The Reconstruction of the U. S. Navy [pp. 381-386]

The Reconstlruction of the United States Nary.
able side to this settlement by arbitration
of the Alabama claims.
Even the smaller questions between
nations involving money considerations,
which are, perhaps, necessarily settled
by arbitration and mixed commissions,
have a history that is not always pleasant
to contemplate, or reassuring to lovers
of justice and advocates of joint international tribunals. The written and unwritten history of the Venezuela commission, in which we formed a part,
emphasizes this view of the subject; and
the records of our State Department
would doubtless show others not wise to
dwell upon.
The transfer of questions involving
national honor, dignity, obligations, or
self-preservation, to lawyers alone for
final settlement has all of the advantages
that pertain to a bloodless decision; but
may it not carry with it the disadvantages and the fetters that are sometimes
the result of litigation in our ordinary
courts of law, where at times crushing
monopolies and arbitrary trusts can be
successfully defended, railways and their
shareholders legally wrecked, and municipal bribery and corruption left unpunished?
Arbitration is practiced between
equals; a stronger power, with a wrong
to redress or an aggressive policy to enforce, will not stop for measures of arbitration. In the propositions for arbitration treaties now being agitated no
principle of general disarmament is advanced or would be considered by other
powers. Thus, while we should be deluded into a false sense of security, and
should continue in a weak and defenseless state, other powers would keep up
their armament and increase their powers of attack. Hence, the reconstruction
of the navy would be delayed or hindered,
as well as the provision of proper means
of defense for our coast, and increased
efficiency in our naval and military services.
Let me now consider from a profes
sional point of view the needs of the
naval service in the above matters.
Until very recently, the annual expenditure of the country for naval purposes has been an amount averaging in
the vicinity of fourteen millions of dollars, with a result that is universally
admitted to be unsatisfactory. We have
not had enough new ship construction
to replace even feebly the vessels condemned through the inevitable waste
and decay,- inevitable under any circumstances, but more so from the fact
that the navy was composed of vessels
built of wood. The result is that we now
have a navy less in relative force and
efficiency than we had in I86o, without
a single battle ship or armored cruiser,
with guns that are mostly obsolete, without proper torpedoes or torpedo boats;
and finally without coaling stations under our control, allowing refuge or refit
in time of war beyond our own coast.
By a broad and comprehensive policy
the immediate predecessor of the present Secretary of the Navy laid the foundations for the provision of modern
ordnance and armor. He was ably met
and assisted by the courage and faith of
some Pennsylvania ironmasters. Steps
were also taken towards the solution of
the torpedo question, on board cruising
and fighting ships. This policy has been
continued and improved by the present
Secretary, whose able and enlightened
views, if seconded by Congress, by the
grant of the necessary sums of money,
not intermittently but continuously, will
remedy these great defects in our naval
materiel.
The greatest need, however, exists
and remains in our first line of naval defense, in our want of battle ships fully
sea-going: of these we have none afloat,
none building, and only two authorized.
There are skeptics as to the utility of
sea-going armor clads or battle ships
for a defensive navy, so let us examine
the question. It is one of the first principles of warfare that the first, the most
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[October,