Some Difficulties of Modern Materialism [pp. 344-372]

SOME DFFICUL TIES OF MODERN MA TERI4AISM. 355
reproduce the thing-series, and it is of interest to know how this
can be. The general notion that the latter determines the for mer in no way implies that the latter must determine the former
so as to correspond to itself. If an organism be able to gen,erate thoughts, it by no means follows that the thoughts must
represent external objects. One would expect that the thoughts
would represent, if anything, the organic processes of which
they are the inner face; whereas they never refer to these, and
commonly refer to things entirely apart from the organism.
Nervous combinations and movements are said to have ideas
for their mental face, and the natural thought would be that
those ideas would be ideas of their peculiar nervous correlates
But this is never the case; indeed the current doctrines about
those correlates are even now matters of not very cogent
inference. This complete silence of the organism as to what
is going on in itself, and the report instead of what is taking place in the outer world, are very remarkable facts. Certainly when matter is declared to be a double-faced entity, we
expect to find the mental face reflecting that part of the physical face which is over against it; but the mental face never reflects the series which produces it, but other and unconnected
series. Thus rays of light fall upon the body and a thought results, but not a thought of nerve-processes nor of vibrating
ethers, but of an external luminous object. It is strange indeed, that anything should result, but that the thought should
be of an object at many removes of mediated action, is surprising in a far higher degree. The wonder is still greater in our
perception of others' thoughts. Here some waves of air fall
upon the ear, and at once the nerves produce thoughts with the
added assurance that they are the reproduction of a thoughtseries existing apart from our own. There is the additional
wonder in the latter case that some nerves produce thoughts
only in response to certain vibrations, and other nerves need
different vibrations. The difference between a Frenchman and
an Englishman is fundamentally a difference of nerves. We
can now understand the problem. If knowledge is to be possible, the mental series must truly reproduce the physical series
and all other mental series; but what ground is there for affirming that they must correspond? This particular problem has