Right and Wrong in Politics [pp. 265-293]

RIGHT AND WRONG IN POLITICS.
sively divided. There are others, such as flogging, on which
public opinion may be said to be wavering and unsettled. Two
principles of moral criticism have, however, clearly emerged of
late years. One is, that there are certain moral and personal
attributes which constitute the humanity of every one, and that.
there are kinds of outrage on this humanity which no end whatever can justify the state in resorting to. Again, it is getting
recognized that in all criminal punishments the moral improvement of the individual offender must be always maintained as
one of the ends in view, so far as it is compatible with the protection of society. The application of these principles in detail
is indeed not easy, and will long continue to promote debate
among philanthropists and reformers. But it is no small gain
to the cause of morality to have forever altered the aspect of
criminal punishments from being violent, vengeful, and retaliatory conflicts with the defenceless wretch for whose crimes society is at least as much responsible as himself, to a deliberative and
cautious essay as to how far the minimum of pain to one may be
combined with the maximum of profit to all the parties involved.
The majesty and authority of the state is far better manifested
in using its giant strength with precision, with gentleness, and
with caution, than (as was once supposed) in surrendering itself
to the promptings of angry passion and a capricious vindictiveness better befitting children or madmen than rational human
beings called to share in the divine task of government.
The aspects towards right and wrong of the individual citizen and of the state in its domestic relations have hitherto
attracted less attention than the more obvious moral constitution and responsibilities of the state when brought into contact
with other political or imperfectly civilized communities. In
the last case the unity and integrity of the state are pre-eminently
conspicuous, and the complexity of its action, as well as the
counter-movements of opposed parties, from the ultimate reconciliation of which every determinate course of proceeding springs,
is cloaked under the form of decisive administration and simple
diplomatic utterances. Indeed, in very ancient times the good
or bad faith of states towards each other in respect of the strict
observance of treaties, of engagements towards commanders in
Is
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