dated the 20th of the present month. If the accused shall be of the grade of lieutenant or higher, the said commandant shall himself be the judge, and if the latter shall be the accused the senior commandant of the Province shall name as judge an officer who holds a higher grade, unless the same senior commandant shall himself have brought the suit. The judge shall always belong to the class of chiefs. ART. XXVI.-On the conclusion of the preliminary hearing the senior commandant shall designate three officers of equal or higher rank to the judge, and the military court shall consist of the said officers, the judge, the councilor, and the president. The latter shall be the commandant of the zone if the accused be of the grade of lien

Page  428 428 APPENDIX tenant or higher. This court shall conduct the trial in the form customary in the provincial courts, but the judgment shall be appealable to the higher courts of war. ART. XXVII. The superior court shall be composed of six members, who shall hold rank not less than brigadier-generals, and the judge-advocate. If the number of generals present in the capital of the revolutionary government shall not be sufficient, the deficiency shall be supplied by representatives designated and commissioned by congress. The president of the court shall be the general having the highest rank of all, and should there be more than one having equal rank the president shall be elected from among them by absolute majority of votes. ART. XXVIII. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in all cases affecting the higher commandants, the commandants of zones and all officers of the rank of major and higher. ART. XXIX. Commit military crimes: First, those who fail ta grant the necessary protection to foreigners, both in their persons and property, and those who similarly fail to afford protection to hospitals and ambulances, including persons and effectr which may be found in possession of one or the other, and those engaged in the service of the same, provided always they commit to hostile act; second, those who fail in the respect due to the lives, money, and jewels of enemies who lay down their arms, and of prisoners of war; third, Filipinos who place themselves in the service of the enemy, acting as spies or disclosing to them secrets of war and the plans the revolutionary positions and fortifications, and those who present themselves under a flag of truce without justifying properly their office and their personality; and fourth, those who fail to recognize a flag of truce duly accredited in the form prescribed by international law. Will commit also military crimes: Those who conspire against the unity of the revolutionists, provoking rivalry between chiefs, and forming divisions and armed bands; second, those who solicit contributions without authority of the government and misappropriate the public funds; third, those who desert to the enemy, or are guilty of cowardice in the presence of the enemy, being armed; and fourth, those who seize the property of any person who has done no harm to the revolution, violate women and assassinate or inflict serious wounds on unarmed persons, and who commit robberies and arson. ART. XXX. Those who commit the crimes enumerated will be considered as declared enemies of the revolution, and will incur the penalties prescribed in the Spanish Penal Code, and in the highest grade. If the crime shall not be found in the said code, the offender shall be imprisoned until the revolution triumphs, unless the' result

Page  429 AGUINALDO'S PROCLAMATION ETC. 429 of this shall be an irreparable damage which, in the judgment of the tribunal, shall be a sufficient cause for imposing the penalty of death. ADDITIONAL CLAUSES. The government will establish abroad a revolutionary committee composed of a number, not yet determined, of persons most competent in the Philippine Archipelago. This committee will be divided into three delegations: One of diplomacy, another of the navy, and another of the army. The delegation of diplomacy will arrange and conduct negotiations with foreign cabinets with a view to the recognition of the belligerency and independence of the Philippines. The delegation of the navy will be charged with the studying and organizing of the Philippine navy and preparing the expenditures which the necessities of the revolution may require. The delegation of the army will study military tactics and the best form of organization for the general staff, artillery, and engineers, and whatever else may be necessary in order to fit out the Philippine army under the conditions required by modern progress. ART. XXXII. The government will issue the necessary instructions for the proper execution of the present decree. ART. XXXIII. All the decrees of the dictatorial government in conflict with the foregoing are hereby annulled. Given at Cavite the 23d of June, 1898. EMILIO AGUINALDO.

