History of the 151st field artillery, Rainbow Division, by Louis L. Collins, lieutenant governor of Minnesota. Edited by Wayne E. Stevens, PH. D. Pub. by the Minnesota War records commission.

246 HISTORY OF THE 151ST FIELD ARTILLERY

and proceeded with them to the Vesle. It supported this division in the crossing
of the Vesle and remained with them until the night of August 10-11th, when
it was relieved and withdrawn to the vicinity of Moucheton Chateau.
Killed Wounded Missing
Off. Meff Meff Men Off. Men
Infantry 24 609 134 3641 560
Machine Gun 1 53 3 349 18
Artillery 0 9 5 108
25 671 142 4098 578
OBSERVATIONS.
1. The enemy fought a strong rear guard action on carefully selected
positions which were defended principally by machine guns supported by thin
lines of infantry and by artillery fire. The machine gun positions were skillfully
chosen and well camouflaged, and apparently suffered little from our artillery
fire.
2. It would have been of great advantage to the Division had it been supplemented by other arms. During the pursuit, cavalry would have been very useful
in establishing and maintaining contact with the enemy. Tanks or armored
cars could have been used with excellent effect against machine gun nests, and
the fact that the enemy had practically complete control of the air not only prevented our troops from receiving adequate information but enabled the enemy
to adopt a very aggressive attitude in the way of firing on our troops with
machine guns and bombs.
3. In warfare of this character, at least a part of our light artillery should
be used aggressively and pushed up with the advance infantry for use in destroying by direct fire located machine gun nests.
4. It would appear that in attacking machine gun positions, the infantry
should take a formation calculated to give intense fire superiority to cover the
advance of detachments moving forward to attack the nests in the flank or rear.
Many opportunities appeared where small groups could have done effective work
by crawling forward on the flanks of machine gun positions, and had this
method been followed, losses might have been avoided.
5. In the pursuit by infantry, the approach formations should be used
cautiously. Advance guard formations can progress much more rapidly and
tend to prevent the possibility of surprise. All pursuit bodies should be preceded by scouts and patrols thrown well in advance.
6. All means of liaison should be used to the utmost, and rapidly advancing infantry should invariably be accompanied by aeroplanes, capable of directing the fire of their own artillery. Runners are apt to get lost in warfare of
this character and their routes should be carefully marked. Judicious use of a
relay system of runners is recommended. Because of necessary attendant delay
in the delivery of messages, runners should be used as a last resort and after
every means of rapid liaison has been employed as long as possible.
7. Excellent results were obtained by locating Artillery Commanders'
P.C.'s. at the P.C.'s. of the infantry units they were supporting, down to battalions.
8. Wire and other Engineering material should be pushed well forward
with the advance. In several instances, had the enemy prepared and executed a
powerful counter attack, he might have made substantial progress before strikin,g organized resistance. Material should be readily available to establish posi.
tions of defense in rear of the advance as circumstances require.
9. The supply problem in a rapid advance of this character is serious
and should be carefully organized in advance. With American troops, the matter of water supply is a most important one, and considerable sickness has resulted
from the use of infected or impure water.
C. A. F. FLAGLER,
Major General, U.S.A., Commanding.