State and Federal Bills of Credit, Etc. [pp. 455-485]

4C~O Bills of Credit. [AI~ril
construction of terms, approach its meaning;-but we are not prepared, in a matter of such vital importance to the security of the State,
and the safety of the citizen, to countenance any sophistical rules of
construction, however ingenious. We are corupelled, therefore,
to seek after the meaning of il~ese rather cabalistic words in the
volumes wntten prior to, or at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. In ii one other may we hope to find it.
That we may the better comprehend the importance of the inquiry
upon which we propose to enter, the most obvious process is to
show what eminent jurists, elsewhere, have said upon the subject.
From these it will be seen that the phrase, "Bills of Credit," as used
in the Constitution, is one wholly marred with uncertainty as to its
exact meaning. In il~c case of "Craig Vs. The State of Missoun,"
Mr. Justice Johnson says, "the terms`Bills of Credit' are in themselves vague and general, and at the present day almost dismissed
from our language." in the same case, Mr. Justice Thompson says,
"the precise meaning and interpretation of the terms Bills of
C,~dit, has nowhere been settled, or if it has, it has nowhere fallen
within my knowledge." In the same case, Mr. Justice McLane also
says, "it will be found somewhat difficult to give a satisf~ctory definition of a Bill of Credit. Mr. McLane says, farther, in the aftercase of "Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,"
"fl~e definition of il~e terms Bills of Credit, as used in the Constitution, if it be not an impracticable task, will be found one of no
small difficulty." It was, moreover, said by Judge lluger, in delivering the opinion of the Constitutional Court of South-Carolina, in
the case of "James Billis vs. The State," that "the term Bills of
Credit seldom occur in the books, but when used, is always synony
n~us with Letters of Credit, whij~ appears to be its technical sig
nification"-and, to conclude this point, as to the mere difficulty of
reaching a correct definition of the phrase, Justices Johnson and
Story assert-the one in the case of Craig, and the other in the
case of Briscoe-in language of the same import, that "it is only
by resorting to the nomenclature of the day of the Constitution
that we can hope to get at the idea which the framers of the Consti.
tution attached to it."
Nor are our difficulties in respect to a correct definition of the
constitutional phrase, removed by any means through the definitions