Page  430 APPENDIX D THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC (1) PRESIDENCY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINES. DON EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY, President of the Revolutionary Government of Philippines and Captain-General and Commander in Chief of the A-rmy. Know all Philippine Citizens: That the assembly of representatives of the nation using its sovereignty, has decreed, and I have sanctioned, the political constitution of the state. Therefore I command all the military and civil authorities of any class or rank to keep it and cause it to be kept, complied with, and executed in all its parts, because it is the sovereign will of the Philippine people. Done at Malolos on the 21st day of January in the year eighteen hundred and ninety-nine. EMILIO AGUINALDO The President of the Council: APOLINARIO MABINI We, the representatives of the Philippine people, lawfully invoked, in order to establish justice, provide for common defense, promote general welfare, and insure the benefits of freedom, inploring the aid of the Sovereign Legislator of the Universe in order to attain these purposes, have voted, decreed, and sanctioned the following: POLITICAL CONSTITUTION. FIRST TITLE.-The Republic. ARTICLE I. The political association of all the Filipinios constitutes a nation, the state of which is denominated Philippine Republic. ART. 2. The Philippine Republic is free and independent. ART. 3. Sovereignty resides exclusively in the people. SECOND TITLE.-The Government. ART. 4. The government of the republic is popular, representative, alternative and responsible, and is exercised by three dis(1) This literal translation was originally printed as Exhibit IV, Volume I Repwrt of the Philippine Commission to the President, January 31, 1900, Senate Document 188. Fifty-sixth Congress, first session.

Page  431 THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION ETC. tinct powers, which are denominated legislative, executive and judicial. Two or more of these powers shall never be vested in one person or corporation; neither shall the legislature be vested in one individual alone. THIRD TITLE. —Religion. ART. 5. The state recognizes the equality of all religious worships and the separation of the church and the state. FOURTH TITLE.-The Filipinos and their national and individual rights. ART. 6. The following are Filipinos: 1. All persons born in Philippine territory. A vessel flying the Philippine flag shall, for this purpose, be considered a portion of the Philippine territory. 2. The offspring of a Filipino father and mother although born outside the Philippine territory. 3. Foreigners who have obtained certificate of naturalization. 4. Those who without it may have gained "vecindad" (residence) in any town of the Philippine territory. It is understood that residence is gained by staying two years without interruption in one locality of the Philippine territory, having an open abode and known mode of living and contributing to all the charges of the nation. The nationality of the Filipino is lost in accordance with the laws. (S. C. C., 1st Title, 1st Art.; S. C., 1st Title, 1st Art.) ART. 7. No Filipinos nor foreigner shall be arrested nor imprisoned unless on account of crime, and in accordance with the laws. (S. C., 4th Art.) ART. 8. Any person arrested shall be discharged or delivered over to the judicial authority within twenty-four hours following the arrest. (S. C. 4th Art.) Any arrest shall be held without effect or shall be carried to commitment within seventy-two hours after the detained has been delivered over to a competent judge. The party interested shall receive notice of the order which may be issued within the same time. (S. C., 4th Art.) ART. 9. No Filipino can become a prisoner unless by virtue of the mandate of a competent judge. The decree by which may be issued the mandate shall be ratified or confirmed, having heard the presumed criminal within seventy-two hours following the act of commitment. (S. C., 5th Art.) ART. 10. No one can enter the domicile of a Filipino or foreign resident in the Philippines without his consent, except in urgent

Page  432 432 APPENDIX cases of fire, flood, earthquake, or other similar danger, or of unlawful aggression proceeding from within or in order to assist a person within calling for help. Outside of these cases, the entrance in the domicile of a Filipino or foreign resident of the Philippines and the searching of his papers or effects can only be decreed by a competent judge and executed during the day. The searching of the papers and effects shall take place always in the presence of the party interested or of an individual of his family, and, in their absence, of two resident witnesses of the same place. Notwithstanding, when a delinquent may be found, in "flagranti" and pursued by the authority with its agents, may take refuge in his domicile, he may be followed into the same only for the purpose of apprehension. If he should take refuge in the domicile of another, notification to the owner of the latter shall precede. (S. C., 6th Art.) ART. 11. No Filipino can be compelled to make change of his domicile or residence unless by virtue of an executive sentence (S. C., 9th Art.) ART. 12. In no case can there be detained nor opened by the governing authority the correspondence confided to the post-office, nor can that of the telegraph or telephone be detained. But, by virtue of a decree of a competent judge, can be detained any correspondence and also opened in the presence of the accused that which may be conveyed by the postoffice. (S. C., 7th, Art.) ART. 13. Any decree of imprisonment, of search of abode, or of detention of the correspondence written, telegraphed, or telephoned, shall be justified. When the decree may fall short of this requisite, or when the motives in which it may be founded may be judicially declared unlawful or notoriously insufficient, the person who may have been imprisoned, or whose imprisonment may not have been ratified within the term prescribed in art. 9, or whose domicile may be forcibly entered, or whose correspondence may be detained, shall have the right to demand the responsibilities which ensue. (S. C., 8 th Art.) ART. 14. No Filipino shall be prosecuted nor sentenced, unless by a judge or tribunal to whom, by virtue of the Jaws which precede the crime, is delegated its cognizance, and in the form which the latter prescribe. (S. C., 16th Art.) ART. 15. Any person detained or imprisoned, without the legal formalities, unless in the cases provided in this constitution, shall be discharged upon their own petition or that of any Filipino.

