The Battle of Churubusco [pp. 78-116]

112 Battle of Cl~urubusco. [July,
them in the march towards the city-the others returning
to the field. The first gun turned upon the retiring enemy was fired by Brevet Captain Ayres,* early in the
work, and the first shot was aimed, through mistake, at
the Palmettos, then near or on the causeway. ~ossibly
the t~~e-de-pont fell first-probably the enemy gave way
at both places at the same time. Either would not alter
the true point at issue-the matter is of comparatively
trifling importance-any decision would be useless, and
farther discussion fruitless of good.t
Gen. Scott acknowledges that he could have occupied
the capital the same evening, with "little addifional loss."
There were two considerations il~at induced him to check
the enthusiasm of his army, and halt it outside of the
walls. The first was a public one-which he and ThIr.
Trist have both expressed —the fear that a precipitate
entrance would expel the members of d~e government,
degrade the republic, (by thus mortifying individual vanity,) exasperate the people, and "scatter the elements of
peace."~ The neutral British, and others, had impressed
upon him this fear, while yet at Puebla. The will-o'-tliewisp of peace had not yet exhausted its baleful light. All
efforts were applied to constrain a close waddling after its
zig-zag course. ~1ilitaty operations and military renown
were perverted into subordination to the distant lure of
"the same size," 200 and Shields, 240. Now, [official report,] Worth, out
of 2600 men, lost 335; Twiggs, having the 4th aitillery and 7th infantry ah.
sent from the battle, and numbering about 2000, lost 178; and Shields out of
1500, lost 399 Let us ask here, according to his rule, where was the "hardest fighting?" lie puts Pillow's loss at 200, placing the division entire under
Pillow, to the exclusion of the credit due Shields; whereas Pillow's loss, in
fact, was but 16, including a regular officer [Lient. Irons] ini his staff. The
voltigeurs (see Andrews's Report, Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 122) losing only
one man.
With regard to the three divisions, Ripley [2d. vol., p. 310] says, " Had any
been beaten, it is difficult to see how the victory would have been achieved."
Stevens, p. 72, says of Shields, "The only safety to his command, perl~ops
to tlie army stavif, was to reach the causeway. Again, p. 73, "All [the di vi.
sions] suffered in nearly equal proportion, and to no particular one belongs the
glory."
*Capt. Ayres informed our authority.
t Au ~fficer of distinction, of the regular army, and disinterested on this question, informs us that be viewed tltu combats from a church top, at the ingle of
the Coyacan road and San Antonio causeway, and distinctly saw the enemy give
-way in front of Shields, before the tctc.de-pont hud beeni taken. This ought
to be conclusive of the matter.
~Scott's despatch, 28th August, 1847.