Anthropomorphism [pp. 120-144]

THE PRINVCE TON RE VIEW.
substitute "person"? A person exists. That is easily conceiv able. He continues to exist in consecutive moments of time.
That, too, is equally conceivable. Is the problem at all compli cated as to conceivability when we assert that the series of con secutive moments of time has no end?
We claim that the eternal existence of a person is just as
conceivable as the temporal existence of a person. Yet to say
that a person exists eternally is the same thing as saying that
the person is infinite in respect to time. One definite, intelligible meaning, then, in the phrase "infinite person" may be that
the person is infinite in time relations-relations which in their
nature admit of measurement.
Again, Mr. Spencer talks very intelligently about an infinite
universe. And tho, in order to maintain his principle of the
Instability of the Homogeneous, he is compelled to postulate a
finite universe, still he discusses very clearly the possibility of an
infinite universe through which his unknown force might act;
and an infinite universe means infinite space.
The word-jugglery Of our pseudo-metaphysics to the contrary notwithstanding, we have as clear a concept of infinite
space as we have of finite space, and our concepts of both are
distinct and of intelligible content. We are guilty of no absurdity when we speak of our own will-power as acting in finite
space. There is no additional confusion of concepts when we
magnify that will-power and assert that it acts, really or potentially, in infinite space. We claim that the illimitation in space
of the real or possible acts of a personal will-power is just as
conceivable as the limitation in space of such acts. Yet that is
the same thing as saying that it is conceivable that a person
should be infinite in respect to space. Another definite, intelligible meaning, then, in the phrase "infinite person" may be that
the person as active power is infinite in space relations-relations
which in their nature admit of measurement.
Again, if there be any distinction between imagination and
conception, we can conceive of infinite number. We can conceive of an infinite number of things. We can conceive of an
infinite number of acts. We have no difficulty in conceiving of
our own will-power as performing a limited number of acts. Is
there any confusion of concepts in the thought of a will-power
I36