Page  433 THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION ETC. 433 The laws shall determine the form of proceeding summarily in this case, as well as the personal and pecuniary penalties incurred by him who may order, execute, or cause to be executed, the illegal detention or imprisonment. ART. 16. No person shall be deprived temporarily or permanently of his property or rights, nor disturbed in the possession of them, unless by virtue of a judicial sentence. (S. C., 10th Art.).. Those functionaries who under any pretext infringe this provision shall be personally responsible for the damage caused. ART. 17. No person shall be deprived of his property unless through necessity and common welfare, previously justified and declared by the proper authority, providing indemnity to the owner previously to the deprivation. (S. C., 10th Art.) ART. 18. No person shall be obliged to pay contribution which may not have been voted by the assembly or by the popular corporations legally authorized to impose it, and which exaction shall not be made in the form prescribed by law. (S. C., 3rd. Art.) ART. 19. No Filipino who may be in the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights shall be hindered in the free exercise of the same. ART. 20. Neither shall any Filipino be deprived of: 1. The right of expressing liberally his ideas and opinions either by word or by writing availing himself of the press or of any other similar means. 2. The right of associating with all the objects of human life which may not be contrary to public morality; and, finally. 3. Of the right to direct petitions, individually or collectively, to the public powers and to the authorities. The right of petition shall not be exercised by any class of armed force. (S. C., 15th Art.) ART. 21. The exercise of the rights expressed in the preceding article shall be subject to the general provisions which regulate them. ART. 22. Those crimes which are committed upon the occasion of the exercise of the rights granted in this title shall be punished by the tribunals in accordance with the common laws. ART. 23. Any Filipino can found and maintain establishments of instruction or of education, in accordance with provisions which are established. Popular education shall be obligatory and gratuitous in the schools of the nation. (S. C., 12th Art.) ART. 34. Any foreigner may establish himself liberally in the Philippines territory, subject to the provisions which regulate the

Page  434 APPENDIX matter, exercising therein his industry or devoting himself to any profession in the exercise of which the laws may not require diplomas of fitness issued by the national authorities. (S. C., 12th Art.) ART. 25. No Filipino who is in the full enjoyment of his political and civil rights shall be hindered from going freely from the territory, nor from removing his residence or property to a foreign country, except the obligations of contributing to the military service and the maintenance of the public taxes. ART. 26. The foreigner who may not have become naturalized shall not exercise in the Philippines any ohce which may have attached to it authority or jurisdiction. ART. 27. Every Filipino is obliged to defend the country with arms when he may be called upon by the laws, and to contribute to the expense of the estate (government) in proportion to his property. (S. C., 13th Art.) ART. 28. The enumeration of the rights granted in this title does not imply the prohibition of any other not expressly delegated. ART. 29. Previous authorization shall not be necessary in order to prosecute before the ordinary tribunals the public functionaries whatever may be the crime they commit. A superior mandate shall not exempt from responsibility inl cases of manifest infraction; clear and determinate, of a constitutional provision. In the other cases it shall exempt only the agents who may not exercise the authority. ART. 30. The guarantees provided in articles 7, 8, 9, and 10 and 11 and paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 20th article shall not be suspended in the republic nor any part of it, unless temporarily and by means of a law, when the security of the state shall demand it in extraordinary circumstances. It being promulgated in the territory to which it may apply, the special law shall govern during the suspension according to the circumstances which demand it. The latter as well as the former shall be voted in the national assembly, and in case the assembly may be closed the government is authorized to issue it in conjunction with the permanent commission without prejudice to convoklving the former within the shortest time and giving them information of what have been done. But neither by the one nor the other law can there be suspended any other guarantees than those delegated in the first paragraph of this article nor authorizing the government to banish from the country or transport any Filipino. In no case can the military or civil chiefs establish any other penalty than that previously prescribed by the law. (S. C., 17th Art)

