Secretary Root's record. "Marked severities" in Philippine warfare. An analysis of the law and facts bearing on the action and utterances of President Roosevelt and Secretary Root.

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Now let us read what the same journal said after the exposure of
the facts:- -
It is amazing to find journals of known loyalty to the administration
at Washington, like the Philadelphia Press, for example, engaged in
zealous but misdirected efforts to exempt the President and the War
Department from the responsibility for General Smith's conduct of
the campaign in Samar. The Press says that General Smith's order
"was not approzved by our government or known to it." Now what are
the facts?
General Smith's orders in the province of Samar and General
Bell's in the province of Batangas were submitted to Major-general
Chaffee. He approved them, and submitted copies of them to the
War Department in Washington.... So far as the responsibility for
the conduct of the campaign in Samar, Batangas, and other provinces
is concerned, General Chaffee, General Smith, General Bell, and every
man under them were acting as directly with the approval of the government as if their orders had been written at the White House and
countersigned at the War Department....
It is the business of the War Department to protect the officers
against indefinite complaints quite as much as it is to hold them
responsible when definite charges are made. It is or should be a
point of honor to do this. Obligations are mutual; and, if the duty
of unquestioning obedience is imposed upon the officers, it is equally
demanded of the President of the United States that he should irnterpose the shield of his high office to protect the officer against public
disapproval when he does only the duty that obedience demands of
him.
The contrast between the articles is clear. The statement of the
War Department's duty to shield the army is equally clear.*
Mr. Henry Loomis Nelson is a very well-informed correspondent
of large experience, and not likely to exaggerate. On April 29 he
stated the attitude of the army in a nutshell. After alluding to the
* GENERAL HUGHES THREW SOMt LIGHT ON THIS SUBJECT IN HIS EVIDBNCB.
Senator RAWLINS. If these shacks were of no consequence what was the utility of their destruction?
General HUGHBS. The destruction was as a punishment. They permitted these people to come in there
and conceal themselves and they gave no sign. It is alwaysSenator RAWLINS. The punishment in that case would fall, not upon the men, who could go elsewhere,
but mainly upon the women and little children.
General HUGHES. The women and children are part of the family, and where you wish to inflict a punishment you can punish the man probably worse in that way than in any other.
Senator RAWLINS. But is that within the ordinary rules of civilized warfare? Of course you could
exterminate the family, which would be still worse punishment.
General HUGHES. These people are not civilized.
Senator RAWLINS. Then I understand you to say it is not civilized warfare?
General HUGHES. No: I think it is not.
Senator RAWLINS. Is it not true that operations in the islands became progressively more severe within
the past year and a half in dealing with districts which were disturbed?
General HUGHES. I think that is true. I would not say it is entirely so. The severities depend upon
the man immediately in command of the force that he has with him. In the department I suppose I had at
times as many as a hundred and twenty commands in the field. Each commander, under general restrictions,
had authority to act for himself. These commanders were changed from time to time. The new commanders
coming in would probably start in very much easier than the old ones.
Senator HALE. Very much what?
General HUGHES. Easier. They would come from this country with their ideas of civilized warfare, and
they were allowed to get their lesson.