Shall We Have a Navy? Shall We Pursue the Defensive Policy, or Invade the Enemy's Country? [pp. 211-223]

SHALL WE HAVE A NAVY?
dollar would do so, if needed, for an honest and an earnest
effort to that end. As I understand, the point in dispute
between the United States and the Confederate States is not
whether cotton shlall be sent abroad, but whether sent through
United States or Confederate States ports.
Thle United States have made foreig(rn powers believe that
cottoil would be filrnished the m whenever they could open a
cotton port. Now, if such be the case, why not sell and get
vessels for the produce loan: for the subscribers, 1 conclude,
would ilot object, and let it go throug,h any port, for the loan
is useless as matters now stand. Would the United States
prevent the subjects of France tand EnilInd from slhip)ping
cotton thlroug,h Northern ports? We buy and the United Stat.s
buy arms in Europe, that is certain. If tl-he foreign powers
desired the blockade raised and desired to aLvoid a war with the
United States by raising it, would they not be glatd to give us
a chance to raise it ourselves. If they recognized us, surely
this could be done. But do we believe the United States would
go to war with foreign powers for raising, tlhe shiain blockad(le?
Not after the obsequious conduct on the part of the United
States so recently exhibited. No; if war occurs, it will be
En,gland, not the United States, that makles it. MIay not other
powers be, in like condition with tl-e United States, forced to
miake war abroad to keep peace at home. But if we are driven
to our own resources, are we in this more inferior to the United
States now tlhan thle United States were to (Great Britain in
1812? I think not; and if so, we can establish a navy. Where
thlere is a will, there is a way. If we never begin, we shall
never accomplish the undertakling therefore, the sooner begrun
the better. The dread of tl-he transfer of trade and commnerce
to the Confederate States, if a re(ognized people, with an
unfettered commnerce, in a few years, I believe las much more
to do in continuing the slamn blockade than is supposed. And if,
indeed, the juncture of affairs we live in has been truly indicated, and the South, in virtue of her production, is thle great
impelling cause of demands upon governments for concessions
to the people, wve should labor for a navy in season and out of
season, and labor with all our mig,ht for such vessels as will
enable us, if not done sooner by others, to raise the blockade
ourselves; and if the war continue, to protect our coast, and
then to have vessels to protect our fl,g(r wherever it floats on
the high seas. Then, and not till then, may we consider ourselves safe and independelt. Especially should we eingage in
no undertaking which must necessarily cause the expenditure
of immense sums, and which, if' successful, will probably
almost certainly result disastrously, if not occasion the overthrow and loss of liberty. And this brings me to the next
question- Shall we assume in war the a.ggressive policy?
Those in favor of aggression must take leave of the volunteer
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