Page  435 THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION ETC. 435 ART. 31. In the Philippine Republic no one can be tried by private laws nor special tribunals. No person can have privileges nor enjoy emoluments which may not be compensation for public service and which as fixed by law. "El fuero de guerra y marina" (the jurisdiction, privileges, and powers of army and navy) shall extend solely to the crimes and faults which may have intimate connection with the military and maritime discipline. ART. 32. No Filipino can establish "MIayorazgo:-" now institutions "vinculadores" (title or perpetual succession by eldest son nor institution entailed) of property, nor accept honors, "condecoraciones" (insignia or decoration of orders) or titles of honors and nobility from foreign nations without the authorization of the government. Neither can the government establish the institutions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, nor grant honors, "condecoraciones" or titles of honor and nobility to any Filipino. Notwithstanding the nation may reward by a special law, voted by the assembly, eminent services which may be rendered by the citizens to their country. FIFTH TITLE.-Legislative Power. -~ ART. 33. The legislative power shall be exercised by an as- l sembly of the representatives of the nation. This assembly shall be organized in the form and under the conditions determined by the law which may be issued to that effect. ART. 34. The members of the assembly shall represent the entire iation, and not exclusively those who elect them. ART. 35. No representative shall be subjected to any imperative man of his electors. ART. 36. The assembly shall meet every year. It is the prerogative of the President of the republic to convoke it, suspend and close its sessions and dissolve it, in concurrence with the same or with the permanent commission in its default, and within legal terms. ART. 37. The assembly shall be opened at least three months each year, not including in this time that which is consumed in its organization. The President of the republic shall convoke it at the latest by the 15th of April. ART. 38. In an extraordinary case he can convoke it outside of the legal period, with the concurrence of the permanent commission, and prolong the legislature, when the term does not extend one month nor takes place more than twice in the same legislature.

Page  436 APPENDIX ART. 39. The national assembly, together with the extraordinary representatives, shall form the constituents in order to proceed to the modification of the constitution and to the election of the new President of the republic, convoked at least one month previous to the termination of the powers of the former. In the case of the death or of the resignation of the President of the republic, the assembly shall meet immediately by its own right and at the request of its president or of that of the permanent commission. ART. 40. In the meantime, while the appointment of the New President of the republic proceeds, the president of the supreme court of justice shall exercise his functions, his place being filled by one of the members of this tribunal, in accordance with the laws. ART. 41. Any meeting of the assembly which may be held outside of the ordinary period of the legislature shall be null and void. That which is provided by art. 39 is excepted, and in that the assembly is constituted a tribunal of justice, not being allowed to exercise in such case other than judicial functions. ART. 44. The sessions of the assembly shall be public. Notwithstanding, they can be secret at the petition of a certain number of its individuals, fixed by the regulations, it being decided afterwards by an absolute majority of the votes of the members present whether the discussion of the same matter be continued in public. ART. 43. The President of the republic shall communicate with the assembly by means of messages, which shall be read from the rostrum by a secretary of the government. The secretaries of the government shall have entrance into the assembly, with the right to the floor whenever they ask it, and shall cause themselves to be represented in the discussion of any particular project by commissioners designated by decree of the president of the republic. ART. 44. The assembly shall constitute itself a tribunal of justice in order to try the crimes committed against the security of the estate by the President of the republic and individuals of the Counsel of Government, by the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, by the Procurer-General of the nation by means of a decree of the same, or of the permanent commission in his absence, or of the President of the republic at the proposal of the Procurer-General or of the counsel of the government. The laws shall determine the mode of procedure for the accussation, preparation for trial and pardon.

