Some Difficulties of Modern Materialism [pp. 344-372]

THE PRINCE TON RE VIEW.
ings of every form of materialism on the problem of knowledge.
And first we point out that we reach the thing-series only
through the thought-series. We know that there are things,
and what they are, only through thought. Hence while the
thing-series may be first and fundamental in the order of
fact, in the order of knowledge the thought-series is first. A
first question, then, would be, What warrant is there for affirming a thing-series at all? If the thought-series be so emaciated
and helpless as the materialist teaches, why trust its reports
about things in any case? Why may not the. thing-series be
after all only a phase of the thought-series? From Hume to
Spencer, materialistic philosophers have defined the thing-series
as a series of vivid states of consciousness; while the ego is a
series of faint states of consciousness. But vivid or faint,
this definition makes both subject and object states of consciousness, and hence both belong to the thought-series. Here
is the place where materialism always tumbles into idealism,
whenever it attempts to reason out a theory of perception. It
is well known that Spencer at this point, when his theory was
about to collapse into nihilism, saved himself by reinstating the
ego as a true agent. The ego, from being a series of faint impressions or the inner side of nerve-movements, suddenly becomes a true source of energy; and the warrant for affirming a
thing-series apart from the thought-series is found in the fact
that our own energy is resisted by an energy not our own.
This is excellent doctrine; but it does not agree with the other
doctrine that the ego is only a sum of mental states, and that
mental states affect no physical states; for it makes our own
consciousness of effort and energy the turning point in the debate between idealism and realism. Upon the whole, we advise
the materialist not to debate this point, but quietly and colossally to ignore it. It will be hard to get out of the debate
either without falling into idealism or without admitting the
real agency of the ego. Logic is a good thing, but in such a
state of affairs it would be easy to get too much of it.
We pass this point and raise another. All arguments for
the efficiency of matter assume that we have a valid knowledge
of matter. That X is adequate or inadequate is a proposition
which admits of no discussion. The thought-series, then, must
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