Some Difficulties of Modern Materialism [pp. 344-372]

SOME DIFFICULTIES OF MODERN MATERIALISM. 365'
there could be any distinction between reason and unreason in
this system we should be forced to allow that along with a little
right thinking matter has done a vast deal of wrong thinking.
It has an inherent tendency to irrationality and falsehood. It
is the sole source of theologies, superstitions, and anthropomorphisms, as well as the sun-clear truths of advanced science. If
we were persons with faculties which could be carelessly used
or wilfully misused, these things might be laid to the charge of
individual carelessness, or stupidity, or dishonesty; but as we
are not such persons, all these things must be charged to matter
itself. This conclusion remains if we call matter the unknowable,
the mysterious one, or anything else which may strike our fancy
In every system of necessity we have to posit in being, along
with reason, a strong tendency to unreason which throws discredit on all knowledge. According to the materialist himself,
for one sound opinion matter has produced a myriad unsound
and grotesque ones. But even yet we have no ground for distinguishing the rational from the irrational. In the old philosophy the distinction between rational and irrational belief is, that
the former rests on grounds which justify it, while the latter is
groundless. But the new philosophy cancels this distinction
entirely, and reduces all beliefs to effects in us. It recognizes
production only, and allows of no deduction. All our beliefs.
are explained by their causes, and none have any rational advantage over any other. The only distinction is of relative extent;
and the only standard possible, unless we yield to pure ipsedixitism, is to take a vote, and view rational beliefs as those which
are most wide spread and enduring.
Our nerves being in motion along this line, they next point
out that the possibility of error can be reconciled with the
validity of knowledge only in the fact of freedom. Error must
be the outcome of carelessness and volition, if knowledge is to(
be saved. If it be a necessary consequence of being, knowledge
is overturned. The question of freedom is commonly supposed
to have only a moral bearing; and its significance for the theoretical reason is entirely overlooked. The utmost that is generally claimed is that if it be denied, moral distinctions vanish;
we insist, in addition, that rationality also vanishes. Discussing
the question entirely in the realm of duty has the disadvantage