Page  437 THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION ETC. 437 ART. 45. No member of the assembly can be prosecuted nor molested for the opinions which he may express nor for the votes which he may cast in the exercise of his office. ART. 46. No member of an assembly can be prosecuted in a criminal matter without authorization of the same, or of the permanent commission, to whom shall immediately be given infornmation of the act for proper disposition. The arrest, detention, or apprehension of a member of the assembly can not take place without previous authorization of the same or of the permanent commission; but having once notified the assembly of the decree of arrest, shall incur responsibility if, within two days following the notification, it may not authorize the arrest or give reasons upon which its refusal is founded. ART. 47. The national assembly shall have besides the following powers: 1. To frame regulations for its interior government. 2. To examine the legality of the elections and the legal qualifications of the members elected. 3. Upon its organization to appoint its President, Vice-President and secretaries. Until the assembly may be dissolved, its President, Vice-Presidents, and secretaries shall continue exercising their office during four legislatures; and 4. To accept the resignations presented by its members, and grant leaves of absence subject to the regulations, (S. C., 34th & 35th Art.) ART. 48. No project can become a law before being voted upon by the assembly. In order to pass the laws there shall be required in the assembly at least a fourth part of the total number of members, whose elections may have been approved and who may have taken the oath of office. ART. 49. No proposed law can be approved by the assembly without having been voted upon as a whole, and article by article. ART. 50. The assemblies shall have the right of censure and each one of its members the right to be heard. ART. 51. The proposal of the laws belongs to the President of the republic and to the assembly. ART. 52. The representative of the assembly who accepts of the government pension employment, or commission with a salary, shall be understood to have renounced his office. The employment of the secretary of the government of the republic and other offices prescribed in special laws are excepted from this provision. (S. C., 31st Art.)

Page  438 438 APPENDIX ART. 53. The office of representative shall be for a term of four years, and those who may exercise it have the right, by way of indemnity, according to the circumstances, to a sum determined by the law. Those who may absent themselves during the whole of the legislature shall not be entitled to this indemnity, but will recover this right if they assist in those which follow. SIXTH TITLE.-The Permanent Commission. ART. 54. The assembly, before the closing of its sessions, shall elect seven of its mernmbers in order to constitute a permanent commission during the period of its being closed, the latter being obliged in its first session to designate a president and secretary. ART. 55. The following are the functions of the permanent commission in the absence of the assembly: 1. To declare whether or not there is a sufficient reason to proceed against the President of the republic, the representatives, secretaries of the government, President of the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Procurer-General in the cases provided by this constitution. 2. To convoke the assembly to an extraordinary meeting in those cases in which it should constitute a tribunal of justice. 3. To transact the business which may remain pending for consideration. 4. To convoke the assembly to extraordinary sessions when the exigency of the case mray demand; and 5. To substitute the assembly in its functions in accordance with the constitution, exception being made of the right to make and pass the laws. The permanent conmmission shall meet whenever it may be convoked by him who presides in accordance with this constitution. SEVENTH TITLE.-2The Executive Power. ART. 56. The executive power shall reside in the President of the republic, who exercises it through his secretaries. ART. 57. The conduct of the interests peculiar to the towns, the provinces, and of the state belonging respectively to the popular assemblies, to the provincial assemblies, and to the active administration, with reference to laws, and upon the basis of the most ample "descentralization" (distribution) and administrative autonomy. EIGHT TITLE.-The President of the Republic. AR. 58. The President of the Republic shall be elected by an absolute majority of votes by the assembly and the representative vpecialy met in constitutive chamber.

