The Federal Constitution, Formerly and Now [pp. 149-159]

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
preme Court of the United States, at the late term thereof,
when the constitutionality of the fugitive slave law was affirmed by the unanimous opinion of all the judges, who
decided also that the supreme court of Wisconsin acted without jurisdiction. The right of the marshal was recognized,
too, to resist such a process as that was, by which the Wisconsin Court commanded him to take the prisoner before that
court, not that justice might be done, but that a criminal
might be shielded from punishment, by a violation of the Constitution of the United States. The judgment of the Supreme
Court of the ULTnited States can do no harm to the offender.
He has been set at large. Where is he now? "Quien
sabe?" If the offender could be found he would be as effectually protected by a lawless and fanatical public sentiment
as a fugitive slave would be. With all these proofs in our possession of the irremediable nature of the flagrant wrongs that
we suffer, and which we have endured so long, why should
the people of the slaveholding States engage in angry or exciting discussions of the question, whether Kansas has the
right while she continues to be a territory, to refuse to afford
appropriate actions in favor of masters to recover slaves unlawfully withheld, or damages for their detention or for an
injury to them? Such discussions tend to alienate us from
each other, and thus to weaken us. Destitute as Kansas
doubtless is of lawful power to withhold remedies to recover
property in slaves, or damages for injuries done to them, there
is a lawless power there, such as has been exercised in several of the free States, which, if resorted to, can as effectually
prevent actual redress for such wrongs, as if no right existed
to bring suits for them in the courts of the territory. There
are courts in that territory established by the authority of the
United States, and judges who have been appointed by the
same authority. Common law actions lie in these courts for
the recovery of personal property of any kind, or damages for
any injury to it. Of these actions the owners of slaves may
avail themselves. They have an equal right to do so with the
owners of personal property of any other kind. From any
judgment of a court in the territory in such a case, an appeal
lies to the Supreme Court of the United States. Should the
territorial legislature prohibit, by the enactment of a statute,
actions for the recovery of slaves, or damages for injuries to
them, a territorial court would, most probably, maintain the
common, proper law actions, and hold the prohibitory act unconstitutional and void. If the court instructed the jury otherwise, and in favor of the act, upon an exception to the
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