Anthropomorphism [pp. 120-144]

A,4VTHROPOMORPtPISM.
Manifested under the forms of finite thought. And the theistic
argument claims and proves that the only forms of thought
under which we can think such manifestations as are actually
given us are the forms which interpret those manifestations as
the indicia of thought- and will-power. We are compelled, then,
by the structure of our being, while the manifestations of God
are what they are, to think him as Mind.
More than Mind he may be. Other races of beings with
clairvoyant insight may have revelations of far higher qualities
than thought in the wondrous Being of an infinite deity. To
himself, in the divine self-knowledge, who dares to say what
he may be? We grant to agnosticism all its enigmas of ultimate essence. But to our finite thought God is Mind-forever
Mind-because our only knowledge of him is, now and forever,
through manifestations which to us are manifestations of Mind,
and of Mind only.
If we grant to the principles of relativity the full weight
which is claimed for it by agnosticism, there is nothing left for
us but a philosophical nihilism which holds that, because thought
is thought and human thought is human thought, we are forever shut up to the passing states of our own consciousness,
and because of the relativity of the idea of existence we dare
not assert the absolute existence even of those states of consciousness. One cannot help admiring the logical consistency
of such suicidal nihilism, but it is not true to the facts of consciousness or to the dictates of common-sense.
But if we adopt a more reasonable interpretation of the principle-of relativity, we must choose between two positions. We
may admit that thought is thought, and make no attempt by
thought to get outside of thought. We must admit, then, the
practical reality to us of the subjective human concepts of existence, manifestation, Something, God. Still, we may deny that
the manifestations of the Something are of such a nature that
we are compelled to interpret them under the subjective form
of thought-manifestations. If so, we may deny that we must
form the concept of God as that of a Something which thinks.
This position may be perfectly consistent logically. But it
surrenders the appeal to relativity, and falls back upon the
simple denial of the evidence of intelligence in the manifesta
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