Page  439 THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION ETC. His term of the office shall be for four years and he will be reeligible. ART. 59. The President of the Republic shall have the pro-. posal of the laws as well as the members of the assembly, and shall promulgate the laws when they have been passed and approved by the latter and shall watch over and insure their execution. ART. 60. The power of causing the laws to be executed extends itself to all that which conduces to the conservation of public order in the interior and in the international security. ART. 61. The President of the Republic shall promulgate the laws within twenty days following the time when they have been transmitted by the assembly definitely approved. ART. 62. If within this time they may not be promulgated, it shall devolve upon the President to return them to the assembly with justification of the causes of their detention, proceeding in such case to their revision, and it shall, not be considered that it insists upon them, if it does not reproduce them by a vote of at least two-thirds of the members of the assembly present. Reproducing the law in the form indicated the government shall promulgate it within ten days, announcing his nonconformnity. In the samne manner the government shall become obligated if he allows to pass the term of twenty-days without returning the lave to the assembly. ART. 63. When the promulgation of a law may have been declared urgent by a vote expressed by an absolute majority of the votes of the assembly the President can call upon them by a message, stating his reasons for a new deliberation, which can not be denied, and the same law being approved anew, shall be promulgated within the legal term, without prejudice to the President's announciig his nonconformity. ART. 64. The promulgation of the laws shall take place by means of their publication in the official periodical of the republic and shall take effect after thirty days from the date of publication. ART. 65. The President of the Republic shall have commnand of the army, and navy making and ratifying treaties of peace, with the previous concurrence of the assembly. ART. 66. Treaties of peace shall not be binding until passed by this assembly. ART. 67. In addition to the necessary powers for the execution of the laws, the President of the Republic shall have the following: 1. To confer civil and military employment with reference to the laws. 2. To appoint the secretaries of the government.

Page  440 440 APPENDIX 3. To direct diplorniatic and commercial relations with foreign powers. 4. To see to it that in the entire territory may be administered speedy and complete justice. 5. To pardon delinquients in accordance with the laws, excepting the provision relative to the secretaries of the government. 6. To preside over national assemblies and to receive.the envoys and representatives of the foreign powers authorized to meet him. ART. 68. The President of the Republic shall need to be authorized by a special law: 1. In order to alienate, cede, or exchange any part of the Filipino territory. 2. In order to annex any other territory to that of the Philippines. 3. In order to admit foreign troops into the Philippine territory. 4. In order to ratify treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive; special treaties of commerce-those which stipulate to give subsidy to a foreign power-and all those which may bind individually the Filipinos. In no case can the secret articles of a treaty derrogate those which are public. 5. In order to grant amnesties and general pardons. 6. In order to coin money. (S. C., 55th Art.) ART. 69. To the President of the Republic belongs the power of dictating regulations for compliance and application of the laws in accordance with the requisite which the same prescribe. (S. C., 54th Art.) ART. 70. The President of the Republic can, with the previous concurrence adopted by a majority of the votes of the representatives, dissolve the assembly before the expiration of the legal term of its office. In this case they shall be convoked for new elections within a term of three months. ART. 71. The President of the Republic shall only be responsile in cases of high treason. ART. 72. The compensation of the President of the Republic shall be fixed by a special law, which can not be changed until the end of the presidential term of office. NINTH TITLE.-The Secretaries of the Government. ART. 73. The council of the government shall be composed of a President and seven Secretaries, who shall have charge of the offices

Page  441 THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION ETC. 441 of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Treasury, Armay and Navy, Public instruction, Public Communications and Works, Agriculture, Industry and Comnmerce. ART. 74. All that which the President may or provide in the exercise of his authority shall be signed by the Secretary to whom it belongs. No public functionary shlall give compliance to any which lack this requisite. ART. 75. The Secretaries of the government are responsible jointly to the assembly for the general policy of the governmrent and individually for their personal acts. To the Procurer-General of the nation belongs the accusing of them, and to the assembly their trial. The laws shall determine the cases of responsibility of the secretaries of the government, the penalties to which they are subject, and the mode of procedure against them. ART. 76. If they should be condemned by the assembly, in order to pardon them there shall precede the petition of an absolute majority of his representatives. TENTH TITLE.-The Judical Power. ART. 77. To the tribunals belongs exclusively the power of applying the laws in the name of the nation in civil and criminal trials. The same codes shall govern in the entire republic without, prejudice to modifications which for particular circumstances the laws may prescribe. In them shall not be established more than one jurisdiction for all the citizens in common trials, civil and criminal. ART. 78. The tribunals shall not apply the general and municipal regulations only in so far as they conform with the laws. ART. 79. The exercise of the judicial power resides in the Supreme Court of Justice and in the tribunals which are prescribed by the laws. The composition, organization, and other attributes shall be governed by the organic law which may be determined. ART. 80. The President of the Supreme Court of Justice and "Procurer-General" shall be appointed by the national assembly in concurrence w