Philosophy and Specific Problems [pp. 208-232]

THE PRINCE TONV RE VIEW.
construct some sort of scientific justification for the particular
beliefs in question, and especially for that one which strikes our
empiricist as the more important of the two, viz. the belief in
the existence of an external world! And so the problem respecting the existence of the external world could become, in
the language of Mr. Bain, the "great problem of metaphysics
[sic!] in the eighteenth century," as it still is for Mr. Bain and
other metaphysicians, the Mills, Spencers, and their like, of the
nineteenth century. But since all ground of evidence upon
which to solve the "problem" is cut away by the dogmatic
theory of knowledge or experience adopted at the outset, it follows that all discussion of it, all ostensible weighing of evidence,
concerning it, can really only consist in a dialectical beating of
the air, dancing or trying to dance in an intellectual vacuum,
pompously uttering words and phrases which have a solemn
sound but convey no meaning. As for the "intuitionists," the
number of their original and invincible or "intuitive" beliefs is,
more numerous, including the belief in God, in absolute moral
and esthetic distinctions, etc., etc. But even for them toowhose mode of viewing consciousness as a source of knowledge is'
identical in kind with that of the "'empiricists," their ostensible
adversaries-the "cardinal question" (in Hamilton's words) of
theoretic interest for philosophy is the question relating to our
"perception of the external world." If this be "metaphysics,"
the self-confessed inability of the vast majority of sensible and
intelligent people to "understand" it, and their indisposition to
hear or know aught of it, require neither apology nor further
explanation. It is the work of philosophy to offer to men the
intellectual bread of life and not, like the "metaphysics" of sensational or empirical psychology, a stone. The external worlds
the question concerning whose existence furnishes so much employment to sensational "metaphysics," is given in man's experience. It is not indeed, as our "metaphysicians" find, given
in his sensible experience, considered purely and simply as such,.
but it is given in his whole experience, which is not merely and
exclusively sensible. It is no work of philosophy, it is not one
of philosophy's "specific problems," to justify our belief in the
external world, or to prove the "real existence" of the latter,
but to comprehend it as it is given. The like is to be said with
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