The Common and Particular Ownership of Property [pp. 433-443]

THE COMMON AND PARTICULAR
or law that regulated and defined the equal rights of all to goods
given negatively in common. Hence they all concurred in maintaining (I) that God gave the goods of the earth to mankind
negatively in common; (2) that the division of those goods was
made ex jure gentium-i.e., by human laws; (3) that the division
thus made conferred on individuals exclusive ownership of their
equitable shares.
It may be truly said that Mr. George, in denying that land
can be divided so as to give exclusive ownership to individuals,
contradicts the teachings of all the wisest jurists, all the great
schools of Christian philosophy, and the universal practice of
all enlightened nations.
Yet in refuting the communistic arguments of Mr. George
and others who impugn the right of individual ment to own property, even when acquired under the conditions appointed by just
human lawv, we should not fall into the opposite error of maintaining either that Nature immediately gave to individuals the
exclusive right to their particular property any more than that
she gave to mankind all the goods of the earth positively in common. Individual persons can acquire exclusive ownership of property in accordance with a just and equitable positive rule or law,
and only in accordance with such principle can a valid title to
what is owned negatively in common be acquired, except, as before said, when the necessity of self-preservation renders goods
positively common. In refuting Mr. George's visionary and impracticable theories it is necessary to argue from first principles
that are true.
The objection might occur to the mind of the reader that the
moral claim of particular persons to their rightful property is
not sufficiently sanctioned and safeguarded according to the foregoing principles, seeing that their right is not allowed to rest
directly on the immutable precepts of Nature, but is referred to
the authority of the fallible and mutable laws of men. Wherefore it might be argued: What is brought about by human law
and agreement may be changed or abrogated by the same
method.
In answer it should be observed that not all things done
conventionally can be arbitrarily annulled by human authority;
only those things can be thus changed which are of such character or quality as admits of change. From the very nature of
things those changes may not be made which would be simple
acts of injustice. Changes may not be made either when it is
purely inexpedient or disadvantageous to the welfare of a nation
438
[July,